+// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
+// history.
+//
+// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
+// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
+// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
+// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
+// licenses.
+
//! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
+use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
-use chain::chaininterface::{ChainError, ChainWatchInterface};
+use chain;
+use chain::Access;
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
-use ln::msgs::{DecodeError,ErrorAction,LightningError,RoutingMessageHandler,NetAddress};
+use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
+use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, OptionalField};
+use ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
use ln::msgs;
use util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Writer};
-use util::logger::Logger;
+use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
+use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
+use util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
+
+use io;
+use prelude::*;
+use alloc::collections::{BTreeMap, btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry};
+use core::{cmp, fmt};
+use sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
+use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
+use sync::Mutex;
+use core::ops::Deref;
+use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
+
+#[cfg(feature = "std")]
+use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
+
+/// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
+/// suggestion.
+const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
+
+/// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
+/// refuse to relay the message.
+const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
+
+/// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
+/// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
+const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
+
+/// Represents the compressed public key of a node
+#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
+pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
+
+impl NodeId {
+ /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
+ pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
+ NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
+ }
+
+ /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
+ pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
+ &self.0
+ }
+}
+
+impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
+ write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
+ }
+}
+
+impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
+ fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
+ self.0.hash(hasher);
+ }
+}
+
+impl Eq for NodeId {}
+
+impl PartialEq for NodeId {
+ fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
+ self.0[..] == other.0[..]
+ }
+}
+
+impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
+ fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
+ Some(self.cmp(other))
+ }
+}
+
+impl Ord for NodeId {
+ fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
+ self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for NodeId {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl Readable for NodeId {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
+ reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
+ Ok(Self(buf))
+ }
+}
+
+/// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
+pub struct NetworkGraph {
+ genesis_hash: BlockHash,
+ // Lock order: channels -> nodes
+ channels: RwLock<BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
+ nodes: RwLock<BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
+}
+
+impl Clone for NetworkGraph {
+ fn clone(&self) -> Self {
+ let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
+ let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
+ Self {
+ genesis_hash: self.genesis_hash.clone(),
+ channels: RwLock::new(channels.clone()),
+ nodes: RwLock::new(nodes.clone()),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
+pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
+ channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
+ nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
+}
+
+/// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
+/// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
+///
+/// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+pub enum NetworkUpdate {
+ /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
+ /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
+ ChannelUpdateMessage {
+ /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
+ msg: ChannelUpdate,
+ },
+ /// An error indicating only that a channel has been closed, which should be applied via
+ /// [`NetworkGraph::close_channel_from_update`].
+ ChannelClosed {
+ /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
+ short_channel_id: u64,
+ /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
+ /// `channel_update` message is received.
+ is_permanent: bool,
+ },
+ /// An error indicating only that a node has failed, which should be applied via
+ /// [`NetworkGraph::fail_node`].
+ NodeFailure {
+ /// The node id of the failed node.
+ node_id: PublicKey,
+ /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
+ /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
+ is_permanent: bool,
+ }
+}
-use std::{cmp, fmt};
-use std::sync::RwLock;
-use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
-use std::collections::BTreeMap;
-use std::collections::btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry;
-use std::ops::Deref;
+impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
+ (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
+ (0, msg, required),
+ },
+ (2, ChannelClosed) => {
+ (0, short_channel_id, required),
+ (2, is_permanent, required),
+ },
+ (4, NodeFailure) => {
+ (0, node_id, required),
+ (2, is_permanent, required),
+ },
+);
+
+impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> EventHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
+where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
+ fn handle_event(&self, event: &Event) {
+ if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash: _, rejected_by_dest: _, network_update, .. } = event {
+ if let Some(network_update) = network_update {
+ self.handle_network_update(network_update);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
/// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
/// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
/// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
/// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
/// serving historical announcements.
-pub struct NetGraphMsgHandler<C: Deref, L: Deref> where C::Target: ChainWatchInterface, L::Target: Logger {
+///
+/// Serves as an [`EventHandler`] for applying updates from [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`] to the
+/// [`NetworkGraph`].
+pub struct NetGraphMsgHandler<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref>
+where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
+{
secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
- /// Representation of the payment channel network
- pub network_graph: RwLock<NetworkGraph>,
- chain_monitor: C,
+ network_graph: G,
+ chain_access: Option<C>,
full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
+ pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
logger: L,
}
-impl<C: Deref, L: Deref> NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L> where C::Target: ChainWatchInterface, L::Target: Logger {
+impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
+where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
+{
/// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
- /// assuming a fresh network graph.
+ /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
/// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
/// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
/// channel owners' keys.
- pub fn new(chain_monitor: C, logger: L) -> Self {
+ pub fn new(network_graph: G, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
NetGraphMsgHandler {
secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
- network_graph: RwLock::new(NetworkGraph {
- channels: BTreeMap::new(),
- nodes: BTreeMap::new(),
- }),
+ network_graph,
full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
- chain_monitor,
+ chain_access,
+ pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
logger,
}
}
- /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
- /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
- pub fn from_net_graph(chain_monitor: C, logger: L, network_graph: NetworkGraph) -> Self {
- NetGraphMsgHandler {
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
- network_graph: RwLock::new(network_graph),
- full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
- chain_monitor,
- logger,
+ /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
+ /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
+ /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
+ pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
+ self.chain_access = chain_access;
+ }
+
+ /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
+ /// [`NetGraphMsgHandler::new`].
+ ///
+ /// (C-not exported) as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
+ pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
+ &self.network_graph
+ }
+
+ /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
+ fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
+ //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
+ const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
+ if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
+ self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
+ true
+ } else {
+ false
}
}
-}
+ /// Applies changes to the [`NetworkGraph`] from the given update.
+ fn handle_network_update(&self, update: &NetworkUpdate) {
+ match *update {
+ NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
+ let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
+ let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
+ let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
+ let _ = self.network_graph.update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx);
+ },
+ NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
+ let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, short_channel_id);
+ self.network_graph.close_channel_from_update(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
+ },
+ NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
+ let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "{} node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, node_id);
+ self.network_graph.fail_node(node_id, is_permanent);
+ },
+ }
+ }
+}
macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
- ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr ) => {
+ ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
match $secp_ctx.verify($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
Ok(_) => {},
- Err(_) => return Err(LightningError{err: "Invalid signature from remote node", action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
+ Err(_) => {
+ return Err(LightningError {
+ err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
+ action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
+ msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
+ channel_id: [0; 32],
+ data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
+ },
+ log_level: Level::Trace,
+ },
+ });
+ },
}
};
}
-impl<C: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send> RoutingMessageHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L> where C::Target: ChainWatchInterface, L::Target: Logger {
+impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
+where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
+{
fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
- self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_node_from_announcement(msg, Some(&self.secp_ctx))
+ self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
+ Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
+ msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
+ msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
}
fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
- if msg.contents.node_id_1 == msg.contents.node_id_2 || msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2 {
- return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself", action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
- }
-
- let checked_utxo = match self.chain_monitor.get_chain_utxo(msg.contents.chain_hash, msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
- Ok((script_pubkey, _value)) => {
- let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
- .push_slice(&msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
- .push_slice(&msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
- if script_pubkey != expected_script {
- return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement keys didn't match on-chain script", action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
- }
- //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
- //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
- true
- },
- Err(ChainError::NotSupported) => {
- // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
- false
- },
- Err(ChainError::NotWatched) => {
- return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced on an unknown chain", action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
- },
- Err(ChainError::UnknownTx) => {
- return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry", action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
- },
- };
- let result = self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel_from_announcement(msg, checked_utxo, Some(&self.secp_ctx));
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
- result
- }
-
- fn handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&self, update: &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate) {
- match update {
- &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
- let _ = self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel(msg, Some(&self.secp_ctx));
- },
- &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
- self.network_graph.write().unwrap().close_channel_from_update(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
- },
- &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
- self.network_graph.write().unwrap().fail_node(node_id, is_permanent);
- },
- }
+ self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access, &self.secp_ctx)?;
+ log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
+ Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
}
fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
- self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel(msg, Some(&self.secp_ctx))
+ self.network_graph.update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
+ Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
}
- fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
- let network_graph = self.network_graph.read().unwrap();
+ fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
- let mut iter = network_graph.get_channels().range(starting_point..);
+ let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
+ let mut iter = channels.range(starting_point..);
while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
if let Some((_, ref chan)) = iter.next() {
if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
result
}
- fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<msgs::NodeAnnouncement> {
- let network_graph = self.network_graph.read().unwrap();
+ fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<NodeAnnouncement> {
let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
+ let nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.read().unwrap();
let mut iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
- let mut iter = network_graph.get_nodes().range((*pubkey)..);
+ let mut iter = nodes.range(NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey)..);
iter.next();
iter
} else {
- network_graph.get_nodes().range(..)
+ nodes.range::<NodeId, _>(..)
};
while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
if let Some((_, ref node)) = iter.next() {
result
}
- fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
- //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
- const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
- if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
- self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
- true
- } else {
- false
+ /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
+ /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
+ /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
+ ///
+ /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
+ /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
+ /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
+ /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
+ /// tracking this directly.
+ fn sync_routing_table(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) {
+
+ // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
+ if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
+ return ();
+ }
+
+ // Check if we need to perform a full synchronization with this peer
+ if !self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
+ return ();
+ }
+
+ let first_blocknum = 0;
+ let number_of_blocks = 0xffffffff;
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), first_blocknum, number_of_blocks);
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg: QueryChannelRange {
+ chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
+ first_blocknum,
+ number_of_blocks,
+ },
+ });
+ }
+
+ /// Statelessly processes a reply to a channel range query by immediately
+ /// sending an SCID query with SCIDs in the reply. To keep this handler
+ /// stateless, it does not validate the sequencing of replies for multi-
+ /// reply ranges. It does not validate whether the reply(ies) cover the
+ /// queried range. It also does not filter SCIDs to only those in the
+ /// original query range. We also do not validate that the chain_hash
+ /// matches the chain_hash of the NetworkGraph. Any chan_ann message that
+ /// does not match our chain_hash will be rejected when the announcement is
+ /// processed.
+ fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}, sync_complete={}, scids={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks, msg.sync_complete, msg.short_channel_ids.len(),);
+
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_short_channel_ids peer={}, batch_size={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.short_channel_ids.len());
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg: QueryShortChannelIds {
+ chain_hash: msg.chain_hash,
+ short_channel_ids: msg.short_channel_ids,
+ }
+ });
+
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// When an SCID query is initiated the remote peer will begin streaming
+ /// gossip messages. In the event of a failure, we may have received
+ /// some channel information. Before trying with another peer, the
+ /// caller should update its set of SCIDs that need to be queried.
+ fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_short_channel_ids_end peer={}, full_information={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.full_information);
+
+ // If the remote node does not have up-to-date information for the
+ // chain_hash they will set full_information=false. We can fail
+ // the result and try again with a different peer.
+ if !msg.full_information {
+ return Err(LightningError {
+ err: String::from("Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information"),
+ action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError
+ });
+ }
+
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
+ /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
+ /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
+ /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
+ /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
+ /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
+ /// memory constrained systems.
+ fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
+
+ let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
+
+ // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
+ // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
+ let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
+
+ // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
+ if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg: ReplyChannelRange {
+ chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
+ first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
+ number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
+ sync_complete: true,
+ short_channel_ids: vec![],
+ }
+ });
+ return Err(LightningError {
+ err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
+ action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
+ });
+ }
+
+ // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
+ // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
+ // exists even if its not yet routable.
+ let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
+ let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
+ for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
+ if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
+ // Construct a new batch if last one is full
+ if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
+ batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
+ }
+
+ let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
+ batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
+ }
+ }
+ drop(channels);
+
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ let batch_count = batches.len();
+ let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
+ for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
+ // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
+ // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
+ //
+ // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
+ // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
+ // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
+ // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
+ // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
+ // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
+ let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
+
+ // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
+ // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
+ // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
+ //
+ // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
+ // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
+ // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
+ //
+ // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
+ // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
+ let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
+ (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
+ }
+ // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
+ // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
+ else {
+ (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
+ };
+
+ prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
+
+ pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg: ReplyChannelRange {
+ chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
+ first_blocknum,
+ number_of_blocks,
+ sync_complete,
+ short_channel_ids: batch,
+ }
+ });
}
+
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ // TODO
+ Err(LightningError {
+ err: String::from("Not implemented"),
+ action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph>, C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for NetGraphMsgHandler<G, C, L>
+where
+ C::Target: chain::Access,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+{
+ fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
+ let mut ret = Vec::new();
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
+ ret
}
}
-#[derive(PartialEq, Debug)]
-/// Details about one direction of a channel. Received
-/// within a channel update.
-pub struct DirectionalChannelInfo {
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+/// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
+pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
/// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
/// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
pub last_update: u32,
pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
/// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
+ /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
+ pub htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
/// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
pub fees: RoutingFees,
/// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
/// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
/// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
/// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
- pub last_update_message: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>,
+ pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
}
-impl fmt::Display for DirectionalChannelInfo {
+impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
Ok(())
}
}
-impl_writeable!(DirectionalChannelInfo, 0, {
- last_update,
- enabled,
- cltv_expiry_delta,
- htlc_minimum_msat,
- fees,
- last_update_message
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelUpdateInfo, {
+ (0, last_update, required),
+ (2, enabled, required),
+ (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
+ (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
+ (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
+ (10, fees, required),
+ (12, last_update_message, required),
});
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
/// Details about a channel (both directions).
/// Received within a channel announcement.
pub struct ChannelInfo {
/// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
pub features: ChannelFeatures,
/// Source node of the first direction of a channel
- pub node_one: PublicKey,
+ pub node_one: NodeId,
/// Details about the first direction of a channel
- pub one_to_two: Option<DirectionalChannelInfo>,
+ pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
/// Source node of the second direction of a channel
- pub node_two: PublicKey,
+ pub node_two: NodeId,
/// Details about the second direction of a channel
- pub two_to_one: Option<DirectionalChannelInfo>,
+ pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
+ /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
+ pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
/// An initial announcement of the channel
/// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
/// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
/// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
- pub announcement_message: Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>,
+ pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
+ /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
+ /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
+ /// network graph in memory!).
+ announcement_received_time: u64,
+}
+
+impl ChannelInfo {
+ /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
+ /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
+ pub(crate) fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
+ let (direction, source) = {
+ if target == &self.node_one {
+ (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
+ } else if target == &self.node_two {
+ (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
+ } else {
+ return None;
+ }
+ };
+ Some((DirectedChannelInfo { channel: self, direction }, source))
+ }
}
impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
- log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_pubkey!(self.node_one), self.one_to_two, log_pubkey!(self.node_two), self.two_to_one)?;
+ log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
Ok(())
}
}
-impl_writeable!(ChannelInfo, 0, {
- features,
- node_one,
- one_to_two,
- node_two,
- two_to_one,
- announcement_message
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelInfo, {
+ (0, features, required),
+ (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
+ (2, node_one, required),
+ (4, one_to_two, required),
+ (6, node_two, required),
+ (8, two_to_one, required),
+ (10, capacity_sats, required),
+ (12, announcement_message, required),
});
+/// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
+/// source node to a target node.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
+ channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
+ direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>,
+}
+
+impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
+ /// Returns information for the channel.
+ pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
+
+ /// Returns information for the direction.
+ pub fn direction(&self) -> Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo> { self.direction }
+
+ /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
+ ///
+ /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
+ /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
+ /// whichever is smaller.
+ pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
+ let capacity_msat = self.channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
+ self.direction
+ .and_then(|direction| direction.htlc_maximum_msat)
+ .map(|max_htlc_msat| {
+ let capacity_msat = capacity_msat.unwrap_or(u64::max_value());
+ if max_htlc_msat < capacity_msat {
+ EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat: max_htlc_msat }
+ } else {
+ EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat }
+ }
+ })
+ .or_else(|| capacity_msat.map(|capacity_msat|
+ EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat }))
+ .unwrap_or(EffectiveCapacity::Unknown)
+ }
+
+ /// Returns `Some` if [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] is available in the direction.
+ pub(super) fn with_update(self) -> Option<DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a>> {
+ match self.direction {
+ Some(_) => Some(DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate { inner: self }),
+ None => None,
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
+ f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
+ .field("channel", &self.channel)
+ .finish()
+ }
+}
+
+/// A [`DirectedChannelInfo`] with [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] available in its direction.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub(super) struct DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
+ inner: DirectedChannelInfo<'a>,
+}
+
+impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
+ /// Returns information for the channel.
+ #[inline]
+ pub(super) fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { &self.inner.channel }
+
+ /// Returns information for the direction.
+ #[inline]
+ pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.inner.direction.unwrap() }
+
+ /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
+ #[inline]
+ pub(super) fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity { self.inner.effective_capacity() }
+}
+
+impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
+ self.inner.fmt(f)
+ }
+}
+
+/// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
+///
+/// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
+/// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
+pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
+ /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
+ /// direct hop.
+ ExactLiquidity {
+ /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
+ /// millisatoshi.
+ liquidity_msat: u64,
+ },
+ /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
+ MaximumHTLC {
+ /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
+ amount_msat: u64,
+ },
+ /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
+ Total {
+ /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
+ capacity_msat: u64,
+ },
+ /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
+ /// an invoice.
+ Infinite,
+ /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
+ /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
+ Unknown,
+}
+
+/// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
+/// use when making routing decisions.
+pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
+
+impl EffectiveCapacity {
+ /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
+ pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
+ match self {
+ EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
+ EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
+ EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat } => *capacity_msat,
+ EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
+ EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
+ }
+ }
+}
/// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
-#[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug)]
+#[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
pub struct RoutingFees {
/// Flat routing fee in satoshis
pub base_msat: u32,
pub proportional_millionths: u32,
}
-impl Readable for RoutingFees{
- fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<RoutingFees, DecodeError> {
- let base_msat: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let proportional_millionths: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- Ok(RoutingFees {
- base_msat,
- proportional_millionths,
- })
- }
-}
-
-impl Writeable for RoutingFees {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- self.base_msat.write(writer)?;
- self.proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
- Ok(())
- }
-}
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
+ (0, base_msat, required),
+ (2, proportional_millionths, required)
+});
-#[derive(PartialEq, Debug)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
/// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
/// Protocol features the node announced support for
/// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
/// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
/// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
- pub announcement_message: Option<msgs::NodeAnnouncement>
-}
-
-impl Writeable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- self.features.write(writer)?;
- self.last_update.write(writer)?;
- self.rgb.write(writer)?;
- self.alias.write(writer)?;
- (self.addresses.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for ref addr in &self.addresses {
- addr.write(writer)?;
- }
- self.announcement_message.write(writer)?;
- Ok(())
- }
+ pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
}
-impl Readable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
- fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NodeAnnouncementInfo, DecodeError> {
- let features = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let last_update = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let rgb = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let alias = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let addresses_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut addresses = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(addresses_count, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 40) as usize);
- for _ in 0..addresses_count {
- match Readable::read(reader) {
- Ok(Ok(addr)) => { addresses.push(addr); },
- Ok(Err(_)) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor),
- _ => unreachable!(),
- }
- }
- let announcement_message = Readable::read(reader)?;
- Ok(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
- features,
- last_update,
- rgb,
- alias,
- addresses,
- announcement_message
- })
- }
-}
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
+ (0, features, required),
+ (2, last_update, required),
+ (4, rgb, required),
+ (6, alias, required),
+ (8, announcement_message, option),
+ (10, addresses, vec_type),
+});
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
/// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
pub struct NodeInfo {
/// All valid channels a node has announced
}
}
-impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- (self.channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for ref chan in self.channels.iter() {
- chan.write(writer)?;
- }
- self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees.write(writer)?;
- self.announcement_info.write(writer)?;
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 64*1024;
-
-impl Readable for NodeInfo {
- fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NodeInfo, DecodeError> {
- let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut channels = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(channels_count, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8) as usize);
- for _ in 0..channels_count {
- channels.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
- }
- let lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let announcement_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
- Ok(NodeInfo {
- channels,
- lowest_inbound_channel_fees,
- announcement_info,
- })
- }
-}
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeInfo, {
+ (0, lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
+ (2, announcement_info, option),
+ (4, channels, vec_type),
+});
-/// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
-pub struct NetworkGraph {
- channels: BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>,
- nodes: BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo>,
-}
+const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
impl Writeable for NetworkGraph {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- (self.channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in self.channels.iter() {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
+
+ self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
+ let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
+ (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.iter() {
(*chan_id).write(writer)?;
chan_info.write(writer)?;
}
- (self.nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in self.nodes.iter() {
+ let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
+ (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.iter() {
node_id.write(writer)?;
node_info.write(writer)?;
}
+
+ write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
Ok(())
}
}
impl Readable for NetworkGraph {
- fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetworkGraph, DecodeError> {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetworkGraph, DecodeError> {
+ let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
+
+ let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
for _ in 0..channels_count {
let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
}
+ read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
+
Ok(NetworkGraph {
- channels,
- nodes,
+ genesis_hash,
+ channels: RwLock::new(channels),
+ nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
})
}
}
impl fmt::Display for NetworkGraph {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
- write!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]\n")?;
- for (key, val) in self.channels.iter() {
- write!(f, " {}: {}\n", key, val)?;
+ writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
+ for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().iter() {
+ writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
}
- write!(f, "[Nodes]\n")?;
- for (key, val) in self.nodes.iter() {
- write!(f, " {}: {}\n", log_pubkey!(key), val)?;
+ writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
+ for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().iter() {
+ writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
}
Ok(())
}
}
-impl NetworkGraph {
- /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
- pub fn get_channels<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> { &self.channels }
- /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
- pub fn get_nodes<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo> { &self.nodes }
-
- /// Get network addresses by node id.
- /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
- /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
- pub fn get_addresses<'a>(&'a self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<&'a Vec<NetAddress>> {
- if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(pubkey) {
- if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
- return Some(&node_info.addresses)
- }
- }
- None
+impl PartialEq for NetworkGraph {
+ fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
+ self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
+ *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
+ *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
}
+}
+impl NetworkGraph {
/// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
- pub fn new() -> NetworkGraph {
+ pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash) -> NetworkGraph {
Self {
- channels: BTreeMap::new(),
- nodes: BTreeMap::new(),
+ genesis_hash,
+ channels: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
+ nodes: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
}
}
- /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a given node announcement
- /// Announcement signatures are checked here only if Secp256k1 object is provided.
- fn update_node_from_announcement(&mut self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: Option<&Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>>) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
- if let Some(sig_verifier) = secp_ctx {
- let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
- secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id);
+ /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
+ pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
+ let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
+ let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
+ ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
+ channels,
+ nodes,
}
+ }
+
+ /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
+ /// given node announcement.
+ ///
+ /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
+ /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
+ /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
+ pub fn update_node_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
+ secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement");
+ self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
+ }
- match self.nodes.get_mut(&msg.contents.node_id) {
- None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement", action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
+ /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
+ /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
+ /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
+ /// peers.
+ pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
+ }
+
+ fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ match self.nodes.write().unwrap().get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id)) {
+ None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
Some(node) => {
if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
- if node_info.last_update >= msg.contents.timestamp {
- return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update", action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+ // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
+ // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
+ // that it be at least the current time.
+ if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
+ } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
}
}
- let should_relay = msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() && msg.contents.excess_address_data.is_empty();
+ let should_relay =
+ msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
+ msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
+ msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
- features: msg.contents.features.clone(),
- last_update: msg.contents.timestamp,
- rgb: msg.contents.rgb,
- alias: msg.contents.alias,
- addresses: msg.contents.addresses.clone(),
- announcement_message: if should_relay { Some(msg.clone()) } else { None },
+ features: msg.features.clone(),
+ last_update: msg.timestamp,
+ rgb: msg.rgb,
+ alias: msg.alias,
+ addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
+ announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
});
- Ok(should_relay)
+ Ok(())
}
}
}
- /// For a new or already known (from previous announcement) channel, store or update channel info.
- /// Also store nodes (if not stored yet) the channel is between, and make node aware of this channel.
- /// Checking utxo on-chain is useful if we receive an update for already known channel id,
- /// which is probably result of a reorg. In that case, we update channel info only if the
- /// utxo was checked, otherwise stick to the existing update, to prevent DoS risks.
- /// Announcement signatures are checked here only if Secp256k1 object is provided.
- fn update_channel_from_announcement(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, checked_utxo: bool, secp_ctx: Option<&Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>>) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
- if let Some(sig_verifier) = secp_ctx {
- let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
- secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1);
- secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2);
- secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1);
- secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2);
+ /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
+ ///
+ /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
+ /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
+ /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
+ ///
+ /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
+ /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
+ pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification, C: Deref>(
+ &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>
+ ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
+ where
+ C::Target: chain::Access,
+ {
+ let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
+ secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement");
+ secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement");
+ secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement");
+ secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement");
+ self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
+ }
+
+ /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
+ /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
+ /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
+ ///
+ /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
+ /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
+ pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>(
+ &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>
+ ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
+ where
+ C::Target: chain::Access,
+ {
+ self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
+ }
+
+ fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>(
+ &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>
+ ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
+ where
+ C::Target: chain::Access,
+ {
+ if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
}
- let should_relay = msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty();
+ let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
+ &None => {
+ // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
+ None
+ },
+ &Some(ref chain_access) => {
+ match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
+ Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
+ let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
+ .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
+ .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
+ if script_pubkey != expected_script {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", script_pubkey.to_hex(), expected_script.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+ }
+ //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
+ //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
+ Some(value)
+ },
+ Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+ },
+ Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+ },
+ }
+ },
+ };
+
+ #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
+ let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")]
+ {
+ announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
+ }
let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
- features: msg.contents.features.clone(),
- node_one: msg.contents.node_id_1.clone(),
+ features: msg.features.clone(),
+ node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1),
one_to_two: None,
- node_two: msg.contents.node_id_2.clone(),
+ node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2),
two_to_one: None,
- announcement_message: if should_relay { Some(msg.clone()) } else { None },
+ capacity_sats: utxo_value,
+ announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
+ { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
+ announcement_received_time,
};
- match self.channels.entry(msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
+ let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
+ let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
+ match channels.entry(msg.short_channel_id) {
BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
//TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
//in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
//exactly how...
- if checked_utxo {
+ if utxo_value.is_some() {
// Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
// only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
// that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
// b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
// get reorg'd out.
// c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
- Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut self.nodes, &entry.get(), msg.contents.short_channel_id);
+ Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), msg.short_channel_id);
*entry.get_mut() = chan_info;
} else {
- return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel", action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError})
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
}
},
BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
macro_rules! add_channel_to_node {
( $node_id: expr ) => {
- match self.nodes.entry($node_id) {
+ match nodes.entry($node_id) {
BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
- node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(msg.contents.short_channel_id);
+ node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(msg.short_channel_id);
},
BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
- channels: vec!(msg.contents.short_channel_id),
+ channels: vec!(msg.short_channel_id),
lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
announcement_info: None,
});
};
}
- add_channel_to_node!(msg.contents.node_id_1);
- add_channel_to_node!(msg.contents.node_id_2);
+ add_channel_to_node!(NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1));
+ add_channel_to_node!(NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2));
- Ok(should_relay)
+ Ok(())
}
/// Close a channel if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
/// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
/// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
/// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
- pub fn close_channel_from_update(&mut self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
+ pub fn close_channel_from_update(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
+ let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
if is_permanent {
- if let Some(chan) = self.channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
- Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut self.nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
+ if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
+ let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
+ Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
}
} else {
- if let Some(chan) = self.channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
+ if let Some(chan) = channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
one_to_two.enabled = false;
}
}
}
- fn fail_node(&mut self, _node_id: &PublicKey, is_permanent: bool) {
+ /// Marks a node in the graph as failed.
+ pub fn fail_node(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey, is_permanent: bool) {
if is_permanent {
// TODO: Wholly remove the node
} else {
}
}
- /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions of a channel.
- /// Announcement signatures are checked here only if Secp256k1 object is provided.
- fn update_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate, secp_ctx: Option<&Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>>) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
- let dest_node_id;
- let chan_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
- let chan_was_enabled;
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")]
+ /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
+ /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
+ /// exist.
+ ///
+ /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
+ /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
+ /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
+ ///
+ /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
+ /// automatically called regularly for you.
+ ///
+ /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
+ /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
+ pub fn remove_stale_channels(&self) {
+ let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
+ self.remove_stale_channels_with_time(time);
+ }
- match self.channels.get_mut(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
- None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update", action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
- Some(channel) => {
- macro_rules! maybe_update_channel_info {
+ /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
+ /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
+ /// exist.
+ ///
+ /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
+ /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
+ /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
+ ///
+ /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
+ /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels`] may be preferable.
+ pub fn remove_stale_channels_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
+ let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
+ // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
+ if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
+ if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
+ let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
+ // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
+ // time.
+ let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
+ for (scid, info) in channels.iter_mut() {
+ if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
+ info.one_to_two = None;
+ }
+ if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
+ info.two_to_one = None;
+ }
+ if info.one_to_two.is_none() && info.two_to_one.is_none() {
+ // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
+ // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
+ // channel_update for.
+ if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
+ scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
+ let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
+ for scid in scids_to_remove {
+ let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
+ Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
+ /// of the channel.
+ ///
+ /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
+ /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
+ /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
+ ///
+ /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
+ /// materially in the future will be rejected.
+ pub fn update_channel<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some((&msg.signature, secp_ctx)))
+ }
+
+ /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
+ /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
+ /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
+ ///
+ /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
+ /// materially in the future will be rejected.
+ pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None::<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>)>)
+ }
+
+ fn update_channel_intern<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig_info: Option<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<T>)>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ let dest_node_id;
+ let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
+ let chan_was_enabled;
+
+ #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
+ {
+ // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
+ // disable this check during tests!
+ let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
+ if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
+ }
+ if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
+ }
+ }
+
+ let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
+ match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
+ None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
+ Some(channel) => {
+ if let OptionalField::Present(htlc_maximum_msat) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat {
+ if htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+ }
+
+ if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
+ // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
+ // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
+ if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ macro_rules! maybe_update_channel_info {
( $target: expr, $src_node: expr) => {
if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
- if existing_chan_info.last_update >= msg.contents.timestamp {
- return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update", action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+ // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
+ // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
+ // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
+ // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
+ // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
+ // but only in the non-normative section.
+ if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
+ } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
}
chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
} else {
chan_was_enabled = false;
}
- let last_update_message = if msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() {
- Some(msg.clone())
- } else {
- None
- };
+ let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
+ { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
- let updated_channel_dir_info = DirectionalChannelInfo {
+ let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
enabled: chan_enabled,
- last_update: msg.contents.timestamp,
- cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta,
- htlc_minimum_msat: msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat,
+ last_update: msg.timestamp,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: if let OptionalField::Present(max_value) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat { Some(max_value) } else { None },
fees: RoutingFees {
- base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
- proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
+ base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
+ proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
},
last_update_message
};
- $target = Some(updated_channel_dir_info);
+ $target = Some(updated_channel_update_info);
}
}
- let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
- if msg.contents.flags & 1 == 1 {
+ let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
+ if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
- if let Some(sig_verifier) = secp_ctx {
- secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &channel.node_two);
+ if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
+ secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
+ err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
+ action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
+ })?, "channel_update");
}
maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.two_to_one, channel.node_two);
} else {
dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
- if let Some(sig_verifier) = secp_ctx {
- secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &channel.node_one);
+ if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
+ secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
+ err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
+ action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
+ })?, "channel_update");
}
maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.one_to_two, channel.node_one);
}
}
}
+ let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
if chan_enabled {
- let node = self.nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
- let mut base_msat = msg.contents.fee_base_msat;
- let mut proportional_millionths = msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths;
+ let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
+ let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
+ let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
proportional_millionths
});
} else if chan_was_enabled {
- let node = self.nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
+ let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fees = None;
for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
- let chan = self.channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
+ let chan = channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
let chan_info_opt;
if chan.node_one == dest_node_id {
chan_info_opt = chan.two_to_one.as_ref();
node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
}
- Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty())
+ Ok(())
}
- fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
+ fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
macro_rules! remove_from_node {
($node_id: expr) => {
if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
}
}
+impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
+ /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
+ ///
+ /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
+ pub fn channels(&self) -> &BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
+ &*self.channels
+ }
+
+ /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
+ ///
+ /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
+ pub fn nodes(&self) -> &BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
+ &*self.nodes
+ }
+
+ /// Get network addresses by node id.
+ /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
+ /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
+ pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
+ if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey)) {
+ if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
+ return Some(node_info.addresses.clone())
+ }
+ }
+ None
+ }
+}
+
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
- use chain::chaininterface;
- use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
- use routing::network_graph::{NetGraphMsgHandler, NetworkGraph};
- use ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
- UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate, HTLCFailChannelUpdate};
+ use chain;
+ use ln::PaymentHash;
+ use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
+ use routing::network_graph::{NetGraphMsgHandler, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY};
+ use ln::msgs::{Init, OptionalField, RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
+ UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
+ ReplyChannelRange, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
use util::test_utils;
use util::logger::Logger;
use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
+ use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
+ use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
+
+ use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
- use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
- use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
use hex;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
- use std::sync::Arc;
+ use io;
+ use prelude::*;
+ use sync::Arc;
+
+ fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph {
+ let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
+ NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash)
+ }
- fn create_net_graph_msg_handler() -> (Secp256k1<All>, NetGraphMsgHandler<Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) {
+ fn create_net_graph_msg_handler(network_graph: &NetworkGraph) -> (
+ Secp256k1<All>, NetGraphMsgHandler<&NetworkGraph, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
+ ) {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
- let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet));
- let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(chain_monitor, Arc::clone(&logger));
+ let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
(secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler)
}
#[test]
fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
- let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
+ let network_graph = create_network_graph();
+ let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
assert!(!net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
}
- #[test]
- fn handling_node_announcements() {
- let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
-
- let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
- let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
- let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
- let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
- let first_announcement_time = 500;
-
+ fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
+ let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key);
let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
features: NodeFeatures::known(),
- timestamp: first_announcement_time,
- node_id: node_id_1,
+ timestamp: 100,
+ node_id: node_id,
rgb: [0; 3],
alias: [0; 32],
addresses: Vec::new(),
excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
excess_data: Vec::new(),
};
- let mut msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
+ f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
+ let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
+ NodeAnnouncement {
+ signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_key),
+ contents: unsigned_announcement
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
+ let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
+ let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
+ let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
+ let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
+
+ let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
+ features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
+ chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
+ short_channel_id: 0,
+ node_id_1,
+ node_id_2,
+ bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
+ bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
+ excess_data: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
+ let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
+ ChannelAnnouncement {
+ node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_key),
+ node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_key),
+ bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
+ bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
+ contents: unsigned_announcement,
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
+ let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
+ let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
+ .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey).serialize())
+ .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
+ .to_v0_p2wsh()
+ }
+
+ fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
+ let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
+ short_channel_id: 0,
+ timestamp: 100,
+ flags: 0,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
+ fee_base_msat: 10_000,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
+ excess_data: Vec::new()
};
+ f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
+ let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
+ ChannelUpdate {
+ signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_key),
+ contents: unsigned_channel_update
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn handling_node_announcements() {
+ let network_graph = create_network_graph();
+ let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
+
+ let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
+ let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
+ let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
+ let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
{
// Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
- let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
- features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
- chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
- short_channel_id: 0,
- node_id_1,
- node_id_2,
- bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
- excess_data: Vec::new(),
- };
-
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
- };
+ let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Ok(res) => assert!(res),
_ => panic!()
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(
&NodeAnnouncement {
signature: secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
+ contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
}) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
- Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
+ Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
};
- unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
- unsigned_announcement.excess_data.push(1);
- msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let announcement_with_data = NodeAnnouncement {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
- };
+ let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
+ unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
+ unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
+ }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
// Return false because contains excess data.
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
Err(_) => panic!()
};
- unsigned_announcement.excess_data = Vec::new();
// Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
// so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
- unsigned_announcement.timestamp -= 10;
- msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let outdated_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
- };
+ let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
+ unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
+ }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
fn handling_channel_announcements() {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
- let chain_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainWatcher::new());
- let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
-
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
- let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
- let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
-
- let good_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
- .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey).serialize())
- .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
-
-
- let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
- features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
- chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
- short_channel_id: 0,
- node_id_1,
- node_id_2,
- bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
- excess_data: Vec::new(),
- };
- let mut msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
- };
+ let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
+ let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
// Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
- *chain_monitor.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chaininterface::ChainError::NotSupported);
-
+ let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
+ let mut net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Ok(res) => assert!(res),
_ => panic!()
};
{
- let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
- match network.get_channels().get(&unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id) {
+ match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
None => panic!(),
Some(_) => ()
- }
+ };
}
-
// If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
// drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have knowledge of channel")
};
-
// Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
- *chain_monitor.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chaininterface::ChainError::UnknownTx);
- unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
-
- msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
- };
-
+ let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
+ *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
+ let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
+ net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
+
+ let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
+ unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
+ }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
};
-
// Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
- unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
- *chain_monitor.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok((good_script.clone(), 0));
-
- msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
- };
+ *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
+ let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
+ unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
+ }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Ok(res) => assert!(res),
_ => panic!()
};
{
- let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
- match network.get_channels().get(&unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id) {
+ match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
None => panic!(),
Some(_) => ()
- }
+ };
}
// If we receive announcement for the same channel (but TX is not confirmed),
// drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
- *chain_monitor.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chaininterface::ChainError::UnknownTx);
+ *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
};
// But if it is confirmed, replace the channel
- *chain_monitor.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok((good_script, 0));
- unsigned_announcement.features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
- msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
- };
+ *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
+ let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
+ unsigned_announcement.features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
+ unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
+ }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Ok(res) => assert!(res),
_ => panic!()
};
{
- let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
- match network.get_channels().get(&unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id) {
+ match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
Some(channel_entry) => {
assert_eq!(channel_entry.features, ChannelFeatures::empty());
},
_ => panic!()
- }
+ };
}
// Don't relay valid channels with excess data
- unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
- unsigned_announcement.excess_data.push(1);
- msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
- };
+ let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
+ unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
+ unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
+ }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
_ => panic!()
};
- unsigned_announcement.excess_data = Vec::new();
- let invalid_sig_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
- };
+ let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
+ invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
- Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
+ Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
};
- unsigned_announcement.node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
- msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let channel_to_itself_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
- };
+ let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
#[test]
fn handling_channel_update() {
- let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
+ let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
+ let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash());
+ let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
+
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
- let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
- let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
- let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
- let short_channel_id = 0;
- let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash();
+ let amount_sats = 1000_000;
+ let short_channel_id;
+
{
// Announce a channel we will update
- let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
- features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
- chain_hash,
- short_channel_id,
- node_id_1,
- node_id_2,
- bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
- excess_data: Vec::new(),
- };
+ let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
+ *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
- };
+ let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
+ short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
Ok(_) => (),
Err(_) => panic!()
}
- let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
- chain_hash,
- short_channel_id,
- timestamp: 100,
- flags: 0,
- cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
- fee_base_msat: 10000,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
- excess_data: Vec::new()
- };
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
- };
-
+ let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
Ok(res) => assert!(res),
_ => panic!()
};
{
- let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
- match network.get_channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
+ match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
None => panic!(),
Some(channel_info) => {
assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
}
- }
+ };
}
- unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
- unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.push(1);
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
- };
+ let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
+ unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
+ unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
+ }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
// Return false because contains excess data
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
_ => panic!()
};
- unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
+ let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
+ unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
+ unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
+ }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
+ match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
+ Ok(_) => panic!(),
+ Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
};
+ let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
+ unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1);
+ unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
+ }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
- Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
+ Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
};
- unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
+ let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
+ unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(amount_sats * 1000 + 1);
+ unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
+ }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
+ match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
+ Ok(_) => panic!(),
+ Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
+ };
// Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
// so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
- unsigned_channel_update.timestamp -= 10;
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
- };
-
+ let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
+ unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
+ }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
- Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
+ Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
};
- unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
+ let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
+ unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
+ }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
+ let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
- let invalid_sig_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
- };
-
+ invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
- Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
+ Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
};
-
}
#[test]
- fn handling_htlc_fail_channel_update() {
- let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
+ fn handling_network_update() {
+ let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
+ let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
+ let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
+ let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
+ let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), &logger);
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
- let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
- let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
-
- let short_channel_id = 0;
- let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash();
{
// There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
- let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(network.get_nodes().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
}
+ let short_channel_id;
{
// Announce a channel we will update
- let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
- features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
- chain_hash,
- short_channel_id,
- node_id_1,
- node_id_2,
- bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
- excess_data: Vec::new(),
- };
-
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
- };
- match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
- Ok(_) => (),
- Err(_) => panic!()
- };
-
- let unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
- chain_hash,
- short_channel_id,
- timestamp: 100,
- flags: 0,
- cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
- fee_base_msat: 10000,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
- excess_data: Vec::new()
- };
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
- };
+ let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
+ short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
+ let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
+ assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source, &secp_ctx).is_ok());
+ assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
+
+ let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
+ assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
+
+ net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
+ payment_id: None,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+ rejected_by_dest: false,
+ all_paths_failed: true,
+ path: vec![],
+ network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
+ msg: valid_channel_update,
+ }),
+ short_channel_id: None,
+ retry: None,
+ error_code: None,
+ error_data: None,
+ });
- match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
- Ok(res) => assert!(res),
- _ => panic!()
- };
+ assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
}
// Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
{
- let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
- match network.get_channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
+ match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
None => panic!(),
Some(channel_info) => {
- assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.is_some());
+ assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
}
- }
- }
-
- let channel_close_msg = HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
- short_channel_id,
- is_permanent: false
- };
+ };
- net_graph_msg_handler.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&channel_close_msg);
+ net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
+ payment_id: None,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+ rejected_by_dest: false,
+ all_paths_failed: true,
+ path: vec![],
+ network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed {
+ short_channel_id,
+ is_permanent: false,
+ }),
+ short_channel_id: None,
+ retry: None,
+ error_code: None,
+ error_data: None,
+ });
- // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
- {
- let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
- match network.get_channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
+ match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
None => panic!(),
Some(channel_info) => {
assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
}
- }
+ };
}
- let channel_close_msg = HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
- short_channel_id,
- is_permanent: true
- };
+ // Permanent closing deletes a channel
+ net_graph_msg_handler.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
+ payment_id: None,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+ rejected_by_dest: false,
+ all_paths_failed: true,
+ path: vec![],
+ network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelClosed {
+ short_channel_id,
+ is_permanent: true,
+ }),
+ short_channel_id: None,
+ retry: None,
+ error_code: None,
+ error_data: None,
+ });
+
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
+ // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
+ // TODO: Test NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure, which is not implemented yet.
+ }
- net_graph_msg_handler.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&channel_close_msg);
+ #[test]
+ fn test_channel_timeouts() {
+ // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels`.
+ let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
+ let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
+ let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
+ let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
+ let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(&network_graph, Some(chain_source.clone()), &logger);
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- // Permanent closing deletes a channel
+ let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
+ let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
+
+ let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
+ let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
+ let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
+ assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source, &secp_ctx).is_ok());
+ assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
+
+ let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
+ assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
+ assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
+
+ network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
+
+ network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")]
{
- let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(network.get_channels().len(), 0);
- // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
- assert_eq!(network.get_nodes().len(), 0);
+ // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
+ // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
+ // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks. Note that the
+ // directional channel information will have been removed already..
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
+ assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
+
+ use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
+ let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
+ network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
}
- // TODO: Test HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure, which is not implemented yet.
+
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
}
#[test]
fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
- let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
+ let network_graph = create_network_graph();
+ let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
- let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
- let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
-
- let short_channel_id = 1;
- let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash();
// Channels were not announced yet.
let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(0, 1);
assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
+ let short_channel_id;
{
// Announce a channel we will update
- let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
- features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
- chain_hash,
- short_channel_id,
- node_id_1,
- node_id_2,
- bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
- excess_data: Vec::new(),
- };
-
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
- };
+ let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
+ short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
Ok(_) => (),
Err(_) => panic!()
{
// Valid channel update
- let unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
- chain_hash,
- short_channel_id,
- timestamp: 101,
- flags: 0,
- cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
- fee_base_msat: 10000,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
- excess_data: Vec::new()
- };
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
- };
+ let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
+ unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
+ }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
Ok(_) => (),
Err(_) => panic!()
panic!();
}
-
{
// Channel update with excess data.
- let unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
- chain_hash,
- short_channel_id,
- timestamp: 102,
- flags: 0,
- cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
- fee_base_msat: 10000,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
- excess_data: [1; 3].to_vec()
- };
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
- };
+ let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
+ unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
+ unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
+ }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
Ok(_) => (),
Err(_) => panic!()
#[test]
fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
- let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
+ let network_graph = create_network_graph();
+ let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
- let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
- let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
-
- let short_channel_id = 1;
- let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash();
// No nodes yet.
let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 10);
{
// Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
- let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
- features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
- chain_hash,
- short_channel_id,
- node_id_1,
- node_id_2,
- bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
- excess_data: Vec::new(),
- };
-
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
- };
+ let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
Ok(_) => (),
Err(_) => panic!()
assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
{
- let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
- features: NodeFeatures::known(),
- timestamp: 1000,
- node_id: node_id_1,
- rgb: [0; 3],
- alias: [0; 32],
- addresses: Vec::new(),
- excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
- excess_data: Vec::new(),
- };
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
- };
+ let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Ok(_) => (),
Err(_) => panic!()
};
- unsigned_announcement.node_id = node_id_2;
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
- };
-
+ let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Ok(_) => (),
Err(_) => panic!()
{
// Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
- let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
- features: NodeFeatures::known(),
- timestamp: 1010,
- node_id: node_id_2,
- rgb: [0; 3],
- alias: [0; 32],
- addresses: Vec::new(),
- excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
- excess_data: [1; 3].to_vec(),
- };
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
- };
+ let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
+ unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
+ unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
+ }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
Err(_) => panic!()
#[test]
fn network_graph_serialization() {
- let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
+ let network_graph = create_network_graph();
+ let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
- let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
// Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
- let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
- let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
- let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
- features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
- chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
- short_channel_id: 0,
- node_id_1,
- node_id_2,
- bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
- excess_data: Vec::new(),
- };
-
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
- bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
- bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
- };
+ let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Ok(res) => assert!(res),
_ => panic!()
};
-
- let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
- let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
- features: NodeFeatures::known(),
- timestamp: 100,
- node_id,
- rgb: [0; 3],
- alias: [0; 32],
- addresses: Vec::new(),
- excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
- excess_data: Vec::new(),
- };
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
- signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
- };
-
+ let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
Ok(_) => (),
Err(_) => panic!()
};
- let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.write().unwrap();
let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
- assert!(!network.get_nodes().is_empty());
- assert!(!network.get_channels().is_empty());
- network.write(&mut w).unwrap();
- assert!(<NetworkGraph>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap() == *network);
+ assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
+ assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
+ network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
+ assert!(<NetworkGraph>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap() == network_graph);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
+ let network_graph = create_network_graph();
+ let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
+ let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
+ let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
+
+ let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
+ let first_blocknum = 0;
+ let number_of_blocks = 0xffff_ffff;
+
+ // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
+ {
+ let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known().clear_gossip_queries() };
+ net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
+ let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
+ }
+
+ // It should send a query_channel_message with the correct information
+ {
+ let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known() };
+ net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
+ let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match &events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery{ node_id, msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
+ assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
+ assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, first_blocknum);
+ assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, number_of_blocks);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
+ };
+ }
+
+ // It should not enqueue a query when should_request_full_sync return false.
+ // The initial implementation allows syncing with the first 5 peers after
+ // which should_request_full_sync will return false
+ {
+ let network_graph = create_network_graph();
+ let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
+ let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known() };
+ for n in 1..7 {
+ let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[n; 32]).unwrap();
+ let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
+ net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id, &init_msg);
+ let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ if n <= 5 {
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
+ }
+
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn handling_reply_channel_range() {
+ let network_graph = create_network_graph();
+ let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
+ let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
+ let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
+
+ let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
+
+ // Test receipt of a single reply that should enqueue an SCID query
+ // matching the SCIDs in the reply
+ {
+ let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_channel_range(&node_id_1, ReplyChannelRange {
+ chain_hash,
+ sync_complete: true,
+ first_blocknum: 0,
+ number_of_blocks: 2000,
+ short_channel_ids: vec![
+ 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0
+ 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0
+ 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0
+ 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0
+ 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0
+ 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0
+ ],
+ });
+ assert!(result.is_ok());
+
+ // We expect to emit a query_short_channel_ids message with the received scids
+ let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match &events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { node_id, msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
+ assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
+ assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, vec![
+ 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0
+ 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0
+ 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0
+ 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0
+ 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0
+ 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0
+ ]);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery"),
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn handling_reply_short_channel_ids() {
+ let network_graph = create_network_graph();
+ let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
+ let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
+ let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
+
+ let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
+
+ // Test receipt of a successful reply
+ {
+ let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
+ chain_hash,
+ full_information: true,
+ });
+ assert!(result.is_ok());
+ }
+
+ // Test receipt of a reply that indicates the peer does not maintain up-to-date information
+ // for the chain_hash requested in the query.
+ {
+ let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
+ chain_hash,
+ full_information: false,
+ });
+ assert!(result.is_err());
+ assert_eq!(result.err().unwrap().err, "Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information");
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn handling_query_channel_range() {
+ let network_graph = create_network_graph();
+ let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
+
+ let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
+ let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
+ let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
+ let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
+
+ let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
+ scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
+ scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
+ ];
+
+ // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
+ for block in 100000..=108001 {
+ scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
+ }
+
+ // used for testing resumption on same block
+ scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
+
+ for scid in scids {
+ let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
+ unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
+ }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
+ match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
+ Ok(_) => (),
+ _ => panic!()
+ };
+ }
+
+ // Error when number_of_blocks=0
+ do_handling_query_channel_range(
+ &net_graph_msg_handler,
+ &node_id_2,
+ QueryChannelRange {
+ chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
+ first_blocknum: 0,
+ number_of_blocks: 0,
+ },
+ false,
+ vec![ReplyChannelRange {
+ chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
+ first_blocknum: 0,
+ number_of_blocks: 0,
+ sync_complete: true,
+ short_channel_ids: vec![]
+ }]
+ );
+
+ // Error when wrong chain
+ do_handling_query_channel_range(
+ &net_graph_msg_handler,
+ &node_id_2,
+ QueryChannelRange {
+ chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
+ first_blocknum: 0,
+ number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
+ },
+ false,
+ vec![ReplyChannelRange {
+ chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
+ first_blocknum: 0,
+ number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
+ sync_complete: true,
+ short_channel_ids: vec![],
+ }]
+ );
+
+ // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
+ do_handling_query_channel_range(
+ &net_graph_msg_handler,
+ &node_id_2,
+ QueryChannelRange {
+ chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
+ first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
+ number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
+ },
+ false,
+ vec![ReplyChannelRange {
+ chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
+ first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
+ number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
+ sync_complete: true,
+ short_channel_ids: vec![]
+ }]
+ );
+
+ // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
+ do_handling_query_channel_range(
+ &net_graph_msg_handler,
+ &node_id_2,
+ QueryChannelRange {
+ chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
+ first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
+ number_of_blocks: 1,
+ },
+ true,
+ vec![
+ ReplyChannelRange {
+ chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
+ first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
+ number_of_blocks: 1,
+ sync_complete: true,
+ short_channel_ids: vec![]
+ },
+ ]
+ );
+
+ // No results in valid query range
+ do_handling_query_channel_range(
+ &net_graph_msg_handler,
+ &node_id_2,
+ QueryChannelRange {
+ chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
+ first_blocknum: 1000,
+ number_of_blocks: 1000,
+ },
+ true,
+ vec![
+ ReplyChannelRange {
+ chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
+ first_blocknum: 1000,
+ number_of_blocks: 1000,
+ sync_complete: true,
+ short_channel_ids: vec![],
+ }
+ ]
+ );
+
+ // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
+ do_handling_query_channel_range(
+ &net_graph_msg_handler,
+ &node_id_2,
+ QueryChannelRange {
+ chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
+ first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
+ number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
+ },
+ true,
+ vec![
+ ReplyChannelRange {
+ chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
+ first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
+ number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
+ sync_complete: true,
+ short_channel_ids: vec![
+ 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
+ ]
+ }
+ ]
+ );
+
+ // Single block exactly full
+ do_handling_query_channel_range(
+ &net_graph_msg_handler,
+ &node_id_2,
+ QueryChannelRange {
+ chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
+ first_blocknum: 100000,
+ number_of_blocks: 8000,
+ },
+ true,
+ vec![
+ ReplyChannelRange {
+ chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
+ first_blocknum: 100000,
+ number_of_blocks: 8000,
+ sync_complete: true,
+ short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
+ .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
+ .collect(),
+ },
+ ]
+ );
+
+ // Multiple split on new block
+ do_handling_query_channel_range(
+ &net_graph_msg_handler,
+ &node_id_2,
+ QueryChannelRange {
+ chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
+ first_blocknum: 100000,
+ number_of_blocks: 8001,
+ },
+ true,
+ vec![
+ ReplyChannelRange {
+ chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
+ first_blocknum: 100000,
+ number_of_blocks: 7999,
+ sync_complete: false,
+ short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
+ .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
+ .collect(),
+ },
+ ReplyChannelRange {
+ chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
+ first_blocknum: 107999,
+ number_of_blocks: 2,
+ sync_complete: true,
+ short_channel_ids: vec![
+ scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
+ ],
+ }
+ ]
+ );
+
+ // Multiple split on same block
+ do_handling_query_channel_range(
+ &net_graph_msg_handler,
+ &node_id_2,
+ QueryChannelRange {
+ chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
+ first_blocknum: 100002,
+ number_of_blocks: 8000,
+ },
+ true,
+ vec![
+ ReplyChannelRange {
+ chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
+ first_blocknum: 100002,
+ number_of_blocks: 7999,
+ sync_complete: false,
+ short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
+ .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
+ .collect(),
+ },
+ ReplyChannelRange {
+ chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
+ first_blocknum: 108001,
+ number_of_blocks: 1,
+ sync_complete: true,
+ short_channel_ids: vec![
+ scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
+ ],
+ }
+ ]
+ );
+ }
+
+ fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
+ net_graph_msg_handler: &NetGraphMsgHandler<&NetworkGraph, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
+ test_node_id: &PublicKey,
+ msg: QueryChannelRange,
+ expected_ok: bool,
+ expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
+ ) {
+ let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
+ let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
+ let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
+ let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
+
+ if expected_ok {
+ assert!(result.is_ok());
+ } else {
+ assert!(result.is_err());
+ }
+
+ let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
+
+ for i in 0..events.len() {
+ let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
+ match &events[i] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
+ assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
+ assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
+ assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
+ assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
+ assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
+
+ // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
+ assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
+ assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
+ max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
+ c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
+
+ // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
+ if i == events.len() - 1 {
+ assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
+ }
+ },
+ _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
+ let network_graph = create_network_graph();
+ let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler(&network_graph);
+ let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
+ let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
+
+ let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
+
+ let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
+ chain_hash,
+ short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
+ });
+ assert!(result.is_err());
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
+mod benches {
+ use super::*;
+
+ use test::Bencher;
+ use std::io::Read;
+
+ #[bench]
+ fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
+ let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
+ let mut v = Vec::new();
+ d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
+ bench.iter(|| {
+ let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v)).unwrap();
+ });
+ }
+
+ #[bench]
+ fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
+ let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
+ let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d).unwrap();
+ bench.iter(|| {
+ let _ = net_graph.encode();
+ });
}
}