Merge pull request #2110 from munjesi/docs_fixes
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / payment_tests.rs
index 72513087fda17edb527bac5aa141657df8a2e956..29972c9015655d4e8ff288e05db997b1d4f79ddd 100644 (file)
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ use crate::util::events::{ClosureReason, Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEven
 use crate::util::test_utils;
 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
+use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
 
 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, TxMerkleNode};
 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
@@ -353,7 +354,7 @@ fn do_retry_with_no_persist(confirm_before_reload: bool) {
                MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
                        assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                        nodes[1].node.handle_error(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), msg);
-                       check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) });
+                       check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())) });
                        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                        assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
                },
@@ -518,7 +519,7 @@ fn do_test_completed_payment_not_retryable_on_reload(use_dust: bool) {
                MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
                        assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                        nodes[1].node.handle_error(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), msg);
-                       check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) });
+                       check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())) });
                        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                        bs_commitment_tx = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
                },
@@ -1192,33 +1193,31 @@ fn test_trivial_inflight_htlc_tracking(){
        let (_, _, chan_2_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
 
        // Send and claim the payment. Inflight HTLCs should be empty.
-       let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 500000);
-       nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
-       check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-       pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..]], 500000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
-       claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], payment_preimage);
+       let payment_hash = send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 500000).1;
+       let inflight_htlcs = node_chanmgrs[0].compute_inflight_htlcs();
        {
-               let inflight_htlcs = node_chanmgrs[0].compute_inflight_htlcs();
-
                let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
                let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
-               let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
-               let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
                let channel_1 =  get_channel_ref!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1_id);
-               let channel_2 =  get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[2], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, chan_2_id);
 
                let chan_1_used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat(
                        &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) ,
                        &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
                        channel_1.get_short_channel_id().unwrap()
                );
+               assert_eq!(chan_1_used_liquidity, None);
+       }
+       {
+               let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
+               let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
+               let channel_2 =  get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[2], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, chan_2_id);
+
                let chan_2_used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat(
                        &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) ,
                        &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()),
                        channel_2.get_short_channel_id().unwrap()
                );
 
-               assert_eq!(chan_1_used_liquidity, None);
                assert_eq!(chan_2_used_liquidity, None);
        }
        let pending_payments = nodes[0].node.list_recent_payments();
@@ -1231,30 +1230,32 @@ fn test_trivial_inflight_htlc_tracking(){
        }
 
        // Send the payment, but do not claim it. Our inflight HTLCs should contain the pending payment.
-       let (payment_preimage, payment_hash,  _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 500000);
+       let (payment_preimage, payment_hash,  _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 500000);
+       let inflight_htlcs = node_chanmgrs[0].compute_inflight_htlcs();
        {
-               let inflight_htlcs = node_chanmgrs[0].compute_inflight_htlcs();
-
                let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
                let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
-               let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
-               let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
                let channel_1 =  get_channel_ref!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1_id);
-               let channel_2 =  get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[2], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, chan_2_id);
 
                let chan_1_used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat(
                        &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) ,
                        &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
                        channel_1.get_short_channel_id().unwrap()
                );
+               // First hop accounts for expected 1000 msat fee
+               assert_eq!(chan_1_used_liquidity, Some(501000));
+       }
+       {
+               let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
+               let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
+               let channel_2 =  get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[2], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, chan_2_id);
+
                let chan_2_used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat(
                        &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) ,
                        &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()),
                        channel_2.get_short_channel_id().unwrap()
                );
 
-               // First hop accounts for expected 1000 msat fee
-               assert_eq!(chan_1_used_liquidity, Some(501000));
                assert_eq!(chan_2_used_liquidity, Some(500000));
        }
        let pending_payments = nodes[0].node.list_recent_payments();
@@ -1269,28 +1270,29 @@ fn test_trivial_inflight_htlc_tracking(){
                nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
        }
 
+       let inflight_htlcs = node_chanmgrs[0].compute_inflight_htlcs();
        {
-               let inflight_htlcs = node_chanmgrs[0].compute_inflight_htlcs();
-
                let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
                let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
-               let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
-               let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
                let channel_1 =  get_channel_ref!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1_id);
-               let channel_2 =  get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[2], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, chan_2_id);
 
                let chan_1_used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat(
                        &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) ,
                        &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
                        channel_1.get_short_channel_id().unwrap()
                );
+               assert_eq!(chan_1_used_liquidity, None);
+       }
+       {
+               let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
+               let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
+               let channel_2 =  get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[2], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, chan_2_id);
+
                let chan_2_used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat(
                        &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) ,
                        &NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()),
                        channel_2.get_short_channel_id().unwrap()
                );
-
-               assert_eq!(chan_1_used_liquidity, None);
                assert_eq!(chan_2_used_liquidity, None);
        }
 
@@ -2747,3 +2749,83 @@ fn test_threaded_payment_retries() {
                }
        }
 }
+
+fn do_no_missing_sent_on_midpoint_reload(persist_manager_with_payment: bool) {
+       // Test that if we reload in the middle of an HTLC claim commitment signed dance we'll still
+       // receive the PaymentSent event even if the ChannelManager had no idea about the payment when
+       // it was last persisted.
+       let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+       let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+       let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+       let (persister_a, persister_b, persister_c);
+       let (chain_monitor_a, chain_monitor_b, chain_monitor_c);
+       let (nodes_0_deserialized, nodes_0_deserialized_b, nodes_0_deserialized_c);
+       let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+       let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
+
+       let mut nodes_0_serialized = Vec::new();
+       if !persist_manager_with_payment {
+               nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
+       }
+
+       let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
+
+       if persist_manager_with_payment {
+               nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
+       }
+
+       nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
+       check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+       expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 1_000_000);
+
+       let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+       nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
+       nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
+       check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+       // The ChannelMonitor should always be the latest version, as we're required to persist it
+       // during the commitment signed handling.
+       let chan_0_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).encode();
+       reload_node!(nodes[0], test_default_channel_config(), &nodes_0_serialized, &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized], persister_a, chain_monitor_a, nodes_0_deserialized);
+
+       let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+       assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+       if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
+       if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[1] { assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage); } else { panic!(); }
+       // Note that we don't get a PaymentPathSuccessful here as we leave the HTLC pending to avoid
+       // the double-claim that would otherwise appear at the end of this test.
+       let as_broadcasted_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+       assert_eq!(as_broadcasted_txn.len(), 1);
+
+       // Ensure that, even after some time, if we restart we still include *something* in the current
+       // `ChannelManager` which prevents a `PaymentFailed` when we restart even if pending resolved
+       // payments have since been timed out thanks to `IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS`.
+       // A naive implementation of the fix here would wipe the pending payments set, causing a
+       // failure event when we restart.
+       for _ in 0..(IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS * 2) { nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); }
+
+       let chan_0_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).encode();
+       reload_node!(nodes[0], test_default_channel_config(), &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized], persister_b, chain_monitor_b, nodes_0_deserialized_b);
+       let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+       assert!(events.is_empty());
+
+       // Ensure that we don't generate any further events even after the channel-closing commitment
+       // transaction is confirmed on-chain.
+       confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_broadcasted_txn[0]);
+       for _ in 0..(IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS * 2) { nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); }
+
+       let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+       assert!(events.is_empty());
+
+       let chan_0_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).encode();
+       reload_node!(nodes[0], test_default_channel_config(), &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized], persister_c, chain_monitor_c, nodes_0_deserialized_c);
+       let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+       assert!(events.is_empty());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn no_missing_sent_on_midpoint_reload() {
+       do_no_missing_sent_on_midpoint_reload(false);
+       do_no_missing_sent_on_midpoint_reload(true);
+}