Merge pull request #3113 from TheBlueMatt/2024-04-async-monitor-fuzz
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / onion_message / messenger.rs
index bc7518be800faa9e76dabc7369291c7e7be503bb..ee49d00e99dea2de48c8a9c2fa76e92c2c2b9b27 100644 (file)
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ for OnionMessenger<ES, NS, L, NL, MR, OMH, CMH> where
 /// #         })
 /// #     }
 /// #     fn create_blinded_paths<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(
-/// #         &self, _recipient: PublicKey, _peers: Vec<ForwardNode>, _secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>
+/// #         &self, _recipient: PublicKey, _peers: Vec<PublicKey>, _secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>
 /// #     ) -> Result<Vec<BlindedPath>, ()> {
 /// #         unreachable!()
 /// #     }
@@ -426,11 +426,43 @@ pub trait MessageRouter {
        fn create_blinded_paths<
                T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification
        >(
-               &self, recipient: PublicKey, peers: Vec<ForwardNode>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
+               &self, recipient: PublicKey, peers: Vec<PublicKey>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
        ) -> Result<Vec<BlindedPath>, ()>;
+
+       /// Creates compact [`BlindedPath`]s to the `recipient` node. The nodes in `peers` are assumed
+       /// to be direct peers with the `recipient`.
+       ///
+       /// Compact blinded paths use short channel ids instead of pubkeys for a smaller serialization,
+       /// which is beneficial when a QR code is used to transport the data. The SCID is passed using a
+       /// [`ForwardNode`] but may be `None` for graceful degradation.
+       ///
+       /// Implementations using additional intermediate nodes are responsible for using a
+       /// [`ForwardNode`] with `Some` short channel id, if possible. Similarly, implementations should
+       /// call [`BlindedPath::use_compact_introduction_node`].
+       ///
+       /// The provided implementation simply delegates to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`],
+       /// ignoring the short channel ids.
+       fn create_compact_blinded_paths<
+               T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification
+       >(
+               &self, recipient: PublicKey, peers: Vec<ForwardNode>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
+       ) -> Result<Vec<BlindedPath>, ()> {
+               let peers = peers
+                       .into_iter()
+                       .map(|ForwardNode { node_id, short_channel_id: _ }| node_id)
+                       .collect();
+               self.create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
+       }
 }
 
 /// A [`MessageRouter`] that can only route to a directly connected [`Destination`].
+///
+/// # Privacy
+///
+/// Creating [`BlindedPath`]s may affect privacy since, if a suitable path cannot be found, it will
+/// create a one-hop path using the recipient as the introduction node if it is a announced node.
+/// Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node in order to send a message,
+/// and thus an `Err` is returned.
 pub struct DefaultMessageRouter<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, L: Deref, ES: Deref>
 where
        L::Target: Logger,
@@ -449,51 +481,12 @@ where
        pub fn new(network_graph: G, entropy_source: ES) -> Self {
                Self { network_graph, entropy_source }
        }
-}
-
-impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, L: Deref, ES: Deref> MessageRouter for DefaultMessageRouter<G, L, ES>
-where
-       L::Target: Logger,
-       ES::Target: EntropySource,
-{
-       fn find_path(
-               &self, sender: PublicKey, peers: Vec<PublicKey>, mut destination: Destination
-       ) -> Result<OnionMessagePath, ()> {
-               let network_graph = self.network_graph.deref().read_only();
-               destination.resolve(&network_graph);
 
-               let first_node = match destination.first_node() {
-                       Some(first_node) => first_node,
-                       None => return Err(()),
-               };
-
-               if peers.contains(&first_node) || sender == first_node {
-                       Ok(OnionMessagePath {
-                               intermediate_nodes: vec![], destination, first_node_addresses: None
-                       })
-               } else {
-                       let node_announcement = network_graph
-                               .node(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&first_node))
-                               .and_then(|node_info| node_info.announcement_info.as_ref())
-                               .and_then(|announcement_info| announcement_info.announcement_message.as_ref())
-                               .map(|node_announcement| &node_announcement.contents);
-
-                       match node_announcement {
-                               Some(node_announcement) if node_announcement.features.supports_onion_messages() => {
-                                       let first_node_addresses = Some(node_announcement.addresses.clone());
-                                       Ok(OnionMessagePath {
-                                               intermediate_nodes: vec![], destination, first_node_addresses
-                                       })
-                               },
-                               _ => Err(()),
-                       }
-               }
-       }
-
-       fn create_blinded_paths<
+       fn create_blinded_paths_from_iter<
+               I: Iterator<Item = ForwardNode>,
                T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification
        >(
-               &self, recipient: PublicKey, peers: Vec<ForwardNode>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
+               &self, recipient: PublicKey, peers: I, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, compact_paths: bool
        ) -> Result<Vec<BlindedPath>, ()> {
                // Limit the number of blinded paths that are computed.
                const MAX_PATHS: usize = 3;
@@ -506,7 +499,7 @@ where
                let is_recipient_announced =
                        network_graph.nodes().contains_key(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&recipient));
 
-               let mut peer_info = peers.into_iter()
+               let mut peer_info = peers
                        // Limit to peers with announced channels
                        .filter_map(|peer|
                                network_graph
@@ -541,14 +534,75 @@ where
                                }
                        },
                }?;
-               for path in &mut paths {
-                       path.use_compact_introduction_node(&network_graph);
+
+               if compact_paths {
+                       for path in &mut paths {
+                               path.use_compact_introduction_node(&network_graph);
+                       }
                }
 
                Ok(paths)
        }
 }
 
+impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, L: Deref, ES: Deref> MessageRouter for DefaultMessageRouter<G, L, ES>
+where
+       L::Target: Logger,
+       ES::Target: EntropySource,
+{
+       fn find_path(
+               &self, sender: PublicKey, peers: Vec<PublicKey>, mut destination: Destination
+       ) -> Result<OnionMessagePath, ()> {
+               let network_graph = self.network_graph.deref().read_only();
+               destination.resolve(&network_graph);
+
+               let first_node = match destination.first_node() {
+                       Some(first_node) => first_node,
+                       None => return Err(()),
+               };
+
+               if peers.contains(&first_node) || sender == first_node {
+                       Ok(OnionMessagePath {
+                               intermediate_nodes: vec![], destination, first_node_addresses: None
+                       })
+               } else {
+                       let node_details = network_graph
+                               .node(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&first_node))
+                               .and_then(|node_info| node_info.announcement_info.as_ref())
+                               .map(|announcement_info| (announcement_info.features(), announcement_info.addresses()));
+
+                       match node_details {
+                               Some((features, addresses)) if features.supports_onion_messages() && addresses.len() > 0 => {
+                                       let first_node_addresses = Some(addresses.clone());
+                                       Ok(OnionMessagePath {
+                                               intermediate_nodes: vec![], destination, first_node_addresses
+                                       })
+                               },
+                               _ => Err(()),
+                       }
+               }
+       }
+
+       fn create_blinded_paths<
+               T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification
+       >(
+               &self, recipient: PublicKey, peers: Vec<PublicKey>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
+       ) -> Result<Vec<BlindedPath>, ()> {
+               let peers = peers
+                       .into_iter()
+                       .map(|node_id| ForwardNode { node_id, short_channel_id: None });
+               self.create_blinded_paths_from_iter(recipient, peers, secp_ctx, false)
+       }
+
+       fn create_compact_blinded_paths<
+               T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification
+       >(
+               &self, recipient: PublicKey, peers: Vec<ForwardNode>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
+       ) -> Result<Vec<BlindedPath>, ()> {
+               self.create_blinded_paths_from_iter(recipient, peers.into_iter(), secp_ctx, true)
+       }
+}
+
 /// A path for sending an [`OnionMessage`].
 #[derive(Clone)]
 pub struct OnionMessagePath {
@@ -1082,10 +1136,7 @@ where
                let peers = self.message_recipients.lock().unwrap()
                        .iter()
                        .filter(|(_, peer)| matches!(peer, OnionMessageRecipient::ConnectedPeer(_)))
-                       .map(|(node_id, _ )| ForwardNode {
-                               node_id: *node_id,
-                               short_channel_id: None,
-                       })
+                       .map(|(node_id, _ )| *node_id)
                        .collect::<Vec<_>>();
 
                self.message_router