use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-use bitcoin::util::hash::{Sha256dHash, Hash160};
+use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash, Hash160};
use bitcoin::util::bip143;
-use bitcoin::network;
-use bitcoin::network::serialize::{BitcoinHash, RawDecoder, RawEncoder};
-use bitcoin::network::encodable::{ConsensusEncodable, ConsensusDecodable};
+use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Encodable, Decodable};
+
+use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
use secp256k1;
-use crypto::digest::Digest;
-
use ln::msgs;
-use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, HandleError};
+use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
-use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingForwardHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder};
+use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingForwardHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT,HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
use ln::chan_utils;
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
use util::{transaction_utils,rng};
use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
-use util::sha2::Sha256;
use util::logger::Logger;
use util::errors::APIError;
use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
- Fulfill([u8; 32]),
+ Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
}
enum InboundHTLCState {
htlc_id: u64,
amount_msat: u64,
cltv_expiry: u32,
- payment_hash: [u8; 32],
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash,
state: InboundHTLCState,
}
htlc_id: u64,
amount_msat: u64,
cltv_expiry: u32,
- payment_hash: [u8; 32],
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash,
state: OutboundHTLCState,
source: HTLCSource,
/// If we're in a removed state, set if they failed, otherwise None
// always outbound
amount_msat: u64,
cltv_expiry: u32,
- payment_hash: [u8; 32],
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash,
source: HTLCSource,
onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
time_created: Instant, //TODO: Some kind of timeout thing-a-majig
},
ClaimHTLC {
- payment_preimage: [u8; 32],
+ payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
htlc_id: u64,
},
FailHTLC {
monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
monitor_pending_order: Option<RAACommitmentOrder>,
monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>,
- monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32], HTLCFailReason)>,
+ monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
// pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
// For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
/// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 14;
-const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
-const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
+/// Exposing these two constants for use in test in ChannelMonitor
+pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
+pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
/// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
/// it's 2^24.
pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = (1 << 24);
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub const ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 138; //Here we have a diff due to HTLC CLTV expiry being < 2^15 in test
+#[cfg(not(test))]
+pub const ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 139;
+pub const OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 133;
+
/// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
/// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
/// channel_id in ChannelManager.
+#[derive(Debug)]
pub(super) enum ChannelError {
Ignore(&'static str),
Close(&'static str),
}
-macro_rules! secp_call {
- ( $res: expr, $err: expr, $chan_id: expr ) => {
+macro_rules! secp_check {
+ ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
match $res {
- Ok(key) => key,
- Err(_) => return Err(HandleError {err: $err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {channel_id: $chan_id, data: $err.to_string()}})})
+ Ok(thing) => thing,
+ Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
}
};
}
-macro_rules! secp_derived_key {
- ( $res: expr, $chan_id: expr ) => {
- secp_call!($res, "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters", $chan_id)
- }
-}
impl Channel {
// Convert constants + channel value to limits:
fn get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key,
- &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
+ &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, &chan_keys.payment_base_key, &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
Ok(Channel {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key,
- &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
+ &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, &chan_keys.payment_base_key, &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
channel_monitor.set_their_base_keys(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
channel_monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(msg.to_self_delay);
// Utilities to build transactions:
fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self) -> u64 {
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
let our_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);
if self.channel_outbound {
sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
}
- let mut res = [0; 32];
- sha.result(&mut res);
+ let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
((res[26] as u64) << 5*8) |
((res[27] as u64) << 4*8) |
/// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
/// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
#[inline]
- fn build_commitment_transaction(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) {
+ fn build_commitment_transaction(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, Vec<(PaymentHash, &HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>) {
let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
let txins = {
ins
};
- let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() + 2);
+ let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() + 2);
+ let mut unincluded_htlc_sources: Vec<(PaymentHash, &HTLCSource, Option<u32>)> = Vec::new();
let dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.our_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.their_dust_limit_satoshis };
let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
- ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr) => {
+ ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr) => {
if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
txouts.push((TxOut {
script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
- }, Some(htlc_in_tx)));
+ }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
+ } else {
+ if let Some(source) = $source {
+ unincluded_htlc_sources.push(($htlc.payment_hash, source, None));
+ }
}
} else {
if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
txouts.push((TxOut { // "received HTLC output"
script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
- }, Some(htlc_in_tx)));
+ }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
+ } else {
+ if let Some(source) = $source {
+ unincluded_htlc_sources.push(($htlc.payment_hash, source, None));
+ }
}
}
}
};
if include {
- add_htlc_output!(htlc, false);
+ add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None);
remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
} else {
match &htlc.state {
};
if include {
- add_htlc_output!(htlc, true);
+ add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source));
local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
} else {
match htlc.state {
transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts);
let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
- let mut htlcs_used: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
+ let mut htlcs_included: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
+ let mut htlc_sources: Vec<(PaymentHash, &HTLCSource, Option<u32>)> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len() + unincluded_htlc_sources.len());
for (idx, out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
outputs.push(out.0);
- if let Some(out_htlc) = out.1 {
- htlcs_used.push(out_htlc);
- htlcs_used.last_mut().unwrap().transaction_output_index = idx as u32;
+ if let Some((mut htlc, source_option)) = out.1 {
+ htlc.transaction_output_index = idx as u32;
+ if let Some(source) = source_option {
+ htlc_sources.push((htlc.payment_hash, source, Some(idx as u32)));
+ }
+ htlcs_included.push(htlc);
}
}
+ htlc_sources.append(&mut unincluded_htlc_sources);
(Transaction {
version: 2,
lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
input: txins,
output: outputs,
- }, htlcs_used)
+ }, htlcs_included, htlc_sources)
}
#[inline]
/// our counterparty!)
/// The result is a transaction which we can revoke ownership of (ie a "local" transaction)
/// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
- fn build_local_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, HandleError> {
+ fn build_local_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(commitment_number));
let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
- Ok(secp_derived_key!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &self.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()), self.channel_id()))
+ Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &self.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
}
#[inline]
/// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
/// will sign and send to our counterparty.
- fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, HandleError> {
+ /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
+ fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
//TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
//may see payments to it!
let payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);
let revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key);
let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
- Ok(secp_derived_key!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap(), &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint), self.channel_id()))
+ Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap(), &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
}
/// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT }, htlc, &keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
}
- fn create_htlc_tx_signature(&self, tx: &Transaction, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<(Script, Signature, bool), HandleError> {
+ fn create_htlc_tx_signature(&self, tx: &Transaction, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<(Script, Signature, bool), ChannelError> {
if tx.input.len() != 1 {
panic!("Tried to sign HTLC transaction that had input count != 1!");
}
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
- let our_htlc_key = secp_derived_key!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), self.channel_id());
+ let our_htlc_key = secp_check!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters");
let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
let is_local_tx = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key) == keys.a_htlc_key;
Ok((htlc_redeemscript, self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key), is_local_tx))
/// Signs a transaction created by build_htlc_transaction. If the transaction is an
/// HTLC-Success transaction (ie htlc.offered is false), preimate must be set!
- fn sign_htlc_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature, preimage: &Option<[u8; 32]>, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<Signature, HandleError> {
+ fn sign_htlc_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> {
if tx.input.len() != 1 {
panic!("Tried to sign HTLC transaction that had input count != 1!");
}
if htlc.offered {
tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
} else {
- tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().to_vec());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
}
tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.into_bytes());
Ok(our_sig)
}
- /// May return an IgnoreError, but should not, and will always return Ok(_) when
- /// debug_assertions are turned on
- fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), HandleError> {
+ /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
+ /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
+ /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
+ fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), ChannelError> {
// Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it wont bet unset) or there is no way any
// caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
// incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
}
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&payment_preimage_arg);
- let mut payment_hash_calc = [0; 32];
- sha.result(&mut payment_hash_calc);
+ let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
+
+ // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
+ // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
+ // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
- if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
- } else {
- debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
- // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
+ match htlc.state {
+ InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
+ InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
+ if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
+ } else {
+ log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ }
+ return Ok((None, None));
+ },
+ _ => {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
+ // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
+ }
}
pending_idx = idx;
break;
}
}
if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
- debug_assert!(false, "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID");
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
}
// Now update local state:
match pending_update {
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
- debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC we already had a pending fulfill for");
return Ok((None, None));
}
},
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
- debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC we already had a holding-cell failure on");
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
+ log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
+ // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
+ return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
}
},
_ => {}
}), Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())))
}
- pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), HandleError> {
+ pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), ChannelError> {
match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage)? {
(Some(update_fulfill_htlc), _) => {
let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
}
}
- /// May return an IgnoreError, but should not, and will always return Ok(_) when
- /// debug_assertions are turned on
- pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, HandleError> {
+ /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
+ /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
+ /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
+ pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
}
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
+ // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
+ // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
+ // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
+
let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
- if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
- } else {
- debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to fail before it was fully committed to");
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
+ match htlc.state {
+ InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
+ InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
+ return Ok(None);
+ },
+ _ => {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matchd the given HTLC ID"));
+ }
}
pending_idx = idx;
}
}
if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
- debug_assert!(false, "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID");
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
}
// Now update local state:
match pending_update {
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
- debug_assert!(false, "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID");
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
}
},
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
- debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that we already had a pending failure for");
- return Ok(None);
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
}
},
_ => {}
}))
}
- pub fn get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, HandleError> {
+ pub fn get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet)? {
Some(update_fail_htlc) => {
let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
Ok(())
}
- fn funding_created_signature(&mut self, sig: &Signature) -> Result<(Transaction, Signature), HandleError> {
+ fn funding_created_signature(&mut self, sig: &Signature) -> Result<(Transaction, Transaction, Signature, TxCreationKeys), ChannelError> {
let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
- let local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
+ let mut local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
- // They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
- secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer", self.channel_id());
+ // They sign the "local" commitment transaction...
+ secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer");
+
+ // ...and we sign it, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish
+ self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_initial_commitment_tx, sig);
let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
let remote_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
// We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
- Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key)))
+ Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, local_initial_commitment_tx, self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key), local_keys))
}
- pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
+ pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
if self.channel_outbound {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_created for an outbound channel?", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {channel_id: self.channel_id, data: "Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_string()}})});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?"));
}
if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
// BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
// remember the channel, so its safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
// channel.
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_created after we got the channel!", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {channel_id: self.channel_id, data: "Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_string()}})});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!"));
}
if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
- let (remote_initial_commitment_tx, our_signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature) {
+ let (remote_initial_commitment_tx, local_initial_commitment_tx, our_signature, local_keys) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature) {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => {
self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
// Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
- self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number);
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
+ self.last_local_commitment_txn = vec![local_initial_commitment_tx.clone()];
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
/// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
/// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
- pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<ChannelMonitor, HandleError> {
+ pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<ChannelMonitor, ChannelError> {
if !self.channel_outbound {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?", action: None});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?"));
}
if self.channel_state != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_signed in strange state!", action: None});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!"));
}
if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 ||
let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
// They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
- secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_signed signature from peer", self.channel_id());
+ secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_signed signature from peer");
self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_initial_commitment_tx, &msg.signature);
- self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx.clone(), local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx.clone(), local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
self.last_local_commitment_txn = vec![local_initial_commitment_tx];
self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
}
- pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingHTLCStatus) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingHTLCStatus) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
}
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
}
if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel", action: None});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel"));
}
if msg.amount_msat < self.our_htlc_minimum_msat {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value", action: None});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value"));
}
let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs", action: None});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs"));
}
//TODO: Spec is unclear if this is per-direction or in total (I assume per direction):
// Check our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote HTLC add would put them over their max HTLC value in flight", action: None});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over their max HTLC value in flight"));
}
// Check our_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
// the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
// something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat + self.value_to_self_msat > (self.channel_value_satoshis - Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)) * 1000 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value", action: None});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"));
}
if self.next_remote_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote skipped HTLC ID", action: None});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote skipped HTLC ID"));
}
if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height", action: None});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height"));
}
//TODO: Check msg.cltv_expiry further? Do this in channel manager?
/// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
#[inline]
- fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<[u8; 32]>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
+ fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
match check_preimage {
Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find"))
}
- pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
+ pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
}
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
}
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&msg.payment_preimage);
- let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
- sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
-
- self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None)
+ let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
+ self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
}
- pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
+ pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
}
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
}
- self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))
+ self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
+ Ok(())
}
- pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc<'a>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
+ pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc<'a>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
}
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
}
- self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))
+ self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
+ Ok(())
}
- pub fn commitment_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
+ pub fn commitment_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state"));
}
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
}
if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds"));
}
let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
+ let mut update_fee = false;
let feerate_per_kw = if !self.channel_outbound && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
+ update_fee = true;
self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
} else {
self.feerate_per_kw
};
- let mut local_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw);
+ let mut local_commitment_tx = {
+ let mut commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw);
+ let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.drain(..).map(|htlc_source| (htlc_source.0, htlc_source.1.clone(), htlc_source.2)).collect();
+ (commitment_tx.0, commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned)
+ };
let local_commitment_txid = local_commitment_tx.0.txid();
let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&local_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
- secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid commitment tx signature from peer", self.channel_id());
+ secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid commitment tx signature from peer");
+
+ //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
+ if update_fee {
+ let num_htlcs = local_commitment_tx.1.len();
+ let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
+
+ if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee"));
+ }
+ }
if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != local_commitment_tx.1.len() {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Got wrong number of HTLC signatures from remote", action: None});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures from remote"));
}
let mut new_local_commitment_txn = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.1.len() + 1);
new_local_commitment_txn.push(local_commitment_tx.0.clone());
let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.1.len());
- for (idx, ref htlc) in local_commitment_tx.1.iter().enumerate() {
- let mut htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&local_commitment_txid, htlc, true, &local_keys, feerate_per_kw);
+ for (idx, htlc) in local_commitment_tx.1.drain(..).enumerate() {
+ let mut htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&local_commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &local_keys, feerate_per_kw);
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &local_keys);
let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
- secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key), "Invalid HTLC tx siganture from peer", self.channel_id());
+ secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key), "Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer");
let htlc_sig = if htlc.offered {
- let htlc_sig = self.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &None, htlc, &local_keys)?;
+ let htlc_sig = self.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &None, &htlc, &local_keys)?;
new_local_commitment_txn.push(htlc_tx);
htlc_sig
} else {
- self.create_htlc_tx_signature(&htlc_tx, htlc, &local_keys)?.1
+ self.create_htlc_tx_signature(&htlc_tx, &htlc, &local_keys)?.1
};
- htlcs_and_sigs.push(((*htlc).clone(), msg.htlc_signatures[idx], htlc_sig));
+ htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, msg.htlc_signatures[idx], htlc_sig));
}
let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number - 1));
}
}
}
+
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
// This is a response to our post-monitor-failed unfreeze messages, so we can clear the
// monitor_pending_order requirement as we won't re-send the monitor_pending messages.
self.monitor_pending_order = None;
}
- self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_commitment_tx.0, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_and_sigs);
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_commitment_tx.0, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_and_sigs, local_commitment_tx.2);
for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= need_our_commitment;
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA"));
}
let (our_commitment_signed, monitor_update, closing_signed) = if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
/// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
/// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
- fn free_holding_cell_htlcs(&mut self) -> Result<Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitor)>, HandleError> {
+ fn free_holding_cell_htlcs(&mut self) -> Result<Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
} else {
match &htlc_update {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
- match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
+ match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
Err(e) => {
err = Some(e);
}
}
},
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
- match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
+ match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage) {
Ok(update_fulfill_msg_option) => update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.0.unwrap()),
Err(e) => {
- if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {}
+ if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
else {
panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
}
match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
Err(e) => {
- if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {}
+ if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
else {
panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
}
/// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
/// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
/// revoke_and_ack message.
- pub fn revoke_and_ack(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32], HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
+ pub fn revoke_and_ack(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state"));
}
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
}
if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds"));
}
if let Some(their_prev_commitment_point) = self.their_prev_commitment_point {
- if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret", self.channel_id())) != their_prev_commitment_point {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey", action: None});
+ if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret")) != their_prev_commitment_point {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey"));
}
}
- self.channel_monitor.provide_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret, Some((self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number - 1, msg.next_per_commitment_point)))?;
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
+ .map_err(|e| ChannelError::Close(e.0))?;
// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
// (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
})
}
- pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, HandleError> {
+ pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
Some(update_fee) => {
let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
/// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
/// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
/// completed.
- pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&mut self) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])> {
+ pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&mut self) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> {
let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
return outbound_drops;
}
+ // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
+ // will be retransmitted.
+ self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
/// commitment update or a revoke_and_ack generation). The messages which were generated from
/// that original call must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead have been
/// dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
- pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, order: RAACommitmentOrder) {
+ pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, order: RAACommitmentOrder, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, raa_first_dropped_cs: bool) {
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
match order {
RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
},
RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
- self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
+ self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = raa_first_dropped_cs;
},
}
+ assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
+ mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
+ assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
+ mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
self.monitor_pending_order = Some(order);
self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
}
/// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
/// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
/// to the remote side.
- pub fn monitor_updating_restored(&mut self) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32], HTLCFailReason)>) {
+ pub fn monitor_updating_restored(&mut self) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
}
Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
-
self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64);
self.channel_update_count += 1;
Ok(())
/// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
/// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
- pub fn channel_reestablish(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitor>, RAACommitmentOrder), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn channel_reestablish(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitor>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> {
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
// While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
// almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect"));
}
- if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
+ msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish"));
}
// remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
- return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst));
- }
+ let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
+ Some(msgs::Shutdown {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
+ })
+ } else { None };
- if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 || msg.next_remote_commitment_number == 0 {
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a pre-funding channel_reestablish after we exchanged funding_locked"));
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ if self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 == 0 {
+ if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet"));
+ }
+ // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
+ return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
}
+
// We have OurFundingLocked set!
let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
channel_id: self.channel_id(),
next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
- }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst));
+ }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
}
- let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
+ let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
// Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
// Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
None
- } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
+ } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
None
// have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
// now!
match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs() {
- Err(e) => {
- if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(_)}) = &e.action {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(e.err));
- } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: _}) = &e.action {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(e.err));
- } else {
- panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs");
- }
- },
- Ok(Some((commitment_update, channel_monitor))) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(channel_monitor), order)),
- Ok(None) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, order)),
+ Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
+ Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
+ Ok(Some((commitment_update, channel_monitor))) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(channel_monitor), order, shutdown_msg)),
+ Ok(None) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, order, shutdown_msg)),
}
} else {
- return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, order));
+ return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, order, shutdown_msg));
}
} else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number - 1 {
if required_revoke.is_some() {
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
- return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, order));
+ return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, order, shutdown_msg));
}
- return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update()), None, order));
+ return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update()), None, order, shutdown_msg));
} else {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction"));
}
fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned> {
if !self.channel_outbound || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
- self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() ||
- self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number{
+ self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
return None;
}
})
}
- pub fn shutdown(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn shutdown(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> {
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
}
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs"));
}
}
- if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Remote peer sent duplicate shutdown message"));
- }
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
// BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to
Ok((our_shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
}
- pub fn closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), HandleError> {
+ pub fn closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError> {
if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown", action: None});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown"));
}
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
}
if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs", action: None});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs"));
}
if msg.fee_satoshis > 21000000 * 10000000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee", action: None});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee"));
}
let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim", action: None});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim"));
}
let mut sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
// limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
- secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer", self.channel_id());
+ secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer");
},
};
if proposed_sat_per_kw > our_max_feerate {
if let Some((last_feerate, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
if our_max_feerate <= last_feerate {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher than our Normal feerate", action: None});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher than our Normal feerate"));
}
}
propose_new_feerate!(our_max_feerate);
if proposed_sat_per_kw < our_min_feerate {
if let Some((last_feerate, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
if our_min_feerate >= last_feerate {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower than our Background feerate", action: None});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower than our Background feerate"));
}
}
propose_new_feerate!(our_min_feerate);
/// In case of Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard requirements
/// apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed post-shutdown.
/// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
- pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, HandleError> {
+ pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> {
let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
}
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
self.channel_update_count += 1;
- return Err(HandleError{err: "funding tx had wrong script/value", action: Some(ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: None})});
+ return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
+ });
} else {
+ if self.channel_outbound {
+ for input in tx.input.iter() {
+ if input.witness.is_empty() {
+ // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
+ // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
+ }
+ }
+ }
self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
((*index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
}
}
- fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self) -> Result<(Signature, Transaction), HandleError> {
+ /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
+ fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self) -> Result<(Signature, Transaction), ChannelError> {
let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
/// or if called on an inbound channel.
/// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
/// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
- pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint) -> Result<(msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
+ /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
+ pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint) -> Result<(msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
if !self.channel_outbound {
panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
}
let (our_signature, commitment_tx) = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature() {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => {
- log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
+ log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
return Err(e);
}
let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
// Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
- self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number);
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
/// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
pub fn get_channel_reestablish(&self) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish {
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
+ assert_ne!(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
msgs::ChannelReestablish {
channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
+ // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
+ // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
+ // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
+ // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
+ // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
+
+ // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
+ // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
- next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) { 1 } else { 0 },
+ // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
+ // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
+ // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
+ // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
+ // cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
+ // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
+ // overflow here.
+ next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
data_loss_protect: None,
}
}
/// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
/// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
/// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
- pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: [u8; 32], cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, HandleError> {
+ pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down", action: None});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down"));
}
if amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send more than the total value of the channel", action: None});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send more than the total value of the channel"));
}
if amount_msat < self.their_htlc_minimum_msat {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value", action: None});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value"));
}
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
// disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
// end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
// IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update"));
}
let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.their_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs", action: None});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs"));
}
//TODO: Spec is unclear if this is per-direction or in total (I assume per direction):
// Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight", action: None});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"));
}
let mut holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat = 0;
// Check self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
// reserve for them to have something to claim if we misbehave)
if self.value_to_self_msat < self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + amount_msat + holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat + htlc_outbound_value_msat {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value", action: None});
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"));
}
//TODO: Check cltv_expiry? Do this in channel manager?
}
/// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
- /// Always returns a Channel-failing HandleError::action if an immediately-preceding (read: the
+ /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
/// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
/// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
- pub fn send_commitment(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
+ pub fn send_commitment(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
}
self.send_commitment_no_status_check()
}
/// Only fails in case of bad keys
- fn send_commitment_no_status_check(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
+ fn send_commitment_no_status_check(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
// We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
// fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
// is acceptable.
}
}
- match self.send_commitment_no_state_update() {
- Ok((res, remote_commitment_tx)) => {
+ let (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs, htlc_sources) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update() {
+ Ok((res, (remote_commitment_tx, htlcs, mut htlc_sources))) => {
// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
- self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_commitment_tx.0, remote_commitment_tx.1, self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number);
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
- Ok((res, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
+ let htlc_sources_no_ref = htlc_sources.drain(..).map(|htlc_source| (htlc_source.0, htlc_source.1.clone(), htlc_source.2)).collect();
+ (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs, htlc_sources_no_ref)
},
- Err(e) => Err(e),
- }
+ Err(e) => return Err(e),
+ };
+
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_commitment_tx, htlcs, htlc_sources, self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
+ self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
+ Ok((res, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
}
/// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
/// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
- fn send_commitment_no_state_update(&self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>)), HandleError> {
+ fn send_commitment_no_state_update(&self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, Vec<(PaymentHash, &HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>)), ChannelError> {
let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&remote_commitment_txid, htlc, false, &remote_keys, feerate_per_kw);
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &remote_keys);
let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
- let our_htlc_key = secp_derived_key!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &remote_keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), self.channel_id());
+ let our_htlc_key = secp_check!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &remote_keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters");
htlc_sigs.push(self.secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &our_htlc_key));
}
/// to send to the remote peer in one go.
/// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
/// more info.
- pub fn send_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: [u8; 32], cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, HandleError> {
+ pub fn send_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
Some(update_add_htlc) => {
let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
/// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
/// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
- pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>), APIError> {
+ pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first"});
/// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
/// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
/// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
- pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>) {
+ pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
// We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
(self.last_local_commitment_txn.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
for tx in self.last_local_commitment_txn.iter() {
- if let Err(e) = tx.consensus_encode(&mut RawEncoder::new(WriterWriteAdaptor(writer))) {
+ if let Err(e) = tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
match e {
- network::serialize::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
+ encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
_ => panic!("last_local_commitment_txn must have been well-formed!"),
}
}
let last_local_commitment_txn_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut last_local_commitment_txn = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(last_local_commitment_txn_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2 + 1));
for _ in 0..last_local_commitment_txn_count {
- last_local_commitment_txn.push(match Transaction::consensus_decode(&mut RawDecoder::new(reader.by_ref())) {
+ last_local_commitment_txn.push(match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
Ok(tx) => tx,
Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
});
mod tests {
use bitcoin::util::hash::{Sha256dHash, Hash160};
use bitcoin::util::bip143;
- use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
+ use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use hex;
- use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
+ use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
use ln::chan_utils;
use util::logger::Logger;
use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
- use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
- use crypto::digest::Digest;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
use std::sync::Arc;
struct TestFeeEstimator {
}
fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool) -> ChannelKeys { self.chan_keys.clone() }
+ fn get_session_key(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
}
#[test]
macro_rules! test_commitment {
( $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr) => {
- unsigned_tx = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw);
+ unsigned_tx = {
+ let res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw);
+ (res.0, res.1)
+ };
let their_signature = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&unsigned_tx.0).sighash_all(&unsigned_tx.0.input[0], &chan.get_funding_redeemscript(), chan.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, &chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()).unwrap();
chan.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut unsigned_tx.0, &their_signature);
- assert_eq!(serialize(&unsigned_tx.0).unwrap()[..],
+ assert_eq!(serialize(&unsigned_tx.0)[..],
hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
};
}
let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.b_htlc_key).unwrap();
- let mut preimage: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
+ let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
if !htlc.offered {
for i in 0..5 {
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&[i; 32]);
-
- let mut out = [0; 32];
- sha.result(&mut out);
-
+ let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
if out == htlc.payment_hash {
- preimage = Some([i; 32]);
+ preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
}
}
}
chan.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &remote_signature, &preimage, &htlc, &keys).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx).unwrap()[..],
+ assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..],
hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
};
}
htlc_id: 0,
amount_msat: 1000000,
cltv_expiry: 500,
- payment_hash: [0; 32],
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
};
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
- sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
out
});
chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
htlc_id: 1,
amount_msat: 2000000,
cltv_expiry: 501,
- payment_hash: [0; 32],
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
};
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
- sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
out
});
chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
htlc_id: 2,
amount_msat: 2000000,
cltv_expiry: 502,
- payment_hash: [0; 32],
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
fail_reason: None,
};
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap());
- sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
out
});
chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
htlc_id: 3,
amount_msat: 3000000,
cltv_expiry: 503,
- payment_hash: [0; 32],
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
fail_reason: None,
};
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap());
- sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
out
});
chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
htlc_id: 4,
amount_msat: 4000000,
cltv_expiry: 504,
- payment_hash: [0; 32],
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
};
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap());
- sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
out
});
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff