use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::{ErrorAction, HandleError, MsgEncodable};
use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
-use ln::channelmanager::{PendingForwardHTLCInfo, HTLCFailReason};
+use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, PendingForwardHTLCInfo, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg};
use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT,HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
use ln::chan_utils;
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use util::{transaction_utils,rng};
use util::sha2::Sha256;
+use util::logger::Logger;
+use util::errors::APIError;
use std;
use std::default::Default;
use std::{cmp,mem};
use std::time::Instant;
+use std::sync::{Arc};
pub struct ChannelKeys {
pub funding_key: SecretKey,
#[derive(PartialEq)]
enum HTLCState {
/// Added by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx.
+ /// Implies HTLCOutput::outbound: false
RemoteAnnounced,
/// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
/// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
/// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
/// We also have not yet included this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on
/// a remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
+ /// Implies HTLCOutput::outbound: false
AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
/// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
/// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
/// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
/// We have included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
/// revoke_and_ack.
+ /// Implies HTLCOutput::outbound: true
AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke,
/// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
/// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
/// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
/// doesn't matter to us and its up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
/// we'll never get out of sync).
+ /// Implies HTLCOutput::outbound: true
LocalAnnounced,
Committed,
/// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
/// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
+ /// Implies HTLCOutput::outbound: true
RemoteRemoved,
/// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
/// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
/// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
/// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
/// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
+ /// Implies HTLCOutput::outbound: true
AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove,
/// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
/// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
/// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
/// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
/// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
+ /// Implies HTLCOutput::outbound: true
AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke,
/// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
/// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
/// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
/// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
/// anyway).
+ /// Implies HTLCOutput::outbound: false
LocalRemoved,
/// Removed by us, sent a new commitment_signed and got a revoke_and_ack. Just waiting on an
/// updated local commitment transaction. Implies local_removed_fulfilled.
+ /// Implies HTLCOutput::outbound: false
LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment,
}
/// If we're in LocalRemoved*, set to true if we fulfilled the HTLC, and can claim money
local_removed_fulfilled: bool,
/// state pre-committed Remote* implies pending_forward_state, otherwise it must be None
- pending_forward_state: Option<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>,
+ pending_forward_state: Option<PendingHTLCStatus>,
}
impl HTLCOutput {
channel_id: [u8; 32],
channel_state: u32,
channel_outbound: bool,
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1,
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
announce_publicly: bool,
channel_value_satoshis: u64,
their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
//implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: our_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
- their_funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
- their_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
- their_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
- their_delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
- their_htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
- their_cur_commitment_point: PublicKey,
+ their_funding_pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
+ their_revocation_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
+ their_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
+ their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
+ their_htlc_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
+ their_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
their_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
their_node_id: PublicKey,
their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
channel_monitor: ChannelMonitor,
+
+ logger: Arc<Logger>,
}
const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 5; //TODO
-const CONF_TARGET: u32 = 12; //TODO: Should be much higher
/// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
/// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
/// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
/// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
fn get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
- cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, 1000) //TODO
+ let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
+ cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
}
fn derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u64) -> u64 {
1000 // TODO
}
- // Constructors:
+ fn derive_minimum_depth(_channel_value_satoshis_msat: u64, _value_to_self_msat: u64) -> u32 {
+ // Note that in order to comply with BOLT 7 announcement_signatures requirements this must
+ // be at least 6.
+ const CONF_TARGET: u32 = 12; //TODO: Should be much higher
+ CONF_TARGET
+ }
+
+ fn derive_maximum_minimum_depth(_channel_value_satoshis_msat: u64, _value_to_self_msat: u64) -> u32 {
+ const CONF_TARGET: u32 = 12; //TODO: Should be much higher
+ CONF_TARGET * 2
+ }
- /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`
- pub fn new_outbound(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, chan_keys: ChannelKeys, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, announce_publicly: bool, user_id: u64) -> Channel {
+ // Constructors:
+ pub fn new_outbound(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, chan_keys: ChannelKeys, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, announce_publicly: bool, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Channel, APIError> {
if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
- panic!("funding value > 2^24");
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "funding value > 2^24"});
}
- let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ if push_msat > channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "push value > channel value"});
+ }
+
+
let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
+ if Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
+ return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
+ }
+
+ let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.channel_monitor_claim_key).unwrap().serialize());
+ let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
let our_channel_monitor_claim_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script();
let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key,
- &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key).unwrap(),
+ &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
&chan_keys.htlc_base_key,
BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, our_channel_monitor_claim_script);
- Channel {
+ Ok(Channel {
user_id: user_id,
channel_id: rng::rand_u832(),
local_keys: chan_keys,
cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: (1 << 48) - 1,
cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: (1 << 48) - 1,
- value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000, //TODO: give them something on open? Parameterize it?
+ value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
pending_htlcs: Vec::new(),
holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
next_local_htlc_id: 0,
their_to_self_delay: 0,
their_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
- their_funding_pubkey: PublicKey::new(),
- their_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::new(),
- their_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::new(),
- their_delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::new(),
- their_htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::new(),
- their_cur_commitment_point: PublicKey::new(),
+ their_funding_pubkey: None,
+ their_revocation_basepoint: None,
+ their_payment_basepoint: None,
+ their_delayed_payment_basepoint: None,
+ their_htlc_basepoint: None,
+ their_cur_commitment_point: None,
their_prev_commitment_point: None,
their_node_id: their_node_id,
their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
- }
+
+ logger,
+ })
}
fn check_remote_fee(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
/// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
/// Generally prefers to take the DisconnectPeer action on failure, as a notice to the sender
/// that we're rejecting the new channel.
- pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, chan_keys: ChannelKeys, their_node_id: PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, require_announce: bool, allow_announce: bool) -> Result<Channel, HandleError> {
+ pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, chan_keys: ChannelKeys, their_node_id: PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, require_announce: bool, allow_announce: bool, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Channel, HandleError> {
+ macro_rules! return_error_message {
+ ( $msg: expr ) => {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: $msg, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id, data: $msg.to_string() }})});
+ }
+ }
+
// Check sanity of message fields:
if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "funding value > 2^24", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
+ return_error_message!("funding value > 2^24");
}
if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
+ return_error_message!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis");
}
if msg.push_msat > (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "push_msat more than highest possible value", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
+ return_error_message!("push_msat larger than funding value");
}
if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer never wants payout outputs?", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
+ return_error_message!("Peer never wants payout outputs?");
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
+ return_error_message!("Bogus; channel reserve is less than dust limit");
}
if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Minimum htlc value is full channel value", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
+ return_error_message!("Miminum htlc value is full channel value");
}
- Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
+ Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e|
+ HandleError{err: e.err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id, data: e.err.to_string() }})}
+ )?;
+
if msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
+ return_error_message!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period");
}
if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
+ return_error_message!("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel");
}
- if (msg.channel_flags & 254) != 0 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "unknown channel_flags", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
+ return_error_message!("max_accpted_htlcs > 483");
}
// Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
+ let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
+ let our_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
+ if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ return_error_message!("Suitalbe channel reserve not found. aborting");
+ }
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ return_error_message!("channel_reserve_satoshis too small");
+ }
+ if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
+ return_error_message!("Dust limit too high for our channel reserve");
+ }
+
+ // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
+ // for full fee payment
+ let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
+ if funders_amount_msat < background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT {
+ return_error_message!("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment");
+ }
+
+ let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
+ let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
+ if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= our_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
+ return_error_message!("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment");
+ }
+
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.channel_monitor_claim_key).unwrap().serialize());
+ let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
let our_channel_monitor_claim_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script();
let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key,
- &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key).unwrap(),
+ &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
&chan_keys.htlc_base_key,
BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, our_channel_monitor_claim_script);
channel_monitor.set_their_htlc_base_key(&msg.htlc_basepoint);
feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw as u64,
channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
their_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
- our_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
+ our_dust_limit_satoshis: our_dust_limit_satoshis,
their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
their_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
their_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
their_to_self_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
their_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
- their_funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
- their_revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
- their_payment_basepoint: msg.payment_basepoint,
- their_delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- their_htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint,
- their_cur_commitment_point: msg.first_per_commitment_point,
+ their_funding_pubkey: Some(msg.funding_pubkey),
+ their_revocation_basepoint: Some(msg.revocation_basepoint),
+ their_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.payment_basepoint),
+ their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
+ their_htlc_basepoint: Some(msg.htlc_basepoint),
+ their_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
their_prev_commitment_point: None,
their_node_id: their_node_id,
their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
+
+ logger,
};
let obscure_factor = chan.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self) -> u64 {
let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- let our_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key).unwrap();
+ let our_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);
if self.channel_outbound {
sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
- sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.serialize());
+ sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
} else {
- sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.serialize());
+ sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
}
let mut res = [0; 32];
let txins = {
let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
ins.push(TxIn {
- prev_hash: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().txid,
- prev_index: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().index as u32,
+ previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3*8) as u32),
witness: Vec::new(),
#[inline]
fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
- let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.channel_close_key).unwrap().serialize());
+ let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.channel_close_key).serialize());
Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
}
let txins = {
let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
ins.push(TxIn {
- prev_hash: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().txid,
- prev_index: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().index as u32,
+ previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: 0xffffffff,
witness: Vec::new(),
/// The result is a transaction which we can revoke ownership of (ie a "local" transaction)
/// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
fn build_local_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, HandleError> {
- let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(commitment_number)).unwrap();
- let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key).unwrap();
- let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key).unwrap();
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(commitment_number));
+ let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
+ let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
- Ok(secp_derived_key!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &self.their_revocation_basepoint, &self.their_payment_basepoint, &self.their_htlc_basepoint)))
+ Ok(secp_derived_key!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &self.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap())))
}
#[inline]
fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, HandleError> {
//TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
//may see payments to it!
- let payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key).unwrap();
- let revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key).unwrap();
- let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key).unwrap();
+ let payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);
+ let revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key);
+ let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
- Ok(secp_derived_key!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point, &self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint, &self.their_htlc_basepoint, &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint)))
+ Ok(secp_derived_key!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap(), &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint)))
}
/// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
/// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
- let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap().serialize();
- let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.serialize();
+ let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize();
+ let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize();
if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
- let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap();
+ let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
- let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap().serialize();
- let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.serialize();
+ let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize();
+ let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize();
if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.into_vec());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.into_bytes());
our_sig
}
let our_htlc_key = secp_derived_key!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key));
let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
- let is_local_tx = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key).unwrap() == keys.a_htlc_key;
- Ok((htlc_redeemscript, self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key).unwrap(), is_local_tx))
+ let is_local_tx = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key) == keys.a_htlc_key;
+ Ok((htlc_redeemscript, self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key), is_local_tx))
}
/// Signs a transaction created by build_htlc_transaction. If the transaction is an
tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().to_vec());
}
- tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.into_vec());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.into_bytes());
Ok(our_sig)
}
let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
- if !htlc.outbound && htlc.payment_hash == payment_hash_calc {
- if pending_idx != std::usize::MAX {
- panic!("Duplicate HTLC payment_hash, you probably re-used payment preimages, NEVER DO THIS!");
+ if !htlc.outbound && htlc.payment_hash == payment_hash_calc &&
+ htlc.state != HTLCState::LocalRemoved && htlc.state != HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment {
+ if let Some(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(_)) = htlc.pending_forward_state {
+ } else {
+ if pending_idx != std::usize::MAX {
+ panic!("Duplicate HTLC payment_hash, ChannelManager should have prevented this!");
+ }
+ pending_idx = idx;
}
- pending_idx = idx;
}
}
if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
if htlc.state == HTLCState::Committed {
htlc.state = HTLCState::LocalRemoved;
htlc.local_removed_fulfilled = true;
- } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced {
- panic!("Somehow forwarded HTLC prior to remote revocation!");
- } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemoved || htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", action: None});
+ } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced || htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce || htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {
+ // Theoretically we can hit this if we get the preimage on an HTLC prior to us
+ // having forwarded it to anyone. This implies that the sender is busted as someone
+ // else knows the preimage, but handling this case and implementing the logic to
+ // take their money would be a lot of (never-tested) code to handle a case that
+ // hopefully never happens. Instead, we make sure we get the preimage into the
+ // channel_monitor and pretend we didn't just see the preimage.
+ return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
} else {
+ // LocalRemoved/LocalRemovedAwaitingCOmmitment handled in the search loop
panic!("Have an inbound HTLC when not awaiting remote revoke that had a garbage state");
}
htlc.htlc_id
let mut htlc_amount_msat = 0;
for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter_mut() {
if !htlc.outbound && htlc.payment_hash == *payment_hash_arg {
- if htlc_id != 0 {
- panic!("Duplicate HTLC payment_hash, you probably re-used payment preimages, NEVER DO THIS!");
- }
- htlc_id = htlc.htlc_id;
- htlc_amount_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
if htlc.state == HTLCState::Committed {
htlc.state = HTLCState::LocalRemoved;
} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced {
- panic!("Somehow forwarded HTLC prior to remote revocation!");
+ if let Some(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_)) = htlc.pending_forward_state {
+ panic!("Somehow forwarded HTLC prior to remote revocation!");
+ } else {
+ // We have to pretend this isn't here - we're probably a duplicate with the
+ // same payment_hash as some other HTLC, and the other is getting failed,
+ // we'll fail this one as soon as remote commits to it.
+ continue;
+ }
} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemoved || htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", action: None});
} else {
panic!("Have an inbound HTLC when not awaiting remote revoke that had a garbage state");
}
+ if htlc_id != 0 {
+ panic!("Duplicate HTLC payment_hash, you probably re-used payment preimages, NEVER DO THIS!");
+ }
+ htlc_id = htlc.htlc_id;
+ htlc_amount_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
}
}
if htlc_amount_msat == 0 {
// Message handlers:
pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ macro_rules! return_error_message {
+ ( $msg: expr ) => {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: $msg, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id, data: $msg.to_string() }})});
+ }
+ }
// Check sanity of message fields:
if !self.channel_outbound {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer", action: None});
+ return_error_message!("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer");
}
if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an accept_channel message at a strange time", action: None});
+ return_error_message!("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time");
}
if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer never wants payout outputs?", action: None});
+ return_error_message!("Peer never wants payout outputs?");
}
if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", action: None});
+ return_error_message!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis");
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
+ return_error_message!("Bogus channel_reserve and dust_limit");
+ }
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ return_error_message!("Peer never wants payout outputs?");
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
+ return_error_message!("Dust limit is bigger than our channel reverse");
}
if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Minimum htlc value is full channel value", action: None});
+ return_error_message!("Minimum htlc value is full channel value");
+ }
+ if msg.minimum_depth > Channel::derive_maximum_minimum_depth(self.channel_value_satoshis*1000, self.value_to_self_msat) {
+ return_error_message!("minimum_depth too large");
}
- //TODO do something with minimum_depth
if msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", action: None});
+ return_error_message!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period");
}
if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", action: None});
+ return_error_message!("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel");
}
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
+ return_error_message!("max_accpted_htlcs > 483");
+ }
+
+ // TODO: Optional additional constraints mentioned in the spec
+ // MAY fail the channel if
+ // funding_satoshi is too small
+ // htlc_minimum_msat too large
+ // max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat too small
+ // channel_reserve_satoshis too large
+ // max_accepted_htlcs too small
+ // dust_limit_satoshis too small
self.channel_monitor.set_their_htlc_base_key(&msg.htlc_basepoint);
self.their_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
self.their_to_self_delay = msg.to_self_delay;
self.their_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
- self.their_funding_pubkey = msg.funding_pubkey;
- self.their_revocation_basepoint = msg.revocation_basepoint;
- self.their_payment_basepoint = msg.payment_basepoint;
- self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint = msg.delayed_payment_basepoint;
- self.their_htlc_basepoint = msg.htlc_basepoint;
- self.their_cur_commitment_point = msg.first_per_commitment_point;
+ self.their_funding_pubkey = Some(msg.funding_pubkey);
+ self.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(msg.revocation_basepoint);
+ self.their_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.payment_basepoint);
+ self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
+ self.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(msg.htlc_basepoint);
+ self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
let obscure_factor = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
self.channel_monitor.set_commitment_obscure_factor(obscure_factor);
let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
// They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
- secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, &self.their_funding_pubkey), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer");
+ secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer");
// We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
- Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap()))
+ Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key)))
}
pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
// They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
- secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey), "Invalid funding_signed signature from peer");
+ secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_signed signature from peer");
self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_initial_commitment_tx, &msg.signature);
self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx.clone(), local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time", action: None});
}
- self.their_prev_commitment_point = Some(self.their_cur_commitment_point);
- self.their_cur_commitment_point = msg.next_per_commitment_point;
+ self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
+ self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
Ok(())
}
(inbound_htlc_count, outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
}
- pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingForwardHTLCInfo) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingHTLCStatus) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
}
let mut local_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false);
let local_commitment_txid = local_commitment_tx.0.txid();
let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&local_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
- secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey), "Invalid commitment tx signature from peer");
+ secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid commitment tx signature from peer");
if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != local_commitment_tx.1.len() {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Got wrong number of HTLC signatures from remote", action: None});
htlcs_and_sigs.push(((*htlc).clone(), msg.htlc_signatures[idx], htlc_sig));
}
- let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number - 1)).unwrap();
+ let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number - 1));
let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
update_add_htlcs,
update_fulfill_htlcs,
update_fail_htlcs,
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
commitment_signed,
}, monitor_update)))
},
return Err(HandleError{err: "Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
}
if let Some(their_prev_commitment_point) = self.their_prev_commitment_point {
- if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret")).unwrap() != their_prev_commitment_point {
+ if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret")) != their_prev_commitment_point {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey", action: None});
}
}
// OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
// channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
- self.their_prev_commitment_point = Some(self.their_cur_commitment_point);
- self.their_cur_commitment_point = msg.next_per_commitment_point;
+ self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
+ self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
+ let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
+ let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
let mut require_commitment = false;
let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
// We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
htlc.state = HTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke;
require_commitment = true;
} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {
- htlc.state = HTLCState::Committed;
- to_forward_infos.push(htlc.pending_forward_state.take().unwrap());
+ match htlc.pending_forward_state.take().unwrap() {
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
+ htlc.state = HTLCState::LocalRemoved;
+ require_commitment = true;
+ match fail_msg {
+ HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => update_fail_htlcs.push(msg),
+ HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg),
+ }
+ },
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
+ to_forward_infos.push(forward_info);
+ htlc.state = HTLCState::Committed;
+ }
+ }
} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {
htlc.state = HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke;
require_commitment = true;
self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs()? {
- Some(commitment_update) => {
+ Some(mut commitment_update) => {
+ commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
+ for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
+ }
+ commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
+ for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
+ }
Ok((Some(commitment_update.0), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, commitment_update.1))
},
None => {
Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs,
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
commitment_signed
}), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, monitor_update))
} else {
let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
- (Some(proposed_feerate), Some(total_fee_satoshis), Some(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap()))
+ (Some(proposed_feerate), Some(total_fee_satoshis), Some(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key)))
} else { (None, None, None) };
// From here on out, we may not fail!
}
let mut sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
- match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey) {
+ match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()) {
Ok(_) => {},
- Err(_) => {
+ Err(_e) => {
// The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
// limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
- secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer");
+ secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer");
},
};
let closing_tx_max_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000, false);
sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
- let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap();
+ let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee));
return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
self.channel_value_satoshis
}
+ //TODO: Testing purpose only, should be changed in another way after #81
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub fn get_local_keys(&self) -> &ChannelKeys {
+ &self.local_keys
+ }
+
/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
pub fn get_channel_update_count(&self) -> u32 {
self.channel_update_count
if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
- if self.funding_tx_confirmations == CONF_TARGET as u64 {
+ if self.funding_tx_confirmations == Channel::derive_minimum_depth(self.channel_value_satoshis*1000, self.value_to_self_msat) as u64 {
let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
true
//a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
if need_commitment_update {
let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
- let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret).unwrap();
+ let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
return Ok(Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
if tx.txid() == self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().txid {
let txo_idx = self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().index as usize;
if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
- tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
+ tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
+ if self.channel_outbound {
+ // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
+ // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
+ // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
+ // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
+ // channel and move on.
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
+ }
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
self.channel_update_count += 1;
return Err(HandleError{err: "funding tx had wrong script/value", action: Some(ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: None})});
}
}
if Some(header.bitcoin_hash()) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
- self.funding_tx_confirmations = CONF_TARGET as u64 - 1;
+ self.funding_tx_confirmations = Channel::derive_minimum_depth(self.channel_value_satoshis*1000, self.value_to_self_msat) as u64 - 1;
}
false
}
// Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
// something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
- pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: Sha256dHash, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, HandleError> {
+ pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: Sha256dHash, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, APIError> {
if !self.channel_outbound {
panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
}
if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward", action: None});
+ panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
}
if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != (1 << 48) - 1 {
chain_hash: chain_hash,
temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
- push_msat: 0, //TODO: Something about feerate?
+ push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
feerate_per_kw: fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) as u32,
to_self_delay: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
- funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap(),
- revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key).unwrap(),
- payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key).unwrap(),
- delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key).unwrap(),
- htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key).unwrap(),
- first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret).unwrap(),
+ funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
+ revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
+ payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key),
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
+ htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
+ first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
channel_flags: if self.announce_publicly {1} else {0},
shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
})
}
- pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
+ pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
if self.channel_outbound {
panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
}
let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
- Ok(msgs::AcceptChannel {
+ msgs::AcceptChannel {
temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
- minimum_depth: CONF_TARGET,
+ minimum_depth: Channel::derive_minimum_depth(self.channel_value_satoshis*1000, self.value_to_self_msat),
to_self_delay: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
- funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap(),
- revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key).unwrap(),
- payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key).unwrap(),
- delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key).unwrap(),
- htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key).unwrap(),
- first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret).unwrap(),
+ funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
+ revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
+ payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key),
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
+ htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
+ first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
- })
+ }
}
fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self) -> Result<(Signature, Transaction), HandleError> {
let remote_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
// We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
- Ok((self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap(), remote_initial_commitment_tx))
+ Ok((self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key), remote_initial_commitment_tx))
}
/// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
let (our_signature, commitment_tx) = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature() {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => {
+ log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
return Err(e);
}
/// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
/// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
- /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions. Should be used
+ /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
/// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
- /// Note that you can get an announcement for a channel which is closing, though you should
- /// likely not announce such a thing. In case its already been announced, a channel_update
- /// message can mark the channel disabled.
+ /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
+ /// closing).
+ /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
+ /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: Sha256dHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), HandleError> {
if !self.announce_publicly {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel is not available for public announcements", action: None});
}
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked", action: None});
}
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing", action: None});
+ }
let were_node_one = our_node_id.serialize()[..] < self.their_node_id.serialize()[..];
- let our_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap();
+ let our_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
node_id_1: if were_node_one { our_node_id } else { self.get_their_node_id() },
node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_their_node_id() } else { our_node_id },
- bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_key } else { self.their_funding_pubkey },
- bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.their_funding_pubkey } else { our_bitcoin_key },
+ bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_key } else { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() },
+ bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() } else { our_bitcoin_key },
+ excess_data: Vec::new(),
};
let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
- let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap();
+ let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
Ok((msg, sig))
}
let remote_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, true);
let remote_commitment_txid = remote_commitment_tx.0.txid();
let remote_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&remote_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
- let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap();
+ let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
let mut htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &remote_keys);
let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
let our_htlc_key = secp_derived_key!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &remote_keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key));
- htlc_sigs.push(self.secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &our_htlc_key).unwrap());
+ htlc_sigs.push(self.secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &our_htlc_key));
}
// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
use ln::chan_utils;
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+ use util::test_utils;
+ use util::logger::Logger;
use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
use crypto::digest::Digest;
+ use std::sync::Arc;
struct TestFeeEstimator {
fee_est: u64
fn outbound_commitment_test() {
// Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
+ let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let chan_keys = ChannelKeys {
channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
commitment_seed: [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
};
- assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.funding_key).unwrap().serialize()[..],
+ assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.funding_key).serialize()[..],
hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
- let mut chan = Channel::new_outbound(&feeest, chan_keys, PublicKey::new(), 10000000, false, 42); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
+ let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
+ let mut chan = Channel::new_outbound(&feeest, chan_keys, their_node_id, 10000000, 100000, false, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
chan.their_to_self_delay = 144;
chan.our_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
let funding_info = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), 0);
chan.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_info, Script::new()));
- chan.their_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(chan.their_payment_basepoint.serialize()[..],
+ chan.their_payment_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
+ assert_eq!(chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
- chan.their_funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(chan.their_funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
+ chan.their_funding_pubkey = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
+ assert_eq!(chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize()[..],
hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
- chan.their_htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(chan.their_htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
+ chan.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
+ assert_eq!(chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
- chan.their_revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ chan.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
// We can't just use build_local_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
// derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
// build_commitment_transaction.
- let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key).unwrap();
+ let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret).unwrap();
- let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key).unwrap();
- let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &chan.their_revocation_basepoint, &chan.their_payment_basepoint, &chan.their_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
+ let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
+ let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &chan.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()).unwrap();
let mut unsigned_tx: (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>);
unsigned_tx = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false);
let their_signature = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&unsigned_tx.0).sighash_all(&unsigned_tx.0.input[0], &chan.get_funding_redeemscript(), chan.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
- secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, &chan.their_funding_pubkey).unwrap();
+ secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, &chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()).unwrap();
chan.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut unsigned_tx.0, &their_signature);
let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).unwrap();
+ let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
- let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret).unwrap();
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],