//! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
+use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use crate::chain::Confirm;
-use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
-use crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager;
+use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent};
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
+use crate::ln::types::ChannelId;
+use crate::sign::OutputSpender;
use crate::util::test_utils;
use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
- let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
+ let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
// Provide preimage to node 2 by claiming payment
nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
if use_funding_unconfirmed {
let relevant_txids = nodes[0].node.get_relevant_txids();
assert_eq!(relevant_txids.len(), 1);
- let block_hash_opt = relevant_txids[0].1;
+ let block_hash_opt = relevant_txids[0].2;
let expected_hash = nodes[0].get_block_header(chan_conf_height).block_hash();
+ assert_eq!(relevant_txids[0].1, chan_conf_height);
assert_eq!(block_hash_opt, Some(expected_hash));
let txid = relevant_txids[0].0;
assert_eq!(txid, chan.3.txid());
if use_funding_unconfirmed {
let relevant_txids = nodes[0].node.get_relevant_txids();
assert_eq!(relevant_txids.len(), 1);
- let block_hash_opt = relevant_txids[0].1;
+ let block_hash_opt = relevant_txids[0].2;
let expected_hash = nodes[0].get_block_header(chan_conf_height).block_hash();
+ assert_eq!(chan_conf_height, relevant_txids[0].1);
assert_eq!(block_hash_opt, Some(expected_hash));
let txid = relevant_txids[0].0;
assert_eq!(txid, chan.3.txid());
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
- let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
- let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
+ let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
+ let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
// Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs: to_local, to_remote, 2 outgoing HTLC
let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
// Connect blocks on node B
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
// Verify node B broadcast 2 HTLC-timeout txn
let partial_claim_tx = {
let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
- assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
+ assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
let remote_txn_a = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
let remote_txn_b = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
+ if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(channel_id, Some(chan_id));
let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn_b[0]);
let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
+ if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(channel_id, Some(chan_id));
let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn_a[0]);
do_test_to_remote_after_local_detection(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstReorgsOnlyTip);
do_test_to_remote_after_local_detection(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_htlc_preimage_claim_holder_commitment_after_counterparty_commitment_reorg() {
+ // We detect a counterparty commitment confirm onchain, followed by a reorg and a confirmation
+ // of a holder commitment. Then, if we learn of the preimage for an HTLC in both commitments,
+ // test that we only claim the currently confirmed commitment.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
+ // Route an HTLC which we will claim onchain with the preimage.
+ let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
+
+ // Force close with the latest counterparty commitment, confirm it, and reorg it with the latest
+ // holder commitment.
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+ check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
+ check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ let commitment_tx_a = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx_a, funding_tx);
+
+ let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ let commitment_tx_b = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx_b, funding_tx);
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx_a);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx_a);
+
+ disconnect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
+ disconnect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx_b);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx_b);
+ if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
+ let _ = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ }
+
+ // Provide the preimage now, such that we only claim from the holder commitment (since it's
+ // currently confirmed) and not the counterparty's.
+ get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
+ &payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &nodes[1].tx_broadcaster,
+ &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator(nodes[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
+ );
+
+ let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ let htlc_success_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ check_spends!(htlc_success_tx, commitment_tx_b);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_htlc_preimage_claim_prev_counterparty_commitment_after_current_counterparty_commitment_reorg() {
+ // We detect a counterparty commitment confirm onchain, followed by a reorg and a
+ // confirmation of the previous (still unrevoked) counterparty commitment. Then, if we learn
+ // of the preimage for an HTLC in both commitments, test that we only claim the currently
+ // confirmed commitment.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
+ // Route an HTLC which we will claim onchain with the preimage.
+ let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
+
+ // Obtain the current commitment, which will become the previous after a fee update.
+ let prev_commitment_a = &get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id)[0];
+
+ *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 4;
+ nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+ let mut msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
+ let (update_fee, commit_sig) = if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, mut updates } = msg_events.pop().unwrap() {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ (updates.update_fee.take().unwrap(), updates.commitment_signed)
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected message send event");
+ };
+
+ // Handle the fee update on the other side, but don't send the last RAA such that the previous
+ // commitment is still valid (unrevoked).
+ nodes[1].node().handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
+ let _last_revoke_and_ack = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commit_sig, false, true, false, true);
+
+ // Force close with the latest commitment, confirm it, and reorg it with the previous commitment.
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+ check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ let current_commitment_a = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ assert_ne!(current_commitment_a.txid(), prev_commitment_a.txid());
+ check_spends!(current_commitment_a, funding_tx);
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], ¤t_commitment_a);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], ¤t_commitment_a);
+
+ check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
+ check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+
+ disconnect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
+ disconnect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &prev_commitment_a);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &prev_commitment_a);
+
+ // Provide the preimage now, such that we only claim from the previous commitment (since it's
+ // currently confirmed) and not the latest.
+ get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
+ &payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &nodes[1].tx_broadcaster,
+ &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator(nodes[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
+ );
+
+ let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ let htlc_preimage_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ check_spends!(htlc_preimage_tx, prev_commitment_a);
+ // Make sure it was indeed a preimage claim and not a revocation claim since the previous
+ // commitment (still unrevoked) is the currently confirmed closing transaction.
+ assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].witness.second_to_last().unwrap(), &payment_preimage.0[..]);
+}
+
+fn do_test_retries_own_commitment_broadcast_after_reorg(anchors: bool, revoked_counterparty_commitment: bool) {
+ // Tests that a node will retry broadcasting its own commitment after seeing a confirmed
+ // counterparty commitment be reorged out.
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ if revoked_counterparty_commitment {
+ chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
+ }
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
+ if anchors {
+ config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
+ config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+ }
+ let persister;
+ let new_chain_monitor;
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
+ let nodes_1_deserialized;
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
+ // Route a payment so we have an HTLC to claim as well.
+ let _ = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
+
+ if revoked_counterparty_commitment {
+ // Trigger a fee update such that we advance the state. We will have B broadcast its state
+ // without the fee update.
+ let serialized_node = nodes[1].node.encode();
+ let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
+
+ *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() += 1;
+ nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
+
+ reload_node!(
+ nodes[1], config, &serialized_node, &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, nodes_1_deserialized
+ );
+ }
+
+ // Connect blocks until the HTLC expiry is met, prompting a commitment broadcast by A.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+ check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, false, &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
+
+ {
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ if anchors {
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ let commitment_tx_a = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx_a, funding_tx);
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
+ let htlc_tx_a = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ let commitment_tx_a = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx_a, funding_tx);
+ check_spends!(htlc_tx_a, commitment_tx_a);
+ }
+ };
+
+ // B will also broadcast its own commitment.
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
+ check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
+
+ let commitment_b = {
+ let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ let tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ check_spends!(tx, funding_tx);
+ tx
+ };
+
+ // Confirm B's commitment, A should now broadcast an HTLC timeout for commitment B.
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_b);
+ {
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
+ // `commitment_a` and `htlc_timeout_a` are rebroadcast because the best block was
+ // updated prior to seeing `commitment_b`.
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 3 });
+ check_spends!(txn.last().unwrap(), commitment_b);
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_b);
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Disconnect the block, allowing A to retry its own commitment. Note that we connect two
+ // blocks, one to get us back to the original height, and another to retry our pending claims.
+ disconnect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
+ {
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
+ if anchors {
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
+ check_spends!(txn[0], txn[1]); // HTLC timeout A
+ check_spends!(txn[1], funding_tx); // Commitment A
+ assert_ne!(txn[1].txid(), commitment_b.txid());
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_retries_own_commitment_broadcast_after_reorg() {
+ do_test_retries_own_commitment_broadcast_after_reorg(false, false);
+ do_test_retries_own_commitment_broadcast_after_reorg(false, true);
+ do_test_retries_own_commitment_broadcast_after_reorg(true, false);
+ do_test_retries_own_commitment_broadcast_after_reorg(true, true);
+}