use crate::ln::channel::{ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS};
use crate::ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, TrustedCommitmentTransaction, ClosingTransaction};
-use crate::ln::{chan_utils, msgs, PaymentPreimage};
+use crate::ln::channel_keys::{HtlcKey};
+use crate::ln::{msgs, PaymentPreimage};
use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner};
use crate::prelude::*;
use crate::sync::{Mutex, Arc};
#[cfg(test)] use crate::sync::MutexGuard;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
-use bitcoin::util::sighash;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
+use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
+use bitcoin::sighash;
+use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
-use crate::events::bump_transaction::HTLCDescriptor;
+use crate::sign::HTLCDescriptor;
use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Writer};
use crate::io::Error;
use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
/// Channel state used for policy enforcement
pub state: Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>>,
pub disable_revocation_policy_check: bool,
+ /// When `true` (the default), the signer will respond immediately with signatures. When `false`,
+ /// the signer will return an error indicating that it is unavailable.
+ pub available: Arc<Mutex<bool>>,
}
impl PartialEq for TestChannelSigner {
Self {
inner,
state,
- disable_revocation_policy_check: false
+ disable_revocation_policy_check: false,
+ available: Arc::new(Mutex::new(true)),
}
}
Self {
inner,
state,
- disable_revocation_policy_check
+ disable_revocation_policy_check,
+ available: Arc::new(Mutex::new(true)),
}
}
- pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures { self.inner.channel_type_features() }
+ pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures { self.inner.channel_type_features().unwrap() }
#[cfg(test)]
pub fn get_enforcement_state(&self) -> MutexGuard<EnforcementState> {
self.state.lock().unwrap()
}
+
+ /// Marks the signer's availability.
+ ///
+ /// When `true`, methods are forwarded to the underlying signer as normal. When `false`, some
+ /// methods will return `Err` indicating that the signer is unavailable. Intended to be used for
+ /// testing asynchronous signing.
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub fn set_available(&self, available: bool) {
+ *self.available.lock().unwrap() = available;
+ }
}
impl ChannelSigner for TestChannelSigner {
self.verify_counterparty_commitment_tx(commitment_tx, secp_ctx);
{
+ if !*self.available.lock().unwrap() {
+ return Err(());
+ }
let mut state = self.state.lock().unwrap();
let actual_commitment_number = commitment_tx.commitment_number();
let last_commitment_number = state.last_counterparty_commitment;
}
fn validate_counterparty_revocation(&self, idx: u64, _secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<(), ()> {
+ if !*self.available.lock().unwrap() {
+ return Err(());
+ }
let mut state = self.state.lock().unwrap();
assert!(idx == state.last_counterparty_revoked_commitment || idx == state.last_counterparty_revoked_commitment - 1, "expecting to validate the current or next counterparty revocation - trying {}, current {}", idx, state.last_counterparty_revoked_commitment);
state.last_counterparty_revoked_commitment = idx;
Ok(())
}
- fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
+ fn sign_holder_commitment(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ if !*self.available.lock().unwrap() {
+ return Err(());
+ }
let trusted_tx = self.verify_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx, secp_ctx);
- let commitment_txid = trusted_tx.txid();
- let holder_csv = self.inner.counterparty_selected_contest_delay();
-
let state = self.state.lock().unwrap();
let commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
if state.last_holder_revoked_commitment - 1 != commitment_number && state.last_holder_revoked_commitment - 2 != commitment_number {
state.last_holder_revoked_commitment, commitment_number, self.inner.commitment_seed[0])
}
}
-
- for (this_htlc, sig) in trusted_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs) {
- assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
- let keys = trusted_tx.keys();
- let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(), holder_csv, &this_htlc, self.channel_type_features(), &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
-
- let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&this_htlc, self.channel_type_features(), &keys);
-
- let sighash_type = if self.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
- EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay
- } else {
- EcdsaSighashType::All
- };
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(
- &sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
- 0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.amount_msat / 1000, sighash_type,
- ).unwrap()[..]
- );
- secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, sig, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
- }
-
- Ok(self.inner.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(commitment_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
+ Ok(self.inner.sign_holder_commitment(commitment_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
}
#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
- fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
- Ok(self.inner.unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(commitment_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
+ fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ Ok(self.inner.unsafe_sign_holder_commitment(commitment_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
}
fn sign_justice_revoked_output(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, htlc_descriptor: &HTLCDescriptor,
secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>
) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ let state = self.state.lock().unwrap();
+ if state.last_holder_revoked_commitment - 1 != htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number &&
+ state.last_holder_revoked_commitment - 2 != htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number
+ {
+ if !self.disable_revocation_policy_check {
+ panic!("can only sign the next two unrevoked commitment numbers, revoked={} vs requested={} for {}",
+ state.last_holder_revoked_commitment, htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, self.inner.commitment_seed[0])
+ }
+ }
assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[input], htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
assert_eq!(htlc_tx.output[input], htlc_descriptor.tx_output(secp_ctx));
+ {
+ let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(secp_ctx);
+ let sighash_type = if self.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay
+ } else {
+ EcdsaSighashType::All
+ };
+ let sighash = &sighash::SighashCache::new(&*htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
+ input, &witness_script, htlc_descriptor.htlc.amount_msat / 1000, sighash_type
+ ).unwrap();
+ let countersignatory_htlc_key = HtlcKey::from_basepoint(
+ &secp_ctx, &self.inner.counterparty_pubkeys().unwrap().htlc_basepoint, &htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_point,
+ );
+
+ secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(
+ &hash_to_message!(sighash.as_byte_array()), &htlc_descriptor.counterparty_sig, &countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()
+ ).unwrap();
+ }
Ok(self.inner.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, htlc_descriptor, secp_ctx).unwrap())
}
}
fn sign_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
- closing_tx.verify(self.inner.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint())
+ closing_tx.verify(self.inner.funding_outpoint().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint())
.expect("derived different closing transaction");
Ok(self.inner.sign_closing_transaction(closing_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
}
impl TestChannelSigner {
fn verify_counterparty_commitment_tx<'a, T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &'a CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
- commitment_tx.verify(&self.inner.get_channel_parameters().as_counterparty_broadcastable(),
- self.inner.counterparty_pubkeys(), self.inner.pubkeys(), secp_ctx)
- .expect("derived different per-tx keys or built transaction")
+ commitment_tx.verify(
+ &self.inner.get_channel_parameters().unwrap().as_counterparty_broadcastable(),
+ self.inner.counterparty_pubkeys().unwrap(), self.inner.pubkeys(), secp_ctx
+ ).expect("derived different per-tx keys or built transaction")
}
fn verify_holder_commitment_tx<'a, T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &'a CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
- commitment_tx.verify(&self.inner.get_channel_parameters().as_holder_broadcastable(),
- self.inner.pubkeys(), self.inner.counterparty_pubkeys(), secp_ctx)
- .expect("derived different per-tx keys or built transaction")
+ commitment_tx.verify(
+ &self.inner.get_channel_parameters().unwrap().as_holder_broadcastable(),
+ self.inner.pubkeys(), self.inner.counterparty_pubkeys().unwrap(), secp_ctx
+ ).expect("derived different per-tx keys or built transaction")
}
}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff