use crypto::hkdf::{hkdf_extract,hkdf_expand};
use ln::msgs;
-use ln::msgs::{ErrorAction, HandleError, MsgEncodable};
+use ln::msgs::{ErrorAction, HandleError};
use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
-use ln::channelmanager::{PendingForwardHTLCInfo, HTLCFailReason};
+use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, PendingForwardHTLCInfo, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg};
use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT,HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
use ln::chan_utils;
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use util::{transaction_utils,rng};
+use util::ser::Writeable;
use util::sha2::Sha256;
use util::logger::Logger;
use util::errors::APIError;
}
#[derive(PartialEq)]
-enum HTLCState {
+enum InboundHTLCState {
/// Added by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx.
- /// Implies HTLCOutput::outbound: false
RemoteAnnounced,
/// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
/// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
/// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
/// We also have not yet included this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on
/// a remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
- /// Implies HTLCOutput::outbound: false
AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
/// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
/// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
/// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
/// We have included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
/// revoke_and_ack.
- /// Implies HTLCOutput::outbound: true
AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke,
+ Committed,
+ /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
+ /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
+ /// we'll drop it.
+ /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
+ /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
+ /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
+ /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
+ /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
+ /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
+ /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info will not include this HTLC.
+ LocalRemoved,
+}
+
+struct InboundHTLCOutput {
+ htlc_id: u64,
+ amount_msat: u64,
+ cltv_expiry: u32,
+ payment_hash: [u8; 32],
+ state: InboundHTLCState,
+ /// If we're in LocalRemoved, set to true if we fulfilled the HTLC, and can claim money
+ local_removed_fulfilled: bool,
+ /// state pre-Committed implies pending_forward_state, otherwise it must be None
+ pending_forward_state: Option<PendingHTLCStatus>,
+}
+
+#[derive(PartialEq)]
+enum OutboundHTLCState {
/// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
/// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
/// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
/// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
/// doesn't matter to us and its up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
/// we'll never get out of sync).
- /// Implies HTLCOutput::outbound: true
LocalAnnounced,
Committed,
/// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
/// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
- /// Implies HTLCOutput::outbound: true
RemoteRemoved,
/// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
/// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
/// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
/// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
/// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
- /// Implies HTLCOutput::outbound: true
AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove,
/// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
/// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
/// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
/// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
/// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
- /// Implies HTLCOutput::outbound: true
AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke,
- /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
- /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
- /// we'll promote to LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment if we fulfilled, otherwise we'll drop at
- /// that point.
- /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
- /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
- /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
- /// anyway).
- /// Implies HTLCOutput::outbound: false
- LocalRemoved,
- /// Removed by us, sent a new commitment_signed and got a revoke_and_ack. Just waiting on an
- /// updated local commitment transaction. Implies local_removed_fulfilled.
- /// Implies HTLCOutput::outbound: false
- LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment,
}
-struct HTLCOutput { //TODO: Refactor into Outbound/InboundHTLCOutput (will save memory and fewer panics)
- outbound: bool, // ie to an HTLC-Timeout transaction
+struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
htlc_id: u64,
amount_msat: u64,
cltv_expiry: u32,
payment_hash: [u8; 32],
- state: HTLCState,
- /// If we're in a Remote* removed state, set if they failed, otherwise None
+ state: OutboundHTLCState,
+ source: HTLCSource,
+ /// If we're in a removed state, set if they failed, otherwise None
fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>,
- /// If we're in LocalRemoved*, set to true if we fulfilled the HTLC, and can claim money
- local_removed_fulfilled: bool,
- /// state pre-committed Remote* implies pending_forward_state, otherwise it must be None
- pending_forward_state: Option<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>,
}
-impl HTLCOutput {
- fn get_in_commitment(&self, offered: bool) -> HTLCOutputInCommitment {
+macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
+ ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
HTLCOutputInCommitment {
- offered: offered,
- amount_msat: self.amount_msat,
- cltv_expiry: self.cltv_expiry,
- payment_hash: self.payment_hash,
+ offered: $offered,
+ amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
+ cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
+ payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
transaction_output_index: 0
}
}
amount_msat: u64,
cltv_expiry: u32,
payment_hash: [u8; 32],
+ source: HTLCSource,
onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
time_created: Instant, //TODO: Some kind of timeout thing-a-majig
},
ClaimHTLC {
payment_preimage: [u8; 32],
- payment_hash: [u8; 32], // Only here for effecient duplicate detection
+ htlc_id: u64,
},
FailHTLC {
- payment_hash: [u8; 32],
+ htlc_id: u64,
err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
},
}
+/// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
+/// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
+/// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
+/// move on to ChannelFunded.
+/// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
+/// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
+/// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
enum ChannelState {
/// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
OurInitSent = (1 << 0),
/// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
OurFundingLocked = (1 << 5),
ChannelFunded = 64,
+ /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
+ /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
+ /// dance.
+ PeerDisconnected = (1 << 7),
/// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
/// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
/// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
/// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
/// later.
/// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
- AwaitingRemoteRevoke = (1 << 7),
+ AwaitingRemoteRevoke = (1 << 8),
/// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
/// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
/// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
- RemoteShutdownSent = (1 << 8),
+ RemoteShutdownSent = (1 << 9),
/// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
/// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
/// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
/// us their shutdown.
- LocalShutdownSent = (1 << 9),
+ LocalShutdownSent = (1 << 10),
/// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
/// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
- ShutdownComplete = (1 << 10),
+ ShutdownComplete = 2048,
}
const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32);
+const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
+
// TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
// has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
// calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
// inbound channel.
-pub struct Channel {
+pub(super) struct Channel {
user_id: u64,
channel_id: [u8; 32],
channel_state: u32,
channel_outbound: bool,
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1,
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
announce_publicly: bool,
channel_value_satoshis: u64,
cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
- pending_htlcs: Vec<HTLCOutput>,
+ pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
+ pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
next_local_htlc_id: u64,
next_remote_htlc_id: u64,
their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
//implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: our_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
- their_funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
- their_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
- their_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
- their_delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
- their_htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
- their_cur_commitment_point: PublicKey,
+ their_funding_pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
+ their_revocation_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
+ their_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
+ their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
+ their_htlc_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
+ their_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
their_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
their_node_id: PublicKey,
pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = (1 << 24);
macro_rules! secp_call {
- ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
+ ( $res: expr, $err: expr, $chan_id: expr ) => {
match $res {
Ok(key) => key,
- //TODO: make the error a parameter
- Err(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: $err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })})
+ Err(_) => return Err(HandleError {err: $err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {channel_id: $chan_id, data: $err.to_string()}})})
}
};
}
macro_rules! secp_derived_key {
- ( $res: expr ) => {
- secp_call!($res, "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters")
+ ( $res: expr, $chan_id: expr ) => {
+ secp_call!($res, "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters", $chan_id)
}
}
impl Channel {
}
fn derive_minimum_depth(_channel_value_satoshis_msat: u64, _value_to_self_msat: u64) -> u32 {
+ // Note that in order to comply with BOLT 7 announcement_signatures requirements this must
+ // be at least 6.
const CONF_TARGET: u32 = 12; //TODO: Should be much higher
CONF_TARGET
}
let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.channel_monitor_claim_key).unwrap().serialize());
+ let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
let our_channel_monitor_claim_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script();
let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key,
- &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key).unwrap(),
+ &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
&chan_keys.htlc_base_key,
BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, our_channel_monitor_claim_script);
channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
local_keys: chan_keys,
- cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: (1 << 48) - 1,
- cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: (1 << 48) - 1,
+ cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+ cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
- pending_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
next_local_htlc_id: 0,
next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
their_to_self_delay: 0,
their_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
- their_funding_pubkey: PublicKey::new(),
- their_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::new(),
- their_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::new(),
- their_delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::new(),
- their_htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::new(),
- their_cur_commitment_point: PublicKey::new(),
+ their_funding_pubkey: None,
+ their_revocation_basepoint: None,
+ their_payment_basepoint: None,
+ their_delayed_payment_basepoint: None,
+ their_htlc_basepoint: None,
+ their_cur_commitment_point: None,
their_prev_commitment_point: None,
their_node_id: their_node_id,
let their_announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
if require_announce && !their_announce {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer tried to open unannounced channel, but we require public ones", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) });
+ return_error_message!("Peer tried to open unannounced channel, but we require public ones");
}
if !allow_announce && their_announce {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer tried to open announced channel, but we require private ones", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) });
+ return_error_message!("Peer tried to open announced channel, but we require private ones");
}
let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
}
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.channel_monitor_claim_key).unwrap().serialize());
+ let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
let our_channel_monitor_claim_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script();
let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key,
- &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key).unwrap(),
+ &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
&chan_keys.htlc_base_key,
BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, our_channel_monitor_claim_script);
- channel_monitor.set_their_htlc_base_key(&msg.htlc_basepoint);
+ channel_monitor.set_their_base_keys(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
channel_monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(msg.to_self_delay);
let mut chan = Channel {
announce_publicly: their_announce,
local_keys: chan_keys,
- cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: (1 << 48) - 1,
- cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: (1 << 48) - 1,
+ cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+ cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
- pending_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
next_local_htlc_id: 0,
next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
their_to_self_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
their_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
- their_funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
- their_revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
- their_payment_basepoint: msg.payment_basepoint,
- their_delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- their_htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint,
- their_cur_commitment_point: msg.first_per_commitment_point,
+ their_funding_pubkey: Some(msg.funding_pubkey),
+ their_revocation_basepoint: Some(msg.revocation_basepoint),
+ their_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.payment_basepoint),
+ their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
+ their_htlc_basepoint: Some(msg.htlc_basepoint),
+ their_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
their_prev_commitment_point: None,
their_node_id: their_node_id,
fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self) -> u64 {
let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- let our_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key).unwrap();
+ let our_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);
if self.channel_outbound {
sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
- sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.serialize());
+ sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
} else {
- sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.serialize());
+ sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
}
let mut res = [0; 32];
/// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
#[inline]
fn build_commitment_transaction(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool) -> (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) {
- let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ (0xffffffffffff - commitment_number);
+ let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
let txins = {
let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
ins.push(TxIn {
- prev_hash: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().txid,
- prev_index: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().index as u32,
+ previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3*8) as u32),
witness: Vec::new(),
ins
};
- let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_htlcs.len() + 2);
+ let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() + 2);
let dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.our_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.their_dust_limit_satoshis };
let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
- for ref htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter() {
- let include = match htlc.state {
- HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced => !generated_by_local,
- HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => !generated_by_local,
- HTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke => true,
- HTLCState::LocalAnnounced => generated_by_local,
- HTLCState::Committed => true,
- HTLCState::RemoteRemoved => generated_by_local,
- HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => generated_by_local,
- HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => false,
- HTLCState::LocalRemoved => !generated_by_local,
- HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment => false,
- };
-
- if include {
- if htlc.outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (self.feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
- let htlc_in_tx = htlc.get_in_commitment(true);
+ macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
+ ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr) => {
+ if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
+ if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (self.feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
+ let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
txouts.push((TxOut {
script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
- value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000
+ value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
}, Some(htlc_in_tx)));
}
} else {
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (self.feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
- let htlc_in_tx = htlc.get_in_commitment(false);
+ if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (self.feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
+ let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
txouts.push((TxOut { // "received HTLC output"
script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
- value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000
+ value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
}, Some(htlc_in_tx)));
}
- };
- if htlc.outbound {
- local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
- } else {
- remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
}
+ }
+ }
+
+ for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ let include = match htlc.state {
+ InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced => !generated_by_local,
+ InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => !generated_by_local,
+ InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke => true,
+ InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
+ InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved => !generated_by_local,
+ };
+
+ if include {
+ add_htlc_output!(htlc, false);
+ remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ } else {
+ match htlc.state {
+ InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved => {
+ if generated_by_local && htlc.local_removed_fulfilled {
+ value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
+ }
+ },
+ _ => {},
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ let include = match htlc.state {
+ OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced => generated_by_local,
+ OutboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
+ OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved => generated_by_local,
+ OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => generated_by_local,
+ OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => false,
+ };
+
+ if include {
+ add_htlc_output!(htlc, true);
+ local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
} else {
match htlc.state {
- HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove|HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => {
+ OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => {
if htlc.fail_reason.is_none() {
value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
}
},
- HTLCState::RemoteRemoved => {
+ OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved => {
if !generated_by_local && htlc.fail_reason.is_none() {
value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
}
},
- HTLCState::LocalRemoved => {
- if generated_by_local && htlc.local_removed_fulfilled {
- value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
- }
- },
- HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment => {
- assert!(htlc.local_removed_fulfilled);
- value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
- },
_ => {},
}
}
#[inline]
fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
- let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.channel_close_key).unwrap().serialize());
+ let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.channel_close_key).serialize());
Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
}
let txins = {
let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
ins.push(TxIn {
- prev_hash: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().txid,
- prev_index: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().index as u32,
+ previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: 0xffffffff,
witness: Vec::new(),
ins
};
- assert!(self.pending_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
/// The result is a transaction which we can revoke ownership of (ie a "local" transaction)
/// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
fn build_local_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, HandleError> {
- let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(commitment_number)).unwrap();
- let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key).unwrap();
- let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key).unwrap();
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(commitment_number));
+ let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
+ let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
- Ok(secp_derived_key!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &self.their_revocation_basepoint, &self.their_payment_basepoint, &self.their_htlc_basepoint)))
+ Ok(secp_derived_key!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &self.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()), self.channel_id()))
}
#[inline]
fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, HandleError> {
//TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
//may see payments to it!
- let payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key).unwrap();
- let revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key).unwrap();
- let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key).unwrap();
+ let payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);
+ let revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key);
+ let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
- Ok(secp_derived_key!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point, &self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint, &self.their_htlc_basepoint, &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint)))
+ Ok(secp_derived_key!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap(), &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint), self.channel_id()))
}
/// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
/// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
+ /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
- let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap().serialize();
- let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.serialize();
+ let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize();
+ let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.expect("get_funding_redeemscript only allowed after accept_channel").serialize();
if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
- let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap();
+ let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
- let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap().serialize();
- let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.serialize();
+ let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize();
+ let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize();
if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.into_vec());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.into_bytes());
our_sig
}
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
- let our_htlc_key = secp_derived_key!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key));
+ let our_htlc_key = secp_derived_key!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), self.channel_id());
let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
- let is_local_tx = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key).unwrap() == keys.a_htlc_key;
- Ok((htlc_redeemscript, self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key).unwrap(), is_local_tx))
+ let is_local_tx = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key) == keys.a_htlc_key;
+ Ok((htlc_redeemscript, self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key), is_local_tx))
}
/// Signs a transaction created by build_htlc_transaction. If the transaction is an
tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().to_vec());
}
- tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.into_vec());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.into_bytes());
Ok(our_sig)
}
- fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, payment_preimage_arg: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), HandleError> {
+ /// May return an IgnoreError, but should not, and will always return Ok(_) when
+ /// debug_assertions are turned on
+ fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), HandleError> {
// Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it wont bet unset) or there is no way any
// caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
// incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
sha.result(&mut payment_hash_calc);
let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
- for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
- if !htlc.outbound && htlc.payment_hash == payment_hash_calc {
- if pending_idx != std::usize::MAX {
- panic!("Duplicate HTLC payment_hash, ChannelManager should have prevented this!");
+ for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
+ if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
+ assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
+ if htlc.state != InboundHTLCState::Committed {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
+ // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
}
pending_idx = idx;
+ break;
}
}
if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", action: None});
+ debug_assert!(false, "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID");
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
}
// Now update local state:
// can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
self.channel_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash_calc, &payment_preimage_arg);
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
match pending_update {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, .. } => {
- if payment_preimage_arg == *payment_preimage {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
+ if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC we already had a pending fulfill for");
return Ok((None, None));
}
},
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
- if payment_hash_calc == *payment_hash {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", action: None});
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
+ if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC we already had a holding-cell failure on");
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
}
},
_ => {}
}
}
self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
- payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, payment_hash: payment_hash_calc,
+ payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
});
return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
}
- let htlc_id = {
- let htlc = &mut self.pending_htlcs[pending_idx];
- if htlc.state == HTLCState::Committed {
- htlc.state = HTLCState::LocalRemoved;
- htlc.local_removed_fulfilled = true;
- } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced || htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce || htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {
- // Theoretically we can hit this if we get the preimage on an HTLC prior to us
- // having forwarded it to anyone. This implies that the sender is busted as someone
- // else knows the preimage, but handling this case and implementing the logic to
- // take their money would be a lot of (never-tested) code to handle a case that
- // hopefully never happens. Instead, we make sure we get the preimage into the
- // channel_monitor and pretend we didn't just see the preimage.
+ {
+ let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
+ if htlc.state != InboundHTLCState::Committed {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
- } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemoved || htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", action: None});
- } else {
- panic!("Have an inbound HTLC when not awaiting remote revoke that had a garbage state");
}
- htlc.htlc_id
- };
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved;
+ htlc.local_removed_fulfilled = true;
+ }
Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- htlc_id: htlc_id,
+ htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
}), Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())))
}
- pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), HandleError> {
- match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(payment_preimage)? {
+ pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), HandleError> {
+ match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage)? {
(Some(update_fulfill_htlc), _) => {
let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
}
}
- pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, payment_hash_arg: &[u8; 32], err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, HandleError> {
+ /// May return an IgnoreError, but should not, and will always return Ok(_) when
+ /// debug_assertions are turned on
+ pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, HandleError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
+ panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
}
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
+ let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
+ for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
+ if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
+ if htlc.state != InboundHTLCState::Committed {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to fail before it was fully committed to");
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
+ }
+ pending_idx = idx;
+ }
+ }
+ if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID");
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
+ }
+
// Now update local state:
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
match pending_update {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
- if *payment_hash_arg == *payment_hash {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", action: None});
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
+ if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID");
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
}
},
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
- if *payment_hash_arg == *payment_hash {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
+ if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that we already had a pending failure for");
return Ok(None);
}
},
}
}
self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
- payment_hash: payment_hash_arg.clone(),
+ htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
err_packet,
});
return Ok(None);
}
- let mut htlc_id = 0;
- let mut htlc_amount_msat = 0;
- for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- if !htlc.outbound && htlc.payment_hash == *payment_hash_arg {
- if htlc_id != 0 {
- panic!("Duplicate HTLC payment_hash, you probably re-used payment preimages, NEVER DO THIS!");
- }
- htlc_id = htlc.htlc_id;
- htlc_amount_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
- if htlc.state == HTLCState::Committed {
- htlc.state = HTLCState::LocalRemoved;
- } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced {
- panic!("Somehow forwarded HTLC prior to remote revocation!");
- } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemoved || htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", action: None});
- } else {
- panic!("Have an inbound HTLC when not awaiting remote revoke that had a garbage state");
- }
- }
- }
- if htlc_amount_msat == 0 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", action: None});
+ {
+ let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved;
+ htlc.local_removed_fulfilled = false;
}
Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- htlc_id,
+ htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
reason: err_packet
}))
}
- pub fn get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, HandleError> {
- match self.get_update_fail_htlc(payment_hash, err_packet)? {
+ pub fn get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, HandleError> {
+ match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet)? {
Some(update_fail_htlc) => {
let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
Ok(Some((update_fail_htlc, commitment, monitor_update)))
// max_accepted_htlcs too small
// dust_limit_satoshis too small
- self.channel_monitor.set_their_htlc_base_key(&msg.htlc_basepoint);
+ self.channel_monitor.set_their_base_keys(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
self.their_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
self.their_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
self.their_to_self_delay = msg.to_self_delay;
self.their_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
- self.their_funding_pubkey = msg.funding_pubkey;
- self.their_revocation_basepoint = msg.revocation_basepoint;
- self.their_payment_basepoint = msg.payment_basepoint;
- self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint = msg.delayed_payment_basepoint;
- self.their_htlc_basepoint = msg.htlc_basepoint;
- self.their_cur_commitment_point = msg.first_per_commitment_point;
+ self.their_funding_pubkey = Some(msg.funding_pubkey);
+ self.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(msg.revocation_basepoint);
+ self.their_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.payment_basepoint);
+ self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
+ self.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(msg.htlc_basepoint);
+ self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
let obscure_factor = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
self.channel_monitor.set_commitment_obscure_factor(obscure_factor);
fn funding_created_signature(&mut self, sig: &Signature) -> Result<(Transaction, Signature), HandleError> {
let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
- let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false).0;
- let remote_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
-
let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
let local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false).0;
let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
// They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
- secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, &self.their_funding_pubkey), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer");
+ secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer", self.channel_id());
+
+ let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
+ let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false).0;
+ let remote_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
// We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
- Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap()))
+ Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key)))
}
pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
if self.channel_outbound {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_created for an outbound channel?", action: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_created for an outbound channel?", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {channel_id: self.channel_id, data: "Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_string()}})});
}
if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_created after we got the channel!", action: None});
- }
- if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) || self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != (1 << 48) - 1 || self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != (1 << 48) - 1 {
+ // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
+ // remember the channel, so its safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
+ // channel.
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_created after we got the channel!", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {channel_id: self.channel_id, data: "Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_string()}})});
+ }
+ if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
+ self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
+ self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
}
if self.channel_state != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_signed in strange state!", action: None});
}
- if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) || self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != (1 << 48) - 2 || self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != (1 << 48) - 1 {
+ if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
+ self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 ||
+ self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
}
let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
// They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
- secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey), "Invalid funding_signed signature from peer");
+ secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_signed signature from peer", self.channel_id());
self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_initial_commitment_tx, &msg.signature);
self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx.clone(), local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
}
pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
+ }
let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK);
if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
} else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK);
self.channel_update_count += 1;
+ } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
+ // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
+ self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
+ self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
+ if self.their_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point", action: None});
+ }
+ // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
+ return Ok(());
} else {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time", action: None});
}
- self.their_prev_commitment_point = Some(self.their_cur_commitment_point);
- self.their_cur_commitment_point = msg.next_per_commitment_point;
+ self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
+ self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
Ok(())
}
/// totals, though there is little reason to outside of further avoiding any race condition
/// issues.
fn get_pending_htlc_stats(&self, for_remote_update_check: bool) -> (u32, u32, u64, u64) {
+ //TODO: Can probably split this into inbound/outbound
let mut inbound_htlc_count: u32 = 0;
let mut outbound_htlc_count: u32 = 0;
let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
- for ref htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter() {
+ for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
match htlc.state {
- HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced => {},
- HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {},
- HTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke => {},
- HTLCState::LocalAnnounced => { if for_remote_update_check { continue; } },
- HTLCState::Committed => {},
- HTLCState::RemoteRemoved => { if for_remote_update_check { continue; } },
- HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => { if for_remote_update_check { continue; } },
- HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => { if for_remote_update_check { continue; } },
- HTLCState::LocalRemoved => {},
- HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment => { if for_remote_update_check { continue; } },
+ InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced => {},
+ InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {},
+ InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke => {},
+ InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
+ InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved => {},
}
- if !htlc.outbound {
- inbound_htlc_count += 1;
- htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
- } else {
- outbound_htlc_count += 1;
- htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ inbound_htlc_count += 1;
+ htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ }
+ for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ match htlc.state {
+ OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced => { if for_remote_update_check { continue; } },
+ OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
+ OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved => { if for_remote_update_check { continue; } },
+ OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => { if for_remote_update_check { continue; } },
+ OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => { if for_remote_update_check { continue; } },
}
+ outbound_htlc_count += 1;
+ htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
}
+
(inbound_htlc_count, outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
}
- pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingForwardHTLCInfo) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingHTLCStatus) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
}
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
+ }
if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel", action: None});
}
// Now update local state:
self.next_remote_htlc_id += 1;
- self.pending_htlcs.push(HTLCOutput {
- outbound: false,
+ self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
- state: HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced,
- fail_reason: None,
+ state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced,
local_removed_fulfilled: false,
pending_forward_state: Some(pending_forward_state),
});
/// Removes an outbound HTLC which has been commitment_signed by the remote end
#[inline]
- fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<[u8; 32]>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
- for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- if htlc.outbound && htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
+ fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<[u8; 32]>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, HandleError> {
+ for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
match check_preimage {
None => {},
Some(payment_hash) =>
return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to fulfill HTLC with an incorrect preimage", action: None});
}
};
- if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalAnnounced {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to fulfill HTLC before it had been committed", action: None});
- } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::Committed {
- htlc.state = HTLCState::RemoteRemoved;
- htlc.fail_reason = fail_reason;
- } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove || htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke || htlc.state == HTLCState::RemoteRemoved {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to fulfill HTLC that they'd already fulfilled", action: None});
- } else {
- panic!("Got a non-outbound state on an outbound HTLC");
+ match htlc.state {
+ OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced =>
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to fulfill HTLC before it had been committed", action: None}),
+ OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
+ htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved;
+ htlc.fail_reason = fail_reason;
+ },
+ OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved =>
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to fulfill HTLC that they'd already fulfilled", action: None}),
}
- return Ok(htlc.payment_hash.clone());
+ return Ok(&htlc.source);
}
}
Err(HandleError{err: "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find", action: None})
}
- pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<&HTLCSource, HandleError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
}
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
+ }
let mut sha = Sha256::new();
sha.input(&msg.payment_preimage);
let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
- self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None)?;
- Ok(())
+ self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None)
}
- pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
+ pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<&HTLCSource, HandleError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
}
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
+ }
self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))
}
- pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc<'a>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<&HTLCSource, HandleError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
}
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
+ }
- self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
- Ok(())
+ self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))
}
pub fn commitment_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
}
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
+ }
let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
let mut local_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false);
let local_commitment_txid = local_commitment_tx.0.txid();
let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&local_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
- secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey), "Invalid commitment tx signature from peer");
+ secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid commitment tx signature from peer", self.channel_id());
if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != local_commitment_tx.1.len() {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Got wrong number of HTLC signatures from remote", action: None});
let mut htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&local_commitment_txid, htlc, true, &local_keys);
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &local_keys);
let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
- secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key), "Invalid HTLC tx siganture from peer");
+ secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key), "Invalid HTLC tx siganture from peer", self.channel_id());
let htlc_sig = if htlc.offered {
let htlc_sig = self.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &None, htlc, &local_keys)?;
new_local_commitment_txn.push(htlc_tx);
htlcs_and_sigs.push(((*htlc).clone(), msg.htlc_signatures[idx], htlc_sig));
}
- let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number - 1)).unwrap();
+ let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number - 1));
let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_commitment_tx.0, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_and_sigs);
let mut need_our_commitment = false;
- for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- if htlc.state == HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced {
- htlc.state = HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
+ for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ if htlc.state == InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced {
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
need_our_commitment = true;
- } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::RemoteRemoved {
- htlc.state = HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove;
+ }
+ }
+ for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ if htlc.state == OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {
+ htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove;
need_our_commitment = true;
}
}
- // Finally delete all the LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment HTLCs
- // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
- let mut claimed_value_msat = 0;
- self.pending_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
- if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment {
- claimed_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
- false
- } else { true }
- });
- self.value_to_self_msat += claimed_value_msat;
self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
self.last_local_commitment_txn = new_local_commitment_txn;
self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
} else {
match &htlc_update {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
- match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
+ match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
Err(e) => {
err = Some(e);
}
}
},
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { payment_preimage, .. } => {
- match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(payment_preimage) {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
+ match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
Ok(update_fulfill_msg_option) => update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.0.unwrap()),
Err(e) => {
- err = Some(e);
+ if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {}
+ else {
+ panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
+ }
}
}
},
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { payment_hash, ref err_packet } => {
- match self.get_update_fail_htlc(&payment_hash, err_packet.clone()) {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
+ match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
Err(e) => {
- err = Some(e);
+ if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {}
+ else {
+ panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
+ }
}
}
},
//fail it back the route, if its a temporary issue we can ignore it...
match err {
None => {
+ if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() {
+ // This should never actually happen and indicates we got some Errs back
+ // from update_fulfill_htlc/update_fail_htlc, but we handle it anyway in
+ // case there is some strange way to hit duplicate HTLC removes.
+ return Ok(None);
+ }
let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
Ok(Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
update_add_htlcs,
update_fulfill_htlcs,
update_fail_htlcs,
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
commitment_signed,
}, monitor_update)))
},
/// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
/// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
/// revoke_and_ack message.
- pub fn revoke_and_ack(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>, Vec<([u8; 32], HTLCFailReason)>, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
+ pub fn revoke_and_ack(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32], HTLCFailReason)>, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
}
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
+ }
if let Some(their_prev_commitment_point) = self.their_prev_commitment_point {
- if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret")).unwrap() != their_prev_commitment_point {
+ if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret", self.channel_id())) != their_prev_commitment_point {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey", action: None});
}
}
// OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
// channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
- self.their_prev_commitment_point = Some(self.their_cur_commitment_point);
- self.their_cur_commitment_point = msg.next_per_commitment_point;
+ self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
+ self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
+ let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
+ let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
let mut require_commitment = false;
let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
// We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
- self.pending_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
- if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemoved {
- if htlc.local_removed_fulfilled { true } else { false }
- } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {
+ self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
+ if htlc.state == InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved {
+ if htlc.local_removed_fulfilled {
+ value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
+ }
+ false
+ } else { true }
+ });
+ self.pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
+ if htlc.state == OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {
if let Some(reason) = htlc.fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
- revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.payment_hash, reason));
+ revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
} else {
// They fulfilled, so we sent them money
value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
false
} else { true }
});
- for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalAnnounced {
- htlc.state = HTLCState::Committed;
- } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
- htlc.state = HTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke;
+ for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ if htlc.state == InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke;
require_commitment = true;
- } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {
- htlc.state = HTLCState::Committed;
- to_forward_infos.push(htlc.pending_forward_state.take().unwrap());
- } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {
- htlc.state = HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke;
+ } else if htlc.state == InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {
+ match htlc.pending_forward_state.take().unwrap() {
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved;
+ require_commitment = true;
+ match fail_msg {
+ HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => update_fail_htlcs.push(msg),
+ HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg),
+ }
+ },
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
+ to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ if htlc.state == OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {
+ htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
+ } else if htlc.state == OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {
+ htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke;
require_commitment = true;
- } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemoved {
- assert!(htlc.local_removed_fulfilled);
- htlc.state = HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment;
}
}
self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs()? {
- Some(commitment_update) => {
+ Some(mut commitment_update) => {
+ commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
+ for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
+ }
+ commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
+ for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
+ }
Ok((Some(commitment_update.0), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, commitment_update.1))
},
None => {
Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs,
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
commitment_signed
}), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, monitor_update))
} else {
}
}
+ /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
+ /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
+ /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
+ /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
+ /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
+ /// completed.
+ pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&mut self) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])> {
+ let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
+
+ assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
+ if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ return outbound_drops;
+ }
+
+ let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
+ self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
+ match htlc.state {
+ InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced => {
+ // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
+ // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
+ // this HTLC accordingly
+ inbound_drop_count += 1;
+ false
+ },
+ InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke => {
+ // Same goes for AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove and AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke
+ // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
+ // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
+ // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
+ true
+ },
+ InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
+ InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved => { // Same goes for LocalAnnounced
+ // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
+ // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
+ // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
+ // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
+ true
+ },
+ }
+ });
+
+ for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ if htlc.state == OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {
+ // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
+ // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
+ // the update upon reconnection.
+ htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
+ }
+ }
+
+ self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
+ match htlc_update {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
+ outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
+ false
+ },
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
+ }
+ });
+ self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
+ log_debug!(self, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ outbound_drops
+ }
+
pub fn update_fee(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
if self.channel_outbound {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee", action: None});
}
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
+ }
Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
self.channel_update_count += 1;
self.feerate_per_kw = msg.feerate_per_kw as u64;
Ok(())
}
- pub fn shutdown(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<[u8; 32]>), HandleError> {
+ /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
+ /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
+ pub fn channel_reestablish(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), HandleError> {
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
+ }
+
+ if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 || msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
+ msg.next_remote_commitment_number == 0 || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer send garbage channel_reestablish", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer send garbage channel_reestablish".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
+ }
+
+ // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
+ // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
+ self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
+
+ let mut required_revoke = None;
+ if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
+ // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
+ // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
+ } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
+ let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number));
+ let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
+ required_revoke = Some(msgs::RevokeAndACK {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ per_commitment_secret,
+ next_per_commitment_point,
+ });
+ } else {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
+ }
+
+ if msg.next_local_commitment_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number {
+ if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
+ log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with no lost commitment txn", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && msg.next_remote_commitment_number == 1 {
+ let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
+ return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+ }), None, None, None));
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
+ // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
+ // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
+ // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
+ // now!
+ match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs() {
+ Err(e) => {
+ if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(_)}) = &e.action {
+ } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: _}) = &e.action {
+ } else {
+ panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs");
+ }
+ return Err(e);
+ },
+ Ok(Some((commitment_update, channel_monitor))) => return Ok((None, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(channel_monitor))),
+ Ok(None) => return Ok((None, required_revoke, None, None)),
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Ok((None, required_revoke, None, None));
+ }
+ } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number {
+ return Ok((None, required_revoke,
+ Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update().expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
+ }), None));
+ } else {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub fn shutdown(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>), HandleError> {
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
+ }
if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
self.channel_update_count += 1;
return Ok((None, None, Vec::new()));
}
- for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter() {
- if htlc.state == HTLCState::RemoteAnnounced {
+ for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if htlc.state == InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs", action: None});
}
}
let our_closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
- let (proposed_feerate, proposed_fee, our_sig) = if self.channel_outbound && self.pending_htlcs.is_empty() {
+ let (proposed_feerate, proposed_fee, our_sig) = if self.channel_outbound && self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
- (Some(proposed_feerate), Some(total_fee_satoshis), Some(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap()))
+ (Some(proposed_feerate), Some(total_fee_satoshis), Some(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key)))
} else { (None, None, None) };
// From here on out, we may not fail!
let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
match htlc_update {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
- dropped_outbound_htlcs.push(payment_hash.clone());
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
+ dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
false
},
_ => true
}
});
- for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter() {
- if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalAnnounced {
+ for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if htlc.state == OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {
return Ok((None, None, dropped_outbound_htlcs));
}
}
self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
self.channel_update_count += 1;
- if self.pending_htlcs.is_empty() && self.channel_outbound {
+ if self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.channel_outbound {
// There are no more HTLCs and we're the funder, this means we start the closing_signed
// dance with an initial fee proposal!
self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate.unwrap(), proposed_fee.unwrap()));
if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown", action: None});
}
- if !self.pending_htlcs.is_empty() {
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: msgs::ErrorMessage{data: "Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_string(), channel_id: msg.channel_id}})});
+ }
+ if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs", action: None});
}
if msg.fee_satoshis > 21000000 * 10000000 {
}
let mut sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
- match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey) {
+ match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()) {
Ok(_) => {},
Err(_e) => {
// The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
// limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
- secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer");
+ secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer", self.channel_id());
},
};
let closing_tx_max_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000, false);
sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
- let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap();
+ let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee));
return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
self.channel_value_satoshis
}
+ //TODO: Testing purpose only, should be changed in another way after #81
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub fn get_local_keys(&self) -> &ChannelKeys {
+ &self.local_keys
+ }
+
/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
pub fn get_channel_update_count(&self) -> u32 {
self.channel_update_count
res as u32
}
+ /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
+ pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
+ self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
+ }
+
/// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
/// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
- self.is_usable()
+ self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
}
/// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
//a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
if need_commitment_update {
let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
- let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret).unwrap();
+ let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
return Ok(Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
if tx.txid() == self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().txid {
let txo_idx = self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().index as usize;
if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
- tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
+ tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
+ if self.channel_outbound {
+ // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
+ // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
+ // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
+ // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
+ // channel and move on.
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
+ }
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
self.channel_update_count += 1;
return Err(HandleError{err: "funding tx had wrong script/value", action: Some(ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: None})});
// Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
// something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
- pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: Sha256dHash, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, APIError> {
+ pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: Sha256dHash, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
if !self.channel_outbound {
panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
}
panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
}
- if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != (1 << 48) - 1 {
+ if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
}
let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
- Ok(msgs::OpenChannel {
+ msgs::OpenChannel {
chain_hash: chain_hash,
temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
feerate_per_kw: fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) as u32,
to_self_delay: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
- funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap(),
- revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key).unwrap(),
- payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key).unwrap(),
- delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key).unwrap(),
- htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key).unwrap(),
- first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret).unwrap(),
+ funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
+ revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
+ payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key),
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
+ htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
+ first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
channel_flags: if self.announce_publicly {1} else {0},
shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
- })
+ }
}
- pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
+ pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
if self.channel_outbound {
panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
}
if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
}
- if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != (1 << 48) - 1 {
+ if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
}
let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
- Ok(msgs::AcceptChannel {
+ msgs::AcceptChannel {
temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
minimum_depth: Channel::derive_minimum_depth(self.channel_value_satoshis*1000, self.value_to_self_msat),
to_self_delay: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
- funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap(),
- revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key).unwrap(),
- payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key).unwrap(),
- delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key).unwrap(),
- htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key).unwrap(),
- first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret).unwrap(),
+ funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
+ revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
+ payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key),
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
+ htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
+ first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
- })
+ }
}
fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self) -> Result<(Signature, Transaction), HandleError> {
let remote_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
// We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
- Ok((self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap(), remote_initial_commitment_tx))
+ Ok((self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key), remote_initial_commitment_tx))
}
/// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
}
- if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) || self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != (1 << 48) - 1 || self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != (1 << 48) - 1 {
+ if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
+ self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
+ self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
}
/// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
/// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
- /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions. Should be used
+ /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
/// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
- /// Note that you can get an announcement for a channel which is closing, though you should
- /// likely not announce such a thing. In case its already been announced, a channel_update
- /// message can mark the channel disabled.
+ /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
+ /// closing).
+ /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
+ /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: Sha256dHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), HandleError> {
if !self.announce_publicly {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel is not available for public announcements", action: None});
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel is not available for public announcements", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
}
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked", action: None});
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
}
let were_node_one = our_node_id.serialize()[..] < self.their_node_id.serialize()[..];
- let our_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap();
+ let our_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
node_id_1: if were_node_one { our_node_id } else { self.get_their_node_id() },
node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_their_node_id() } else { our_node_id },
- bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_key } else { self.their_funding_pubkey },
- bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.their_funding_pubkey } else { our_bitcoin_key },
+ bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_key } else { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() },
+ bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() } else { our_bitcoin_key },
+ excess_data: Vec::new(),
};
let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
- let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap();
+ let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
Ok((msg, sig))
}
+ /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
+ /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
+ pub fn get_channel_reestablish(&self) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish {
+ assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
+ msgs::ChannelReestablish {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
+ next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number,
+ data_loss_protect: None,
+ }
+ }
+
// Send stuff to our remote peers:
/// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
/// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
/// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
- pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: [u8; 32], cltv_expiry: u32, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, HandleError> {
+ /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
+ pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: [u8; 32], cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, HandleError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down", action: None});
}
return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value", action: None});
}
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
+ // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
+ // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
+ // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
+ // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
+ // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
+ // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)});
+ }
+
let (_, outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_pending_htlc_stats(false);
if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.their_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs", action: None});
amount_msat: amount_msat,
payment_hash: payment_hash,
cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
+ source,
onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
time_created: Instant::now(),
});
return Ok(None);
}
- self.pending_htlcs.push(HTLCOutput {
- outbound: true,
+ self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
amount_msat: amount_msat,
payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
- state: HTLCState::LocalAnnounced,
+ state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced,
+ source,
fail_reason: None,
- local_removed_fulfilled: false,
- pending_forward_state: None
});
let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
}
/// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
+ /// Always returns a Channel-failing HandleError::action if an immediately-preceding (read: the
+ /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
+ /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
pub fn send_commitment(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established", action: None});
+ panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
}
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment", action: None});
+ panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
+ }
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
+ panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
}
let mut have_updates = false; // TODO initialize with "have we sent a fee update?"
- for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter() {
- if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalAnnounced {
+ for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if htlc.state == OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {
have_updates = true;
}
if have_updates { break; }
}
if !have_updates {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send", action: None});
+ panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
}
self.send_commitment_no_status_check()
}
/// Only fails in case of bad keys
fn send_commitment_no_status_check(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
- let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
-
// We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
// fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
// is acceptable.
- for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- if htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
- htlc.state = HTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke;
- } else if htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {
- htlc.state = HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke;
+ for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ if htlc.state == InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke;
+ }
+ }
+ for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ if htlc.state == OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {
+ htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke;
}
}
+ match self.send_commitment_no_state_update() {
+ Ok((res, remote_commitment_tx)) => {
+ // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_commitment_tx.0, remote_commitment_tx.1, self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number);
+ self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
+ Ok((res, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
+ },
+ Err(e) => Err(e),
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
+ /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
+ fn send_commitment_no_state_update(&self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>)), HandleError> {
+ let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
+
let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
let remote_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, true);
let remote_commitment_txid = remote_commitment_tx.0.txid();
let remote_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&remote_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
- let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key).unwrap();
+ let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
let mut htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&remote_commitment_txid, htlc, false, &remote_keys);
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &remote_keys);
let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
- let our_htlc_key = secp_derived_key!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &remote_keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key));
- htlc_sigs.push(self.secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &our_htlc_key).unwrap());
+ let our_htlc_key = secp_derived_key!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &remote_keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), self.channel_id());
+ htlc_sigs.push(self.secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &our_htlc_key));
}
- // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
- self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_commitment_tx.0, remote_commitment_tx.1, self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number);
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
-
Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
signature: our_sig,
htlc_signatures: htlc_sigs,
- }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
+ }, remote_commitment_tx))
}
/// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
/// to send to the remote peer in one go.
/// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
/// more info.
- pub fn send_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: [u8; 32], cltv_expiry: u32, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, HandleError> {
- match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, onion_routing_packet)? {
+ pub fn send_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: [u8; 32], cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, HandleError> {
+ match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
Some(update_add_htlc) => {
let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
/// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
/// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
- pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<[u8; 32]>), HandleError> {
- for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.iter() {
- if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalAnnounced {
+ pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>), HandleError> {
+ for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if htlc.state == OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs, call send_commitment first", action: None});
}
}
return Err(HandleError{err: "Shutdown already in progress", action: None});
}
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected, maybe force-close instead?", action: None});
+ }
let our_closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
match htlc_update {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
- dropped_outbound_htlcs.push(payment_hash.clone());
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
+ dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
false
},
_ => true
/// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
/// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
/// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
- pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<[u8; 32]>) {
+ pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>) {
assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
// We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
match htlc_update {
- HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { payment_hash, .. } => {
- dropped_outbound_htlcs.push(payment_hash);
+ HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
+ dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
},
_ => {}
}
}
- for htlc in self.pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
- if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalAnnounced {
- dropped_outbound_htlcs.push(htlc.payment_hash);
- }
+ for _htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
//TODO: Do something with the remaining HTLCs
//(we need to have the ChannelManager monitor them so we can claim the inbound HTLCs
//which correspond)
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
use hex;
- use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,HTLCOutput,HTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
+ use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
+ use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
use ln::chan_utils;
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
commitment_seed: [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
};
- assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.funding_key).unwrap().serialize()[..],
+ assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.funding_key).serialize()[..],
hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
- let mut chan = Channel::new_outbound(&feeest, chan_keys, PublicKey::new(), 10000000, 100000, false, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
+ let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
+ let mut chan = Channel::new_outbound(&feeest, chan_keys, their_node_id, 10000000, 100000, false, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
chan.their_to_self_delay = 144;
chan.our_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
let funding_info = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), 0);
chan.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_info, Script::new()));
- chan.their_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(chan.their_payment_basepoint.serialize()[..],
+ chan.their_payment_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
+ assert_eq!(chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
- chan.their_funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(chan.their_funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
+ chan.their_funding_pubkey = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
+ assert_eq!(chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize()[..],
hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
- chan.their_htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(chan.their_htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
+ chan.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
+ assert_eq!(chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
- chan.their_revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ chan.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
// We can't just use build_local_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
// derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
// build_commitment_transaction.
- let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key).unwrap();
+ let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret).unwrap();
- let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key).unwrap();
- let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &chan.their_revocation_basepoint, &chan.their_payment_basepoint, &chan.their_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
+ let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
+ let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &chan.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()).unwrap();
let mut unsigned_tx: (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>);
unsigned_tx = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false);
let their_signature = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&unsigned_tx.0).sighash_all(&unsigned_tx.0.input[0], &chan.get_funding_redeemscript(), chan.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
- secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, &chan.their_funding_pubkey).unwrap();
+ secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, &chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()).unwrap();
chan.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut unsigned_tx.0, &their_signature);
"02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014ccf1af2f2aabee14bb40fa3851ab2301de84311054a56a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022051b75c73198c6deee1a875871c3961832909acd297c6b908d59e3319e5185a46022055c419379c5051a78d00dbbce11b5b664a0c22815fbcc6fcef6b1937c383693901483045022100f51d2e566a70ba740fc5d8c0f07b9b93d2ed741c3c0860c613173de7d39e7968022041376d520e9c0e1ad52248ddf4b22e12be8763007df977253ef45a4ca3bdb7c001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220");
}
- chan.pending_htlcs.push({
- let mut out = HTLCOutput{
+ chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
+ let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
htlc_id: 0,
- outbound: false,
amount_msat: 1000000,
cltv_expiry: 500,
payment_hash: [0; 32],
- state: HTLCState::Committed,
- fail_reason: None,
+ state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
local_removed_fulfilled: false,
pending_forward_state: None,
};
sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
out
});
- chan.pending_htlcs.push({
- let mut out = HTLCOutput{
+ chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
+ let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
htlc_id: 1,
- outbound: false,
amount_msat: 2000000,
cltv_expiry: 501,
payment_hash: [0; 32],
- state: HTLCState::Committed,
- fail_reason: None,
+ state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
local_removed_fulfilled: false,
pending_forward_state: None,
};
sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
out
});
- chan.pending_htlcs.push({
- let mut out = HTLCOutput{
+ chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
+ let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
htlc_id: 2,
- outbound: true,
amount_msat: 2000000,
cltv_expiry: 502,
payment_hash: [0; 32],
- state: HTLCState::Committed,
+ state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
+ source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
fail_reason: None,
- local_removed_fulfilled: false,
- pending_forward_state: None,
};
let mut sha = Sha256::new();
sha.input(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap());
sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
out
});
- chan.pending_htlcs.push({
- let mut out = HTLCOutput{
+ chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
+ let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
htlc_id: 3,
- outbound: true,
amount_msat: 3000000,
cltv_expiry: 503,
payment_hash: [0; 32],
- state: HTLCState::Committed,
+ state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
+ source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
fail_reason: None,
- local_removed_fulfilled: false,
- pending_forward_state: None,
};
let mut sha = Sha256::new();
sha.input(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap());
sha.result(&mut out.payment_hash);
out
});
- chan.pending_htlcs.push({
- let mut out = HTLCOutput{
+ chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
+ let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
htlc_id: 4,
- outbound: false,
amount_msat: 4000000,
cltv_expiry: 504,
payment_hash: [0; 32],
- state: HTLCState::Committed,
- fail_reason: None,
+ state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
local_removed_fulfilled: false,
pending_forward_state: None,
};
let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).unwrap();
+ let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
- let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret).unwrap();
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],