Prefer one-hop blinded path to Tor intro nodes

[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / onion_message / messenger.rs

diff --git a/lightning/src/onion_message/messenger.rs b/lightning/src/onion_message/messenger.rs
index 6987ece9627b9856b149a3d0ea8b137436fe4fe2..37de550453283e4a383051ace821cabb44f95ff1 100644 (file)
--- a/lightning/src/onion_message/messenger.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/onion_message/messenger.rs
@@ -358,6 +358,9 @@ where
                const MIN_PEER_CHANNELS: usize = 3;
 
                let network_graph = self.network_graph.deref().read_only();
+               let is_recipient_announced =
+                       network_graph.nodes().contains_key(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&recipient));
+
                let mut peer_info = peers.iter()
                        // Limit to peers with announced channels
                        .filter_map(|pubkey|
@@ -366,6 +369,8 @@ where
                                        .filter(|info| info.channels.len() >= MIN_PEER_CHANNELS)
                                        .map(|info| (*pubkey, info.is_tor_only(), info.channels.len()))
                        )
+                       // Exclude Tor-only nodes when the recipient is announced.
+                       .filter(|(_, is_tor_only, _)| !(*is_tor_only && is_recipient_announced))
                        .collect::<Vec<_>>();
 
                // Prefer using non-Tor nodes with the most channels as the introduction node.
@@ -382,7 +387,7 @@ where
                match paths {
                        Ok(paths) if !paths.is_empty() => Ok(paths),
                        _ => {
-                               if network_graph.nodes().contains_key(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&recipient)) {
+                               if is_recipient_announced {
                                        BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(recipient, &*self.entropy_source, secp_ctx)
                                                .map(|path| vec![path])
                                } else {