use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER, InputMaterial, ClaimRequest};
-use chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys;
+use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
use util::logger::Logger;
-use util::ser::{Readable, Writer, Writeable};
+use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writer, Writeable, VecWriter};
use util::byte_utils;
use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
self.prev_holder_commitment.write(writer)?;
self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs.write(writer)?;
- self.key_storage.write(writer)?;
self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
+ let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
+ self.key_storage.write(&mut key_data)?;
+ assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::usize::MAX);
+ assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::u32::MAX as usize);
+ (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
+
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64))?;
for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, claim_tx_data) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
ancestor_claim_txid.write(writer)?;
}
}
-impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> Readable for OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner> {
- fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+impl<'a, K: KeysInterface> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for OnchainTxHandler<K::ChanKeySigner> {
+ fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
let holder_commitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
let prev_holder_commitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
let prev_holder_htlc_sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let key_storage = Readable::read(reader)?;
let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
+ while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
+ // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
+ let mut data = [0; 1024];
+ let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
+ reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
+ keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
+ }
+ let key_storage = keys_manager.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
+
let pending_claim_requests_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut pending_claim_requests = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
for _ in 0..pending_claim_requests_len {
/// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize coutnerparty onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock expiration
/// (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may stuck in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or Child-Pay-For-Parent.
+ /// Panics if there are signing errors, because signing operations in reaction to on-chain events
+ /// are not expected to fail, and if they do, we may lose funds.
fn generate_claim_tx<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, cached_claim_datas: &ClaimTxBumpMaterial, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Option<(Option<u32>, u32, Transaction)>
where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
pub(crate) fn provide_latest_holder_tx(&mut self, tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction) {
self.prev_holder_commitment = self.holder_commitment.take();
+ self.holder_htlc_sigs = None;
self.holder_commitment = Some(tx);
}
+ // Normally holder HTLCs are signed at the same time as the holder commitment tx. However,
+ // in some configurations, the holder commitment tx has been signed and broadcast by a
+ // ChannelMonitor replica, so we handle that case here.
fn sign_latest_holder_htlcs(&mut self) {
- if let Some(ref holder_commitment) = self.holder_commitment {
- if let Ok(sigs) = self.key_storage.sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions(holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx) {
+ if self.holder_htlc_sigs.is_none() {
+ if let Some(ref holder_commitment) = self.holder_commitment {
+ let (_sig, sigs) = self.key_storage.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx).expect("sign holder commitment");
self.holder_htlc_sigs = Some(Self::extract_holder_sigs(holder_commitment, sigs));
}
}
}
+ // Normally only the latest commitment tx and HTLCs need to be signed. However, in some
+ // configurations we may have updated our holder commtiment but a replica of the ChannelMonitor
+ // broadcast the previous one before we sync with it. We handle that case here.
fn sign_prev_holder_htlcs(&mut self) {
- if let Some(ref holder_commitment) = self.prev_holder_commitment {
- if let Ok(sigs) = self.key_storage.sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions(holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx) {
+ if self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs.is_none() {
+ if let Some(ref holder_commitment) = self.prev_holder_commitment {
+ let (_sig, sigs) = self.key_storage.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx).expect("sign previous holder commitment");
self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs = Some(Self::extract_holder_sigs(holder_commitment, sigs));
}
}
// to monitor before.
pub(crate) fn get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&mut self, funding_redeemscript: &Script) -> Option<Transaction> {
if let Some(ref mut holder_commitment) = self.holder_commitment {
- match self.key_storage.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx) {
- Ok(sig) => {
+ match self.key_storage.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx) {
+ Ok((sig, htlc_sigs)) => {
+ self.holder_htlc_sigs = Some(Self::extract_holder_sigs(holder_commitment, htlc_sigs));
Some(holder_commitment.add_holder_sig(funding_redeemscript, sig))
},
Err(_) => return None,
#[cfg(any(test, feature="unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
pub(crate) fn get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&mut self, funding_redeemscript: &Script) -> Option<Transaction> {
if let Some(ref mut holder_commitment) = self.holder_commitment {
- match self.key_storage.sign_holder_commitment(holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx) {
- Ok(sig) => {
+ match self.key_storage.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx) {
+ Ok((sig, htlc_sigs)) => {
+ self.holder_htlc_sigs = Some(Self::extract_holder_sigs(holder_commitment, htlc_sigs));
Some(holder_commitment.add_holder_sig(funding_redeemscript, sig))
},
Err(_) => return None,
}
}
}
- if self.prev_holder_commitment.is_some() {
+ if htlc_tx.is_none() && self.prev_holder_commitment.is_some() {
let commitment_txid = self.prev_holder_commitment.as_ref().unwrap().trust().txid();
if commitment_txid == outp.txid {
self.sign_prev_holder_htlcs();
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff