use chain::Access;
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
-use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, OptionalField};
+use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, OptionalField, GossipTimestampFilter};
use ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
use ln::msgs;
use util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Writer};
use core::ops::Deref;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
+#[cfg(feature = "std")]
+use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
+
+/// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
+/// suggestion.
+const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
+
/// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
/// refuse to relay the message.
const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
self.chain_access = chain_access;
}
+ /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
+ /// [`NetGraphMsgHandler::new`].
+ ///
+ /// (C-not exported) as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
+ pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
+ &self.network_graph
+ }
+
/// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
//TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
}
macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
- ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr ) => {
+ ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
match $secp_ctx.verify($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
Ok(_) => {},
- Err(_) => return Err(LightningError{err: "Invalid signature from remote node".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
+ Err(_) => {
+ return Err(LightningError {
+ err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
+ action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
+ msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
+ channel_id: [0; 32],
+ data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
+ },
+ log_level: Level::Trace,
+ },
+ });
+ },
}
};
}
/// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
/// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
/// tracking this directly.
- fn sync_routing_table(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) {
-
+ fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) {
// We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
return ();
}
- // Check if we need to perform a full synchronization with this peer
- if !self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
- return ();
+ // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
+ //
+ // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
+ // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
+ // updates from all our peers normally.
+ //
+ // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
+ // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
+ // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
+ // seen.
+ //
+ // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
+ // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
+ // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
+ // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
+ // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
+ //
+ // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
+ // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
+ // relying on it useless.
+ //
+ // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
+ // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
+ // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
+ //
+ // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
+ // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
+ // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
+ // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
+ // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
+ // message).
+ //
+ // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
+ // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
+ // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
+ // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
+ // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
+ // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
+ // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
+ //
+ // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
+ // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
+ // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
+ // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
+ //
+ // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
+ // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
+ // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
+ //
+ // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
+ let should_request_full_sync = self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id);
+ #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
+ let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")]
+ {
+ gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
+ if should_request_full_sync {
+ gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
+ } else {
+ gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
+ }
}
- let first_blocknum = 0;
- let number_of_blocks = 0xffffffff;
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), first_blocknum, number_of_blocks);
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery {
+ pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
- msg: QueryChannelRange {
+ msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
- first_blocknum,
- number_of_blocks,
+ first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
+ timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
},
});
}
- /// Statelessly processes a reply to a channel range query by immediately
- /// sending an SCID query with SCIDs in the reply. To keep this handler
- /// stateless, it does not validate the sequencing of replies for multi-
- /// reply ranges. It does not validate whether the reply(ies) cover the
- /// queried range. It also does not filter SCIDs to only those in the
- /// original query range. We also do not validate that the chain_hash
- /// matches the chain_hash of the NetworkGraph. Any chan_ann message that
- /// does not match our chain_hash will be rejected when the announcement is
- /// processed.
- fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}, sync_complete={}, scids={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks, msg.sync_complete, msg.short_channel_ids.len(),);
-
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_short_channel_ids peer={}, batch_size={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.short_channel_ids.len());
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery {
- node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
- msg: QueryShortChannelIds {
- chain_hash: msg.chain_hash,
- short_channel_ids: msg.short_channel_ids,
- }
- });
-
+ fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
+ // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
+ // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
Ok(())
}
- /// When an SCID query is initiated the remote peer will begin streaming
- /// gossip messages. In the event of a failure, we may have received
- /// some channel information. Before trying with another peer, the
- /// caller should update its set of SCIDs that need to be queried.
- fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_short_channel_ids_end peer={}, full_information={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.full_information);
-
- // If the remote node does not have up-to-date information for the
- // chain_hash they will set full_information=false. We can fail
- // the result and try again with a different peer.
- if !msg.full_information {
- return Err(LightningError {
- err: String::from("Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information"),
- action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError
- });
- }
-
+ fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
+ // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
+ // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
Ok(())
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
-/// Details about one direction of a channel. Received
-/// within a channel update.
-pub struct DirectionalChannelInfo {
+/// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
+pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
/// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
/// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
pub last_update: u32,
pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
}
-impl fmt::Display for DirectionalChannelInfo {
+impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
Ok(())
}
}
-impl_writeable_tlv_based!(DirectionalChannelInfo, {
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelUpdateInfo, {
(0, last_update, required),
(2, enabled, required),
(4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
/// Source node of the first direction of a channel
pub node_one: NodeId,
/// Details about the first direction of a channel
- pub one_to_two: Option<DirectionalChannelInfo>,
+ pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
/// Source node of the second direction of a channel
pub node_two: NodeId,
/// Details about the second direction of a channel
- pub two_to_one: Option<DirectionalChannelInfo>,
+ pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
/// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
/// An initial announcement of the channel
/// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
/// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
+ /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
+ /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
+ /// network graph in memory!).
+ announcement_received_time: u64,
+}
+
+impl ChannelInfo {
+ /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
+ /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
+ pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
+ let (direction, source) = {
+ if target == &self.node_one {
+ (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
+ } else if target == &self.node_two {
+ (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
+ } else {
+ return None;
+ }
+ };
+ Some((DirectedChannelInfo { channel: self, direction }, source))
+ }
+
+ /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
+ /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
+ pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
+ let (direction, target) = {
+ if source == &self.node_one {
+ (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
+ } else if source == &self.node_two {
+ (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
+ } else {
+ return None;
+ }
+ };
+ Some((DirectedChannelInfo { channel: self, direction }, target))
+ }
}
impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelInfo, {
(0, features, required),
+ (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
(2, node_one, required),
(4, one_to_two, required),
(6, node_two, required),
(12, announcement_message, required),
});
+/// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
+/// source node to a target node.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
+ channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
+ direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>,
+}
+
+impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
+ /// Returns information for the channel.
+ pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
+
+ /// Returns information for the direction.
+ pub fn direction(&self) -> Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo> { self.direction }
+
+ /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
+ ///
+ /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
+ /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
+ /// whichever is smaller.
+ pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
+ let capacity_msat = self.channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
+ self.direction
+ .and_then(|direction| direction.htlc_maximum_msat)
+ .map(|max_htlc_msat| {
+ let capacity_msat = capacity_msat.unwrap_or(u64::max_value());
+ if max_htlc_msat < capacity_msat {
+ EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat: max_htlc_msat }
+ } else {
+ EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat }
+ }
+ })
+ .or_else(|| capacity_msat.map(|capacity_msat|
+ EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat }))
+ .unwrap_or(EffectiveCapacity::Unknown)
+ }
+
+ /// Returns `Some` if [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] is available in the direction.
+ pub(super) fn with_update(self) -> Option<DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a>> {
+ match self.direction {
+ Some(_) => Some(DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate { inner: self }),
+ None => None,
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
+ f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
+ .field("channel", &self.channel)
+ .finish()
+ }
+}
+
+/// A [`DirectedChannelInfo`] with [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] available in its direction.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub(super) struct DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
+ inner: DirectedChannelInfo<'a>,
+}
+
+impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
+ /// Returns information for the channel.
+ #[inline]
+ pub(super) fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { &self.inner.channel }
+
+ /// Returns information for the direction.
+ #[inline]
+ pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.inner.direction.unwrap() }
+
+ /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
+ #[inline]
+ pub(super) fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity { self.inner.effective_capacity() }
+}
+
+impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
+ self.inner.fmt(f)
+ }
+}
+
+/// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
+///
+/// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
+/// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
+pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
+ /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
+ /// direct hop.
+ ExactLiquidity {
+ /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
+ /// millisatoshi.
+ liquidity_msat: u64,
+ },
+ /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
+ MaximumHTLC {
+ /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
+ amount_msat: u64,
+ },
+ /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
+ Total {
+ /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
+ capacity_msat: u64,
+ },
+ /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
+ /// an invoice.
+ Infinite,
+ /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
+ /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
+ Unknown,
+}
+
+/// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
+/// use when making routing decisions.
+pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
+
+impl EffectiveCapacity {
+ /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
+ pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
+ match self {
+ EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
+ EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
+ EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat } => *capacity_msat,
+ EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
+ EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
+ }
+ }
+}
/// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
#[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
}
}
+ /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
+ /// purposes.
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
+ for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().iter_mut() {
+ node.1.announcement_info = None;
+ }
+ }
+
/// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
/// given node announcement.
///
/// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
pub fn update_node_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
- secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id);
+ secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement");
self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
}
None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
Some(node) => {
if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
- if node_info.last_update >= msg.timestamp {
+ // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
+ // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
+ // that it be at least the current time.
+ if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
+ } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
}
}
C::Target: chain::Access,
{
let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
- secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1);
- secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2);
- secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1);
- secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2);
+ secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement");
+ secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement");
+ secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement");
+ secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement");
self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
}
},
};
+ #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
+ let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")]
+ {
+ announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
+ }
+
let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
features: msg.features.clone(),
node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1),
capacity_sats: utxo_value,
announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
{ full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
+ announcement_received_time,
};
let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), msg.short_channel_id);
*entry.get_mut() = chan_info;
} else {
- return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)})
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
}
},
BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
}
}
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")]
+ /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
+ /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
+ /// exist.
+ ///
+ /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
+ /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
+ /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
+ ///
+ /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
+ /// automatically called regularly for you.
+ ///
+ /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
+ /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
+ pub fn remove_stale_channels(&self) {
+ let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
+ self.remove_stale_channels_with_time(time);
+ }
+
+ /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
+ /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
+ /// exist.
+ ///
+ /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
+ /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
+ /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
+ ///
+ /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
+ /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels`] may be preferable.
+ pub fn remove_stale_channels_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
+ let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
+ // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
+ if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
+ if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
+ let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
+ // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
+ // time.
+ let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
+ for (scid, info) in channels.iter_mut() {
+ if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
+ info.one_to_two = None;
+ }
+ if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
+ info.two_to_one = None;
+ }
+ if info.one_to_two.is_none() && info.two_to_one.is_none() {
+ // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
+ // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
+ // channel_update for.
+ if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
+ scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
+ let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
+ for scid in scids_to_remove {
+ let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
+ Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
/// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
/// of the channel.
///
/// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
/// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
/// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
+ ///
+ /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
+ /// materially in the future will be rejected.
pub fn update_channel<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some((&msg.signature, secp_ctx)))
}
/// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
/// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
/// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
+ ///
+ /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
+ /// materially in the future will be rejected.
pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None::<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>)>)
}
let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
let chan_was_enabled;
+ #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
+ {
+ // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
+ // disable this check during tests!
+ let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
+ if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
+ }
+ if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
+ }
+ }
+
let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
}
}
}
- macro_rules! maybe_update_channel_info {
- ( $target: expr, $src_node: expr) => {
+ macro_rules! check_update_latest {
+ ($target: expr) => {
if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
- if existing_chan_info.last_update >= msg.timestamp {
+ // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
+ // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
+ // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
+ // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
+ // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
+ // but only in the non-normative section.
+ if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
+ } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
}
chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
} else {
chan_was_enabled = false;
}
+ }
+ }
+ macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
+ () => { {
let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
{ full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
- let updated_channel_dir_info = DirectionalChannelInfo {
+ let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
enabled: chan_enabled,
last_update: msg.timestamp,
cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
},
last_update_message
};
- $target = Some(updated_channel_dir_info);
- }
+ Some(updated_channel_update_info)
+ } }
}
let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
+ check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
- })?);
+ })?, "channel_update");
}
- maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.two_to_one, channel.node_two);
+ channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
} else {
dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
+ check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
- })?);
+ })?, "channel_update");
}
- maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.one_to_two, channel.node_one);
+ channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
}
}
}
use routing::network_graph::{NetGraphMsgHandler, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY};
use ln::msgs::{Init, OptionalField, RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
- ReplyChannelRange, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
+ ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
use util::test_utils;
use util::logger::Logger;
use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
+ use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
+
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
- use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
assert!(!net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
}
- #[test]
- fn handling_node_announcements() {
- let network_graph = create_network_graph();
- let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
-
- let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
- let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
- let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
- let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
- let first_announcement_time = 500;
-
+ fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
+ let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key);
let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
features: NodeFeatures::known(),
- timestamp: first_announcement_time,
- node_id: node_id_1,
+ timestamp: 100,
+ node_id: node_id,
rgb: [0; 3],
alias: [0; 32],
addresses: Vec::new(),
excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
excess_data: Vec::new(),
};
- let mut msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
+ f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
+ let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
+ NodeAnnouncement {
+ signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_key),
+ contents: unsigned_announcement
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
+ let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
+ let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
+ let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
+ let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
+
+ let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
+ features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
+ chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
+ short_channel_id: 0,
+ node_id_1,
+ node_id_2,
+ bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
+ bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
+ excess_data: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
+ let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
+ ChannelAnnouncement {
+ node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_key),
+ node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_key),
+ bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
+ bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
+ contents: unsigned_announcement,
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
+ let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
+ let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
+ .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey).serialize())
+ .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
+ .to_v0_p2wsh()
+ }
+
+ fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
+ let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
+ short_channel_id: 0,
+ timestamp: 100,
+ flags: 0,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
+ fee_base_msat: 10_000,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
+ excess_data: Vec::new()
};
+ f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
+ let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
+ ChannelUpdate {
+ signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_key),
+ contents: unsigned_channel_update
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn handling_node_announcements() {
+ let network_graph = create_network_graph();
+ let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
+
+ let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
+ let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
+ let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
+ let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
{
// Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
- let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
- features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
- chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
- short_channel_id: 0,
- node_id_1,
- node_id_2,
- bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
- excess_data: Vec::new(),
- };
-
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
- };
+ let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Ok(res) => assert!(res),
_ => panic!()
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(
&NodeAnnouncement {
signature: secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
+ contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
}) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
- Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
+ Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
};
- unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
- unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
- msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let announcement_with_data = NodeAnnouncement {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
- };
+ let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
+ unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
+ unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
+ }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
// Return false because contains excess data.
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
Err(_) => panic!()
};
- unsigned_announcement.excess_data = Vec::new();
// Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
// so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
- unsigned_announcement.timestamp -= 10;
- msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let outdated_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
- };
+ let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
+ unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
+ }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
- let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
- let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
-
- let good_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
- .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey).serialize())
- .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
-
- let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
- features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
- chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
- short_channel_id: 0,
- node_id_1,
- node_id_2,
- bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
- excess_data: Vec::new(),
- };
-
- let mut msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
- };
+ let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
+ let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
// Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
};
{
- match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id) {
+ match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
None => panic!(),
Some(_) => ()
};
*chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
- unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
-
- msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
- };
+ let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
+ unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
+ }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
};
// Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
- unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
*chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
-
- msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
- };
+ let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
+ unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
+ }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Ok(res) => assert!(res),
_ => panic!()
};
{
- match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id) {
+ match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
None => panic!(),
Some(_) => ()
};
// But if it is confirmed, replace the channel
*chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
- unsigned_announcement.features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
- msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
- };
+ let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
+ unsigned_announcement.features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
+ unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
+ }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Ok(res) => assert!(res),
_ => panic!()
};
{
- match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id) {
+ match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
Some(channel_entry) => {
assert_eq!(channel_entry.features, ChannelFeatures::empty());
},
}
// Don't relay valid channels with excess data
- unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
- unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
- msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
- };
+ let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
+ unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
+ unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
+ }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
_ => panic!()
};
- unsigned_announcement.excess_data = Vec::new();
- let invalid_sig_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
- };
+ let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
+ invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
- Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
+ Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
};
- unsigned_announcement.node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
- msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let channel_to_itself_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
- };
+ let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
- let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
- let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
- let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
- let short_channel_id = 0;
- let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
let amount_sats = 1000_000;
+ let short_channel_id;
{
// Announce a channel we will update
- let good_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
- .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey).serialize())
- .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
+ let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
*chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
- let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
- features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
- chain_hash,
- short_channel_id,
- node_id_1,
- node_id_2,
- bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
- excess_data: Vec::new(),
- };
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
- };
+ let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
+ short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
Ok(_) => (),
Err(_) => panic!()
}
- let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
- chain_hash,
- short_channel_id,
- timestamp: 100,
- flags: 0,
- cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
- htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
- fee_base_msat: 10000,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
- excess_data: Vec::new()
- };
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
- };
-
+ let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
Ok(res) => assert!(res),
_ => panic!()
};
}
- unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
- unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
- };
+ let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
+ unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
+ unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
+ }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
// Return false because contains excess data
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
_ => panic!()
};
- unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 10;
-
- unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
- };
+ let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
+ unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
+ unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
+ }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
};
- unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
-
- unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1);
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
- };
+ let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
+ unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1);
+ unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
+ }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
};
- unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Absent;
-
- unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(amount_sats * 1000 + 1);
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
- };
+ let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
+ unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(amount_sats * 1000 + 1);
+ unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
+ }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
};
- unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Absent;
// Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
// so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
- unsigned_channel_update.timestamp -= 10;
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
- };
-
+ let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
+ unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
+ }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
- Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
+ Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
};
- unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
+ let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
+ unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
+ }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
+ let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
- let invalid_sig_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
- };
-
+ invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
- Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
+ Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
};
-
}
#[test]
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
- let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
- let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
-
- let short_channel_id = 0;
- let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
{
// There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
}
+ let short_channel_id;
{
// Announce a channel we will update
- let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
- features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
- chain_hash,
- short_channel_id,
- node_id_1,
- node_id_2,
- bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
- excess_data: Vec::new(),
- };
-
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
- };
+ let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
+ short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source, &secp_ctx).is_ok());
assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
- let unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
- chain_hash,
- short_channel_id,
- timestamp: 100,
- flags: 0,
- cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
- htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
- fee_base_msat: 10000,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
- excess_data: Vec::new()
- };
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
- };
-
+ let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
}
// Permanent closing deletes a channel
+ net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
+ payment_id: None,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+ rejected_by_dest: false,
+ all_paths_failed: true,
+ path: vec![],
+ network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed {
+ short_channel_id,
+ is_permanent: true,
+ }),
+ short_channel_id: None,
+ retry: None,
+ error_code: None,
+ error_data: None,
+ });
+
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
+ // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
+ // TODO: Test NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure, which is not implemented yet.
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_channel_timeouts() {
+ // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels`.
+ let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
+ let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
+ let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
+ let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
+ let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), &logger);
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+
+ let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
+ let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
+
+ let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
+ let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
+ let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
+ assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source, &secp_ctx).is_ok());
+ assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
+
+ let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
+ assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
+ assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
+
+ network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
+
+ network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")]
{
- net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
- payment_id: None,
- payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
- rejected_by_dest: false,
- all_paths_failed: true,
- path: vec![],
- network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed {
- short_channel_id,
- is_permanent: true,
- }),
- short_channel_id: None,
- retry: None,
- error_code: None,
- error_data: None,
- });
+ // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
+ // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
+ // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks. Note that the
+ // directional channel information will have been removed already..
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
+ assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
- assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
- // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
- assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
+ use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
+ let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
+ network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
}
- // TODO: Test NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure, which is not implemented yet.
+
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
}
#[test]
let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
- let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
- let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
-
- let short_channel_id = 1;
- let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
// Channels were not announced yet.
let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(0, 1);
assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
+ let short_channel_id;
{
// Announce a channel we will update
- let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
- features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
- chain_hash,
- short_channel_id,
- node_id_1,
- node_id_2,
- bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
- excess_data: Vec::new(),
- };
-
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
- };
+ let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
+ short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
Ok(_) => (),
Err(_) => panic!()
{
// Valid channel update
- let unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
- chain_hash,
- short_channel_id,
- timestamp: 101,
- flags: 0,
- cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
- htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
- fee_base_msat: 10000,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
- excess_data: Vec::new()
- };
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
- };
+ let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
+ unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
+ }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
Ok(_) => (),
Err(_) => panic!()
panic!();
}
-
{
// Channel update with excess data.
- let unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
- chain_hash,
- short_channel_id,
- timestamp: 102,
- flags: 0,
- cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
- htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
- fee_base_msat: 10000,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
- excess_data: [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec()
- };
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
- };
+ let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
+ unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
+ unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
+ }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
Ok(_) => (),
Err(_) => panic!()
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
- let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
- let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
-
- let short_channel_id = 1;
- let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
// No nodes yet.
let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 10);
{
// Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
- let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
- features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
- chain_hash,
- short_channel_id,
- node_id_1,
- node_id_2,
- bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
- excess_data: Vec::new(),
- };
-
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
- };
+ let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
Ok(_) => (),
Err(_) => panic!()
assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
{
- let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
- features: NodeFeatures::known(),
- timestamp: 1000,
- node_id: node_id_1,
- rgb: [0; 3],
- alias: [0; 32],
- addresses: Vec::new(),
- excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
- excess_data: Vec::new(),
- };
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
- };
+ let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Ok(_) => (),
Err(_) => panic!()
};
- unsigned_announcement.node_id = node_id_2;
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
- };
-
+ let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Ok(_) => (),
Err(_) => panic!()
{
// Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
- let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
- features: NodeFeatures::known(),
- timestamp: 1010,
- node_id: node_id_2,
- rgb: [0; 3],
- alias: [0; 32],
- addresses: Vec::new(),
- excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
- excess_data: [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec(),
- };
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
- };
+ let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
+ unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
+ unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
+ }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
Err(_) => panic!()
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
// Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
- let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
- let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
- let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
- features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
- chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
- short_channel_id: 0,
- node_id_1,
- node_id_2,
- bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
- excess_data: Vec::new(),
- };
-
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
- };
+ let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Ok(res) => assert!(res),
_ => panic!()
};
-
- let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
- let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
- features: NodeFeatures::known(),
- timestamp: 100,
- node_id,
- rgb: [0; 3],
- alias: [0; 32],
- addresses: Vec::new(),
- excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
- excess_data: Vec::new(),
- };
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
- };
-
+ let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Ok(_) => (),
Err(_) => panic!()
}
#[test]
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")]
fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
+ use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
+
let network_graph = create_network_graph();
let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
- let first_blocknum = 0;
- let number_of_blocks = 0xffff_ffff;
// It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
{
- let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known().clear_gossip_queries() };
- net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
+ let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known().clear_gossip_queries(), remote_network_address: None };
+ net_graph_msg_handler.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
}
- // It should send a query_channel_message with the correct information
+ // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
{
- let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known() };
- net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
+ let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None };
+ net_graph_msg_handler.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
match &events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery{ node_id, msg } => {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
- assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, first_blocknum);
- assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, number_of_blocks);
+ let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
+ assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
+ assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
+ assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
},
_ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
};
}
-
- // It should not enqueue a query when should_request_full_sync return false.
- // The initial implementation allows syncing with the first 5 peers after
- // which should_request_full_sync will return false
- {
- let network_graph = create_network_graph();
- let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
- let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known() };
- for n in 1..7 {
- let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[n; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
- net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id, &init_msg);
- let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- if n <= 5 {
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- } else {
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
- }
-
- }
- }
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn handling_reply_channel_range() {
- let network_graph = create_network_graph();
- let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
- let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
-
- let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
-
- // Test receipt of a single reply that should enqueue an SCID query
- // matching the SCIDs in the reply
- {
- let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_channel_range(&node_id_1, ReplyChannelRange {
- chain_hash,
- sync_complete: true,
- first_blocknum: 0,
- number_of_blocks: 2000,
- short_channel_ids: vec![
- 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0
- 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0
- 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0
- 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0
- 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0
- 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0
- ],
- });
- assert!(result.is_ok());
-
- // We expect to emit a query_short_channel_ids message with the received scids
- let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match &events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { node_id, msg } => {
- assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
- assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
- assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, vec![
- 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0
- 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0
- 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0
- 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0
- 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0
- 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0
- ]);
- },
- _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery"),
- }
- }
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn handling_reply_short_channel_ids() {
- let network_graph = create_network_graph();
- let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
- let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
-
- let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
-
- // Test receipt of a successful reply
- {
- let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
- chain_hash,
- full_information: true,
- });
- assert!(result.is_ok());
- }
-
- // Test receipt of a reply that indicates the peer does not maintain up-to-date information
- // for the chain_hash requested in the query.
- {
- let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
- chain_hash,
- full_information: false,
- });
- assert!(result.is_err());
- assert_eq!(result.err().unwrap().err, "Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information");
- }
}
#[test]
let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
- let bitcoin_key_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey);
- let bitcoin_key_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey);
let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
for scid in scids {
- let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
- features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
- chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
- short_channel_id: scid,
- node_id_1,
- node_id_2,
- bitcoin_key_1,
- bitcoin_key_2,
- excess_data: Vec::new(),
- };
-
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
- };
+ let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
+ unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
+ }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Ok(_) => (),
_ => panic!()
}
}
-#[cfg(all(test, feature = "unstable"))]
+#[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
mod benches {
use super::*;