use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkUpdate;
-use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
+use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, Path, RouteHop};
+use crate::sign::NodeSigner;
use crate::util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
use crate::util::errors::{self, APIError};
use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, LengthCalculatingWriter};
Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
}
-pub(crate) fn next_hop_packet_pubkey<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, packet_pubkey: PublicKey, packet_shared_secret: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
+/// Calculates a pubkey for the next hop, such as the next hop's packet pubkey or blinding point.
+pub(crate) fn next_hop_pubkey<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(
+ secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, curr_pubkey: PublicKey, shared_secret: &[u8]
+) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
let blinding_factor = {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
- sha.input(&packet_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
- sha.input(packet_shared_secret);
+ sha.input(&curr_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
+ sha.input(shared_secret);
Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
};
- packet_pubkey.mul_tweak(secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(blinding_factor).unwrap())
+ curr_pubkey.mul_tweak(secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(blinding_factor).unwrap())
}
// can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
#[inline]
-pub(super) fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop, usize)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
+pub(super) fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T, FType>(
+ secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, path: &Path, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType
+) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error>
+where
+ T: secp256k1::Signing,
+ FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, Option<&RouteHop>, usize)
+{
let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
- for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
- let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
+ let unblinded_hops_iter = path.hops.iter().map(|h| (&h.pubkey, Some(h)));
+ let blinded_pks_iter = path.blinded_tail.as_ref()
+ .map(|t| t.hops.iter()).unwrap_or([].iter())
+ .skip(1) // Skip the intro node because it's included in the unblinded hops
+ .map(|h| (&h.blinded_node_id, None));
+ for (idx, (pubkey, route_hop_opt)) in unblinded_hops_iter.chain(blinded_pks_iter).enumerate() {
+ let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(pubkey, &blinded_priv);
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
blinded_priv = blinded_priv.mul_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(blinding_factor).unwrap())?;
blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
- callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop, idx);
+ callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, route_hop_opt, idx);
}
Ok(())
pub(super) fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, path: &Path, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(path.hops.len());
- construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, &path.hops, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _, _| {
+ construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, &path, session_priv,
+ |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _, _|
+ {
let (rho, mu) = gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret.as_ref());
res.push(OnionKeys {
}
/// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
-pub(super) fn build_onion_payloads(path: &Path, total_msat: u64, mut recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, starting_htlc_offset: u32, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
+pub(super) fn build_onion_payloads(path: &Path, total_msat: u64, mut recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, starting_htlc_offset: u32, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OutboundOnionPayload>, u64, u32), APIError> {
let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
- let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(path.hops.len());
+ let mut res: Vec<msgs::OutboundOnionPayload> = Vec::with_capacity(
+ path.hops.len() + path.blinded_tail.as_ref().map_or(0, |t| t.hops.len())
+ );
for (idx, hop) in path.hops.iter().rev().enumerate() {
// First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
// the intended recipient).
let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
- res.insert(0, msgs::OnionHopData {
- format: if idx == 0 {
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
+ if idx == 0 {
+ if let Some(BlindedTail {
+ blinding_point, hops, final_value_msat, excess_final_cltv_expiry_delta, ..
+ }) = &path.blinded_tail {
+ let mut blinding_point = Some(*blinding_point);
+ for (i, blinded_hop) in hops.iter().enumerate() {
+ if i == hops.len() - 1 {
+ cur_value_msat += final_value_msat;
+ cur_cltv += excess_final_cltv_expiry_delta;
+ res.push(msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
+ amt_msat: *final_value_msat,
+ total_msat,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
+ encrypted_tlvs: blinded_hop.encrypted_payload.clone(),
+ intro_node_blinding_point: blinding_point.take(),
+ });
+ } else {
+ res.push(msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
+ encrypted_tlvs: blinded_hop.encrypted_payload.clone(),
+ intro_node_blinding_point: blinding_point.take(),
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ res.push(msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive {
payment_data: if let Some(secret) = recipient_onion.payment_secret.take() {
Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
payment_secret: secret,
} else { None },
payment_metadata: recipient_onion.payment_metadata.take(),
keysend_preimage: *keysend_preimage,
- }
- } else {
- msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
- short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
- }
- },
- amt_to_forward: value_msat,
- outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
- });
+ custom_tlvs: recipient_onion.custom_tlvs.clone(),
+ amt_msat: value_msat,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
+ });
+ }
+ } else {
+ res.insert(0, msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Forward {
+ short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
+ amt_to_forward: value_msat,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
+ });
+ }
cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Channel fees overflowed?".to_owned()});
}
}
-pub(super) fn construct_onion_packet(payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, prng_seed: [u8; 32], associated_data: &PaymentHash) -> Result<msgs::OnionPacket, ()> {
+pub(super) fn construct_onion_packet(
+ payloads: Vec<msgs::OutboundOnionPayload>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, prng_seed: [u8; 32],
+ associated_data: &PaymentHash
+) -> Result<msgs::OnionPacket, ()> {
let mut packet_data = [0; ONION_DATA_LEN];
let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&prng_seed, &[0; 8]);
encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
}
+pub(crate) struct DecodedOnionFailure {
+ pub(crate) network_update: Option<NetworkUpdate>,
+ pub(crate) short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
+ pub(crate) payment_failed_permanently: bool,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(crate) onion_error_code: Option<u16>,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(crate) onion_error_data: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+}
+
/// Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent (implying htlc_source is an
/// OutboundRoute).
-/// Returns update, a boolean indicating that the payment itself failed, the short channel id of
-/// the responsible channel, and the error code.
#[inline]
-pub(super) fn process_onion_failure<T: secp256k1::Signing, L: Deref>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, logger: &L, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<NetworkUpdate>, Option<u64>, bool, Option<u16>, Option<Vec<u8>>) where L::Target: Logger {
- if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = htlc_source {
- let mut res = None;
- let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
- let mut error_code_ret = None;
- let mut error_packet_ret = None;
- let mut is_from_final_node = false;
-
- // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
- construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, &path.hops, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop, route_hop_idx| {
- if res.is_some() { return; }
-
- let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
- htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
-
- let ammag = gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret.as_ref());
-
- let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
- decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
- let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
- chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
- packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
-
- // The failing hop includes either the inbound channel to the recipient or the outbound
- // channel from the current hop (i.e., the next hop's inbound channel).
- is_from_final_node = route_hop_idx + 1 == path.hops.len();
- let failing_route_hop = if is_from_final_node { route_hop } else { &path.hops[route_hop_idx + 1] };
-
- if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
- let um = gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret.as_ref());
- let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&um);
- hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
-
- if fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &err_packet.hmac) {
- if let Some(error_code_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(0..2) {
- const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
- const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
- const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
- const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
-
- let error_code = u16::from_be_bytes(error_code_slice.try_into().expect("len is 2"));
- error_code_ret = Some(error_code);
- error_packet_ret = Some(err_packet.failuremsg[2..].to_vec());
-
- let (debug_field, debug_field_size) = errors::get_onion_debug_field(error_code);
-
- // indicate that payment parameter has failed and no need to
- // update Route object
- let payment_failed = match error_code & 0xff {
- 15|16|17|18|19|23 => true,
- _ => false,
- } && is_from_final_node; // PERM bit observed below even if this error is from the intermediate nodes
-
- let mut network_update = None;
- let mut short_channel_id = None;
-
- if error_code & BADONION == BADONION {
- // If the error code has the BADONION bit set, always blame the channel
- // from the node "originating" the error to its next hop. The
- // "originator" is ultimately actually claiming that its counterparty
- // is the one who is failing the HTLC.
- // If the "originator" here isn't lying we should really mark the
- // next-hop node as failed entirely, but we can't be confident in that,
- // as it would allow any node to get us to completely ban one of its
- // counterparties. Instead, we simply remove the channel in question.
+pub(super) fn process_onion_failure<T: secp256k1::Signing, L: Deref>(
+ secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, logger: &L, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>
+) -> DecodedOnionFailure where L::Target: Logger {
+ let (path, session_priv, first_hop_htlc_msat) = if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
+ ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ..
+ } = htlc_source {
+ (path, session_priv, first_hop_htlc_msat)
+ } else { unreachable!() };
+
+ // Learnings from the HTLC failure to inform future payment retries and scoring.
+ struct FailureLearnings {
+ network_update: Option<NetworkUpdate>,
+ short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
+ payment_failed_permanently: bool,
+ }
+ let mut res: Option<FailureLearnings> = None;
+ let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
+ let mut error_code_ret = None;
+ let mut error_packet_ret = None;
+ let mut is_from_final_node = false;
+
+ const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
+ const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
+ const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
+ const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
+
+ // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
+ construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, &path, session_priv,
+ |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop_opt, route_hop_idx|
+ {
+ if res.is_some() { return; }
+
+ let route_hop = match route_hop_opt {
+ Some(hop) => hop,
+ None => {
+ // Got an error from within a blinded route.
+ error_code_ret = Some(BADONION | PERM | 24); // invalid_onion_blinding
+ error_packet_ret = Some(vec![0; 32]);
+ res = Some(FailureLearnings {
+ network_update: None, short_channel_id: None, payment_failed_permanently: false
+ });
+ return
+ },
+ };
+
+ // The failing hop includes either the inbound channel to the recipient or the outbound channel
+ // from the current hop (i.e., the next hop's inbound channel).
+ let num_blinded_hops = path.blinded_tail.as_ref().map_or(0, |bt| bt.hops.len());
+ // For 1-hop blinded paths, the final `path.hops` entry is the recipient.
+ is_from_final_node = route_hop_idx + 1 == path.hops.len() && num_blinded_hops <= 1;
+ let failing_route_hop = if is_from_final_node { route_hop } else {
+ match path.hops.get(route_hop_idx + 1) {
+ Some(hop) => hop,
+ None => {
+ // The failing hop is within a multi-hop blinded path.
+ error_code_ret = Some(BADONION | PERM | 24); // invalid_onion_blinding
+ error_packet_ret = Some(vec![0; 32]);
+ res = Some(FailureLearnings {
+ network_update: None, short_channel_id: None, payment_failed_permanently: false
+ });
+ return
+ }
+ }
+ };
+
+ let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
+ htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
+
+ let ammag = gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret.as_ref());
+
+ let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
+ decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
+ let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
+ chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
+ packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
+
+ let err_packet = match msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
+ Ok(p) => p,
+ Err(_) => return
+ };
+ let um = gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret.as_ref());
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&um);
+ hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
+
+ if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &err_packet.hmac) { return }
+ let error_code_slice = match err_packet.failuremsg.get(0..2) {
+ Some(s) => s,
+ None => {
+ // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it definitely came from the peer
+ // in question
+ let network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
+ node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
+ is_permanent: true,
+ });
+ let short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id);
+ res = Some(FailureLearnings {
+ network_update, short_channel_id, payment_failed_permanently: is_from_final_node
+ });
+ return
+ }
+ };
+
+ let error_code = u16::from_be_bytes(error_code_slice.try_into().expect("len is 2"));
+ error_code_ret = Some(error_code);
+ error_packet_ret = Some(err_packet.failuremsg[2..].to_vec());
+
+ let (debug_field, debug_field_size) = errors::get_onion_debug_field(error_code);
+
+ // indicate that payment parameter has failed and no need to update Route object
+ let payment_failed = match error_code & 0xff {
+ 15|16|17|18|19|23 => true,
+ _ => false,
+ } && is_from_final_node; // PERM bit observed below even if this error is from the intermediate nodes
+
+ let mut network_update = None;
+ let mut short_channel_id = None;
+
+ if error_code & BADONION == BADONION {
+ // If the error code has the BADONION bit set, always blame the channel from the node
+ // "originating" the error to its next hop. The "originator" is ultimately actually claiming
+ // that its counterparty is the one who is failing the HTLC.
+ // If the "originator" here isn't lying we should really mark the next-hop node as failed
+ // entirely, but we can't be confident in that, as it would allow any node to get us to
+ // completely ban one of its counterparties. Instead, we simply remove the channel in
+ // question.
+ network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
+ short_channel_id: failing_route_hop.short_channel_id,
+ is_permanent: true,
+ });
+ } else if error_code & NODE == NODE {
+ let is_permanent = error_code & PERM == PERM;
+ network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: route_hop.pubkey, is_permanent });
+ short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id);
+ } else if error_code & PERM == PERM {
+ if !payment_failed {
+ network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
+ short_channel_id: failing_route_hop.short_channel_id,
+ is_permanent: true,
+ });
+ short_channel_id = Some(failing_route_hop.short_channel_id);
+ }
+ } else if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE {
+ if let Some(update_len_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size+2..debug_field_size+4) {
+ let update_len = u16::from_be_bytes(update_len_slice.try_into().expect("len is 2")) as usize;
+ if let Some(mut update_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size + 4..debug_field_size + 4 + update_len) {
+ // Historically, the BOLTs were unclear if the message type
+ // bytes should be included here or not. The BOLTs have now
+ // been updated to indicate that they *are* included, but many
+ // nodes still send messages without the type bytes, so we
+ // support both here.
+ // TODO: Switch to hard require the type prefix, as the current
+ // permissiveness introduces the (although small) possibility
+ // that we fail to decode legitimate channel updates that
+ // happen to start with ChannelUpdate::TYPE, i.e., [0x01, 0x02].
+ if update_slice.len() > 2 && update_slice[0..2] == msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.to_be_bytes() {
+ update_slice = &update_slice[2..];
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failure provided features a channel update without type prefix. Deprecated, but allowing for now.");
+ }
+ let update_opt = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&update_slice));
+ if update_opt.is_ok() || update_slice.is_empty() {
+ // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
+ // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
+ let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code & 0xff {
+ 7 => false,
+ 11 => update_opt.is_ok() &&
+ amt_to_forward >
+ update_opt.as_ref().unwrap().contents.htlc_minimum_msat,
+ 12 => update_opt.is_ok() && amt_to_forward
+ .checked_mul(update_opt.as_ref().unwrap()
+ .contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
+ .map(|prop_fee| prop_fee / 1_000_000)
+ .and_then(|prop_fee| prop_fee.checked_add(
+ update_opt.as_ref().unwrap().contents.fee_base_msat as u64))
+ .map(|fee_msats| route_hop.fee_msat >= fee_msats)
+ .unwrap_or(false),
+ 13 => update_opt.is_ok() &&
+ route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >=
+ update_opt.as_ref().unwrap().contents.cltv_expiry_delta,
+ 14 => false, // expiry_too_soon; always valid?
+ 20 => update_opt.as_ref().unwrap().contents.flags & 2 == 0,
+ _ => false, // unknown error code; take channel_update as valid
+ };
+ if is_chan_update_invalid {
+ // This probably indicates the node which forwarded
+ // to the node in question corrupted something.
network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
- short_channel_id: failing_route_hop.short_channel_id,
+ short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
is_permanent: true,
});
- } else if error_code & NODE == NODE {
- let is_permanent = error_code & PERM == PERM;
- network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: route_hop.pubkey, is_permanent });
- short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id);
- } else if error_code & PERM == PERM {
- if !payment_failed {
+ } else {
+ if let Ok(chan_update) = update_opt {
+ // Make sure the ChannelUpdate contains the expected
+ // short channel id.
+ if failing_route_hop.short_channel_id == chan_update.contents.short_channel_id {
+ short_channel_id = Some(failing_route_hop.short_channel_id);
+ } else {
+ log_info!(logger, "Node provided a channel_update for which it was not authoritative, ignoring.");
+ }
+ network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
+ msg: chan_update,
+ })
+ } else {
+ // The node in question intentionally encoded a 0-length channel update. This is
+ // likely due to https://github.com/ElementsProject/lightning/issues/6200.
+ short_channel_id = Some(failing_route_hop.short_channel_id);
network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
short_channel_id: failing_route_hop.short_channel_id,
- is_permanent: true,
- });
- short_channel_id = Some(failing_route_hop.short_channel_id);
- }
- } else if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE {
- if let Some(update_len_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size+2..debug_field_size+4) {
- let update_len = u16::from_be_bytes(update_len_slice.try_into().expect("len is 2")) as usize;
- if let Some(mut update_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size + 4..debug_field_size + 4 + update_len) {
- // Historically, the BOLTs were unclear if the message type
- // bytes should be included here or not. The BOLTs have now
- // been updated to indicate that they *are* included, but many
- // nodes still send messages without the type bytes, so we
- // support both here.
- // TODO: Switch to hard require the type prefix, as the current
- // permissiveness introduces the (although small) possibility
- // that we fail to decode legitimate channel updates that
- // happen to start with ChannelUpdate::TYPE, i.e., [0x01, 0x02].
- if update_slice.len() > 2 && update_slice[0..2] == msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.to_be_bytes() {
- update_slice = &update_slice[2..];
- } else {
- log_trace!(logger, "Failure provided features a channel update without type prefix. Deprecated, but allowing for now.");
- }
- let update_opt = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&update_slice));
- if update_opt.is_ok() || update_slice.is_empty() {
- // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
- // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
- let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code & 0xff {
- 7 => false,
- 11 => update_opt.is_ok() &&
- amt_to_forward >
- update_opt.as_ref().unwrap().contents.htlc_minimum_msat,
- 12 => update_opt.is_ok() && amt_to_forward
- .checked_mul(update_opt.as_ref().unwrap()
- .contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
- .map(|prop_fee| prop_fee / 1_000_000)
- .and_then(|prop_fee| prop_fee.checked_add(
- update_opt.as_ref().unwrap().contents.fee_base_msat as u64))
- .map(|fee_msats| route_hop.fee_msat >= fee_msats)
- .unwrap_or(false),
- 13 => update_opt.is_ok() &&
- route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >=
- update_opt.as_ref().unwrap().contents.cltv_expiry_delta,
- 14 => false, // expiry_too_soon; always valid?
- 20 => update_opt.as_ref().unwrap().contents.flags & 2 == 0,
- _ => false, // unknown error code; take channel_update as valid
- };
- if is_chan_update_invalid {
- // This probably indicates the node which forwarded
- // to the node in question corrupted something.
- network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
- short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
- is_permanent: true,
- });
- } else {
- if let Ok(chan_update) = update_opt {
- // Make sure the ChannelUpdate contains the expected
- // short channel id.
- if failing_route_hop.short_channel_id == chan_update.contents.short_channel_id {
- short_channel_id = Some(failing_route_hop.short_channel_id);
- } else {
- log_info!(logger, "Node provided a channel_update for which it was not authoritative, ignoring.");
- }
- network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
- msg: chan_update,
- })
- } else {
- network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
- short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
- is_permanent: false,
- });
- }
- };
- } else {
- // If the channel_update had a non-zero length (i.e. was
- // present) but we couldn't read it, treat it as a total
- // node failure.
- log_info!(logger,
- "Failed to read a channel_update of len {} in an onion",
- update_slice.len());
- }
- }
- }
- if network_update.is_none() {
- // They provided an UPDATE which was obviously bogus, not worth
- // trying to relay through them anymore.
- network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
- node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
- is_permanent: true,
+ is_permanent: false,
});
}
- if short_channel_id.is_none() {
- short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id);
- }
- } else if payment_failed {
- // Only blame the hop when a value in the HTLC doesn't match the
- // corresponding value in the onion.
- short_channel_id = match error_code & 0xff {
- 18|19 => Some(route_hop.short_channel_id),
- _ => None,
- };
- } else {
- // We can't understand their error messages and they failed to
- // forward...they probably can't understand our forwards so its
- // really not worth trying any further.
- network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
- node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
- is_permanent: true,
- });
- short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id);
- }
-
- res = Some((network_update, short_channel_id, !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
-
- let (description, title) = errors::get_onion_error_description(error_code);
- if debug_field_size > 0 && err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + debug_field_size {
- log_info!(logger, "Onion Error[from {}: {}({:#x}) {}({})] {}", route_hop.pubkey, title, error_code, debug_field, log_bytes!(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4+debug_field_size]), description);
- }
- else {
- log_info!(logger, "Onion Error[from {}: {}({:#x})] {}", route_hop.pubkey, title, error_code, description);
- }
+ };
} else {
- // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
- // definitely came from the peer in question
- let network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
- node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
- is_permanent: true,
- });
- let short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id);
- res = Some((network_update, short_channel_id, !is_from_final_node));
+ // If the channel_update had a non-zero length (i.e. was
+ // present) but we couldn't read it, treat it as a total
+ // node failure.
+ log_info!(logger,
+ "Failed to read a channel_update of len {} in an onion",
+ update_slice.len());
}
}
}
- }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
- if let Some((channel_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable)) = res {
- (channel_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, error_code_ret, error_packet_ret)
+ if network_update.is_none() {
+ // They provided an UPDATE which was obviously bogus, not worth
+ // trying to relay through them anymore.
+ network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
+ node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
+ is_permanent: true,
+ });
+ }
+ if short_channel_id.is_none() {
+ short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id);
+ }
+ } else if payment_failed {
+ // Only blame the hop when a value in the HTLC doesn't match the corresponding value in the
+ // onion.
+ short_channel_id = match error_code & 0xff {
+ 18|19 => Some(route_hop.short_channel_id),
+ _ => None,
+ };
} else {
- // only not set either packet unparseable or hmac does not match with any
- // payment not retryable only when garbage is from the final node
- (None, None, !is_from_final_node, None, None)
+ // We can't understand their error messages and they failed to forward...they probably can't
+ // understand our forwards so it's really not worth trying any further.
+ network_update = Some(NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
+ node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
+ is_permanent: true,
+ });
+ short_channel_id = Some(route_hop.short_channel_id);
}
- } else { unreachable!(); }
+
+ res = Some(FailureLearnings {
+ network_update, short_channel_id,
+ payment_failed_permanently: error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node
+ });
+
+ let (description, title) = errors::get_onion_error_description(error_code);
+ if debug_field_size > 0 && err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + debug_field_size {
+ log_info!(logger, "Onion Error[from {}: {}({:#x}) {}({})] {}", route_hop.pubkey, title, error_code, debug_field, log_bytes!(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4+debug_field_size]), description);
+ } else {
+ log_info!(logger, "Onion Error[from {}: {}({:#x})] {}", route_hop.pubkey, title, error_code, description);
+ }
+ }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
+ if let Some(FailureLearnings {
+ network_update, short_channel_id, payment_failed_permanently
+ }) = res {
+ DecodedOnionFailure {
+ network_update, short_channel_id, payment_failed_permanently,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ onion_error_code: error_code_ret,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ onion_error_data: error_packet_ret
+ }
+ } else {
+ // only not set either packet unparseable or hmac does not match with any
+ // payment not retryable only when garbage is from the final node
+ DecodedOnionFailure {
+ network_update: None, short_channel_id: None, payment_failed_permanently: is_from_final_node,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ onion_error_code: None,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ onion_error_data: None
+ }
+ }
}
#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
pub(super) fn decode_onion_failure<T: secp256k1::Signing, L: Deref>(
&self, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, logger: &L, htlc_source: &HTLCSource
- ) -> (Option<NetworkUpdate>, Option<u64>, bool, Option<u16>, Option<Vec<u8>>)
- where L::Target: Logger {
+ ) -> DecodedOnionFailure where L::Target: Logger {
match self.0 {
HTLCFailReasonRepr::LightningError { ref err } => {
process_onion_failure(secp_ctx, logger, &htlc_source, err.data.clone())
},
+ #[allow(unused)]
HTLCFailReasonRepr::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data, .. } => {
// we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
// TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
// generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
// ChannelDetails.
if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } = htlc_source {
- (None, Some(path.hops[0].short_channel_id), true, Some(*failure_code), Some(data.clone()))
+ DecodedOnionFailure {
+ network_update: None,
+ payment_failed_permanently: false,
+ short_channel_id: Some(path.hops[0].short_channel_id),
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ onion_error_code: Some(*failure_code),
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ onion_error_data: Some(data.clone()),
+ }
} else { unreachable!(); }
}
}
pub(crate) enum Hop {
/// This onion payload was for us, not for forwarding to a next-hop. Contains information for
/// verifying the incoming payment.
- Receive(msgs::OnionHopData),
+ Receive(msgs::InboundOnionPayload),
/// This onion payload needs to be forwarded to a next-hop.
Forward {
/// Onion payload data used in forwarding the payment.
- next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData,
+ next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload,
/// HMAC of the next hop's onion packet.
next_hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
/// Bytes of the onion packet we're forwarding.
},
}
-pub(crate) fn decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret: [u8; 32], hop_data: &[u8], hmac_bytes: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<Hop, OnionDecodeErr> {
- match decode_next_hop(shared_secret, hop_data, hmac_bytes, Some(payment_hash), ()) {
+pub(crate) fn decode_next_payment_hop<NS: Deref>(
+ shared_secret: [u8; 32], hop_data: &[u8], hmac_bytes: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ node_signer: &NS,
+) -> Result<Hop, OnionDecodeErr> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
+ match decode_next_hop(shared_secret, hop_data, hmac_bytes, Some(payment_hash), node_signer) {
Ok((next_hop_data, None)) => Ok(Hop::Receive(next_hop_data)),
Ok((next_hop_data, Some((next_hop_hmac, FixedSizeOnionPacket(new_packet_bytes))))) => {
Ok(Hop::Forward {
RouteHop {
pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(), node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
- short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // We fill in the payloads manually instead of generating them from RouteHops.
+ short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: true, // We fill in the payloads manually instead of generating them from RouteHops.
},
RouteHop {
pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(), node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
- short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // We fill in the payloads manually instead of generating them from RouteHops.
+ short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: true, // We fill in the payloads manually instead of generating them from RouteHops.
},
RouteHop {
pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(), node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
- short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // We fill in the payloads manually instead of generating them from RouteHops.
+ short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: true, // We fill in the payloads manually instead of generating them from RouteHops.
},
RouteHop {
pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(), node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
- short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // We fill in the payloads manually instead of generating them from RouteHops.
+ short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: true, // We fill in the payloads manually instead of generating them from RouteHops.
},
RouteHop {
pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(), node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
- short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // We fill in the payloads manually instead of generating them from RouteHops.
+ short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: true, // We fill in the payloads manually instead of generating them from RouteHops.
},
], blinded_tail: None }],
- payment_params: None,
+ route_params: None,
};
let onion_keys = super::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &get_test_session_key()).unwrap();
// with raw hex instead of our in-memory enums, as the payloads contains custom types, and
// we have no way of representing that with our enums.
let payloads = vec!(
- RawOnionHopData::new(msgs::OnionHopData {
- format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
- short_channel_id: 1,
- },
+ RawOnionHopData::new(msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Forward {
+ short_channel_id: 1,
amt_to_forward: 15000,
outgoing_cltv_value: 1500,
}),
RawOnionHopData {
data: hex::decode("52020236b00402057806080000000000000002fd02013c0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f").unwrap(),
},
- RawOnionHopData::new(msgs::OnionHopData {
- format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
- short_channel_id: 3,
- },
+ RawOnionHopData::new(msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Forward {
+ short_channel_id: 3,
amt_to_forward: 12500,
outgoing_cltv_value: 1250,
}),
- RawOnionHopData::new(msgs::OnionHopData {
- format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
- short_channel_id: 4,
- },
+ RawOnionHopData::new(msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Forward {
+ short_channel_id: 4,
amt_to_forward: 10000,
outgoing_cltv_value: 1000,
}),
data: Vec<u8>
}
impl RawOnionHopData {
- fn new(orig: msgs::OnionHopData) -> Self {
+ fn new(orig: msgs::OutboundOnionPayload) -> Self {
Self { data: orig.encode() }
}
}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff