use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
+use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
-use chain::chaininterface::{ChainError, ChainWatchInterface};
+use chain;
+use chain::Access;
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
-use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, OptionalField, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
+use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
+use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, OptionalField};
+use ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
use ln::msgs;
use util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Writer};
use util::logger::Logger;
+use util::events;
use std::{cmp, fmt};
-use std::sync::RwLock;
+use std::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
+use std::sync::Mutex;
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
use std::collections::btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry;
use std::ops::Deref;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
+/// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
+#[derive(PartialEq)]
+pub struct NetworkGraph {
+ genesis_hash: BlockHash,
+ channels: BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>,
+ nodes: BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo>,
+}
+
+/// A simple newtype for RwLockReadGuard<'a, NetworkGraph>.
+/// This exists only to make accessing a RwLock<NetworkGraph> possible from
+/// the C bindings, as it can be done directly in Rust code.
+pub struct LockedNetworkGraph<'a>(pub RwLockReadGuard<'a, NetworkGraph>);
+
/// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
/// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
/// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
/// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
/// serving historical announcements.
-pub struct NetGraphMsgHandler<C: Deref, L: Deref> where C::Target: ChainWatchInterface, L::Target: Logger {
+pub struct NetGraphMsgHandler<C: Deref, L: Deref> where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
/// Representation of the payment channel network
pub network_graph: RwLock<NetworkGraph>,
- chain_monitor: C,
+ chain_access: Option<C>,
full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
+ pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>>,
logger: L,
}
-impl<C: Deref, L: Deref> NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L> where C::Target: ChainWatchInterface, L::Target: Logger {
+impl<C: Deref, L: Deref> NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L> where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
/// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
/// assuming a fresh network graph.
/// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
/// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
/// channel owners' keys.
- pub fn new(chain_monitor: C, logger: L) -> Self {
+ pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
NetGraphMsgHandler {
secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
- network_graph: RwLock::new(NetworkGraph {
- channels: BTreeMap::new(),
- nodes: BTreeMap::new(),
- }),
+ network_graph: RwLock::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash)),
full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
- chain_monitor,
+ chain_access,
+ pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
logger,
}
}
/// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
/// assuming an existing Network Graph.
- pub fn from_net_graph(chain_monitor: C, logger: L, network_graph: NetworkGraph) -> Self {
+ pub fn from_net_graph(chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L, network_graph: NetworkGraph) -> Self {
NetGraphMsgHandler {
secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
network_graph: RwLock::new(network_graph),
full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
- chain_monitor,
+ chain_access,
+ pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
logger,
}
}
+
+ /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
+ /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
+ /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
+ pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
+ self.chain_access = chain_access;
+ }
+
+ /// Take a read lock on the network_graph and return it in the C-bindings
+ /// newtype helper. This is likely only useful when called via the C
+ /// bindings as you can call `self.network_graph.read().unwrap()` in Rust
+ /// yourself.
+ pub fn read_locked_graph<'a>(&'a self) -> LockedNetworkGraph<'a> {
+ LockedNetworkGraph(self.network_graph.read().unwrap())
+ }
+
+ /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
+ fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
+ //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
+ const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
+ if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
+ self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
+ true
+ } else {
+ false
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl<'a> LockedNetworkGraph<'a> {
+ /// Get a reference to the NetworkGraph which this read-lock contains.
+ pub fn graph(&self) -> &NetworkGraph {
+ &*self.0
+ }
}
};
}
-impl<C: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send> RoutingMessageHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L> where C::Target: ChainWatchInterface, L::Target: Logger {
+impl<C: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send> RoutingMessageHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L> where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
- self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_node_from_announcement(msg, Some(&self.secp_ctx))
+ self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_node_from_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
+ Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() && msg.contents.excess_address_data.is_empty())
}
fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
- if msg.contents.node_id_1 == msg.contents.node_id_2 || msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2 {
- return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
- }
-
- let utxo_value = match self.chain_monitor.get_chain_utxo(msg.contents.chain_hash, msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
- Ok((script_pubkey, value)) => {
- let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
- .push_slice(&msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
- .push_slice(&msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
- if script_pubkey != expected_script {
- return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", script_pubkey.to_hex(), expected_script.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
- }
- //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
- //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
- Some(value)
- },
- Err(ChainError::NotSupported) => {
- // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
- None
- },
- Err(ChainError::NotWatched) => {
- return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.contents.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
- },
- Err(ChainError::UnknownTx) => {
- return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
- },
- };
- let result = self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel_from_announcement(msg, utxo_value, Some(&self.secp_ctx));
+ self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access, &self.secp_ctx)?;
log_trace!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
- result
+ Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty())
}
fn handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&self, update: &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate) {
match update {
&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
- let _ = self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel(msg, Some(&self.secp_ctx));
+ let _ = self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx);
},
&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
self.network_graph.write().unwrap().close_channel_from_update(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
}
fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
- self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel(msg, Some(&self.secp_ctx))
+ self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
+ Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty())
}
- fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
+ fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
let network_graph = self.network_graph.read().unwrap();
let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
let mut iter = network_graph.get_channels().range(starting_point..);
result
}
- fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<msgs::NodeAnnouncement> {
+ fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<NodeAnnouncement> {
let network_graph = self.network_graph.read().unwrap();
let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
let mut iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
result
}
- fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
- //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
- const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
- if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
- self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
- true
- } else {
- false
+ /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
+ /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
+ /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
+ ///
+ /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
+ /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
+ /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
+ /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
+ /// tracking this directly.
+ fn sync_routing_table(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) {
+
+ // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
+ if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
+ return ();
+ }
+
+ // Check if we need to perform a full synchronization with this peer
+ if !self.should_request_full_sync(their_node_id) {
+ return ();
+ }
+
+ let first_blocknum = 0;
+ let number_of_blocks = 0xffffffff;
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), first_blocknum, number_of_blocks);
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg: QueryChannelRange {
+ chain_hash: self.network_graph.read().unwrap().genesis_hash,
+ first_blocknum,
+ number_of_blocks,
+ },
+ });
+ }
+
+ /// Statelessly processes a reply to a channel range query by immediately
+ /// sending an SCID query with SCIDs in the reply. To keep this handler
+ /// stateless, it does not validate the sequencing of replies for multi-
+ /// reply ranges. It does not validate whether the reply(ies) cover the
+ /// queried range. It also does not filter SCIDs to only those in the
+ /// original query range. We also do not validate that the chain_hash
+ /// matches the chain_hash of the NetworkGraph. Any chan_ann message that
+ /// does not match our chain_hash will be rejected when the announcement is
+ /// processed.
+ fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}, full_information={}, scids={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks, msg.full_information, msg.short_channel_ids.len(),);
+
+ // Validate that the remote node maintains up-to-date channel
+ // information for chain_hash. Some nodes use the full_information
+ // flag to indicate multi-part messages so we must check whether
+ // we received SCIDs as well.
+ if !msg.full_information && msg.short_channel_ids.len() == 0 {
+ return Err(LightningError {
+ err: String::from("Received reply_channel_range with no information available"),
+ action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
+ });
}
+
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_short_channel_ids peer={}, batch_size={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.short_channel_ids.len());
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg: QueryShortChannelIds {
+ chain_hash: msg.chain_hash,
+ short_channel_ids: msg.short_channel_ids,
+ }
+ });
+
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// When an SCID query is initiated the remote peer will begin streaming
+ /// gossip messages. In the event of a failure, we may have received
+ /// some channel information. Before trying with another peer, the
+ /// caller should update its set of SCIDs that need to be queried.
+ fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_short_channel_ids_end peer={}, full_information={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.full_information);
+
+ // If the remote node does not have up-to-date information for the
+ // chain_hash they will set full_information=false. We can fail
+ // the result and try again with a different peer.
+ if !msg.full_information {
+ return Err(LightningError {
+ err: String::from("Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information"),
+ action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError
+ });
+ }
+
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ // TODO
+ Err(LightningError {
+ err: String::from("Not implemented"),
+ action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
+ })
+ }
+
+ fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ // TODO
+ Err(LightningError {
+ err: String::from("Not implemented"),
+ action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+impl<C: Deref, L: Deref> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L>
+where
+ C::Target: chain::Access,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+{
+ fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
+ let mut ret = Vec::new();
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ std::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
+ ret
}
}
/// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
/// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
/// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
- pub last_update_message: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>,
+ pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
}
impl fmt::Display for DirectionalChannelInfo {
/// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
/// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
/// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
- pub announcement_message: Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>,
+ pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
}
impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
/// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
/// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
/// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
- pub announcement_message: Option<msgs::NodeAnnouncement>
+ pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
}
impl Writeable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
}
}
-/// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
-pub struct NetworkGraph {
- channels: BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>,
- nodes: BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo>,
-}
-
impl Writeable for NetworkGraph {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
(self.channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in self.channels.iter() {
(*chan_id).write(writer)?;
impl Readable for NetworkGraph {
fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetworkGraph, DecodeError> {
+ let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
for _ in 0..channels_count {
nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
}
Ok(NetworkGraph {
+ genesis_hash,
channels,
nodes,
})
impl fmt::Display for NetworkGraph {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
- write!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]\n")?;
+ writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
for (key, val) in self.channels.iter() {
- write!(f, " {}: {}\n", key, val)?;
+ writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
}
- write!(f, "[Nodes]\n")?;
+ writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
for (key, val) in self.nodes.iter() {
- write!(f, " {}: {}\n", log_pubkey!(key), val)?;
+ writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_pubkey!(key), val)?;
}
Ok(())
}
impl NetworkGraph {
/// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
+ ///
+ /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
pub fn get_channels<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> { &self.channels }
/// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
+ ///
+ /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
pub fn get_nodes<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo> { &self.nodes }
/// Get network addresses by node id.
/// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
/// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
+ ///
+ /// (C-not exported) as there is no practical way to track lifetimes of returned values.
pub fn get_addresses<'a>(&'a self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<&'a Vec<NetAddress>> {
if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(pubkey) {
if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
}
/// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
- pub fn new() -> NetworkGraph {
+ pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash) -> NetworkGraph {
Self {
+ genesis_hash,
channels: BTreeMap::new(),
nodes: BTreeMap::new(),
}
}
- /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a given node announcement
- /// Announcement signatures are checked here only if Secp256k1 object is provided.
- fn update_node_from_announcement(&mut self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: Option<&Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>>) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
- if let Some(sig_verifier) = secp_ctx {
- let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
- secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id);
- }
+ /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
+ /// given node announcement.
+ ///
+ /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
+ /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
+ /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
+ pub fn update_node_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
+ secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id);
+ self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
+ }
- match self.nodes.get_mut(&msg.contents.node_id) {
+ /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
+ /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
+ /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
+ /// peers.
+ pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
+ }
+
+ fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ match self.nodes.get_mut(&msg.node_id) {
None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
Some(node) => {
if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
- if node_info.last_update >= msg.contents.timestamp {
+ if node_info.last_update >= msg.timestamp {
return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
}
}
- let should_relay = msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() && msg.contents.excess_address_data.is_empty();
+ let should_relay = msg.excess_data.is_empty() && msg.excess_address_data.is_empty();
node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
- features: msg.contents.features.clone(),
- last_update: msg.contents.timestamp,
- rgb: msg.contents.rgb,
- alias: msg.contents.alias,
- addresses: msg.contents.addresses.clone(),
- announcement_message: if should_relay { Some(msg.clone()) } else { None },
+ features: msg.features.clone(),
+ last_update: msg.timestamp,
+ rgb: msg.rgb,
+ alias: msg.alias,
+ addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
+ announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
});
- Ok(should_relay)
+ Ok(())
}
}
}
- /// For a new or already known (from previous announcement) channel, store or update channel info.
- /// Also store nodes (if not stored yet) the channel is between, and make node aware of this channel.
- /// Checking utxo on-chain is useful if we receive an update for already known channel id,
- /// which is probably result of a reorg. In that case, we update channel info only if the
- /// utxo was checked, otherwise stick to the existing update, to prevent DoS risks.
- /// Announcement signatures are checked here only if Secp256k1 object is provided.
- fn update_channel_from_announcement(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, utxo_value: Option<u64>, secp_ctx: Option<&Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>>) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
- if let Some(sig_verifier) = secp_ctx {
- let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
- secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1);
- secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2);
- secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1);
- secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2);
+ /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
+ ///
+ /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
+ /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
+ /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
+ ///
+ /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
+ /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
+ pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification, C: Deref>
+ (&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>)
+ -> Result<(), LightningError>
+ where C::Target: chain::Access {
+ let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
+ secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1);
+ secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2);
+ secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1);
+ secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2);
+ self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
+ }
+
+ /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
+ /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
+ /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
+ ///
+ /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
+ /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
+ pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>
+ (&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>)
+ -> Result<(), LightningError>
+ where C::Target: chain::Access {
+ self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
+ }
+
+ fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>
+ (&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>)
+ -> Result<(), LightningError>
+ where C::Target: chain::Access {
+ if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
}
- let should_relay = msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty();
+ let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
+ &None => {
+ // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
+ None
+ },
+ &Some(ref chain_access) => {
+ match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
+ Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
+ let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
+ .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
+ .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
+ if script_pubkey != expected_script {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", script_pubkey.to_hex(), expected_script.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+ }
+ //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
+ //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
+ Some(value)
+ },
+ Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+ },
+ Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+ },
+ }
+ },
+ };
let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
- features: msg.contents.features.clone(),
- node_one: msg.contents.node_id_1.clone(),
+ features: msg.features.clone(),
+ node_one: msg.node_id_1.clone(),
one_to_two: None,
- node_two: msg.contents.node_id_2.clone(),
+ node_two: msg.node_id_2.clone(),
two_to_one: None,
capacity_sats: utxo_value,
- announcement_message: if should_relay { Some(msg.clone()) } else { None },
+ announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.is_empty() { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
};
- match self.channels.entry(msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
+ match self.channels.entry(msg.short_channel_id) {
BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
//TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
//in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
// b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
// get reorg'd out.
// c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
- Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut self.nodes, &entry.get(), msg.contents.short_channel_id);
+ Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut self.nodes, &entry.get(), msg.short_channel_id);
*entry.get_mut() = chan_info;
} else {
return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError})
( $node_id: expr ) => {
match self.nodes.entry($node_id) {
BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
- node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(msg.contents.short_channel_id);
+ node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(msg.short_channel_id);
},
BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
- channels: vec!(msg.contents.short_channel_id),
+ channels: vec!(msg.short_channel_id),
lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
announcement_info: None,
});
};
}
- add_channel_to_node!(msg.contents.node_id_1);
- add_channel_to_node!(msg.contents.node_id_2);
+ add_channel_to_node!(msg.node_id_1);
+ add_channel_to_node!(msg.node_id_2);
- Ok(should_relay)
+ Ok(())
}
/// Close a channel if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
}
}
- /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions of a channel.
- /// Announcement signatures are checked here only if Secp256k1 object is provided.
- fn update_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate, secp_ctx: Option<&Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>>) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
+ /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
+ /// of the channel.
+ ///
+ /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
+ /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
+ /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
+ pub fn update_channel<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some((&msg.signature, secp_ctx)))
+ }
+
+ /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
+ /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
+ /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
+ pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None::<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>)>)
+ }
+
+ fn update_channel_intern<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig_info: Option<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<T>)>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
let dest_node_id;
- let chan_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
+ let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
let chan_was_enabled;
- match self.channels.get_mut(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
+ match self.channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
Some(channel) => {
- if let OptionalField::Present(htlc_maximum_msat) = msg.contents.htlc_maximum_msat {
+ if let OptionalField::Present(htlc_maximum_msat) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat {
if htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
}
if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
// It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
// Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
- if htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
- return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+ if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
}
}
}
macro_rules! maybe_update_channel_info {
( $target: expr, $src_node: expr) => {
if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
- if existing_chan_info.last_update >= msg.contents.timestamp {
+ if existing_chan_info.last_update >= msg.timestamp {
return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
}
chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
chan_was_enabled = false;
}
- let last_update_message = if msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() {
- Some(msg.clone())
- } else {
- None
- };
+ let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.is_empty() { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
let updated_channel_dir_info = DirectionalChannelInfo {
enabled: chan_enabled,
- last_update: msg.contents.timestamp,
- cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta,
- htlc_minimum_msat: msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat,
- htlc_maximum_msat: if let OptionalField::Present(max_value) = msg.contents.htlc_maximum_msat { Some(max_value) } else { None },
+ last_update: msg.timestamp,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: if let OptionalField::Present(max_value) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat { Some(max_value) } else { None },
fees: RoutingFees {
- base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
- proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
+ base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
+ proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
},
last_update_message
};
}
}
- let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
- if msg.contents.flags & 1 == 1 {
+ let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
+ if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
- if let Some(sig_verifier) = secp_ctx {
- secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &channel.node_two);
+ if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
+ secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &channel.node_two);
}
maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.two_to_one, channel.node_two);
} else {
dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
- if let Some(sig_verifier) = secp_ctx {
- secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &channel.node_one);
+ if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
+ secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &channel.node_one);
}
maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.one_to_two, channel.node_one);
}
if chan_enabled {
let node = self.nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
- let mut base_msat = msg.contents.fee_base_msat;
- let mut proportional_millionths = msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths;
+ let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
+ let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
}
- Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty())
+ Ok(())
}
fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
- use chain::chaininterface;
- use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
+ use chain;
+ use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use routing::network_graph::{NetGraphMsgHandler, NetworkGraph};
- use ln::msgs::{OptionalField, RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
+ use ln::msgs::{Init, OptionalField, RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate, HTLCFailChannelUpdate,
- MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
+ ReplyChannelRange, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
use util::test_utils;
use util::logger::Logger;
use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
+ use util::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
- use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
use hex;
use std::sync::Arc;
- fn create_net_graph_msg_handler() -> (Secp256k1<All>, NetGraphMsgHandler<Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) {
+ fn create_net_graph_msg_handler() -> (Secp256k1<All>, NetGraphMsgHandler<Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
- let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet));
- let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(chain_monitor, Arc::clone(&logger));
+ let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
+ let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(genesis_hash, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
(secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler)
}
// Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
- chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
+ chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
short_channel_id: 0,
node_id_1,
node_id_2,
fn handling_channel_announcements() {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
- let chain_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainWatcher::new());
- let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
-
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
- chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
+ chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
short_channel_id: 0,
node_id_1,
node_id_2,
};
// Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
- *chain_monitor.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chaininterface::ChainError::NotSupported);
-
+ let mut net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(), None, Arc::clone(&logger));
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Ok(res) => assert!(res),
_ => panic!()
}
}
-
// If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
// drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have knowledge of channel")
};
-
// Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
- *chain_monitor.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chaininterface::ChainError::UnknownTx);
+ let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
+ *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
+ net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(chain_source.clone().genesis_hash, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
};
-
// Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
- *chain_monitor.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok((good_script.clone(), 0));
+ *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
// If we receive announcement for the same channel (but TX is not confirmed),
// drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
- *chain_monitor.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chaininterface::ChainError::UnknownTx);
+ *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
};
// But if it is confirmed, replace the channel
- *chain_monitor.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok((good_script, 0));
+ *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
unsigned_announcement.features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
unsigned_announcement.node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
let channel_to_itself_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
+ node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
+ node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
fn handling_channel_update() {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
- let chain_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainWatcher::new());
- let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
+ let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
+ let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(), Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
let short_channel_id = 0;
- let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash();
+ let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
let amount_sats = 1000_000;
{
.push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
- *chain_monitor.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok((good_script.clone(), amount_sats));
+ *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
chain_hash,
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
- Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity")
+ Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
};
unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Absent;
let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
let short_channel_id = 0;
- let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash();
+ let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
{
// There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
let short_channel_id = 1;
- let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash();
+ let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
// Channels were not announced yet.
let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(0, 1);
let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
let short_channel_id = 1;
- let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash();
+ let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
// No nodes yet.
let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 10);
let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
- chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
+ chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
short_channel_id: 0,
node_id_1,
node_id_2,
network.write(&mut w).unwrap();
assert!(<NetworkGraph>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap() == *network);
}
+
+ #[test]
+ fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
+ let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
+ let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
+ let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
+
+ let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
+ let first_blocknum = 0;
+ let number_of_blocks = 0xffff_ffff;
+
+ // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
+ {
+ let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known().clear_gossip_queries() };
+ net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
+ let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
+ }
+
+ // It should send a query_channel_message with the correct information
+ {
+ let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known() };
+ net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
+ let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match &events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery{ node_id, msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
+ assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
+ assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, first_blocknum);
+ assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, number_of_blocks);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
+ };
+ }
+
+ // It should not enqueue a query when should_request_full_sync return false.
+ // The initial implementation allows syncing with the first 5 peers after
+ // which should_request_full_sync will return false
+ {
+ let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
+ let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known() };
+ for n in 1..7 {
+ let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[n; 32]).unwrap();
+ let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
+ net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id, &init_msg);
+ let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ if n <= 5 {
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
+ }
+
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn handling_reply_channel_range() {
+ let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
+ let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
+ let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
+
+ let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
+
+ // Test receipt of a single reply that should enqueue an SCID query
+ // matching the SCIDs in the reply
+ {
+ let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_channel_range(&node_id_1, ReplyChannelRange {
+ chain_hash,
+ full_information: true,
+ first_blocknum: 0,
+ number_of_blocks: 2000,
+ short_channel_ids: vec![
+ 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0
+ 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0
+ 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0
+ 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0
+ 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0
+ 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0
+ ],
+ });
+ assert!(result.is_ok());
+
+ // We expect to emit a query_short_channel_ids message with the received scids
+ let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match &events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { node_id, msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
+ assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
+ assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, vec![
+ 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0
+ 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0
+ 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0
+ 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0
+ 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0
+ 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0
+ ]);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery"),
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Test receipt of a reply that indicates the remote node does not maintain up-to-date
+ // information for the chain_hash. Because of discrepancies in implementation we use
+ // full_information=false and short_channel_ids=[] as the signal.
+ {
+ // Handle the reply indicating the peer was unable to fulfill our request.
+ let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_channel_range(&node_id_1, ReplyChannelRange {
+ chain_hash,
+ full_information: false,
+ first_blocknum: 1000,
+ number_of_blocks: 100,
+ short_channel_ids: vec![],
+ });
+ assert!(result.is_err());
+ assert_eq!(result.err().unwrap().err, "Received reply_channel_range with no information available");
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn handling_reply_short_channel_ids() {
+ let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
+ let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
+ let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
+
+ let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
+
+ // Test receipt of a successful reply
+ {
+ let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
+ chain_hash,
+ full_information: true,
+ });
+ assert!(result.is_ok());
+ }
+
+ // Test receipt of a reply that indicates the peer does not maintain up-to-date information
+ // for the chain_hash requested in the query.
+ {
+ let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
+ chain_hash,
+ full_information: false,
+ });
+ assert!(result.is_err());
+ assert_eq!(result.err().unwrap().err, "Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information");
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn handling_query_channel_range() {
+ let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
+ let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
+ let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
+
+ let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
+
+ let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_channel_range(&node_id, QueryChannelRange {
+ chain_hash,
+ first_blocknum: 0,
+ number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
+ });
+ assert!(result.is_err());
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
+ let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
+ let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
+ let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
+
+ let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
+
+ let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
+ chain_hash,
+ short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
+ });
+ assert!(result.is_err());
+ }
}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff