// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
// licenses.
-//! LDK sends, receives, and forwards onion messages via the [`OnionMessenger`]. See its docs for
-//! more information.
+//! LDK sends, receives, and forwards onion messages via this [`OnionMessenger`], which lives here,
+//! as well as various types, traits, and utilities that it uses.
use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
use crate::blinded_path::message::{advance_path_by_one, ForwardTlvs, ReceiveTlvs};
use crate::blinded_path::utils;
use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider};
-use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient};
-#[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
-use crate::ln::channelmanager::{SimpleArcChannelManager, SimpleRefChannelManager};
+use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient};
use crate::ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use crate::ln::msgs::{self, OnionMessage, OnionMessageHandler, SocketAddress};
use crate::ln::onion_utils;
-use crate::ln::peer_handler::IgnoringMessageHandler;
use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NodeId};
-pub use super::packet::OnionMessageContents;
+use super::packet::OnionMessageContents;
use super::packet::ParsedOnionMessageContents;
use super::offers::OffersMessageHandler;
use super::packet::{BIG_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN, ForwardControlTlvs, Packet, Payload, ReceiveControlTlvs, SMALL_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN};
use core::fmt;
use core::ops::Deref;
use crate::io;
-use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+use crate::sync::Mutex;
use crate::prelude::*;
+#[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
+use {
+ crate::sign::KeysManager,
+ crate::ln::channelmanager::{SimpleArcChannelManager, SimpleRefChannelManager},
+ crate::ln::peer_handler::IgnoringMessageHandler,
+ crate::sync::Arc,
+};
+
pub(super) const MAX_TIMER_TICKS: usize = 2;
/// A sender, receiver and forwarder of [`OnionMessage`]s.
/// # extern crate bitcoin;
/// # use bitcoin::hashes::_export::_core::time::Duration;
/// # use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
-/// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
+/// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey, self};
/// # use lightning::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
-/// # use lightning::sign::KeysManager;
+/// # use lightning::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager};
/// # use lightning::ln::peer_handler::IgnoringMessageHandler;
-/// # use lightning::onion_message::{OnionMessageContents, Destination, MessageRouter, OnionMessagePath, OnionMessenger};
+/// # use lightning::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, OnionMessagePath, OnionMessenger};
+/// # use lightning::onion_message::packet::OnionMessageContents;
/// # use lightning::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
/// # use lightning::util::ser::{Writeable, Writer};
/// # use lightning::io;
/// # first_node_addresses: None,
/// # })
/// # }
+/// # fn create_blinded_paths<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(
+/// # &self, _recipient: PublicKey, _peers: Vec<PublicKey>, _secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>
+/// # ) -> Result<Vec<BlindedPath>, ()> {
+/// # unreachable!()
+/// # }
/// # }
/// # let seed = [42u8; 32];
/// # let time = Duration::from_secs(123456);
///
/// These are obtained when released from [`OnionMessenger`]'s handlers after which they are
/// enqueued for sending.
-pub type PendingOnionMessage<T: OnionMessageContents> = (T, Destination, Option<BlindedPath>);
+pub type PendingOnionMessage<T> = (T, Destination, Option<BlindedPath>);
pub(crate) fn new_pending_onion_message<T: OnionMessageContents>(
contents: T, destination: Destination, reply_path: Option<BlindedPath>
fn find_path(
&self, sender: PublicKey, peers: Vec<PublicKey>, destination: Destination
) -> Result<OnionMessagePath, ()>;
+
+ /// Creates [`BlindedPath`]s to the `recipient` node. The nodes in `peers` are assumed to be
+ /// direct peers with the `recipient`.
+ fn create_blinded_paths<
+ T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification
+ >(
+ &self, recipient: PublicKey, peers: Vec<PublicKey>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
+ ) -> Result<Vec<BlindedPath>, ()>;
}
/// A [`MessageRouter`] that can only route to a directly connected [`Destination`].
-pub struct DefaultMessageRouter<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, L: Deref>
+pub struct DefaultMessageRouter<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, L: Deref, ES: Deref>
where
L::Target: Logger,
+ ES::Target: EntropySource,
{
network_graph: G,
+ entropy_source: ES,
}
-impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, L: Deref> DefaultMessageRouter<G, L>
+impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, L: Deref, ES: Deref> DefaultMessageRouter<G, L, ES>
where
L::Target: Logger,
+ ES::Target: EntropySource,
{
/// Creates a [`DefaultMessageRouter`] using the given [`NetworkGraph`].
- pub fn new(network_graph: G) -> Self {
- Self { network_graph }
+ pub fn new(network_graph: G, entropy_source: ES) -> Self {
+ Self { network_graph, entropy_source }
}
}
-impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, L: Deref> MessageRouter for DefaultMessageRouter<G, L>
+impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, L: Deref, ES: Deref> MessageRouter for DefaultMessageRouter<G, L, ES>
where
L::Target: Logger,
+ ES::Target: EntropySource,
{
fn find_path(
&self, _sender: PublicKey, peers: Vec<PublicKey>, destination: Destination
}
}
}
+
+ fn create_blinded_paths<
+ T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification
+ >(
+ &self, recipient: PublicKey, peers: Vec<PublicKey>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
+ ) -> Result<Vec<BlindedPath>, ()> {
+ // Limit the number of blinded paths that are computed.
+ const MAX_PATHS: usize = 3;
+
+ // Ensure peers have at least three channels so that it is more difficult to infer the
+ // recipient's node_id.
+ const MIN_PEER_CHANNELS: usize = 3;
+
+ let network_graph = self.network_graph.deref().read_only();
+ let is_recipient_announced =
+ network_graph.nodes().contains_key(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&recipient));
+
+ let mut peer_info = peers.iter()
+ // Limit to peers with announced channels
+ .filter_map(|pubkey|
+ network_graph
+ .node(&NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey))
+ .filter(|info| info.channels.len() >= MIN_PEER_CHANNELS)
+ .map(|info| (*pubkey, info.is_tor_only(), info.channels.len()))
+ )
+ // Exclude Tor-only nodes when the recipient is announced.
+ .filter(|(_, is_tor_only, _)| !(*is_tor_only && is_recipient_announced))
+ .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+ // Prefer using non-Tor nodes with the most channels as the introduction node.
+ peer_info.sort_unstable_by(|(_, a_tor_only, a_channels), (_, b_tor_only, b_channels)| {
+ a_tor_only.cmp(b_tor_only).then(a_channels.cmp(b_channels).reverse())
+ });
+
+ let paths = peer_info.into_iter()
+ .map(|(pubkey, _, _)| vec![pubkey, recipient])
+ .map(|node_pks| BlindedPath::new_for_message(&node_pks, &*self.entropy_source, secp_ctx))
+ .take(MAX_PATHS)
+ .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>();
+
+ match paths {
+ Ok(paths) if !paths.is_empty() => Ok(paths),
+ _ => {
+ if is_recipient_announced {
+ BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(recipient, &*self.entropy_source, secp_ctx)
+ .map(|path| vec![path])
+ } else {
+ Err(())
+ }
+ },
+ }
+ }
}
/// A path for sending an [`OnionMessage`].
}
/// The destination of an onion message.
-#[derive(Clone)]
+#[derive(Clone, Hash, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Destination {
/// We're sending this onion message to a node.
Node(PublicKey),
/// Result of successfully [sending an onion message].
///
/// [sending an onion message]: OnionMessenger::send_onion_message
-#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Hash, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum SendSuccess {
/// The message was buffered and will be sent once it is processed by
/// [`OnionMessageHandler::next_onion_message_for_peer`].
/// Errors that may occur when [sending an onion message].
///
/// [sending an onion message]: OnionMessenger::send_onion_message
-#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Hash, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum SendError {
/// Errored computing onion message packet keys.
Secp256k1(secp256k1::Error),
/// A processed incoming onion message, containing either a Forward (another onion message)
/// or a Receive payload with decrypted contents.
+#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum PeeledOnion<T: OnionMessageContents> {
/// Forwarded onion, with the next node id and a new onion
Forward(PublicKey, OnionMessage),
OnionMessenger {
entropy_source,
node_signer,
- message_recipients: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
+ message_recipients: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
secp_ctx,
logger,
message_router,
}
}
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(crate) fn set_offers_handler(&mut self, offers_handler: OMH) {
+ self.offers_handler = offers_handler;
+ }
+
/// Sends an [`OnionMessage`] with the given `contents` to `destination`.
///
/// See [`OnionMessenger`] for example usage.
},
Ok(SendSuccess::BufferedAwaitingConnection(node_id)) => {
log_trace!(
- self.logger, "Buffered onion message waiting on peer connection {}: {:?}",
+ self.logger, "Buffered onion message waiting on peer connection {}: {}",
log_suffix, node_id
);
},
}
}
- #[cfg(test)]
- pub(super) fn send_onion_message_using_path<T: OnionMessageContents>(
+ #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
+ pub fn send_onion_message_using_path<T: OnionMessageContents>(
&self, path: OnionMessagePath, contents: T, reply_path: Option<BlindedPath>
) -> Result<SendSuccess, SendError> {
self.enqueue_onion_message(path, contents, reply_path, format_args!(""))
}
+ pub(crate) fn peel_onion_message(
+ &self, msg: &OnionMessage
+ ) -> Result<PeeledOnion<<<CMH>::Target as CustomOnionMessageHandler>::CustomMessage>, ()> {
+ peel_onion_message(
+ msg, &self.secp_ctx, &*self.node_signer, &*self.logger, &*self.custom_handler
+ )
+ }
+
fn handle_onion_message_response<T: OnionMessageContents>(
&self, response: Option<T>, reply_path: Option<BlindedPath>, log_suffix: fmt::Arguments
) {
#[cfg(test)]
pub(super) fn release_pending_msgs(&self) -> HashMap<PublicKey, VecDeque<OnionMessage>> {
let mut message_recipients = self.message_recipients.lock().unwrap();
- let mut msgs = HashMap::new();
+ let mut msgs = new_hash_map();
// We don't want to disconnect the peers by removing them entirely from the original map, so we
// release the pending message buffers individually.
for (node_id, recipient) in &mut *message_recipients {
CMH::Target: CustomOnionMessageHandler,
{
fn handle_onion_message(&self, _peer_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OnionMessage) {
- match peel_onion_message(
- msg, &self.secp_ctx, &*self.node_signer, &*self.logger, &*self.custom_handler
- ) {
+ match self.peel_onion_message(msg) {
Ok(PeeledOnion::Receive(message, path_id, reply_path)) => {
log_trace!(
self.logger,
Ok(PeeledOnion::Forward(next_node_id, onion_message)) => {
let mut message_recipients = self.message_recipients.lock().unwrap();
if outbound_buffer_full(&next_node_id, &message_recipients) {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Dropping forwarded onion message to peer {:?}: outbound buffer full", next_node_id);
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Dropping forwarded onion message to peer {}: outbound buffer full", next_node_id);
return
}
log_trace!(self.logger, "Forwarding an onion message to peer {}", next_node_id);
},
_ => {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Dropping forwarded onion message to disconnected peer {:?}", next_node_id);
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Dropping forwarded onion message to disconnected peer {}", next_node_id);
return
},
}
fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
match self.message_recipients.lock().unwrap().remove(their_node_id) {
Some(OnionMessageRecipient::ConnectedPeer(..)) => {},
- _ => debug_assert!(false),
+ Some(_) => debug_assert!(false),
+ None => {},
}
}
Arc<KeysManager>,
Arc<KeysManager>,
Arc<L>,
- Arc<DefaultMessageRouter<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>,
+ Arc<DefaultMessageRouter<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>, Arc<KeysManager>>>,
Arc<SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L>>,
IgnoringMessageHandler
>;
&'a KeysManager,
&'a KeysManager,
&'b L,
- &'i DefaultMessageRouter<&'g NetworkGraph<&'b L>, &'b L>,
+ &'i DefaultMessageRouter<&'g NetworkGraph<&'b L>, &'b L, &'a KeysManager>,
&'j SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L>,
IgnoringMessageHandler
>;