use crypto::hkdf::{hkdf_extract,hkdf_expand};
use ln::msgs;
-use ln::msgs::{HandleError, MsgEncodable};
+use ln::msgs::{ErrorAction, HandleError, MsgEncodable};
use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
use ln::channelmanager::{PendingForwardHTLCInfo, HTLCFailReason};
use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT,HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
use util::{transaction_utils,rng};
use util::sha2::Sha256;
+use std;
use std::default::Default;
use std::{cmp,mem};
use std::time::Instant;
/// anyway).
LocalRemoved,
/// Removed by us, sent a new commitment_signed and got a revoke_and_ack. Just waiting on an
- /// updated local commitment transaction.
+ /// updated local commitment transaction. Implies local_removed_fulfilled.
LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment,
}
/// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roudtrip where we may not see a full
/// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
/// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
- funding_tx_confirmed_in: Sha256dHash,
+ funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<Sha256dHash>,
short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
/// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks
last_block_connected: Sha256dHash,
last_sent_closing_fee: None,
- funding_tx_confirmed_in: Default::default(),
+ funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
short_channel_id: None,
last_block_connected: Default::default(),
funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
last_sent_closing_fee: None,
- funding_tx_confirmed_in: Default::default(),
+ funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
short_channel_id: None,
last_block_connected: Default::default(),
funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
} else {
match htlc.state {
HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove|HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => {
- if generated_by_local && htlc.fail_reason.is_none() {
+ if htlc.fail_reason.is_none() {
value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
}
},
}
},
HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment => {
+ assert!(htlc.local_removed_fulfilled);
value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
},
_ => {},
Ok(our_sig)
}
- pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, payment_preimage_arg: [u8; 32]) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, ChannelMonitor)>, HandleError> {
+ fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, payment_preimage_arg: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), HandleError> {
// Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it wont bet unset) or there is no way any
// caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
// incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
let mut payment_hash_calc = [0; 32];
sha.result(&mut payment_hash_calc);
+ let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
+ for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
+ if !htlc.outbound && htlc.payment_hash == payment_hash_calc {
+ if pending_idx != std::usize::MAX {
+ panic!("Duplicate HTLC payment_hash, you probably re-used payment preimages, NEVER DO THIS!");
+ }
+ pending_idx = idx;
+ }
+ }
+ if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", action: None});
+ }
+
// Now update local state:
+ //
+ // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
+ // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash_calc, &payment_preimage_arg);
+
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
match pending_update {
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, .. } => {
if payment_preimage_arg == *payment_preimage {
- return Ok(None);
+ return Ok((None, None));
}
},
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, payment_hash: payment_hash_calc,
});
- return Ok(None);
- }
-
- let mut htlc_id = 0;
- let mut htlc_amount_msat = 0;
- for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- if !htlc.outbound && htlc.payment_hash == payment_hash_calc {
- if htlc_id != 0 {
- panic!("Duplicate HTLC payment_hash, you probably re-used payment preimages, NEVER DO THIS!");
- }
- htlc_id = htlc.htlc_id;
- htlc_amount_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
- if htlc.state == HTLCState::Committed {
- htlc.state = HTLCState::LocalRemoved;
- htlc.local_removed_fulfilled = true;
- } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced {
- panic!("Somehow forwarded HTLC prior to remote revocation!");
- } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemoved || htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", action: None});
- } else {
- panic!("Have an inbound HTLC when not awaiting remote revoke that had a garbage state");
- }
+ return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
+ }
+
+ let htlc_id = {
+ let htlc = &mut self.pending_htlcs[pending_idx];
+ if htlc.state == HTLCState::Committed {
+ htlc.state = HTLCState::LocalRemoved;
+ htlc.local_removed_fulfilled = true;
+ } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced {
+ panic!("Somehow forwarded HTLC prior to remote revocation!");
+ } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemoved || htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", action: None});
+ } else {
+ panic!("Have an inbound HTLC when not awaiting remote revoke that had a garbage state");
}
- }
- if htlc_amount_msat == 0 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", action: None});
- }
- self.channel_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash_calc, &payment_preimage_arg);
+ htlc.htlc_id
+ };
- Ok(Some((msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
+ Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
channel_id: self.channel_id(),
htlc_id: htlc_id,
payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
- }, self.channel_monitor.clone())))
+ }), Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())))
}
- pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, HandleError> {
+ pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), HandleError> {
match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(payment_preimage)? {
- Some(update_fulfill_htlc) => {
+ (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), _) => {
let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
- Ok(Some((update_fulfill_htlc.0, commitment, monitor_update)))
+ Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
},
- None => Ok(None)
+ (None, Some(channel_monitor)) => Ok((None, Some(channel_monitor))),
+ (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
}
}
Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find", action: None})
}
- pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<ChannelMonitor, HandleError> {
+ pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
}
let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
- self.channel_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &msg.payment_preimage);
self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None)?;
- Ok(self.channel_monitor.clone())
+ Ok(())
}
pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
},
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { payment_preimage, .. } => {
match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(payment_preimage) {
- Ok(update_fulfill_msg_option) => update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap().0),
+ Ok(update_fulfill_msg_option) => update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.0.unwrap()),
Err(e) => {
err = Some(e);
}
self.user_id
}
+ /// May only be called after funding has been initiated (ie is_funding_initiated() is true)
pub fn channel_monitor(&self) -> ChannelMonitor {
if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
panic!("Can't get a channel monitor until funding has been created");
/// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
/// is_usable() returns true).
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
self.short_channel_id
}
self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo()
}
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
pub fn get_their_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
self.their_node_id
}
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
pub fn get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
}
self.channel_value_satoshis
}
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
pub fn get_channel_update_count(&self) -> u32 {
self.channel_update_count
}
}
/// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
pub fn get_our_fee_base_msat(&self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> u32 {
// For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
// output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
}
/// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
(self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
/// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
/// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
self.is_usable()
}
+ /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
+ pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
+ self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32
+ }
+
/// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
/// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
/// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
/// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being connected.
/// Note that we only need to use this to detect funding_signed, anything else is handled by
/// the channel_monitor.
- pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Option<msgs::FundingLocked> {
+ /// In case of Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard requirements
+ /// apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed post-shutdown.
+ /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
+ pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, HandleError> {
let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK);
if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
if self.funding_tx_confirmations == CONF_TARGET as u64 {
- if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
+ true
} else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK);
self.channel_update_count += 1;
- //TODO: Something about a state where we "lost confirmation"
+ true
+ } else if self.channel_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
+ // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
+ // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
+ false
} else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
- panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?");
- }
- self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = header.bitcoin_hash();
+ panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
+ } else {
+ // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
+ // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
+ false
+ };
+ self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.bitcoin_hash());
//TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
//as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
//they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
//a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
- let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
- let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret).unwrap();
- return Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
- });
+ if need_commitment_update {
+ let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret).unwrap();
+ return Ok(Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+ }));
+ }
}
}
}
tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
self.channel_update_count += 1;
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "funding tx had wrong script/value", action: Some(ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: None})});
} else {
self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
}
}
}
- None
+ Ok(None)
}
/// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
return true;
}
}
- if header.bitcoin_hash() == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
+ if Some(header.bitcoin_hash()) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
self.funding_tx_confirmations = CONF_TARGET as u64 - 1;
}
false
}
/// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependant transactions for relay (forcing
- /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards.
- pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
+ /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
+ /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
+ /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
+ /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
+ pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<[u8; 32]>) {
assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
+
+ // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
+ // return them to fail the payment.
+ let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
+ for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
+ match htlc_update {
+ HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ dropped_outbound_htlcs.push(payment_hash);
+ },
+ _ => {}
+ }
+ }
+
+ for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalAnnounced {
+ dropped_outbound_htlcs.push(htlc.payment_hash);
+ }
+ //TODO: Do something with the remaining HTLCs
+ //(we need to have the ChannelManager monitor them so we can claim the inbound HTLCs
+ //which correspond)
+ }
+
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
self.channel_update_count += 1;
let mut res = Vec::new();
mem::swap(&mut res, &mut self.last_local_commitment_txn);
- res
+ (res, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
}
}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff