//! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
+use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use crate::chain::Confirm;
-use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
-use crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager;
+use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent};
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
use crate::util::test_utils;
use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use crate::prelude::*;
-use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
-use bitcoin::TxMerkleNode;
use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
- let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
+ let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
// Provide preimage to node 2 by claiming payment
nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x2000_0000, prev_blockhash: nodes[2].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
let claim_txn = if local_commitment {
// Broadcast node 1 commitment txn to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
let node_1_commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
check_spends!(node_1_commitment_txn[1], node_1_commitment_txn[0]);
// Give node 2 node 1's transactions and get its response (claiming the HTLC instead).
- connect_block(&nodes[2], &Block { header, txdata: node_1_commitment_txn.clone() });
+ connect_block(&nodes[2], &create_dummy_block(nodes[2].best_block_hash(), 42, node_1_commitment_txn.clone()));
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true); // We should get a BroadcastChannelUpdate (and *only* a BroadcstChannelUpdate)
- check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
let node_2_commitment_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
assert_eq!(node_2_commitment_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: 1 offered HTLC-Claim
check_spends!(node_2_commitment_txn[0], node_1_commitment_txn[0]);
// Make sure node 1's height is the same as the !local_commitment case
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
// Confirm node 1's commitment txn (and HTLC-Timeout) on node 1
- header.prev_blockhash = nodes[1].best_block_hash();
- connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_1_commitment_txn.clone() });
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, node_1_commitment_txn.clone()));
// ...but return node 1's commitment tx in case claim is set and we're preparing to reorg
vec![node_1_commitment_txn[0].clone(), node_2_commitment_txn[0].clone()]
};
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); // We should get a BroadcastChannelUpdate (and *only* a BroadcstChannelUpdate)
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
// Connect ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2 blocks, giving us a confirmation count of ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1.
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
// Disconnect Node 1's HTLC-Timeout which was connected above
disconnect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- let block = Block {
- header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
- txdata: claim_txn,
- };
- connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, claim_txn));
// ChannelManager only polls chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events when we
// probe it for events, so we probe non-message events here (which should just be the
expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(1000), true, true);
} else {
// Confirm the timeout tx and check that we fail the HTLC backwards
- let block = Block {
- header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
- txdata: vec![],
- };
- connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
+ connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new()));
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
}
// on any of the HTLCs, at least until we get six confirmations (which we won't get).
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
// Connect up to one block before the revoked transaction would be considered final, then do a
// Connect the HTLC claim transaction for HTLC 3
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &unrevoked_local_txn[2]);
- expect_payment_sent!(nodes[1], payment_preimage_3);
+ expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], payment_preimage_3, None, true, false);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
// Connect blocks to confirm the unrevoked commitment transaction
// around freeing background events which store monitor updates during block_[dis]connected.
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let persister;
+ let new_chain_monitor;
+
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
- let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
- let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
- let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestRouter, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
+ let nodes_0_deserialized;
+
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
*nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
let relevant_txids = nodes[0].node.get_relevant_txids();
assert_eq!(relevant_txids.len(), 0);
- handle_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1, true, "Channel closed because of an exception: Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at 6 confs, now have 0 confs.");
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
{
let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let relevant_txids = nodes[0].node.get_relevant_txids();
assert_eq!(relevant_txids.len(), 0);
- handle_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1, true, "Channel closed because of an exception: Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at 6 confs, now have 0 confs.");
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
{
let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
nodes[0].node.test_process_background_events(); // Required to free the pending background monitor update
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let expected_err = "Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at 6 confs, now have 0 confs.";
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(format!("Channel closed because of an exception: {}", expected_err)) });
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_owned() });
+ if reorg_after_reload || !reload_node {
+ handle_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1, true, "Channel closed because of an exception: Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at 6 confs, now have 0 confs.");
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(format!("Channel closed because of an exception: {}", expected_err)) }
+ , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+ }
+
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_owned() },
+ [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
// If we dropped the channel before reloading the node, nodes[1] was also dropped from
// nodes[0] storage, and hence not connected again on startup. We therefore need to
// reconnect to the node before attempting to create a new channel.
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
+ features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
}
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
- let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
- let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
+ let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
+ let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
// Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs: to_local, to_remote, 2 outgoing HTLC
let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
// Connect blocks on node A commitment transaction
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
// Verify node A broadcast tx claiming both HTLCs
{
// Connect blocks on node B
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
// Verify node B broadcast 2 HTLC-timeout txn
let partial_claim_tx = {
assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
+ if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(channel_id, Some(chan_id));
let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn_b[0]);
}
let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
+ if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(channel_id, Some(chan_id));
let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn_a[0]);
}
}
do_test_to_remote_after_local_detection(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstReorgsOnlyTip);
do_test_to_remote_after_local_detection(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_htlc_preimage_claim_holder_commitment_after_counterparty_commitment_reorg() {
+ // We detect a counterparty commitment confirm onchain, followed by a reorg and a confirmation
+ // of a holder commitment. Then, if we learn of the preimage for an HTLC in both commitments,
+ // test that we only claim the currently confirmed commitment.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
+ // Route an HTLC which we will claim onchain with the preimage.
+ let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
+
+ // Force close with the latest counterparty commitment, confirm it, and reorg it with the latest
+ // holder commitment.
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+ check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
+ check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ let commitment_tx_a = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx_a, funding_tx);
+
+ let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ let commitment_tx_b = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx_b, funding_tx);
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx_a);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx_a);
+
+ disconnect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
+ disconnect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx_b);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx_b);
+
+ // Provide the preimage now, such that we only claim from the holder commitment (since it's
+ // currently confirmed) and not the counterparty's.
+ get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
+ &payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &nodes[1].tx_broadcaster,
+ &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator(nodes[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
+ );
+
+ let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ let htlc_success_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ check_spends!(htlc_success_tx, commitment_tx_b);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_htlc_preimage_claim_prev_counterparty_commitment_after_current_counterparty_commitment_reorg() {
+ // We detect a counterparty commitment confirm onchain, followed by a reorg and a
+ // confirmation of the previous (still unrevoked) counterparty commitment. Then, if we learn
+ // of the preimage for an HTLC in both commitments, test that we only claim the currently
+ // confirmed commitment.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
+ // Route an HTLC which we will claim onchain with the preimage.
+ let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
+
+ // Obtain the current commitment, which will become the previous after a fee update.
+ let prev_commitment_a = &get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id)[0];
+
+ *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 4;
+ nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+ let mut msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
+ let (update_fee, commit_sig) = if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, mut updates } = msg_events.pop().unwrap() {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ (updates.update_fee.take().unwrap(), updates.commitment_signed)
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected message send event");
+ };
+
+ // Handle the fee update on the other side, but don't send the last RAA such that the previous
+ // commitment is still valid (unrevoked).
+ nodes[1].node().handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
+ let _last_revoke_and_ack = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commit_sig, false, true, false, true);
+
+ // Force close with the latest commitment, confirm it, and reorg it with the previous commitment.
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+ check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ let current_commitment_a = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ assert_ne!(current_commitment_a.txid(), prev_commitment_a.txid());
+ check_spends!(current_commitment_a, funding_tx);
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], ¤t_commitment_a);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], ¤t_commitment_a);
+
+ check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
+ check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+
+ disconnect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
+ disconnect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &prev_commitment_a);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &prev_commitment_a);
+
+ // Provide the preimage now, such that we only claim from the previous commitment (since it's
+ // currently confirmed) and not the latest.
+ get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
+ &payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &nodes[1].tx_broadcaster,
+ &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator(nodes[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
+ );
+
+ let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ let htlc_preimage_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ check_spends!(htlc_preimage_tx, prev_commitment_a);
+ // Make sure it was indeed a preimage claim and not a revocation claim since the previous
+ // commitment (still unrevoked) is the currently confirmed closing transaction.
+ assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].witness.second_to_last().unwrap(), &payment_preimage.0[..]);
+}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff