use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-use bitcoin::util::uint::Uint256;
use bitcoin::util::hash::{Sha256dHash, Hash160};
use bitcoin::util::bip143;
use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
use crypto::hkdf::{hkdf_extract,hkdf_expand};
use ln::msgs;
-use ln::msgs::{HandleError, MsgEncodable};
+use ln::msgs::{ErrorAction, HandleError, MsgEncodable};
use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
-use ln::channelmanager::PendingForwardHTLCInfo;
-use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys,HTLCOutputInCommitment};
+use ln::channelmanager::{PendingForwardHTLCInfo, HTLCFailReason};
+use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT,HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
use ln::chan_utils;
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
+use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use util::{transaction_utils,rng};
use util::sha2::Sha256;
+use util::logger::{Logger, Record};
+use std;
use std::default::Default;
-use std::cmp;
+use std::{cmp,mem};
use std::time::Instant;
+use std::sync::{Arc};
pub struct ChannelKeys {
pub funding_key: SecretKey,
pub fn new_from_seed(seed: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<ChannelKeys, secp256k1::Error> {
let mut prk = [0; 32];
hkdf_extract(Sha256::new(), b"rust-lightning key gen salt", seed, &mut prk);
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::without_caps();
let mut okm = [0; 32];
hkdf_expand(Sha256::new(), &prk, b"rust-lightning funding key info", &mut okm);
#[derive(PartialEq)]
enum HTLCState {
+ /// Added by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx.
RemoteAnnounced,
+ /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
+ /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
+ /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
+ /// We also have not yet included this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on
+ /// a remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
+ AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
+ /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
+ /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
+ /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
+ /// We have included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
+ /// revoke_and_ack.
+ AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke,
+ /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
+ /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
+ /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
+ /// revoke, but we dont really care about that:
+ /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
+ /// money back (though we wont), and,
+ /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
+ /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
+ /// doesn't matter to us and its up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
+ /// we'll never get out of sync).
LocalAnnounced,
Committed,
+ /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
+ /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
+ RemoteRemoved,
+ /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
+ /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
+ /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
+ /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
+ /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
+ AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove,
+ /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
+ /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
+ /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
+ /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
+ /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
+ AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke,
+ /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
+ /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
+ /// we'll promote to LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment if we fulfilled, otherwise we'll drop at
+ /// that point.
+ /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
+ /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
+ /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
+ /// anyway).
+ LocalRemoved,
+ /// Removed by us, sent a new commitment_signed and got a revoke_and_ack. Just waiting on an
+ /// updated local commitment transaction. Implies local_removed_fulfilled.
+ LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment,
}
-struct HTLCOutput {
+struct HTLCOutput { //TODO: Refactor into Outbound/InboundHTLCOutput (will save memory and fewer panics)
outbound: bool, // ie to an HTLC-Timeout transaction
htlc_id: u64,
amount_msat: u64,
cltv_expiry: u32,
payment_hash: [u8; 32],
state: HTLCState,
- // state == RemoteAnnounced implies pending_forward_state, otherwise it must be None
+ /// If we're in a Remote* removed state, set if they failed, otherwise None
+ fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>,
+ /// If we're in LocalRemoved*, set to true if we fulfilled the HTLC, and can claim money
+ local_removed_fulfilled: bool,
+ /// state pre-committed Remote* implies pending_forward_state, otherwise it must be None
pending_forward_state: Option<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>,
}
}
/// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
-struct HTLCOutputAwaitingACK {
- // always outbound
- amount_msat: u64,
- cltv_expiry: u32,
- payment_hash: [u8; 32],
- onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
- time_created: Instant, //TODO: Some kind of timeout thing-a-majig
+enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
+ AddHTLC {
+ // always outbound
+ amount_msat: u64,
+ cltv_expiry: u32,
+ payment_hash: [u8; 32],
+ onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
+ time_created: Instant, //TODO: Some kind of timeout thing-a-majig
+ },
+ ClaimHTLC {
+ payment_preimage: [u8; 32],
+ payment_hash: [u8; 32], // Only here for effecient duplicate detection
+ },
+ FailHTLC {
+ payment_hash: [u8; 32],
+ err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
+ },
}
enum ChannelState {
// TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
// has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
-// calling get_channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
+// calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
// inbound channel.
pub struct Channel {
user_id: u64,
- channel_id: Uint256,
+ channel_id: [u8; 32],
channel_state: u32,
channel_outbound: bool,
secp_ctx: Secp256k1,
local_keys: ChannelKeys,
+ // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
+ // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
+ // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
+
cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
pending_htlcs: Vec<HTLCOutput>,
- holding_cell_htlcs: Vec<HTLCOutputAwaitingACK>,
+ holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
next_local_htlc_id: u64,
next_remote_htlc_id: u64,
channel_update_count: u32,
feerate_per_kw: u64,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ // Used in ChannelManager's tests to send a revoked transaction
+ pub last_local_commitment_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
+ last_local_commitment_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
+
last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, u64)>, // (feerate, fee)
/// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
/// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roudtrip where we may not see a full
/// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
/// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
- funding_tx_confirmed_in: Sha256dHash,
+ funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<Sha256dHash>,
short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
/// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks
last_block_connected: Sha256dHash,
their_delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
their_htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
their_cur_commitment_point: PublicKey,
+
+ their_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
their_node_id: PublicKey,
their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
channel_monitor: ChannelMonitor,
+
+ logger: Arc<Logger>,
}
const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 5; //TODO
const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 14;
const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
-const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
-const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
+/// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
+/// it's 2^24.
+pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = (1 << 24);
macro_rules! secp_call {
- ( $res : expr ) => {
+ ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
match $res {
Ok(key) => key,
//TODO: make the error a parameter
- Err(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Secp call failed - probably bad signature or evil data generated a bad pubkey/privkey", msg: None})
+ Err(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: $err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })})
}
};
}
-macro_rules! get_key {
- ( $ctx : expr, $slice : expr ) => {
- secp_call! (SecretKey::from_slice($ctx, $slice))
- };
+macro_rules! secp_derived_key {
+ ( $res: expr ) => {
+ secp_call!($res, "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters")
+ }
}
-
impl Channel {
// Convert constants + channel value to limits:
fn get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
/// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
fn get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
- cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, 10) //TODO
+ cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, 1000) //TODO
}
fn derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u64) -> u64 {
- at_open_background_feerate * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT //TODO
+ at_open_background_feerate * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000 //TODO
}
fn derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(_at_open_channel_feerate_per_kw: u64) -> u64 {
// Constructors:
- /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= (1 << 24)
- pub fn new_outbound(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, announce_publicly: bool, user_id: u64) -> Channel {
- if channel_value_satoshis >= (1 << 24) {
+ /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`
+ pub fn new_outbound(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, chan_keys: ChannelKeys, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, announce_publicly: bool, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Channel {
+ if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
panic!("funding value > 2^24");
}
- let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_vbyte(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
- let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_vbyte(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
-
- let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
- rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
- let chan_keys = match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
- Ok(key) => key,
- Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
- };
+ let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.channel_monitor_claim_key).unwrap().serialize());
let our_channel_monitor_claim_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script();
let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key,
&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key).unwrap(),
- &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.htlc_base_key).unwrap(),
+ &chan_keys.htlc_base_key,
BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, our_channel_monitor_claim_script);
Channel {
user_id: user_id,
- channel_id: rng::rand_uint256(),
+ channel_id: rng::rand_u832(),
channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
channel_outbound: true,
secp_ctx: secp_ctx,
cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: (1 << 48) - 1,
value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000, //TODO: give them something on open? Parameterize it?
pending_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- holding_cell_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
next_local_htlc_id: 0,
next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
- channel_update_count: 0,
+ channel_update_count: 1,
+
+ last_local_commitment_txn: Vec::new(),
last_sent_closing_fee: None,
- funding_tx_confirmed_in: Default::default(),
+ funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
short_channel_id: None,
last_block_connected: Default::default(),
funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
- feerate_per_kw: feerate * 250,
+ feerate_per_kw: feerate,
their_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
our_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
their_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
their_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(feerate * 250),
+ our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(feerate),
their_to_self_delay: 0,
their_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
their_delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::new(),
their_htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::new(),
their_cur_commitment_point: PublicKey::new(),
+
+ their_prev_commitment_point: None,
their_node_id: their_node_id,
their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
+
+ logger,
}
}
fn check_remote_fee(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- if (feerate_per_kw as u64) < fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_vbyte(ConfirmationTarget::Background) * 250 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer's feerate much too low", msg: None});
+ if (feerate_per_kw as u64) < fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer's feerate much too low", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
}
- if (feerate_per_kw as u64) > fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_vbyte(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) * 375 { // 375 = 250 * 1.5x
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer's feerate much too high", msg: None});
+ if (feerate_per_kw as u64) > fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) * 2 {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer's feerate much too high", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
}
Ok(())
}
/// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
/// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
- pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, their_node_id: PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, announce_publicly: bool) -> Result<Channel, HandleError> {
+ /// Generally prefers to take the DisconnectPeer action on failure, as a notice to the sender
+ /// that we're rejecting the new channel.
+ pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, chan_keys: ChannelKeys, their_node_id: PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, require_announce: bool, allow_announce: bool, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Channel, HandleError> {
// Check sanity of message fields:
- if msg.funding_satoshis >= (1 << 24) {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "funding value > 2^24", msg: None});
- }
- if msg.funding_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "More funding_satoshis than there are satoshis!", msg: None});
+ if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "funding value > 2^24", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
}
if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
}
if msg.push_msat > (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "push_msat more than highest possible value", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "push_msat more than highest possible value", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
}
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg: None});
- }
- if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat > msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Bogus max_htlc_value_in_flight_satoshis", msg: None});
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer never wants payout outputs?", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
}
if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Minimum htlc value is full channel value", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Minimum htlc value is full channel value", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
}
Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
if msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
}
if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
}
if (msg.channel_flags & 254) != 0 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "unknown channel_flags", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "unknown channel_flags", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })});
}
// Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
let their_announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
+ if require_announce && !their_announce {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer tried to open unannounced channel, but we require public ones", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) });
+ }
+ if !allow_announce && their_announce {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer tried to open announced channel, but we require private ones", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) });
+ }
- let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_vbyte(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
-
- let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
- rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
- let chan_keys = match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
- Ok(key) => key,
- Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
- };
+ let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.channel_monitor_claim_key).unwrap().serialize());
let our_channel_monitor_claim_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script();
let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key,
- &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key).unwrap(),
- &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.htlc_base_key).unwrap(),
- BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, our_channel_monitor_claim_script);
+ &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key).unwrap(),
+ &chan_keys.htlc_base_key,
+ BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, our_channel_monitor_claim_script);
channel_monitor.set_their_htlc_base_key(&msg.htlc_basepoint);
+ channel_monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(msg.to_self_delay);
let mut chan = Channel {
user_id: user_id,
channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
channel_outbound: false,
secp_ctx: secp_ctx,
- announce_publicly: their_announce && announce_publicly,
+ announce_publicly: their_announce,
local_keys: chan_keys,
cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: (1 << 48) - 1,
cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: (1 << 48) - 1,
value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
pending_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- holding_cell_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
next_local_htlc_id: 0,
next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
- channel_update_count: 0,
+ channel_update_count: 1,
+
+ last_local_commitment_txn: Vec::new(),
last_sent_closing_fee: None,
- funding_tx_confirmed_in: Default::default(),
+ funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
short_channel_id: None,
last_block_connected: Default::default(),
funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
their_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
our_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
- their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
+ their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
their_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
their_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64),
their_delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
their_htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint,
their_cur_commitment_point: msg.first_per_commitment_point,
+
+ their_prev_commitment_point: None,
their_node_id: their_node_id,
their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
+
+ logger,
};
let obscure_factor = chan.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
// Utilities to derive keys:
- fn build_local_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<SecretKey, HandleError> {
+ fn build_local_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> SecretKey {
let res = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, idx);
- Ok(get_key!(&self.secp_ctx, &res))
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res).unwrap()
}
// Utilities to build transactions:
/// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
/// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
#[inline]
- fn build_commitment_transaction(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool) -> Result<(Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>), HandleError> {
- let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ commitment_number;
+ fn build_commitment_transaction(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool) -> (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) {
+ let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ (0xffffffffffff - commitment_number);
let txins = {
let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
ins.push(TxIn {
- prev_hash: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().0,
- prev_index: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().1 as u32,
+ prev_hash: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().txid,
+ prev_index: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().index as u32,
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3*8) as u32),
witness: Vec::new(),
ins
};
- let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>)> = Vec::new();
+ let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_htlcs.len() + 2);
let dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.our_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.their_dust_limit_satoshis };
let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
+ let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
for ref htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter() {
- if htlc.state == HTLCState::Committed || htlc.state == (if generated_by_local { HTLCState::LocalAnnounced } else { HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced }) {
+ let include = match htlc.state {
+ HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced => !generated_by_local,
+ HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => !generated_by_local,
+ HTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke => true,
+ HTLCState::LocalAnnounced => generated_by_local,
+ HTLCState::Committed => true,
+ HTLCState::RemoteRemoved => generated_by_local,
+ HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => generated_by_local,
+ HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => false,
+ HTLCState::LocalRemoved => !generated_by_local,
+ HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment => false,
+ };
+
+ if include {
if htlc.outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (self.feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
let htlc_in_tx = htlc.get_in_commitment(true);
txouts.push((TxOut {
- script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys, true).to_v0_p2wsh(),
+ script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000
}, Some(htlc_in_tx)));
}
if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (self.feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
let htlc_in_tx = htlc.get_in_commitment(false);
txouts.push((TxOut { // "received HTLC output"
- script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys, false).to_v0_p2wsh(),
+ script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000
}, Some(htlc_in_tx)));
}
} else {
remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
}
+ } else {
+ match htlc.state {
+ HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove|HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => {
+ if htlc.fail_reason.is_none() {
+ value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
+ }
+ },
+ HTLCState::RemoteRemoved => {
+ if !generated_by_local && htlc.fail_reason.is_none() {
+ value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
+ }
+ },
+ HTLCState::LocalRemoved => {
+ if generated_by_local && htlc.local_removed_fulfilled {
+ value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
+ }
+ },
+ HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment => {
+ assert!(htlc.local_removed_fulfilled);
+ value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
+ },
+ _ => {},
+ }
}
}
let total_fee: u64 = self.feerate_per_kw * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (txouts.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
- let value_to_self: i64 = ((self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64) / 1000 - if self.channel_outbound { total_fee as i64 } else { 0 };
- let value_to_remote: i64 = (((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat - remote_htlc_total_msat) / 1000) as i64) - if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else { total_fee as i64 };
+ let value_to_self: i64 = ((self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset) / 1000 - if self.channel_outbound { total_fee as i64 } else { 0 };
+ let value_to_remote: i64 = (((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat - remote_htlc_total_msat) as i64 - value_to_self_msat_offset) / 1000) - if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else { total_fee as i64 };
let value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
let value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts);
- let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
- let mut htlcs_used: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> = Vec::new();
+ let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
+ let mut htlcs_used: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
for (idx, out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
outputs.push(out.0);
- match out.1 {
- Some(out_htlc) => {
- htlcs_used.push(out_htlc);
- htlcs_used.last_mut().unwrap().transaction_output_index = idx as u32;
- },
- None => {}
+ if let Some(out_htlc) = out.1 {
+ htlcs_used.push(out_htlc);
+ htlcs_used.last_mut().unwrap().transaction_output_index = idx as u32;
}
}
- Ok((Transaction {
+ (Transaction {
version: 2,
lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
input: txins,
output: outputs,
- }, htlcs_used))
+ }, htlcs_used)
}
#[inline]
let txins = {
let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
ins.push(TxIn {
- prev_hash: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().0,
- prev_index: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().1 as u32,
+ prev_hash: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().txid,
+ prev_index: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().index as u32,
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: 0xffffffff,
witness: Vec::new(),
/// The result is a transaction which we can revoke ownership of (ie a "local" transaction)
/// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
fn build_local_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, HandleError> {
- let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(commitment_number)?).unwrap();
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(commitment_number)).unwrap();
let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key).unwrap();
let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key).unwrap();
- Ok(secp_call!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &self.their_revocation_basepoint, &self.their_payment_basepoint, &self.their_htlc_basepoint)))
+ Ok(secp_derived_key!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &self.their_revocation_basepoint, &self.their_payment_basepoint, &self.their_htlc_basepoint)))
}
#[inline]
let revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key).unwrap();
let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key).unwrap();
- Ok(secp_call!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point, &self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint, &self.their_htlc_basepoint, &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint)))
+ Ok(secp_derived_key!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point, &self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint, &self.their_htlc_basepoint, &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint)))
}
/// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
/// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
/// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
/// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
- fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Sha256dHash, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<Transaction, HandleError> {
- let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
- txins.push(TxIn {
- prev_hash: prev_hash.clone(),
- prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index,
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
+ fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Sha256dHash, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Transaction {
+ chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, self.feerate_per_kw, if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT }, htlc, &keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
+ }
- let total_fee = if htlc.offered {
- self.feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
- } else {
- self.feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
- };
+ fn create_htlc_tx_signature(&self, tx: &Transaction, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<(Script, Signature, bool), HandleError> {
+ if tx.input.len() != 1 {
+ panic!("Tried to sign HTLC transaction that had input count != 1!");
+ }
- let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
- txouts.push(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&keys.revocation_key,
- if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT },
- &keys.a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
- value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
- });
+ let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
- Ok(Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 },
- input: txins,
- output: txouts,
- })
+ let our_htlc_key = secp_derived_key!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key));
+ let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
+ let is_local_tx = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key).unwrap() == keys.a_htlc_key;
+ Ok((htlc_redeemscript, self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key).unwrap(), is_local_tx))
}
/// Signs a transaction created by build_htlc_transaction. If the transaction is an
/// HTLC-Success transaction (ie htlc.offered is false), preimate must be set!
- fn sign_htlc_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature, preimage: &Option<[u8; 32]>, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ fn sign_htlc_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature, preimage: &Option<[u8; 32]>, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<Signature, HandleError> {
if tx.input.len() != 1 {
panic!("Tried to sign HTLC transaction that had input count != 1!");
}
panic!("Tried to re-sign HTLC transaction");
}
- let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys, htlc.offered);
-
- let our_htlc_key = secp_call!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key));
- let sighash = secp_call!(Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]));
- let our_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key));
-
- let local_tx = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key).unwrap() == keys.a_htlc_key;
+ let (htlc_redeemscript, our_sig, local_tx) = self.create_htlc_tx_signature(tx, htlc, keys)?;
tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.into_vec());
- Ok(())
+ Ok(our_sig)
}
- pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> Result<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, HandleError> {
+ fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, payment_preimage_arg: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), HandleError> {
+ // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it wont bet unset) or there is no way any
+ // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
+ // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
+ // either.
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state", msg: None});
+ panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
}
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&payment_preimage);
- let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
- sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
-
- let mut htlc_id = 0;
- let mut htlc_amount_msat = 0;
- //TODO: swap_remove since we dont need to maintain ordering here
- self.pending_htlcs.retain(|ref htlc| {
- if !htlc.outbound && htlc.payment_hash == payment_hash {
- if htlc_id != 0 {
+ sha.input(&payment_preimage_arg);
+ let mut payment_hash_calc = [0; 32];
+ sha.result(&mut payment_hash_calc);
+
+ let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
+ for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
+ if !htlc.outbound && htlc.payment_hash == payment_hash_calc {
+ if pending_idx != std::usize::MAX {
panic!("Duplicate HTLC payment_hash, you probably re-used payment preimages, NEVER DO THIS!");
}
- htlc_id = htlc.htlc_id;
- htlc_amount_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
- false
- } else { true }
- });
- if htlc_amount_msat == 0 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", msg: None});
+ pending_idx = idx;
+ }
}
+ if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", action: None});
+ }
+
+ // Now update local state:
+ //
+ // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
+ // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash_calc, &payment_preimage_arg);
+
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
+ for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
+ match pending_update {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, .. } => {
+ if payment_preimage_arg == *payment_preimage {
+ return Ok((None, None));
+ }
+ },
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
+ if payment_hash_calc == *payment_hash {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", action: None});
+ }
+ },
+ _ => {}
+ }
+ }
+ self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
+ payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, payment_hash: payment_hash_calc,
+ });
+ return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
+ }
+
+ let htlc_id = {
+ let htlc = &mut self.pending_htlcs[pending_idx];
+ if htlc.state == HTLCState::Committed {
+ htlc.state = HTLCState::LocalRemoved;
+ htlc.local_removed_fulfilled = true;
+ } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced {
+ panic!("Somehow forwarded HTLC prior to remote revocation!");
+ } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemoved || htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", action: None});
+ } else {
+ panic!("Have an inbound HTLC when not awaiting remote revoke that had a garbage state");
+ }
+ htlc.htlc_id
+ };
- //TODO: This is racy af, they may have pending messages in flight to us that will not have
- //received this yet!
- self.value_to_self_msat += htlc_amount_msat;
- Ok(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
+ Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
channel_id: self.channel_id(),
htlc_id: htlc_id,
- payment_preimage: payment_preimage,
- })
+ payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
+ }), Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())))
+ }
+
+ pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), HandleError> {
+ match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(payment_preimage)? {
+ (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), _) => {
+ let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+ Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
+ },
+ (None, Some(channel_monitor)) => Ok((None, Some(channel_monitor))),
+ (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
+ }
}
- pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, HandleError> {
+ pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, payment_hash_arg: &[u8; 32], err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, HandleError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
}
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
+ // Now update local state:
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
+ for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
+ match pending_update {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
+ if *payment_hash_arg == *payment_hash {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", action: None});
+ }
+ },
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
+ if *payment_hash_arg == *payment_hash {
+ return Ok(None);
+ }
+ },
+ _ => {}
+ }
+ }
+ self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
+ payment_hash: payment_hash_arg.clone(),
+ err_packet,
+ });
+ return Ok(None);
+ }
+
let mut htlc_id = 0;
let mut htlc_amount_msat = 0;
- //TODO: swap_remove since we dont need to maintain ordering here
- self.pending_htlcs.retain(|ref htlc| {
- if !htlc.outbound && htlc.payment_hash == *payment_hash {
+ for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ if !htlc.outbound && htlc.payment_hash == *payment_hash_arg {
if htlc_id != 0 {
panic!("Duplicate HTLC payment_hash, you probably re-used payment preimages, NEVER DO THIS!");
}
htlc_id = htlc.htlc_id;
htlc_amount_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
- false
- } else { true }
- });
+ if htlc.state == HTLCState::Committed {
+ htlc.state = HTLCState::LocalRemoved;
+ } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced {
+ panic!("Somehow forwarded HTLC prior to remote revocation!");
+ } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemoved || htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", action: None});
+ } else {
+ panic!("Have an inbound HTLC when not awaiting remote revoke that had a garbage state");
+ }
+ }
+ }
if htlc_amount_msat == 0 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", action: None});
}
- //TODO: This is racy af, they may have pending messages in flight to us that will not have
- //received this yet!
-
- Ok(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
channel_id: self.channel_id(),
htlc_id,
reason: err_packet
- })
+ }))
+ }
+
+ pub fn get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, HandleError> {
+ match self.get_update_fail_htlc(payment_hash, err_packet)? {
+ Some(update_fail_htlc) => {
+ let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+ Ok(Some((update_fail_htlc, commitment, monitor_update)))
+ },
+ None => Ok(None)
+ }
}
// Message handlers:
pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
// Check sanity of message fields:
if !self.channel_outbound {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer", action: None});
}
if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an accept_channel message at a strange time", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Got an accept_channel message at a strange time", action: None});
}
if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg: None});
- }
- if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Bogus max_htlc_value_in_flight_satoshis", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer never wants payout outputs?", action: None});
}
if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", action: None});
}
if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Minimum htlc value is full channel value", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Minimum htlc value is full channel value", action: None});
}
//TODO do something with minimum_depth
if msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", action: None});
}
if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", action: None});
}
self.channel_monitor.set_their_htlc_base_key(&msg.htlc_basepoint);
self.their_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
- self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
+ self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
self.their_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
self.their_to_self_delay = msg.to_self_delay;
let obscure_factor = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
self.channel_monitor.set_commitment_obscure_factor(obscure_factor);
+ self.channel_monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(msg.to_self_delay);
self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
- let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false)?.0;
- let remote_sighash = secp_call!(Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]));
+ let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false).0;
+ let remote_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
- let local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false)?.0;
- let local_sighash = secp_call!(Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]));
+ let local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false).0;
+ let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
// They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
- secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, &self.their_funding_pubkey));
+ secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, &self.their_funding_pubkey), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer");
// We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
- Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key))))
+ Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap()))
}
- pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
+ pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
if self.channel_outbound {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_created for an outbound channel?", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_created for an outbound channel?", action: None});
}
if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_created after we got the channel!", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_created after we got the channel!", action: None});
}
if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) || self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != (1 << 48) - 1 || self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != (1 << 48) - 1 {
panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
}
- self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info(msg.funding_txid, msg.funding_output_index);
+ let funding_txo = OutPoint::new(msg.funding_txid, msg.funding_output_index);
+ let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
+ self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
let (remote_initial_commitment_tx, our_signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature) {
- Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, sig)) => (remote_initial_commitment_tx, sig),
+ Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => {
self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
return Err(e);
// Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
- //TODO: Determine which tx index in remote_initial_commitment_transaction's outputs
- //represent a revokeable script!
- self.channel_monitor.provide_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, 0, Vec::new());
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number);
self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
- let funding_txo = self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
- self.channel_id = funding_txo.0.into_be() ^ Uint256::from_u64(funding_txo.1 as u64).unwrap(); //TODO: or le?
+ self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
+ self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
- Ok(msgs::FundingSigned {
+ Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
signature: our_signature
- })
+ }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
}
/// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
/// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
- pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<ChannelMonitor, HandleError> {
if !self.channel_outbound {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?", action: None});
}
if self.channel_state != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_signed in strange state!", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_signed in strange state!", action: None});
}
- if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) || self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != (1 << 48) - 1 || self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != (1 << 48) - 1 {
+ if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) || self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != (1 << 48) - 2 || self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != (1 << 48) - 1 {
panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
}
let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
- let local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false)?.0;
- let local_sighash = secp_call!(Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]));
+ let mut local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false).0;
+ let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
// They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
- secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey));
+ secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey), "Invalid funding_signed signature from peer");
+ self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_initial_commitment_tx, &msg.signature);
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx.clone(), local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
+ self.last_local_commitment_txn = vec![local_initial_commitment_tx];
self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
+ self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
- Ok(())
+ Ok(self.channel_monitor.clone())
}
pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
} else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK);
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
} else {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time", action: None});
}
- //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
- //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
- //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
- //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
- if self.their_cur_commitment_point != msg.next_per_commitment_point {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Non-duplicate next_per_commitment_point in funding_locked", msg: None});
- }
+ self.their_prev_commitment_point = Some(self.their_cur_commitment_point);
self.their_cur_commitment_point = msg.next_per_commitment_point;
Ok(())
}
/// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
- fn get_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u32, u64, u64) {
+ /// If its for a remote update check, we need to be more lax about checking against messages we
+ /// sent but they may not have received/processed before they sent this message. Further, for
+ /// our own sends, we're more conservative and even consider things they've removed against
+ /// totals, though there is little reason to outside of further avoiding any race condition
+ /// issues.
+ fn get_pending_htlc_stats(&self, for_remote_update_check: bool) -> (u32, u32, u64, u64) {
let mut inbound_htlc_count: u32 = 0;
let mut outbound_htlc_count: u32 = 0;
let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
for ref htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter() {
+ match htlc.state {
+ HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced => {},
+ HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {},
+ HTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke => {},
+ HTLCState::LocalAnnounced => { if for_remote_update_check { continue; } },
+ HTLCState::Committed => {},
+ HTLCState::RemoteRemoved => { if for_remote_update_check { continue; } },
+ HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => { if for_remote_update_check { continue; } },
+ HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => { if for_remote_update_check { continue; } },
+ HTLCState::LocalRemoved => {},
+ HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment => { if for_remote_update_check { continue; } },
+ }
if !htlc.outbound {
inbound_htlc_count += 1;
htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingForwardHTLCInfo) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
}
if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel", action: None});
}
if msg.amount_msat < self.our_htlc_minimum_msat {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value", action: None});
}
- let (inbound_htlc_count, _, htlc_outbound_value_msat, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_pending_htlc_stats();
+ let (inbound_htlc_count, _, htlc_outbound_value_msat, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_pending_htlc_stats(true);
if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs", action: None});
}
//TODO: Spec is unclear if this is per-direction or in total (I assume per direction):
// Check our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote HTLC add would put them over their max HTLC value in flight", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote HTLC add would put them over their max HTLC value in flight", action: None});
}
// Check our_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
// the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
// something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
if htlc_inbound_value_msat + htlc_outbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat + self.value_to_self_msat > (self.channel_value_satoshis - Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)) * 1000 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value", action: None});
}
if self.next_remote_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote skipped HTLC ID", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote skipped HTLC ID", action: None});
}
if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height", action: None});
}
//TODO: Check msg.cltv_expiry further? Do this in channel manager?
payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
state: HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced,
+ fail_reason: None,
+ local_removed_fulfilled: false,
pending_forward_state: Some(pending_forward_state),
});
}
/// Removes an outbound HTLC which has been commitment_signed by the remote end
- fn remove_outbound_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<HTLCOutput, HandleError> {
- let mut found_idx = None;
- for (idx, ref htlc) in self.pending_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
+ #[inline]
+ fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<[u8; 32]>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
+ for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter_mut() {
if htlc.outbound && htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
match check_preimage {
None => {},
Some(payment_hash) =>
if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to fulfill HTLC with an incorrect preimage", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to fulfill HTLC with an incorrect preimage", action: None});
}
};
- found_idx = Some(idx);
- break;
- }
- }
- match found_idx {
- None => Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find", msg: None}),
- Some(idx) => {
- Ok(self.pending_htlcs.swap_remove(idx))
- }
- }
- }
-
- /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
- /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
- fn free_holding_cell_htlcs(&mut self) -> Result<Option<(Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, HandleError> {
- if self.holding_cell_htlcs.len() != 0 {
- let mut new_htlcs = self.holding_cell_htlcs.split_off(0);
- let mut update_add_msgs = Vec::with_capacity(new_htlcs.len());
- let mut err = None;
- for new_htlc in new_htlcs.drain(..) {
- // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
- // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
- // the limit. In case its less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
- // handling this case better and maybe fufilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
- // to rebalance channels.
- if self.holding_cell_htlcs.len() != 0 {
- self.holding_cell_htlcs.push(new_htlc);
+ if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalAnnounced {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to fulfill HTLC before it had been committed", action: None});
+ } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::Committed {
+ htlc.state = HTLCState::RemoteRemoved;
+ htlc.fail_reason = fail_reason;
+ } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove || htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke || htlc.state == HTLCState::RemoteRemoved {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to fulfill HTLC that they'd already fulfilled", action: None});
} else {
- match self.send_htlc(new_htlc.amount_msat, new_htlc.payment_hash, new_htlc.cltv_expiry, new_htlc.onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
- Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_msgs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
- Err(e) => {
- self.holding_cell_htlcs.push(new_htlc);
- err = Some(e);
- }
- }
+ panic!("Got a non-outbound state on an outbound HTLC");
}
+ return Ok(htlc.payment_hash.clone());
}
- //TODO: Need to examine the type of err - if its a fee issue or similar we may want to
- //fail it back the route, if its a temporary issue we can ignore it...
- if update_add_msgs.len() > 0 {
- Ok(Some((update_add_msgs, self.send_commitment()?)))
- } else {
- Err(err.unwrap())
- }
- } else {
- Ok(None)
}
+ Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find", action: None})
}
pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
}
let mut sha = Sha256::new();
let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
- match self.remove_outbound_htlc(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash)) {
- Err(e) => return Err(e),
- Ok(htlc) => {
- //TODO: Double-check that we didn't exceed some limits (or value_to_self went
- //negative here?)
- self.value_to_self_msat -= htlc.amount_msat;
- }
- }
+ self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None)?;
Ok(())
}
- pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
+ pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
}
- let payment_hash = match self.remove_outbound_htlc(msg.htlc_id, None) {
- Err(e) => return Err(e),
- Ok(htlc) => {
- //TODO: Double-check that we didn't exceed some limits (or value_to_self went
- //negative here?)
- htlc.payment_hash
- }
- };
- Ok(payment_hash)
+ self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))
}
- pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
+ pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
}
- let payment_hash = match self.remove_outbound_htlc(msg.htlc_id, None) {
- Err(e) => return Err(e),
- Ok(htlc) => {
- //TODO: Double-check that we didn't exceed some limits (or value_to_self went
- //negative here?)
- htlc.payment_hash
- }
- };
- Ok(payment_hash)
+ self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
+ Ok(())
}
- pub fn commitment_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>), HandleError> {
+ pub fn commitment_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
}
let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
- let local_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false)?;
+ let mut local_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false);
let local_commitment_txid = local_commitment_tx.0.txid();
- let local_sighash = secp_call!(Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&local_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]));
- secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey));
+ let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&local_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
+ secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey), "Invalid commitment tx signature from peer");
if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != local_commitment_tx.1.len() {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Got wrong number of HTLC signatures from remote", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Got wrong number of HTLC signatures from remote", action: None});
}
+ let mut new_local_commitment_txn = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.1.len() + 1);
+ self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_commitment_tx.0, &msg.signature);
+ new_local_commitment_txn.push(local_commitment_tx.0.clone());
+
+ let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.1.len());
for (idx, ref htlc) in local_commitment_tx.1.iter().enumerate() {
- let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&local_commitment_txid, htlc, true, &local_keys)?;
- let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &local_keys, htlc.offered);
- let htlc_sighash = secp_call!(Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]));
- secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key));
+ let mut htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&local_commitment_txid, htlc, true, &local_keys);
+ let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &local_keys);
+ let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
+ secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key), "Invalid HTLC tx siganture from peer");
+ let htlc_sig = if htlc.offered {
+ let htlc_sig = self.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &None, htlc, &local_keys)?;
+ new_local_commitment_txn.push(htlc_tx);
+ htlc_sig
+ } else {
+ self.create_htlc_tx_signature(&htlc_tx, htlc, &local_keys)?.1
+ };
+ htlcs_and_sigs.push(((*htlc).clone(), msg.htlc_signatures[idx], htlc_sig));
}
- let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number - 1)?).unwrap();
- let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
-
- //TODO: Store htlc keys in our channel_watcher
+ let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number - 1)).unwrap();
+ let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_commitment_tx.0, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_and_sigs);
- let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
- for ref mut htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ let mut need_our_commitment = false;
+ for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter_mut() {
if htlc.state == HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced {
- htlc.state = HTLCState::Committed;
- to_forward_infos.push(htlc.pending_forward_state.take().unwrap());
+ htlc.state = HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
+ need_our_commitment = true;
+ } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::RemoteRemoved {
+ htlc.state = HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove;
+ need_our_commitment = true;
}
}
+ // Finally delete all the LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment HTLCs
+ // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
+ let mut claimed_value_msat = 0;
+ self.pending_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
+ if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment {
+ claimed_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ false
+ } else { true }
+ });
+ self.value_to_self_msat += claimed_value_msat;
self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ self.last_local_commitment_txn = new_local_commitment_txn;
+
+ let (our_commitment_signed, monitor_update) = if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
+ // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
+ // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
+ // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
+ let (msg, monitor) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+ (Some(msg), monitor)
+ } else { (None, self.channel_monitor.clone()) };
Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
per_commitment_secret: per_commitment_secret,
next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
- }, to_forward_infos))
+ }, our_commitment_signed, monitor_update))
+ }
+
+ /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
+ /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
+ fn free_holding_cell_htlcs(&mut self) -> Result<Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitor)>, HandleError> {
+ if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 {
+ let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
+ mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
+ let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
+ let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
+ let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
+ let mut err = None;
+ for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
+ // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
+ // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
+ // the limit. In case its less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
+ // handling this case better and maybe fufilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
+ // to rebalance channels.
+ if err.is_some() { // We're back to AwaitingRemoteRevoke (or are about to fail the channel)
+ self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
+ } else {
+ match &htlc_update {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
+ match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
+ Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
+ Err(e) => {
+ err = Some(e);
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { payment_preimage, .. } => {
+ match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(payment_preimage) {
+ Ok(update_fulfill_msg_option) => update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.0.unwrap()),
+ Err(e) => {
+ err = Some(e);
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { payment_hash, ref err_packet } => {
+ match self.get_update_fail_htlc(&payment_hash, err_packet.clone()) {
+ Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
+ Err(e) => {
+ err = Some(e);
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ }
+ if err.is_some() {
+ self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ //TODO: Need to examine the type of err - if its a fee issue or similar we may want to
+ //fail it back the route, if its a temporary issue we can ignore it...
+ match err {
+ None => {
+ let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+ Ok(Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs,
+ update_fulfill_htlcs,
+ update_fail_htlcs,
+ commitment_signed,
+ }, monitor_update)))
+ },
+ Some(e) => Err(e)
+ }
+ } else {
+ Ok(None)
+ }
}
/// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
/// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
/// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
/// revoke_and_ack message.
- pub fn revoke_and_ack(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<(Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, HandleError> {
+ pub fn revoke_and_ack(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>, Vec<([u8; 32], HTLCFailReason)>, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
}
- if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &get_key!(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.per_commitment_secret)).unwrap() != self.their_cur_commitment_point {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey", msg: None});
+ if let Some(their_prev_commitment_point) = self.their_prev_commitment_point {
+ if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret")).unwrap() != their_prev_commitment_point {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey", action: None});
+ }
}
- self.channel_monitor.provide_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, msg.per_commitment_secret)?;
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret, Some((self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number - 1, msg.next_per_commitment_point)))?;
// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
// (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
// OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
// channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
+ self.their_prev_commitment_point = Some(self.their_cur_commitment_point);
self.their_cur_commitment_point = msg.next_per_commitment_point;
self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+
+ let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
+ let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
+ let mut require_commitment = false;
+ let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
+ // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
+ self.pending_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
+ if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemoved {
+ if htlc.local_removed_fulfilled { true } else { false }
+ } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {
+ if let Some(reason) = htlc.fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
+ revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.payment_hash, reason));
+ } else {
+ // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
+ value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
+ }
+ false
+ } else { true }
+ });
for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter_mut() {
if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalAnnounced {
htlc.state = HTLCState::Committed;
+ } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
+ htlc.state = HTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke;
+ require_commitment = true;
+ } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {
+ htlc.state = HTLCState::Committed;
+ to_forward_infos.push(htlc.pending_forward_state.take().unwrap());
+ } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {
+ htlc.state = HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke;
+ require_commitment = true;
+ } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemoved {
+ assert!(htlc.local_removed_fulfilled);
+ htlc.state = HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment;
}
}
+ self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
- self.free_holding_cell_htlcs()
+ match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs()? {
+ Some(commitment_update) => {
+ Ok((Some(commitment_update.0), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, commitment_update.1))
+ },
+ None => {
+ if require_commitment {
+ let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+ Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ commitment_signed
+ }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, monitor_update))
+ } else {
+ Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
+ }
+ }
+ }
}
pub fn update_fee(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- if self.channel_outbound {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee", msg: None});
- }
+ if self.channel_outbound {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee", action: None});
+ }
Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
self.feerate_per_kw = msg.feerate_per_kw as u64;
Ok(())
}
pub fn shutdown(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<[u8; 32]>), HandleError> {
if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
return Ok((None, None, Vec::new()));
}
for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter() {
if htlc.state == HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs", action: None});
}
}
if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote peer sent duplicate shutdown message", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote peer sent duplicate shutdown message", action: None});
}
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
// BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to
// 34 bytes in length, so dont let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
if self.channel_outbound && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Got shutdown_scriptpubkey of absurd length from remote peer", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Got shutdown_scriptpubkey of absurd length from remote peer", action: None});
}
//TODO: Check shutdown_scriptpubkey form as BOLT says we must? WHYYY
if self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey which did not match their previous scriptpubkey", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey which did not match their previous scriptpubkey", action: None});
}
} else {
self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
let our_closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
let (proposed_feerate, proposed_fee, our_sig) = if self.channel_outbound && self.pending_htlcs.is_empty() {
- let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_vbyte(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
- if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate * 250 {
- proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw / 250;
+ let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
+ if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
+ proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
}
let tx_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&our_closing_script, &msg.scriptpubkey);
- let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate * tx_weight / 4;
+ let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate * tx_weight / 1000;
let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let sighash = secp_call!(Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]));
+ let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
- (Some(proposed_feerate), Some(total_fee_satoshis), Some(secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key))))
+ (Some(proposed_feerate), Some(total_fee_satoshis), Some(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap()))
} else { (None, None, None) };
// From here on out, we may not fail!
self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
// We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
// remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
// cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
- let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlcs.len());
- for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlcs.drain(..) {
- dropped_outbound_htlcs.push(htlc.payment_hash);
- }
+ let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
+ self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
+ match htlc_update {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
+ dropped_outbound_htlcs.push(payment_hash.clone());
+ false
+ },
+ _ => true
+ }
+ });
for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter() {
if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalAnnounced {
return Ok((None, None, dropped_outbound_htlcs));
};
self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
if self.pending_htlcs.is_empty() && self.channel_outbound {
// There are no more HTLCs and we're the funder, this means we start the closing_signed
// dance with an initial fee proposal!
pub fn closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), HandleError> {
if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown", action: None});
}
if !self.pending_htlcs.is_empty() {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs", action: None});
}
if msg.fee_satoshis > 21000000 * 10000000 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee", action: None});
}
let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim", action: None});
}
- let mut sighash = secp_call!(Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]));
+ let mut sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey) {
Ok(_) => {},
- Err(_) => {
+ Err(_e) => {
// The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
// limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
- sighash = secp_call!(Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]));
- secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey));
+ sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
+ secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer");
},
};
if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature);
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
}
}
macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
($new_feerate: expr) => {
let closing_tx_max_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
- let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate * closing_tx_max_weight / 4, false);
- sighash = secp_call!(Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]));
+ let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000, false);
+ sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap();
self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee));
return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
}
}
- let proposed_sat_per_vbyte = msg.fee_satoshis * 4 / closing_tx.get_weight();
+ let proposed_sat_per_kw = msg.fee_satoshis * 1000 / closing_tx.get_weight();
if self.channel_outbound {
- let our_max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_vbyte(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
- if proposed_sat_per_vbyte > our_max_feerate {
+ let our_max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ if proposed_sat_per_kw > our_max_feerate {
if let Some((last_feerate, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
if our_max_feerate <= last_feerate {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher than our Normal feerate", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher than our Normal feerate", action: None});
}
}
propose_new_feerate!(our_max_feerate);
}
} else {
- let our_min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_vbyte(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
- if proposed_sat_per_vbyte < our_min_feerate {
+ let our_min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
+ if proposed_sat_per_kw < our_min_feerate {
if let Some((last_feerate, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
if our_min_feerate >= last_feerate {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower than our Background feerate", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower than our Background feerate", action: None});
}
}
propose_new_feerate!(our_min_feerate);
let our_sig = self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature);
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
// Public utilities:
- pub fn channel_id(&self) -> Uint256 {
+ pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
self.channel_id
}
self.user_id
}
+ /// May only be called after funding has been initiated (ie is_funding_initiated() is true)
+ pub fn channel_monitor(&self) -> ChannelMonitor {
+ if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
+ panic!("Can't get a channel monitor until funding has been created");
+ }
+ self.channel_monitor.clone()
+ }
+
/// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
/// is_usable() returns true).
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
self.short_channel_id
}
/// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
/// get_outbound_funding_created.
- pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<(Sha256dHash, u16)> {
+ pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo()
}
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
pub fn get_their_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
self.their_node_id
}
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
pub fn get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
}
self.channel_value_satoshis
}
- pub fn get_channel_update_count(&mut self) -> u32 {
- self.channel_update_count += 1; //TODO: This should be base on updates, not updates *sent*
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn get_channel_update_count(&self) -> u32 {
self.channel_update_count
}
+ pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
+ self.announce_publicly
+ }
+
/// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
pub fn get_our_fee_base_msat(&self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> u32 {
// For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
// output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
// the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
- let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT);
+ let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
if self.channel_outbound {
// + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
- res += self.feerate_per_kw * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC;
+ res += self.feerate_per_kw * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
}
// + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
- res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_vbyte(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT * 250;
+ res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
res as u32
}
- pub fn channel_monitor(&self) -> ChannelMonitor {
- if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
- panic!("Can't get a channel monitor until funding has been created");
- }
- self.channel_monitor.clone()
- }
-
/// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
(self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
/// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
/// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
self.is_usable()
}
+ /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
+ pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
+ self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32
+ }
+
/// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
/// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
/// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
/// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being connected.
/// Note that we only need to use this to detect funding_signed, anything else is handled by
/// the channel_monitor.
- pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Option<msgs::FundingLocked> {
+ /// In case of Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard requirements
+ /// apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed post-shutdown.
+ /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
+ pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, HandleError> {
let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK);
if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
if self.funding_tx_confirmations == CONF_TARGET as u64 {
- if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
+ true
} else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK);
- //TODO: Something about a state where we "lost confirmation"
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
+ true
+ } else if self.channel_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
+ // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
+ // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
+ false
} else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
- panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?");
- }
- self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = header.bitcoin_hash();
+ panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
+ } else {
+ // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
+ // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
+ false
+ };
+ self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.bitcoin_hash());
//TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
//as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
//they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
//a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
- let next_per_commitment_secret = match self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number) {
- Ok(secret) => secret,
- Err(_) => return None
- };
-
- let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret).unwrap();
- return Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
- });
+ if need_commitment_update {
+ let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret).unwrap();
+ return Ok(Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+ }));
+ }
}
}
}
if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
for (ref tx, index_in_block) in txn_matched.iter().zip(indexes_of_txn_matched) {
- if tx.txid() == self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().0 {
- self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
- self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
- ((*index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
- ((self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().1 as u64) << (2*8)));
+ if tx.txid() == self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().txid {
+ let txo_idx = self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().index as usize;
+ if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
+ tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "funding tx had wrong script/value", action: Some(ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: None})});
+ } else {
+ self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
+ self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
+ ((*index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
+ ((txo_idx as u64) << (0*8)));
+ }
}
}
}
- None
+ Ok(None)
}
/// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
return true;
}
}
- if header.bitcoin_hash() == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
+ if Some(header.bitcoin_hash()) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
self.funding_tx_confirmations = CONF_TARGET as u64 - 1;
}
false
panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
}
if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward", action: None});
}
if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != (1 << 48) - 1 {
panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
}
- let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
+ let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
Ok(msgs::OpenChannel {
chain_hash: chain_hash,
max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
- feerate_per_kw: fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_vbyte(ConfirmationTarget::Background) as u32 * 250,
+ feerate_per_kw: fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) as u32,
to_self_delay: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap(),
panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
}
- let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
+ let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
Ok(msgs::AcceptChannel {
temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
})
}
- fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self) -> Result<Signature, HandleError> {
+ fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self) -> Result<(Signature, Transaction), HandleError> {
let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
- let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false)?.0;
- let remote_sighash = secp_call!(Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]));
+ let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false).0;
+ let remote_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
// We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
- Ok(secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key)))
+ Ok((self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap(), remote_initial_commitment_tx))
}
/// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
/// or if called on an inbound channel.
/// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
/// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
- pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(&mut self, funding_txid: Sha256dHash, funding_output_index: u16) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, HandleError> {
+ pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint) -> Result<(msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
if !self.channel_outbound {
panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
}
panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
}
- self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info(funding_txid, funding_output_index);
+ let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
+ self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
- let our_signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature() {
- Ok(sig) => sig,
+ let (our_signature, commitment_tx) = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature() {
+ Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => {
+ log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
return Err(e);
}
let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
// Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
-
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number);
self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
- let funding_txo = self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
- self.channel_id = funding_txo.0.into_be() ^ Uint256::from_u64(funding_txo.1 as u64).unwrap(); //TODO: or le?
+ self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
+ self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
- Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
+ Ok((msgs::FundingCreated {
temporary_channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
- funding_txid: funding_txid,
- funding_output_index: funding_output_index,
+ funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
+ funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
signature: our_signature
- })
+ }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
}
/// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
/// message can mark the channel disabled.
pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: Sha256dHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), HandleError> {
if !self.announce_publicly {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel is not available for public announcements", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel is not available for public announcements", action: None});
}
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked", action: None});
}
let were_node_one = our_node_id.serialize()[..] < self.their_node_id.serialize()[..];
};
let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
- let sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.local_keys.funding_key));
+ let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap();
Ok((msg, sig))
}
/// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: [u8; 32], cltv_expiry: u32, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, HandleError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down", action: None});
}
if amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send more than the total value of the channel", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send more than the total value of the channel", action: None});
}
if amount_msat < self.their_htlc_minimum_msat {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value", action: None});
}
- let (_, outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_pending_htlc_stats();
+ let (_, outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_pending_htlc_stats(false);
if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.their_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs", action: None});
}
//TODO: Spec is unclear if this is per-direction or in total (I assume per direction):
// Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight", action: None});
}
// Check their_channel_reserve_satoshis:
if htlc_inbound_value_msat + htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat + (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) > (self.channel_value_satoshis - self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value", action: None});
}
//TODO: Check cltv_expiry? Do this in channel manager?
// Now update local state:
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
//TODO: Check the limits *including* other pending holding cell HTLCs!
- self.holding_cell_htlcs.push(HTLCOutputAwaitingACK {
+ self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
amount_msat: amount_msat,
payment_hash: payment_hash,
cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
state: HTLCState::LocalAnnounced,
+ fail_reason: None,
+ local_removed_fulfilled: false,
pending_forward_state: None
});
}
/// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
- pub fn send_commitment(&mut self) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentSigned, HandleError> {
+ pub fn send_commitment(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established", action: None});
}
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment", action: None});
}
let mut have_updates = false; // TODO initialize with "have we sent a fee update?"
for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter() {
if have_updates { break; }
}
if !have_updates {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send", msg: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send", action: None});
}
-
+ self.send_commitment_no_status_check()
+ }
+ /// Only fails in case of bad keys
+ fn send_commitment_no_status_check(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
+ // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
+ // is acceptable.
+ for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ if htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
+ htlc.state = HTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke;
+ } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {
+ htlc.state = HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke;
+ }
+ }
+
let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
- let remote_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, true)?;
+ let remote_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, true);
let remote_commitment_txid = remote_commitment_tx.0.txid();
- let remote_sighash = secp_call!(Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&remote_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]));
- let our_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key));
+ let remote_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&remote_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
+ let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap();
let mut htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
for ref htlc in remote_commitment_tx.1.iter() {
- let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&remote_commitment_txid, htlc, false, &remote_keys)?;
- let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &remote_keys, htlc.offered);
- let htlc_sighash = secp_call!(Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]));
- let our_htlc_key = secp_call!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &remote_keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key));
- htlc_sigs.push(secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &our_htlc_key)));
+ let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&remote_commitment_txid, htlc, false, &remote_keys);
+ let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &remote_keys);
+ let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
+ let our_htlc_key = secp_derived_key!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &remote_keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key));
+ htlc_sigs.push(self.secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &our_htlc_key).unwrap());
}
// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_commitment_tx.0, remote_commitment_tx.1, self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number);
self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
- Ok(msgs::CommitmentSigned {
+ Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
signature: our_sig,
htlc_signatures: htlc_sigs,
- })
+ }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
}
/// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
/// to send to the remote peer in one go.
/// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
/// more info.
- pub fn send_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: [u8; 32], cltv_expiry: u32, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, HandleError> {
+ pub fn send_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: [u8; 32], cltv_expiry: u32, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, HandleError> {
match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, onion_routing_packet)? {
- Some(update_add_htlc) =>
- Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, self.send_commitment()?))),
+ Some(update_add_htlc) => {
+ let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+ Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
+ },
None => Ok(None)
}
}
+
+ /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
+ /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
+ pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<[u8; 32]>), HandleError> {
+ for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter() {
+ if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalAnnounced {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs, call send_commitment first", action: None});
+ }
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Shutdown already in progress", action: None});
+ }
+ assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
+
+ let our_closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
+
+ // From here on out, we may not fail!
+ if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ } else {
+ self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
+ }
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
+
+ // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
+ // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
+ // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
+ let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
+ self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
+ match htlc_update {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
+ dropped_outbound_htlcs.push(payment_hash.clone());
+ false
+ },
+ _ => true
+ }
+ });
+
+ Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ scriptpubkey: our_closing_script,
+ }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
+ }
+
+ /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependant transactions for relay (forcing
+ /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
+ /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
+ /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
+ /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
+ pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<[u8; 32]>) {
+ assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
+
+ // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
+ // return them to fail the payment.
+ let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
+ for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
+ match htlc_update {
+ HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ dropped_outbound_htlcs.push(payment_hash);
+ },
+ _ => {}
+ }
+ }
+
+ for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalAnnounced {
+ dropped_outbound_htlcs.push(htlc.payment_hash);
+ }
+ //TODO: Do something with the remaining HTLCs
+ //(we need to have the ChannelManager monitor them so we can claim the inbound HTLCs
+ //which correspond)
+ }
+
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
+ let mut res = Vec::new();
+ mem::swap(&mut res, &mut self.last_local_commitment_txn);
+ (res, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
+ }
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
- use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes;
use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
use bitcoin::util::bip143;
use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
- use ln::channel::{Channel,HTLCOutput,HTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
+ use hex;
+ use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,HTLCOutput,HTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
+ use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
use ln::chan_utils;
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
+ use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+ use util::test_utils;
+ use util::logger::Logger;
use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
use crypto::digest::Digest;
+ use std::sync::Arc;
struct TestFeeEstimator {
fee_est: u64
}
impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
- fn get_est_sat_per_vbyte(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u64 {
+ fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u64 {
self.fee_est
}
}
+ #[test]
+ fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
+ assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
+ "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis on existence");
+ }
+
#[test]
fn outbound_commitment_test() {
// Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
- let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000/250};
- let mut chan = Channel::new_outbound(&feeest, PublicKey::new(), 10000000, false, 42); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
- chan.their_to_self_delay = 144;
- chan.our_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
-
+ let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
+ let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- chan.local_keys.funding_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap().serialize()[..],
- hex_bytes("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
+ let chan_keys = ChannelKeys {
+ funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+
+ // These aren't set in the test vectors:
+ revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ commitment_seed: [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
+ };
+ assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.funding_key).unwrap().serialize()[..],
+ hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
- chan.local_keys.payment_base_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- chan.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- // chan.local_keys.commitment_seed isn't derived in the test vectors :(
+ let mut chan = Channel::new_outbound(&feeest, chan_keys, PublicKey::new(), 10000000, false, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
+ chan.their_to_self_delay = 144;
+ chan.our_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
- chan.channel_monitor.set_funding_info(Sha256dHash::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), 0);
+ let funding_info = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), 0);
+ chan.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_info, Script::new()));
- chan.their_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()).unwrap();
+ chan.their_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(chan.their_payment_basepoint.serialize()[..],
- hex_bytes("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
+ hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
- chan.their_funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()).unwrap();
+ chan.their_funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(chan.their_funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
- hex_bytes("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
+ hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
- chan.their_htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()).unwrap();
+ chan.their_htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(chan.their_htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
- hex_bytes("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
+ hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
- chan.their_revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ chan.their_revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
// We can't just use build_local_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
// derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
// build_commitment_transaction.
let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key).unwrap();
- let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret).unwrap();
let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key).unwrap();
let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &chan.their_revocation_basepoint, &chan.their_payment_basepoint, &chan.their_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
macro_rules! test_commitment {
( $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr) => {
- unsigned_tx = chan.build_commitment_transaction(42, &keys, true, false).unwrap();
- let their_signature = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ unsigned_tx = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false);
+ let their_signature = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&unsigned_tx.0).sighash_all(&unsigned_tx.0.input[0], &chan.get_funding_redeemscript(), chan.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, &chan.their_funding_pubkey).unwrap();
chan.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut unsigned_tx.0, &their_signature);
assert_eq!(serialize(&unsigned_tx.0).unwrap()[..],
- hex_bytes($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
+ hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
};
}
macro_rules! test_htlc_output {
( $htlc_idx: expr, $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr ) => {
- let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let ref htlc = unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx];
- let mut htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.0.txid(), &htlc, true, &keys).unwrap();
- let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys, htlc.offered);
+ let mut htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.0.txid(), &htlc, true, &keys);
+ let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.b_htlc_key).unwrap();
chan.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &remote_signature, &preimage, &htlc, &keys).unwrap();
assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx).unwrap()[..],
- hex_bytes($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
+ hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
};
}
cltv_expiry: 500,
payment_hash: [0; 32],
state: HTLCState::Committed,
+ fail_reason: None,
+ local_removed_fulfilled: false,
pending_forward_state: None,
};
let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&hex_bytes("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
+ sha.input(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
out
});
cltv_expiry: 501,
payment_hash: [0; 32],
state: HTLCState::Committed,
+ fail_reason: None,
+ local_removed_fulfilled: false,
pending_forward_state: None,
};
let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&hex_bytes("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
+ sha.input(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
out
});
cltv_expiry: 502,
payment_hash: [0; 32],
state: HTLCState::Committed,
+ fail_reason: None,
+ local_removed_fulfilled: false,
pending_forward_state: None,
};
let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&hex_bytes("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap());
+ sha.input(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap());
sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
out
});
cltv_expiry: 503,
payment_hash: [0; 32],
state: HTLCState::Committed,
+ fail_reason: None,
+ local_removed_fulfilled: false,
pending_forward_state: None,
};
let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&hex_bytes("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap());
+ sha.input(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap());
sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
out
});
cltv_expiry: 504,
payment_hash: [0; 32],
state: HTLCState::Committed,
+ fail_reason: None,
+ local_removed_fulfilled: false,
pending_forward_state: None,
};
let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&hex_bytes("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap());
+ sha.input(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap());
sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
out
});
// Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
let mut seed = [0; 32];
- seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
+ seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 281474976710655),
- hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
+ hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
- seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
+ seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 281474976710655),
- hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
+ hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
- hex_bytes("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
+ hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 0x555555555555),
- hex_bytes("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
+ hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
- seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
+ seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 1),
- hex_bytes("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
+ hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
}
#[test]
// Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
- hex_bytes("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
+ hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
- hex_bytes("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
+ hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
- SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
}
}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff