Merge pull request #2205 from wpaulino/sign-ecdsa-with-noncedata
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / offers / signer.rs
index a8ea941e3be834e3504af6c23643db5219e11e33..8d5f98e6f6b050993474bbedbcc9a0f25c409980 100644 (file)
@@ -162,6 +162,14 @@ impl MetadataMaterial {
        }
 }
 
+pub(super) fn derive_keys(nonce: Nonce, expanded_key: &ExpandedKey) -> KeyPair {
+       const IV_BYTES: &[u8; IV_LEN] = b"LDK Invoice ~~~~";
+       let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+       let hmac = Hmac::from_engine(expanded_key.hmac_for_offer(nonce, IV_BYTES));
+       let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(hmac.as_inner()).unwrap();
+       KeyPair::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey)
+}
+
 /// Verifies data given in a TLV stream was used to produce the given metadata, consisting of:
 /// - a 128-bit [`Nonce`] and possibly
 /// - a [`Sha256`] hash of the nonce and the TLV records using the [`ExpandedKey`].
@@ -169,17 +177,43 @@ impl MetadataMaterial {
 /// If the latter is not included in the metadata, the TLV stream is used to check if the given
 /// `signing_pubkey` can be derived from it.
 pub(super) fn verify_metadata<'a, T: secp256k1::Signing>(
-       metadata: &Vec<u8>, expanded_key: &ExpandedKey, iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN],
+       metadata: &[u8], expanded_key: &ExpandedKey, iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN],
        signing_pubkey: PublicKey, tlv_stream: impl core::iter::Iterator<Item = TlvRecord<'a>>,
        secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>
-) -> bool {
+) -> Result<Option<KeyPair>, ()> {
+       let hmac = hmac_for_message(metadata, expanded_key, iv_bytes, tlv_stream)?;
+
+       if metadata.len() == Nonce::LENGTH {
+               let derived_keys = KeyPair::from_secret_key(
+                       secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(hmac.as_inner()).unwrap()
+               );
+               if fixed_time_eq(&signing_pubkey.serialize(), &derived_keys.public_key().serialize()) {
+                       Ok(Some(derived_keys))
+               } else {
+                       Err(())
+               }
+       } else if metadata[Nonce::LENGTH..].len() == Sha256::LEN {
+               if fixed_time_eq(&metadata[Nonce::LENGTH..], &hmac.into_inner()) {
+                       Ok(None)
+               } else {
+                       Err(())
+               }
+       } else {
+               Err(())
+       }
+}
+
+fn hmac_for_message<'a>(
+       metadata: &[u8], expanded_key: &ExpandedKey, iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN],
+       tlv_stream: impl core::iter::Iterator<Item = TlvRecord<'a>>
+) -> Result<Hmac<Sha256>, ()> {
        if metadata.len() < Nonce::LENGTH {
-               return false;
+               return Err(());
        }
 
        let nonce = match Nonce::try_from(&metadata[..Nonce::LENGTH]) {
                Ok(nonce) => nonce,
-               Err(_) => return false,
+               Err(_) => return Err(()),
        };
        let mut hmac = expanded_key.hmac_for_offer(nonce, iv_bytes);
 
@@ -189,13 +223,9 @@ pub(super) fn verify_metadata<'a, T: secp256k1::Signing>(
 
        if metadata.len() == Nonce::LENGTH {
                hmac.input(DERIVED_METADATA_AND_KEYS_HMAC_INPUT);
-               let hmac = Hmac::from_engine(hmac);
-               let derived_pubkey = SecretKey::from_slice(hmac.as_inner()).unwrap().public_key(&secp_ctx);
-               fixed_time_eq(&signing_pubkey.serialize(), &derived_pubkey.serialize())
-       } else if metadata[Nonce::LENGTH..].len() == Sha256::LEN {
-               hmac.input(DERIVED_METADATA_HMAC_INPUT);
-               fixed_time_eq(&metadata[Nonce::LENGTH..], &Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner())
        } else {
-               false
+               hmac.input(DERIVED_METADATA_HMAC_INPUT);
        }
+
+       Ok(Hmac::from_engine(hmac))
 }