//! The provided output descriptors follow a custom LDK data format and are currently not fully
//! compatible with Bitcoin Core output descriptors.
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, EcdsaSighashType};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
+use bitcoin::ecdsa::Signature as EcdsaSignature;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::psbt::PartiallySignedTransaction;
-use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ExtendedPrivKey, ExtendedPubKey, ChildNumber};
-use bitcoin::util::sighash;
+use bitcoin::bip32::{ExtendedPrivKey, ExtendedPubKey, ChildNumber};
+use bitcoin::sighash;
+use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
+#[cfg(taproot)]
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::All;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{KeyPair, PublicKey, Scalar, Secp256k1, SecretKey, Signing};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::{RecoverableSignature, Signature};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::schnorr;
-use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, secp256k1, Sequence, Witness};
+use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence, Witness, Txid};
use crate::util::transaction_utils;
-use crate::util::crypto::{hkdf_extract_expand_twice, sign, sign_with_aux_rand};
+use crate::crypto::utils::{hkdf_extract_expand_twice, sign, sign_with_aux_rand};
use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, Readable, ReadableArgs};
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use crate::events::bump_transaction::HTLCDescriptor;
use crate::ln::channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI;
use crate::ln::{chan_utils, PaymentPreimage};
use crate::ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CommitmentTransaction, ClosingTransaction};
+use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, DelayedPaymentKey, HtlcKey, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
use crate::ln::msgs::{UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedGossipMessage};
+#[cfg(taproot)]
+use crate::ln::msgs::PartialSignatureWithNonce;
use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
use crate::offers::invoice::UnsignedBolt12Invoice;
use crate::offers::invoice_request::UnsignedInvoiceRequest;
use crate::prelude::*;
-use core::convert::TryInto;
use core::ops::Deref;
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
+#[cfg(taproot)]
+use musig2::types::{PartialSignature, PublicNonce};
use crate::io::{self, Error};
use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
+use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
+#[cfg(taproot)]
+use crate::sign::taproot::TaprootChannelSigner;
use crate::util::atomic_counter::AtomicCounter;
-use crate::util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
+use crate::crypto::chacha20::ChaCha20;
use crate::util::invoice::construct_invoice_preimage;
pub(crate) mod type_resolver;
+pub mod ecdsa;
+#[cfg(taproot)]
+pub mod taproot;
+
/// Used as initial key material, to be expanded into multiple secret keys (but not to be used
/// directly). This is used within LDK to encrypt/decrypt inbound payment data.
///
pub output: TxOut,
/// The revocation point specific to the commitment transaction which was broadcast. Used to
/// derive the witnessScript for this output.
- pub revocation_pubkey: PublicKey,
+ pub revocation_pubkey: RevocationKey,
/// Arbitrary identification information returned by a call to [`ChannelSigner::channel_keys_id`].
/// This may be useful in re-deriving keys used in the channel to spend the output.
pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
/// shorter.
// Calculated as 1 byte length + 73 byte signature, 1 byte empty vec push, 1 byte length plus
// redeemscript push length.
- pub const MAX_WITNESS_LENGTH: usize = 1 + 73 + 1 + chan_utils::REVOKEABLE_REDEEMSCRIPT_MAX_LENGTH + 1;
+ pub const MAX_WITNESS_LENGTH: u64 = 1 + 73 + 1 + chan_utils::REVOKEABLE_REDEEMSCRIPT_MAX_LENGTH as u64 + 1;
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, {
///
/// Note that this will only return `Some` for [`StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor`]s that
/// originated from an anchor outputs channel, as they take the form of a P2WSH script.
- pub fn witness_script(&self) -> Option<Script> {
+ pub fn witness_script(&self) -> Option<ScriptBuf> {
self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_ref()
.and_then(|channel_params|
- if channel_params.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ if channel_params.supports_anchors() {
let payment_point = channel_params.holder_pubkeys.payment_point;
Some(chan_utils::get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&payment_point))
} else {
/// The maximum length a well-formed witness spending one of these should have.
/// Note: If you have the grind_signatures feature enabled, this will be at least 1 byte
/// shorter.
- pub fn max_witness_length(&self) -> usize {
- if self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_ref()
- .map(|channel_params| channel_params.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx())
- .unwrap_or(false)
+ pub fn max_witness_length(&self) -> u64 {
+ if self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_ref().map_or(false, |p| p.supports_anchors())
{
let witness_script_weight = 1 /* pubkey push */ + 33 /* pubkey */ +
1 /* OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY */ + 1 /* OP_1 */ + 1 /* OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY */;
1 /* num witness items */ + 1 /* sig push */ + 73 /* sig including sighash flag */ +
1 /* witness script push */ + witness_script_weight
} else {
- P2WPKH_WITNESS_WEIGHT as usize
+ P2WPKH_WITNESS_WEIGHT
}
}
}
outpoint: OutPoint,
/// The output which is referenced by the given outpoint.
output: TxOut,
+ /// The `channel_keys_id` for the channel which this output came from.
+ ///
+ /// For channels which were generated on LDK 0.0.119 or later, this is the value which was
+ /// passed to the [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`] call which provided this
+ /// output script.
+ ///
+ /// For channels which were generated prior to LDK 0.0.119, no such argument existed,
+ /// however this field may still be filled in if such data is available.
+ channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]>
},
/// An output to a P2WSH script which can be spent with a single signature after an `OP_CSV`
/// delay.
/// To derive the delayed payment key which is used to sign this input, you must pass the
/// holder [`InMemorySigner::delayed_payment_base_key`] (i.e., the private key which corresponds to the
/// [`ChannelPublicKeys::delayed_payment_basepoint`] in [`ChannelSigner::pubkeys`]) and the provided
- /// [`DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor::per_commitment_point`] to [`chan_utils::derive_private_key`]. The public key can be
- /// generated without the secret key using [`chan_utils::derive_public_key`] and only the
+ /// [`DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor::per_commitment_point`] to [`chan_utils::derive_private_key`]. The DelayedPaymentKey can be
+ /// generated without the secret key using [`DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint`] and only the
/// [`ChannelPublicKeys::delayed_payment_basepoint`] which appears in [`ChannelSigner::pubkeys`].
///
/// To derive the [`DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor::revocation_pubkey`] provided here (which is
/// [`ChannelPublicKeys::revocation_basepoint`] (which appears in the call to
/// [`ChannelSigner::provide_channel_parameters`]) and the provided
/// [`DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor::per_commitment_point`] to
- /// [`chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key`].
+ /// [`RevocationKey`].
///
/// The witness script which is hashed and included in the output `script_pubkey` may be
/// regenerated by passing the [`DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor::revocation_pubkey`] (derived
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SpendableOutputDescriptor,
(0, StaticOutput) => {
(0, outpoint, required),
+ (1, channel_keys_id, option),
(2, output, required),
},
;
/// does not match the one we can spend.
///
/// We do not enforce that outputs meet the dust limit or that any output scripts are standard.
- pub fn create_spendable_outputs_psbt(descriptors: &[&SpendableOutputDescriptor], outputs: Vec<TxOut>, change_destination_script: Script, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32, locktime: Option<PackedLockTime>) -> Result<(PartiallySignedTransaction, usize), ()> {
+ pub fn create_spendable_outputs_psbt(descriptors: &[&SpendableOutputDescriptor], outputs: Vec<TxOut>, change_destination_script: ScriptBuf, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32, locktime: Option<LockTime>) -> Result<(PartiallySignedTransaction, u64), ()> {
let mut input = Vec::with_capacity(descriptors.len());
let mut input_value = 0;
let mut witness_weight = 0;
- let mut output_set = HashSet::with_capacity(descriptors.len());
+ let mut output_set = hash_set_with_capacity(descriptors.len());
for outp in descriptors {
match outp {
SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor) => {
if !output_set.insert(descriptor.outpoint) { return Err(()); }
let sequence =
if descriptor.channel_transaction_parameters.as_ref()
- .map(|channel_params| channel_params.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx())
- .unwrap_or(false)
+ .map_or(false, |p| p.supports_anchors())
{
Sequence::from_consensus(1)
} else {
};
input.push(TxIn {
previous_output: descriptor.outpoint.into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
- script_sig: Script::new(),
+ script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
sequence,
witness: Witness::new(),
});
witness_weight += descriptor.max_witness_length();
#[cfg(feature = "grind_signatures")]
- { witness_weight -= 1; } // Guarantees a low R signature
+ { // Guarantees a low R signature
+ witness_weight -= 1;
+ }
input_value += descriptor.output.value;
},
SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) => {
if !output_set.insert(descriptor.outpoint) { return Err(()); }
input.push(TxIn {
previous_output: descriptor.outpoint.into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
- script_sig: Script::new(),
+ script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
sequence: Sequence(descriptor.to_self_delay as u32),
witness: Witness::new(),
});
witness_weight += DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor::MAX_WITNESS_LENGTH;
#[cfg(feature = "grind_signatures")]
- { witness_weight -= 1; } // Guarantees a low R signature
+ { // Guarantees a low R signature
+ witness_weight -= 1;
+ }
input_value += descriptor.output.value;
},
- SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => {
+ SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output, .. } => {
if !output_set.insert(*outpoint) { return Err(()); }
input.push(TxIn {
previous_output: outpoint.into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
- script_sig: Script::new(),
+ script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
sequence: Sequence::ZERO,
witness: Witness::new(),
});
witness_weight += 1 + 73 + 34;
#[cfg(feature = "grind_signatures")]
- { witness_weight -= 1; } // Guarantees a low R signature
+ { // Guarantees a low R signature
+ witness_weight -= 1;
+ }
input_value += output.value;
}
}
}
let mut tx = Transaction {
version: 2,
- lock_time: locktime.unwrap_or(PackedLockTime::ZERO),
+ lock_time: locktime.unwrap_or(LockTime::ZERO),
input,
output: outputs,
};
}
}
+/// The parameters required to derive a channel signer via [`SignerProvider`].
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct ChannelDerivationParameters {
+ /// The value in satoshis of the channel we're attempting to spend the anchor output of.
+ pub value_satoshis: u64,
+ /// The unique identifier to re-derive the signer for the associated channel.
+ pub keys_id: [u8; 32],
+ /// The necessary channel parameters that need to be provided to the re-derived signer through
+ /// [`ChannelSigner::provide_channel_parameters`].
+ pub transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
+}
+
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDerivationParameters, {
+ (0, value_satoshis, required),
+ (2, keys_id, required),
+ (4, transaction_parameters, required),
+});
+
+/// A descriptor used to sign for a commitment transaction's HTLC output.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct HTLCDescriptor {
+ /// The parameters required to derive the signer for the HTLC input.
+ pub channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters,
+ /// The txid of the commitment transaction in which the HTLC output lives.
+ pub commitment_txid: Txid,
+ /// The number of the commitment transaction in which the HTLC output lives.
+ pub per_commitment_number: u64,
+ /// The key tweak corresponding to the number of the commitment transaction in which the HTLC
+ /// output lives. This tweak is applied to all the basepoints for both parties in the channel to
+ /// arrive at unique keys per commitment.
+ ///
+ /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md#keys> for more info.
+ pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
+ /// The feerate to use on the HTLC claiming transaction. This is always `0` for HTLCs
+ /// originating from a channel supporting anchor outputs, otherwise it is the channel's
+ /// negotiated feerate at the time the commitment transaction was built.
+ pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
+ /// The details of the HTLC as it appears in the commitment transaction.
+ pub htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment,
+ /// The preimage, if `Some`, to claim the HTLC output with. If `None`, the timeout path must be
+ /// taken.
+ pub preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
+ /// The counterparty's signature required to spend the HTLC output.
+ pub counterparty_sig: Signature
+}
+
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCDescriptor, {
+ (0, channel_derivation_parameters, required),
+ (1, feerate_per_kw, (default_value, 0)),
+ (2, commitment_txid, required),
+ (4, per_commitment_number, required),
+ (6, per_commitment_point, required),
+ (8, htlc, required),
+ (10, preimage, option),
+ (12, counterparty_sig, required),
+});
+
+impl HTLCDescriptor {
+ /// Returns the outpoint of the HTLC output in the commitment transaction. This is the outpoint
+ /// being spent by the HTLC input in the HTLC transaction.
+ pub fn outpoint(&self) -> bitcoin::OutPoint {
+ bitcoin::OutPoint {
+ txid: self.commitment_txid,
+ vout: self.htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap(),
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Returns the UTXO to be spent by the HTLC input, which can be obtained via
+ /// [`Self::unsigned_tx_input`].
+ pub fn previous_utxo<C: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, secp: &Secp256k1<C>) -> TxOut {
+ TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: self.witness_script(secp).to_v0_p2wsh(),
+ value: self.htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Returns the unsigned transaction input spending the HTLC output in the commitment
+ /// transaction.
+ pub fn unsigned_tx_input(&self) -> TxIn {
+ chan_utils::build_htlc_input(
+ &self.commitment_txid, &self.htlc, &self.channel_derivation_parameters.transaction_parameters.channel_type_features
+ )
+ }
+
+ /// Returns the delayed output created as a result of spending the HTLC output in the commitment
+ /// transaction.
+ pub fn tx_output<C: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, secp: &Secp256k1<C>) -> TxOut {
+ let channel_params = self.channel_derivation_parameters.transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
+ let broadcaster_keys = channel_params.broadcaster_pubkeys();
+ let counterparty_keys = channel_params.countersignatory_pubkeys();
+ let broadcaster_delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(
+ secp, &broadcaster_keys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &self.per_commitment_point
+ );
+ let counterparty_revocation_key = &RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp, &counterparty_keys.revocation_basepoint, &self.per_commitment_point);
+ chan_utils::build_htlc_output(
+ self.feerate_per_kw, channel_params.contest_delay(), &self.htlc,
+ channel_params.channel_type_features(), &broadcaster_delayed_key, &counterparty_revocation_key
+ )
+ }
+
+ /// Returns the witness script of the HTLC output in the commitment transaction.
+ pub fn witness_script<C: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, secp: &Secp256k1<C>) -> ScriptBuf {
+ let channel_params = self.channel_derivation_parameters.transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
+ let broadcaster_keys = channel_params.broadcaster_pubkeys();
+ let counterparty_keys = channel_params.countersignatory_pubkeys();
+ let broadcaster_htlc_key = HtlcKey::from_basepoint(
+ secp, &broadcaster_keys.htlc_basepoint, &self.per_commitment_point
+ );
+ let counterparty_htlc_key = HtlcKey::from_basepoint(
+ secp, &counterparty_keys.htlc_basepoint, &self.per_commitment_point,
+ );
+ let counterparty_revocation_key = &RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp, &counterparty_keys.revocation_basepoint, &self.per_commitment_point);
+ chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(
+ &self.htlc, channel_params.channel_type_features(), &broadcaster_htlc_key, &counterparty_htlc_key,
+ &counterparty_revocation_key,
+ )
+ }
+
+ /// Returns the fully signed witness required to spend the HTLC output in the commitment
+ /// transaction.
+ pub fn tx_input_witness(&self, signature: &Signature, witness_script: &Script) -> Witness {
+ chan_utils::build_htlc_input_witness(
+ signature, &self.counterparty_sig, &self.preimage, witness_script,
+ &self.channel_derivation_parameters.transaction_parameters.channel_type_features
+ )
+ }
+
+ /// Derives the channel signer required to sign the HTLC input.
+ pub fn derive_channel_signer<S: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, SP: Deref>(&self, signer_provider: &SP) -> S
+ where
+ SP::Target: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= S>
+ {
+ let mut signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(
+ self.channel_derivation_parameters.value_satoshis,
+ self.channel_derivation_parameters.keys_id,
+ );
+ signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_derivation_parameters.transaction_parameters);
+ signer
+ }
+}
+
/// A trait to handle Lightning channel key material without concretizing the channel type or
/// the signature mechanism.
pub trait ChannelSigner {
/// Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
/// sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
///
- /// The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
+ /// The preimages of outbound HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
/// A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
/// preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
///
/// Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
/// irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
fn validate_holder_commitment(&self, holder_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction,
- preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), ()>;
+ outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), ()>;
+
+ /// Validate the counterparty's revocation.
+ ///
+ /// This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
+ /// forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
+ fn validate_counterparty_revocation(&self, idx: u64, secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<(), ()>;
/// Returns the holder's channel public keys and basepoints.
fn pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys;
fn provide_channel_parameters(&mut self, channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters);
}
-/// A trait to sign Lightning channel transactions as described in
-/// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md).
-///
-/// Signing services could be implemented on a hardware wallet and should implement signing
-/// policies in order to be secure. Please refer to the [VLS Policy
-/// Controls](https://gitlab.com/lightning-signer/validating-lightning-signer/-/blob/main/docs/policy-controls.md)
-/// for an example of such policies.
-pub trait EcdsaChannelSigner: ChannelSigner {
- /// Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
- ///
- /// Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
- ///
- /// Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
- /// sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
- ///
- /// The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
- /// A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
- /// preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
- ///
- /// Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
- /// irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
- //
- // TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
- fn sign_counterparty_commitment(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction,
- preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>
- ) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
- /// Validate the counterparty's revocation.
- ///
- /// This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
- /// forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
- fn validate_counterparty_revocation(&self, idx: u64, secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<(), ()>;
- /// Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
- ///
- /// This will be called
- /// - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`.
- /// - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close.
- /// - with the previous `commitment_tx`, just to get claiming HTLC
- /// signatures, if we are reacting to a [`ChannelMonitor`]
- /// [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
- /// that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest `commitment_tx`.
- ///
- /// This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
- ///
- /// An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
- ///
- /// [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
- // TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
- fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction,
- secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
- /// Same as [`sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs`], but exists only for tests to get access to
- /// holder commitment transactions which will be broadcasted later, after the channel has moved
- /// on to a newer state. Thus, needs its own method as [`sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs`] may
- /// enforce that we only ever get called once.
- #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
- fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction,
- secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
- /// Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
- /// or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
- ///
- /// A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
- /// similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
- /// It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
- /// to an upcoming timelock expiration.
- ///
- /// Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
- ///
- /// `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
- /// revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
- /// not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do
- /// so).
- fn sign_justice_revoked_output(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64,
- per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>
- ) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
- /// Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
- /// HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
- ///
- /// A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
- /// similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
- /// It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
- /// to an upcoming timelock expiration.
- ///
- /// `amount` is the value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143
- /// signature.
- ///
- /// `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
- /// revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
- /// not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
- /// so).
- ///
- /// `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
- /// (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
- fn sign_justice_revoked_htlc(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64,
- per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment,
- secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
- /// Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's HTLC output used as an input within
- /// `htlc_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction at index `input`. The signature returned
- /// must be be computed using [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]. Note that this should only be used to
- /// sign HTLC transactions from channels supporting anchor outputs after all additional
- /// inputs/outputs have been added to the transaction.
- ///
- /// [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType::All
- fn sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize,
- htlc_descriptor: &HTLCDescriptor, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>
- ) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
- /// Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
- /// transaction, either offered or received.
- ///
- /// Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
- /// preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
- /// signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
- /// needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
- ///
- /// `witness_script` is either an offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
- /// outputs.
- ///
- /// `amount` is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
- ///
- /// `per_commitment_point` is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
- /// detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
- /// channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
- /// BIP 143 signature.
- fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64,
- per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment,
- secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
- /// Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
- ///
- /// Note that, due to rounding, there may be one "missing" satoshi, and either party may have
- /// chosen to forgo their output as dust.
- fn sign_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction,
- secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
- /// Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
- /// input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
- fn sign_holder_anchor_input(
- &self, anchor_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
- ) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
- /// Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key proving it comes from one of the
- /// channel participants.
- ///
- /// Channel announcements also require a signature from each node's network key. Our node
- /// signature is computed through [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`].
- ///
- /// Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
- /// our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
- /// protocol.
- fn sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(
- &self, msg: &UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>
- ) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
-}
-
-/// A writeable signer.
-///
-/// There will always be two instances of a signer per channel, one occupied by the
-/// [`ChannelManager`] and another by the channel's [`ChannelMonitor`].
-///
-/// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
-/// [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
-pub trait WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner: EcdsaChannelSigner + Writeable {}
-
/// Specifies the recipient of an invoice.
///
/// This indicates to [`NodeSigner::sign_invoice`] what node secret key should be used to sign
fn sign_gossip_message(&self, msg: UnsignedGossipMessage) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
}
+// Primarily needed in doctests because of https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/67295
+/// A dynamic [`SignerProvider`] temporarily needed for doc tests.
+#[cfg(taproot)]
+#[doc(hidden)]
+#[deprecated(note = "Remove once taproot cfg is removed")]
+pub type DynSignerProvider = dyn SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner, TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner>;
+
+/// A dynamic [`SignerProvider`] temporarily needed for doc tests.
+#[cfg(not(taproot))]
+#[doc(hidden)]
+#[deprecated(note = "Remove once taproot cfg is removed")]
+pub type DynSignerProvider = dyn SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner>;
+
/// A trait that can return signer instances for individual channels.
pub trait SignerProvider {
/// A type which implements [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`] which will be returned by [`Self::derive_channel_signer`].
- type Signer : WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
+ type EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ /// A type which implements [`TaprootChannelSigner`]
+ type TaprootSigner: TaprootChannelSigner;
- /// Generates a unique `channel_keys_id` that can be used to obtain a [`Self::Signer`] through
+ /// Generates a unique `channel_keys_id` that can be used to obtain a [`Self::EcdsaSigner`] through
/// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`]. The `user_channel_id` is provided to allow
/// implementations of [`SignerProvider`] to maintain a mapping between itself and the generated
/// `channel_keys_id`.
/// [`SignerProvider::generate_channel_keys_id`]. Otherwise, an existing `Signer` can be
/// re-derived from its `channel_keys_id`, which can be obtained through its trait method
/// [`ChannelSigner::channel_keys_id`].
- fn derive_channel_signer(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer;
+ fn derive_channel_signer(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner;
/// Reads a [`Signer`] for this [`SignerProvider`] from the given input stream.
/// This is only called during deserialization of other objects which contain
/// This method is slowly being phased out -- it will only be called when reading objects
/// written by LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
///
- /// [`Signer`]: Self::Signer
+ /// [`Signer`]: Self::EcdsaSigner
/// [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
/// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
- fn read_chan_signer(&self, reader: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError>;
+ fn read_chan_signer(&self, reader: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError>;
/// Get a script pubkey which we send funds to when claiming on-chain contestable outputs.
///
/// If this function returns an error, this will result in a channel failing to open.
///
/// This method should return a different value each time it is called, to avoid linking
- /// on-chain funds across channels as controlled to the same user.
- fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()>;
+ /// on-chain funds across channels as controlled to the same user. `channel_keys_id` may be
+ /// used to derive a unique value for each channel.
+ fn get_destination_script(&self, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()>;
/// Get a script pubkey which we will send funds to when closing a channel.
///
channel_value_satoshis: u64,
/// Key derivation parameters.
channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
- /// Seed from which all randomness produced is derived from.
- rand_bytes_unique_start: [u8; 32],
- /// Tracks the number of times we've produced randomness to ensure we don't return the same
- /// bytes twice.
- rand_bytes_index: AtomicCounter,
+ /// A source of random bytes.
+ entropy_source: RandomBytes,
}
impl PartialEq for InMemorySigner {
channel_parameters: self.channel_parameters.clone(),
channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
- rand_bytes_unique_start: self.get_secure_random_bytes(),
- rand_bytes_index: AtomicCounter::new(),
+ entropy_source: RandomBytes::new(self.get_secure_random_bytes()),
}
}
}
holder_channel_pubkeys,
channel_parameters: None,
channel_keys_id,
- rand_bytes_unique_start,
- rand_bytes_index: AtomicCounter::new(),
+ entropy_source: RandomBytes::new(rand_bytes_unique_start),
}
}
let from_secret = |s: &SecretKey| PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, s);
ChannelPublicKeys {
funding_pubkey: from_secret(&funding_key),
- revocation_basepoint: from_secret(&revocation_base_key),
+ revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(from_secret(&revocation_base_key)),
payment_point: from_secret(&payment_key),
- delayed_payment_basepoint: from_secret(&delayed_payment_base_key),
- htlc_basepoint: from_secret(&htlc_base_key),
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(from_secret(&delayed_payment_base_key)),
+ htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(from_secret(&htlc_base_key)),
}
}
/// or if an output descriptor `script_pubkey` does not match the one we can spend.
///
/// [`descriptor.outpoint`]: StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor::outpoint
- pub fn sign_counterparty_payment_input<C: Signing>(&self, spend_tx: &Transaction, input_idx: usize, descriptor: &StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>, ()> {
+ pub fn sign_counterparty_payment_input<C: Signing>(&self, spend_tx: &Transaction, input_idx: usize, descriptor: &StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<Witness, ()> {
// TODO: We really should be taking the SigHashCache as a parameter here instead of
// spend_tx, but ideally the SigHashCache would expose the transaction's inputs read-only
// so that we can check them. This requires upstream rust-bitcoin changes (as well as
let witness_script = if supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
chan_utils::get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&remotepubkey.inner)
} else {
- Script::new_p2pkh(&remotepubkey.pubkey_hash())
+ ScriptBuf::new_p2pkh(&remotepubkey.pubkey_hash())
};
let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(spend_tx).segwit_signature_hash(input_idx, &witness_script, descriptor.output.value, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
let remotesig = sign_with_aux_rand(secp_ctx, &sighash, &self.payment_key, &self);
let payment_script = if supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
witness_script.to_v0_p2wsh()
} else {
- Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&remotepubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap())
+ ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wpkh(&remotepubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap())
};
if payment_script != descriptor.output.script_pubkey { return Err(()); }
} else {
witness.push(remotepubkey.to_bytes());
}
- Ok(witness)
+ Ok(witness.into())
}
/// Sign the single input of `spend_tx` at index `input_idx` which spends the output
///
/// [`descriptor.outpoint`]: DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor::outpoint
/// [`descriptor.to_self_delay`]: DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor::to_self_delay
- pub fn sign_dynamic_p2wsh_input<C: Signing>(&self, spend_tx: &Transaction, input_idx: usize, descriptor: &DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>, ()> {
+ pub fn sign_dynamic_p2wsh_input<C: Signing>(&self, spend_tx: &Transaction, input_idx: usize, descriptor: &DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<Witness, ()> {
// TODO: We really should be taking the SigHashCache as a parameter here instead of
// spend_tx, but ideally the SigHashCache would expose the transaction's inputs read-only
// so that we can check them. This requires upstream rust-bitcoin changes (as well as
if spend_tx.input[input_idx].sequence.0 != descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 { return Err(()); }
let delayed_payment_key = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &descriptor.per_commitment_point, &self.delayed_payment_base_key);
- let delayed_payment_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &delayed_payment_key);
+ let delayed_payment_pubkey = DelayedPaymentKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &delayed_payment_key);
let witness_script = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&descriptor.revocation_pubkey, descriptor.to_self_delay, &delayed_payment_pubkey);
let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(spend_tx).segwit_signature_hash(input_idx, &witness_script, descriptor.output.value, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
- let local_delayedsig = sign_with_aux_rand(secp_ctx, &sighash, &delayed_payment_key, &self);
+ let local_delayedsig = EcdsaSignature {
+ sig: sign_with_aux_rand(secp_ctx, &sighash, &delayed_payment_key, &self),
+ hash_ty: EcdsaSighashType::All,
+ };
let payment_script = bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&witness_script, Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey();
if descriptor.output.script_pubkey != payment_script { return Err(()); }
- let mut witness = Vec::with_capacity(3);
- witness.push(local_delayedsig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- witness[0].push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
- witness.push(vec!()); //MINIMALIF
- witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
- Ok(witness)
+ Ok(Witness::from_slice(&[
+ &local_delayedsig.serialize()[..],
+ &[], // MINIMALIF
+ witness_script.as_bytes(),
+ ]))
}
}
impl EntropySource for InMemorySigner {
fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
- let index = self.rand_bytes_index.get_increment();
- let mut nonce = [0u8; 16];
- nonce[..8].copy_from_slice(&index.to_be_bytes());
- ChaCha20::get_single_block(&self.rand_bytes_unique_start, &nonce)
+ self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()
}
}
chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&self.commitment_seed, idx)
}
- fn validate_holder_commitment(&self, _holder_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, _preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), ()> {
+ fn validate_holder_commitment(&self, _holder_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, _outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), ()> {
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn validate_counterparty_revocation(&self, _idx: u64, _secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<(), ()> {
Ok(())
}
const MISSING_PARAMS_ERR: &'static str = "ChannelSigner::provide_channel_parameters must be called before signing operations";
impl EcdsaChannelSigner for InMemorySigner {
- fn sign_counterparty_commitment(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, _preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
+ fn sign_counterparty_commitment(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, _
inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, _outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
let keys = trusted_tx.keys();
Ok((commitment_sig, htlc_sigs))
}
- fn validate_counterparty_revocation(&self, _idx: u64, _secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<(), ()> {
- Ok(())
- }
-
- fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
+ fn sign_holder_commitment(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
let counterparty_keys = self.counterparty_pubkeys().expect(MISSING_PARAMS_ERR);
let funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &counterparty_keys.funding_pubkey);
let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
- let sig = trusted_tx.built_transaction().sign_holder_commitment(&self.funding_key, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, &self, secp_ctx);
- let channel_parameters = self.get_channel_parameters().expect(MISSING_PARAMS_ERR);
- let htlc_sigs = trusted_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), &self, secp_ctx)?;
- Ok((sig, htlc_sigs))
+ Ok(trusted_tx.built_transaction().sign_holder_commitment(&self.funding_key, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, &self, secp_ctx))
}
#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
- fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
+ fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
let counterparty_keys = self.counterparty_pubkeys().expect(MISSING_PARAMS_ERR);
let funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &counterparty_keys.funding_pubkey);
let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
- let sig = trusted_tx.built_transaction().sign_holder_commitment(&self.funding_key, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, &self, secp_ctx);
- let channel_parameters = self.get_channel_parameters().expect(MISSING_PARAMS_ERR);
- let htlc_sigs = trusted_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), &self, secp_ctx)?;
- Ok((sig, htlc_sigs))
+ Ok(trusted_tx.built_transaction().sign_holder_commitment(&self.funding_key, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, &self, secp_ctx))
}
fn sign_justice_revoked_output(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
let revocation_key = chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.revocation_base_key);
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
- let revocation_pubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint);
+ let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(
+ &secp_ctx, &self.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &per_commitment_point,
+ );
let witness_script = {
let counterparty_keys = self.counterparty_pubkeys().expect(MISSING_PARAMS_ERR);
let holder_selected_contest_delay =
self.holder_selected_contest_delay().expect(MISSING_PARAMS_ERR);
- let counterparty_delayedpubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &counterparty_keys.delayed_payment_basepoint);
+ let counterparty_delayedpubkey = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &counterparty_keys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &per_commitment_point);
chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, holder_selected_contest_delay, &counterparty_delayedpubkey)
};
let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(justice_tx);
fn sign_justice_revoked_htlc(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
let revocation_key = chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.revocation_base_key);
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
- let revocation_pubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint);
+ let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(
+ &secp_ctx, &self.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &per_commitment_point,
+ );
let witness_script = {
let counterparty_keys = self.counterparty_pubkeys().expect(MISSING_PARAMS_ERR);
- let counterparty_htlcpubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &counterparty_keys.htlc_basepoint);
- let holder_htlcpubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint);
+ let counterparty_htlcpubkey = HtlcKey::from_basepoint(
+ &secp_ctx, &counterparty_keys.htlc_basepoint, &per_commitment_point,
+ );
+ let holder_htlcpubkey = HtlcKey::from_basepoint(
+ &secp_ctx, &self.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint, &per_commitment_point,
+ );
let chan_type = self.channel_type_features().expect(MISSING_PARAMS_ERR);
chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, chan_type, &counterparty_htlcpubkey, &holder_htlcpubkey, &revocation_pubkey)
};
let our_htlc_private_key = chan_utils::derive_private_key(
&secp_ctx, &htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_point, &self.htlc_base_key
);
- Ok(sign_with_aux_rand(&secp_ctx, &hash_to_message!(sighash), &our_htlc_private_key, &self))
+ Ok(sign_with_aux_rand(&secp_ctx, &hash_to_message!(sighash.as_byte_array()), &our_htlc_private_key, &self))
}
fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
let htlc_key = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.htlc_base_key);
- let revocation_pubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint);
+ let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(
+ &secp_ctx, &self.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &per_commitment_point,
+ );
let counterparty_keys = self.counterparty_pubkeys().expect(MISSING_PARAMS_ERR);
- let counterparty_htlcpubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &counterparty_keys.htlc_basepoint);
- let htlcpubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint);
+ let counterparty_htlcpubkey = HtlcKey::from_basepoint(
+ &secp_ctx, &counterparty_keys.htlc_basepoint, &per_commitment_point,
+ );
+ let htlcpubkey = HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &self.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint, &per_commitment_point);
let chan_type = self.channel_type_features().expect(MISSING_PARAMS_ERR);
let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, chan_type, &counterparty_htlcpubkey, &htlcpubkey, &revocation_pubkey);
let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(htlc_tx);
}
}
+#[cfg(taproot)]
+impl TaprootChannelSigner for InMemorySigner {
+ fn generate_local_nonce_pair(&self, commitment_number: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>) -> PublicNonce {
+ todo!()
+ }
+
+ fn partially_sign_counterparty_commitment(&self, counterparty_nonce: PublicNonce, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>) -> Result<(PartialSignatureWithNonce, Vec<schnorr::Signature>), ()> {
+ todo!()
+ }
+
+ fn finalize_holder_commitment(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, counterparty_partial_signature: PartialSignatureWithNonce, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>) -> Result<PartialSignature, ()> {
+ todo!()
+ }
+
+ fn sign_justice_revoked_output(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>) -> Result<schnorr::Signature, ()> {
+ todo!()
+ }
+
+ fn sign_justice_revoked_htlc(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>) -> Result<schnorr::Signature, ()> {
+ todo!()
+ }
+
+ fn sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, htlc_descriptor: &HTLCDescriptor, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>) -> Result<schnorr::Signature, ()> {
+ todo!()
+ }
+
+ fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>) -> Result<schnorr::Signature, ()> {
+ todo!()
+ }
+
+ fn partially_sign_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>) -> Result<PartialSignature, ()> {
+ todo!()
+ }
+
+ fn sign_holder_anchor_input(&self, anchor_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>) -> Result<schnorr::Signature, ()> {
+ todo!()
+ }
+}
+
const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
holder_channel_pubkeys,
channel_parameters: counterparty_channel_data,
channel_keys_id: keys_id,
- rand_bytes_unique_start: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
- rand_bytes_index: AtomicCounter::new(),
+ entropy_source: RandomBytes::new(entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()),
})
}
}
node_secret: SecretKey,
node_id: PublicKey,
inbound_payment_key: KeyMaterial,
- destination_script: Script,
+ destination_script: ScriptBuf,
shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
channel_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey,
channel_child_index: AtomicUsize,
- rand_bytes_unique_start: [u8; 32],
- rand_bytes_index: AtomicCounter,
+ entropy_source: RandomBytes,
seed: [u8; 32],
starting_time_secs: u64,
Ok(destination_key) => {
let wpubkey_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&ExtendedPubKey::from_priv(&secp_ctx, &destination_key).to_pub().to_bytes());
Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
- .push_slice(&wpubkey_hash.into_inner())
+ .push_slice(&wpubkey_hash.to_byte_array())
.into_script()
},
Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
rand_bytes_engine.input(&starting_time_nanos.to_be_bytes());
rand_bytes_engine.input(seed);
rand_bytes_engine.input(b"LDK PRNG Seed");
- let rand_bytes_unique_start = Sha256::from_engine(rand_bytes_engine).into_inner();
+ let rand_bytes_unique_start = Sha256::from_engine(rand_bytes_engine).to_byte_array();
let mut res = KeysManager {
secp_ctx,
channel_master_key,
channel_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0),
- rand_bytes_unique_start,
- rand_bytes_index: AtomicCounter::new(),
+ entropy_source: RandomBytes::new(rand_bytes_unique_start),
seed: *seed,
starting_time_secs,
).expect("Your RNG is busted");
unique_start.input(&child_privkey.private_key[..]);
- let seed = Sha256::from_engine(unique_start).into_inner();
+ let seed = Sha256::from_engine(unique_start).to_byte_array();
let commitment_seed = {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&seed);
sha.input(&b"commitment seed"[..]);
- Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
+ Sha256::from_engine(sha).to_byte_array()
};
macro_rules! key_step {
($info: expr, $prev_key: expr) => {{
sha.input(&seed);
sha.input(&$prev_key[..]);
sha.input(&$info[..]);
- SecretKey::from_slice(&Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()).expect("SHA-256 is busted")
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&Sha256::from_engine(sha).to_byte_array()).expect("SHA-256 is busted")
}}
}
let funding_key = key_step!(b"funding key", commitment_seed);
}
keys_cache = Some((signer, descriptor.channel_keys_id));
}
- let witness = Witness::from_vec(keys_cache.as_ref().unwrap().0.sign_counterparty_payment_input(&psbt.unsigned_tx, input_idx, &descriptor, &secp_ctx)?);
+ let witness = keys_cache.as_ref().unwrap().0.sign_counterparty_payment_input(&psbt.unsigned_tx, input_idx, &descriptor, &secp_ctx)?;
psbt.inputs[input_idx].final_script_witness = Some(witness);
},
SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) => {
self.derive_channel_keys(descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &descriptor.channel_keys_id),
descriptor.channel_keys_id));
}
- let witness = Witness::from_vec(keys_cache.as_ref().unwrap().0.sign_dynamic_p2wsh_input(&psbt.unsigned_tx, input_idx, &descriptor, &secp_ctx)?);
+ let witness = keys_cache.as_ref().unwrap().0.sign_dynamic_p2wsh_input(&psbt.unsigned_tx, input_idx, &descriptor, &secp_ctx)?;
psbt.inputs[input_idx].final_script_witness = Some(witness);
},
- SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => {
+ SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output, .. } => {
let input_idx = psbt.unsigned_tx.input.iter().position(|i| i.previous_output == outpoint.into_bitcoin_outpoint()).ok_or(())?;
let derivation_idx = if output.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
1
let sig = sign_with_aux_rand(secp_ctx, &sighash, &secret.private_key, &self);
let mut sig_ser = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
sig_ser.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
- let witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![sig_ser, pubkey.inner.serialize().to_vec()]);
+ let witness = Witness::from_slice(&[&sig_ser, &pubkey.inner.serialize().to_vec()]);
psbt.inputs[input_idx].final_script_witness = Some(witness);
},
}
///
/// May panic if the [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`]s were not generated by channels which used
/// this [`KeysManager`] or one of the [`InMemorySigner`] created by this [`KeysManager`].
- pub fn spend_spendable_outputs<C: Signing>(&self, descriptors: &[&SpendableOutputDescriptor], outputs: Vec<TxOut>, change_destination_script: Script, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32, locktime: Option<PackedLockTime>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<Transaction, ()> {
+ pub fn spend_spendable_outputs<C: Signing>(&self, descriptors: &[&SpendableOutputDescriptor], outputs: Vec<TxOut>, change_destination_script: ScriptBuf, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32, locktime: Option<LockTime>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<Transaction, ()> {
let (mut psbt, expected_max_weight) = SpendableOutputDescriptor::create_spendable_outputs_psbt(descriptors, outputs, change_destination_script, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, locktime)?;
psbt = self.sign_spendable_outputs_psbt(descriptors, psbt, secp_ctx)?;
let spend_tx = psbt.extract_tx();
- debug_assert!(expected_max_weight >= spend_tx.weight());
+ debug_assert!(expected_max_weight >= spend_tx.weight().to_wu());
// Note that witnesses with a signature vary somewhat in size, so allow
// `expected_max_weight` to overshoot by up to 3 bytes per input.
- debug_assert!(expected_max_weight <= spend_tx.weight() + descriptors.len() * 3);
+ debug_assert!(expected_max_weight <= spend_tx.weight().to_wu() + descriptors.len() as u64 * 3);
Ok(spend_tx)
}
impl EntropySource for KeysManager {
fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
- let index = self.rand_bytes_index.get_increment();
- let mut nonce = [0u8; 16];
- nonce[..8].copy_from_slice(&index.to_be_bytes());
- ChaCha20::get_single_block(&self.rand_bytes_unique_start, &nonce)
+ self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()
}
}
Recipient::Node => Ok(&self.node_secret),
Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(())
}?;
- Ok(self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa_recoverable(&hash_to_message!(&Sha256::hash(&preimage)), secret))
+ Ok(self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa_recoverable(&hash_to_message!(&Sha256::hash(&preimage).to_byte_array()), secret))
}
fn sign_bolt12_invoice_request(
}
impl SignerProvider for KeysManager {
- type Signer = InMemorySigner;
+ type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
let child_idx = self.channel_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
id
}
- fn derive_channel_signer(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
+ fn derive_channel_signer(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
self.derive_channel_keys(channel_value_satoshis, &channel_keys_id)
}
- fn read_chan_signer(&self, reader: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> {
+ fn read_chan_signer(&self, reader: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> {
InMemorySigner::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(reader), self)
}
- fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
+ fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
Ok(self.destination_script.clone())
}
Recipient::Node => &self.inner.node_secret,
Recipient::PhantomNode => &self.phantom_secret,
};
- Ok(self.inner.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa_recoverable(&hash_to_message!(&Sha256::hash(&preimage)), secret))
+ Ok(self.inner.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa_recoverable(&hash_to_message!(&Sha256::hash(&preimage).to_byte_array()), secret))
}
fn sign_bolt12_invoice_request(
}
impl SignerProvider for PhantomKeysManager {
- type Signer = InMemorySigner;
+ type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64, user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
self.inner.generate_channel_keys_id(inbound, channel_value_satoshis, user_channel_id)
}
- fn derive_channel_signer(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
+ fn derive_channel_signer(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
self.inner.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id)
}
- fn read_chan_signer(&self, reader: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> {
+ fn read_chan_signer(&self, reader: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> {
self.inner.read_chan_signer(reader)
}
- fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
- self.inner.get_destination_script()
+ fn get_destination_script(&self, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
+ self.inner.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id)
}
fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
}
/// See [`KeysManager::spend_spendable_outputs`] for documentation on this method.
- pub fn spend_spendable_outputs<C: Signing>(&self, descriptors: &[&SpendableOutputDescriptor], outputs: Vec<TxOut>, change_destination_script: Script, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32, locktime: Option<PackedLockTime>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<Transaction, ()> {
+ pub fn spend_spendable_outputs<C: Signing>(&self, descriptors: &[&SpendableOutputDescriptor], outputs: Vec<TxOut>, change_destination_script: ScriptBuf, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32, locktime: Option<LockTime>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<Transaction, ()> {
self.inner.spend_spendable_outputs(descriptors, outputs, change_destination_script, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, locktime, secp_ctx)
}
}
}
+/// An implementation of [`EntropySource`] using ChaCha20.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct RandomBytes {
+ /// Seed from which all randomness produced is derived from.
+ seed: [u8; 32],
+ /// Tracks the number of times we've produced randomness to ensure we don't return the same
+ /// bytes twice.
+ index: AtomicCounter,
+}
+
+impl RandomBytes {
+ /// Creates a new instance using the given seed.
+ pub fn new(seed: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
+ Self {
+ seed,
+ index: AtomicCounter::new(),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl EntropySource for RandomBytes {
+ fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
+ let index = self.index.get_increment();
+ let mut nonce = [0u8; 16];
+ nonce[..8].copy_from_slice(&index.to_be_bytes());
+ ChaCha20::get_single_block(&self.seed, &nonce)
+ }
+}
+
// Ensure that EcdsaChannelSigner can have a vtable
#[test]
pub fn dyn_sign() {
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff