-use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentHash, HTLCSource};
+// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
+// history.
+//
+// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
+// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
+// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
+// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
+// licenses.
+
+use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
+use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
use ln::msgs;
-use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
-use util::byte_utils;
+use routing::network_graph::NetworkUpdate;
+use routing::router::RouteHop;
use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
use util::errors::{self, APIError};
use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, LengthCalculatingWriter};
-use util::logger::{Logger, LogHolder};
+use util::logger::Logger;
-use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
-use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
-use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
+use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
+use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
+use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
-use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
-use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
-use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
-use secp256k1;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1;
-use std::io::Cursor;
-use std::sync::Arc;
+use prelude::*;
+use io::Cursor;
+use core::convert::TryInto;
+use core::ops::Deref;
pub(super) struct OnionKeys {
#[cfg(test)]
// can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
#[inline]
-pub(super) fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
+pub(super) fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop, usize)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
- for hop in route.hops.iter() {
+ for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
blinded_priv.mul_assign(&blinding_factor)?;
blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
- callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
+ callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop, idx);
}
Ok(())
}
// can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
-pub(super) fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
+pub(super) fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(path.len());
- construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
+ construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, path, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _, _| {
let (rho, mu) = gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
res.push(OnionKeys {
}
/// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
-pub(super) fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
+pub(super) fn build_onion_payloads(path: &Vec<RouteHop>, total_msat: u64, payment_secret_option: &Option<PaymentSecret>, starting_htlc_offset: u32, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
- let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
+ let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(path.len());
- for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().rev().enumerate() {
+ for (idx, hop) in path.iter().rev().enumerate() {
// First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
// exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
// the intended recipient).
res.insert(0, msgs::OnionHopData {
format: if hop.node_features.supports_variable_length_onion() {
if idx == 0 {
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode
+ msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
+ payment_data: if let &Some(ref payment_secret) = payment_secret_option {
+ Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
+ payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
+ total_msat,
+ })
+ } else { None },
+ keysend_preimage: *keysend_preimage,
+ }
} else {
msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
});
cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
- return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
+ return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?"});
}
cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
- return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
+ return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?"});
}
last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
}
};
let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
hmac: [0; 32],
- failuremsg: failuremsg,
- pad: pad,
+ failuremsg,
+ pad,
};
let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&um);
/// Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent (implying htlc_source is an
/// OutboundRoute).
-/// Returns update, a boolean indicating that the payment itself failed, and the error code.
-pub(super) fn process_onion_failure<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, logger: &Arc<Logger>, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool, Option<u16>) {
- if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
+/// Returns update, a boolean indicating that the payment itself failed, the short channel id of
+/// the responsible channel, and the error code.
+#[inline]
+pub(super) fn process_onion_failure<T: secp256k1::Signing, L: Deref>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, logger: &L, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<NetworkUpdate>, Option<u64>, bool, Option<u16>, Option<Vec<u8>>) where L::Target: Logger {
+ if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = htlc_source {
let mut res = None;
let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
let mut error_code_ret = None;
- let mut next_route_hop_ix = 0;
+ let mut error_packet_ret = None;
let mut is_from_final_node = false;
// Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
- construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
- next_route_hop_ix += 1;
+ construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, path, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop, route_hop_idx| {
if res.is_some() { return; }
let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
- is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
+ // The failing hop includes either the inbound channel to the recipient or the outbound
+ // channel from the current hop (i.e., the next hop's inbound channel).
+ is_from_final_node = route_hop_idx + 1 == path.len();
+ let failing_route_hop = if is_from_final_node { route_hop } else { &path[route_hop_idx + 1] };
if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
let um = gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
- let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&error_code_slice);
+ let error_code = u16::from_be_bytes(error_code_slice.try_into().expect("len is 2"));
error_code_ret = Some(error_code);
+ error_packet_ret = Some(err_packet.failuremsg[2..].to_vec());
let (debug_field, debug_field_size) = errors::get_onion_debug_field(error_code);
// indicate that payment parameter has failed and no need to
// update Route object
- let payment_failed = (match error_code & 0xff {
+ let payment_failed = match error_code & 0xff {
15|16|17|18|19 => true,
_ => false,
- } && is_from_final_node) // PERM bit observed below even this error is from the intermediate nodes
- || error_code == 21; // Special case error 21 as the Route object is bogus, TODO: Maybe fail the node if the CLTV was reasonable?
+ } && is_from_final_node; // PERM bit observed below even if this error is from the intermediate nodes
- let mut fail_channel_update = None;
+ let mut network_update = None;
+ let mut short_channel_id = None;
if error_code & NODE == NODE {
- fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: route_hop.pubkey, is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM });
+ let is_permanent = error_code & PERM == PERM;
+ network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: route_hop.pubkey, is_permanent });
+ short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id);
}
else if error_code & PERM == PERM {
- fail_channel_update = if payment_failed {None} else {Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
- short_channel_id: route.hops[next_route_hop_ix - if next_route_hop_ix == route.hops.len() { 1 } else { 0 }].short_channel_id,
- is_permanent: true,
- })};
+ if !payment_failed {
+ network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed {
+ short_channel_id: failing_route_hop.short_channel_id,
+ is_permanent: true,
+ });
+ short_channel_id = Some(failing_route_hop.short_channel_id);
+ }
}
else if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE {
if let Some(update_len_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size+2..debug_field_size+4) {
- let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&update_len_slice) as usize;
+ let update_len = u16::from_be_bytes(update_len_slice.try_into().expect("len is 2")) as usize;
if let Some(update_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size + 4..debug_field_size + 4 + update_len) {
if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&update_slice)) {
// if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code & 0xff {
7 => false,
11 => amt_to_forward > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat,
- 12 => {
- let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
- new_fee.is_some() && route_hop.fee_msat >= new_fee.unwrap()
- }
+ 12 => amt_to_forward
+ .checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
+ .map(|prop_fee| prop_fee / 1_000_000)
+ .and_then(|prop_fee| prop_fee.checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64))
+ .map(|fee_msats| route_hop.fee_msat >= fee_msats)
+ .unwrap_or(false),
13 => route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta,
14 => false, // expiry_too_soon; always valid?
20 => chan_update.contents.flags & 2 == 0,
_ => false, // unknown error code; take channel_update as valid
};
- fail_channel_update = if is_chan_update_invalid {
+ if is_chan_update_invalid {
// This probably indicates the node which forwarded
// to the node in question corrupted something.
- Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
+ network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed {
short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
is_permanent: true,
- })
+ });
} else {
- Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
+ // Make sure the ChannelUpdate contains the expected
+ // short channel id.
+ if failing_route_hop.short_channel_id == chan_update.contents.short_channel_id {
+ short_channel_id = Some(failing_route_hop.short_channel_id);
+ }
+ network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
msg: chan_update,
})
};
}
}
}
- if fail_channel_update.is_none() {
+ if network_update.is_none() {
// They provided an UPDATE which was obviously bogus, not worth
// trying to relay through them anymore.
- fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
+ network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
is_permanent: true,
});
}
- } else if !payment_failed {
+ if short_channel_id.is_none() {
+ short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id);
+ }
+ } else if payment_failed {
+ // Only blame the hop when a value in the HTLC doesn't match the
+ // corresponding value in the onion.
+ short_channel_id = match error_code & 0xff {
+ 18|19 => Some(route_hop.short_channel_id),
+ _ => None,
+ };
+ } else {
// We can't understand their error messages and they failed to
// forward...they probably can't understand our forwards so its
// really not worth trying any further.
- fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
+ network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
is_permanent: true,
});
+ short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id);
}
// TODO: Here (and a few other places) we assume that BADONION errors
// are always "sourced" from the node previous to the one which failed
// to decode the onion.
- res = Some((fail_channel_update, !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
+ res = Some((network_update, short_channel_id, !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
let (description, title) = errors::get_onion_error_description(error_code);
if debug_field_size > 0 && err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + debug_field_size {
- let log_holder = LogHolder { logger };
- log_warn!(log_holder, "Onion Error[{}({:#x}) {}({})] {}", title, error_code, debug_field, log_bytes!(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4+debug_field_size]), description);
+ log_warn!(logger, "Onion Error[from {}: {}({:#x}) {}({})] {}", route_hop.pubkey, title, error_code, debug_field, log_bytes!(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4+debug_field_size]), description);
}
else {
- let log_holder = LogHolder { logger };
- log_warn!(log_holder, "Onion Error[{}({:#x})] {}", title, error_code, description);
+ log_warn!(logger, "Onion Error[from {}: {}({:#x})] {}", route_hop.pubkey, title, error_code, description);
}
} else {
// Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
// definitely came from the peer in question
- res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
+ let network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
is_permanent: true,
- }), !is_from_final_node));
+ });
+ let short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id);
+ res = Some((network_update, short_channel_id, !is_from_final_node));
}
}
}
}).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
- if let Some((channel_update, payment_retryable)) = res {
- (channel_update, payment_retryable, error_code_ret)
+ if let Some((channel_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable)) = res {
+ (channel_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, error_code_ret, error_packet_ret)
} else {
// only not set either packet unparseable or hmac does not match with any
// payment not retryable only when garbage is from the final node
- (None, !is_from_final_node, None)
+ (None, None, !is_from_final_node, None, None)
}
} else { unreachable!(); }
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
- use ln::channelmanager::PaymentHash;
+ use io;
+ use prelude::*;
+ use ln::PaymentHash;
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
- use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop};
+ use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
use ln::msgs;
use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer};
use hex;
- use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
- use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
use super::OnionKeys;
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let route = Route {
- hops: vec!(
+ paths: vec![vec![
RouteHop {
pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(), node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(), node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
},
- ),
+ ]],
};
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let onion_keys = super::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
+ let onion_keys = super::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.paths[0].len());
onion_keys
}
}
}
impl Writeable for RawOnionHopData {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
writer.write_all(&self.data[..])
}
}