Merge pull request #3 from RCasatta/fixtry

[rust-lightning] / src / ln / channel.rs

diff --git a/src/ln/channel.rs b/src/ln/channel.rs
index 71b6422115fc52595882f309a429379485d5a7e9..61df7a018bee6ba0ba4f2f34697581b93c2efce7 100644 (file)
--- a/src/ln/channel.rs
+++ b/src/ln/channel.rs
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ enum ChannelState {
        AwaitingRemoteRevoke = (1 << 7),
 }
 
-// TODO: We should refactor this to be a Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
+// TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
 // calling get_channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
 // inbound channel.
@@ -897,7 +897,7 @@ impl Channel {
        }
 
        /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
-       /// If this call is successfull, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
+       /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
        pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
                if !self.channel_outbound {
                        return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?", msg: None});
@@ -933,7 +933,7 @@ impl Channel {
                }
 
                //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
-               //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they cant revoke (well, kinda,
+               //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
                //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
                //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
                if self.their_cur_commitment_point != msg.next_per_commitment_point {
@@ -1333,7 +1333,7 @@ impl Channel {
                                        self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = header.bitcoin_hash();
 
                                        //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
-                                       //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they cant revoke (well, kinda,
+                                       //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
                                        //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
                                        //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
                                        let next_per_commitment_secret = match self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number) {
@@ -1466,7 +1466,7 @@ impl Channel {
        /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
        /// or if called on an inbound channel.
        /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
-       /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successfull funding_signed call!
+       /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
        pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(&mut self, funding_txid: Sha256dHash, funding_output_index: u16) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, HandleError> {
                if !self.channel_outbound {
                        panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
@@ -1694,7 +1694,7 @@ mod tests {
                chan.local_keys.payment_base_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
                chan.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
                chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
-               // chan.local_keys.commitment_seed isnt derived in the test vectors :(
+               // chan.local_keys.commitment_seed isn't derived in the test vectors :(
 
                chan.channel_monitor.set_funding_info(Sha256dHash::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), 0);