use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
+use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
use bitcoin::util::bip143;
use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Encodable, Decodable};
use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
Committed,
/// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
/// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
- RemoteRemoved,
+ RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
/// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
/// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
/// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
/// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
/// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
- AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove,
+ AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
/// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
/// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
/// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
/// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
/// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
- AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke,
+ AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
}
struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
state: OutboundHTLCState,
source: HTLCSource,
- /// If we're in a removed state, set if they failed, otherwise None
- fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>,
}
/// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
- OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
- OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
- OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
+ OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
+ OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
+ OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
};
if include {
} else {
log_trace!(self, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
match htlc.state {
- OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => {
- if htlc.fail_reason.is_none() {
- value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
- }
+ OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
+ value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
},
- OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved => {
- if !generated_by_local && htlc.fail_reason.is_none() {
+ OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
+ if !generated_by_local {
value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
}
},
}
}
-
let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
- let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat - remote_htlc_total_msat) as i64 - value_to_self_msat_offset;
+ assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
+ // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
+ // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
+ // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
+ // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
+ let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
+ assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
{
}, None));
}
- transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts);
+ transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |a, b| {
+ if let &Some(ref a_htlc) = a {
+ if let &Some(ref b_htlc) = b {
+ a_htlc.0.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlc.0.cltv_expiry)
+ // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison
+ // here for fuzztarget mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency
+ // may fail)!
+ .then(a_htlc.0.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlc.0.payment_hash.0))
+ // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we
+ // close the channel due to mismatches - they're doing something dumb:
+ } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
+ } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
+ });
let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
let mut htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len() + included_dust_htlcs.len());
}, ()));
}
- transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts);
+ transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
for out in txouts.drain(..) {
// Check our_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
// the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
// something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
- if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat + self.value_to_self_msat > (self.channel_value_satoshis - Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)) * 1000 {
+ // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
+ // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
+ // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
+ // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
+ // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
+ // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
+ // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
+ // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
+ // transaction).
+ let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
+ for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
+ removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
+ removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ }
+ }
+ if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat + self.value_to_self_msat > (self.channel_value_satoshis - Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)) * 1000 + removed_outbound_total_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"));
}
if self.next_remote_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed")),
OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
- htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved;
- htlc.fail_reason = fail_reason;
+ htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
},
- OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved =>
+ OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC that they'd already fulfilled/failed")),
}
return Ok(&htlc.source);
}
}
for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved = htlc.state {
- htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove;
+ if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
+ Some(fail_reason.take())
+ } else { None } {
+ htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
need_our_commitment = true;
}
}
fn free_holding_cell_htlcs(&mut self) -> Result<Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
+ log_trace!(self, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
+
let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
} else { true }
});
pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
- if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke = htlc.state {
+ if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
- if let Some(reason) = htlc.fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
+ if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
} else {
// They fulfilled, so we sent them money
if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
- } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove = htlc.state {
+ }
+ if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
+ Some(fail_reason.take())
+ } else { None } {
log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
- htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke;
+ htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
require_commitment = true;
}
}
self.next_remote_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved = htlc.state {
+ if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
// They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
// commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
// the update upon reconnection.
excess_data: Vec::new(),
};
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
+ let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
Ok((msg, sig))
cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
source,
- fail_reason: None,
});
let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
}
}
for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove = htlc.state {
- htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke;
+ if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
+ Some(fail_reason.take())
+ } else { None } {
+ htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
}
}
htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
htlc.source.write(writer)?;
- write_option!(htlc.fail_reason);
match &htlc.state {
&OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
0u8.write(writer)?;
&OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
1u8.write(writer)?;
},
- &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved => {
+ &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
2u8.write(writer)?;
+ write_option!(*fail_reason);
},
- &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => {
+ &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
3u8.write(writer)?;
+ write_option!(*fail_reason);
},
- &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => {
+ &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4u8.write(writer)?;
+ write_option!(*fail_reason);
},
}
}
cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
source: Readable::read(reader)?,
- fail_reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
- 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved,
- 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove,
- 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke,
+ 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
},
});
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
- use bitcoin::util::hash::{Sha256dHash, Hash160};
use bitcoin::util::bip143;
use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
use hex;
use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
use std::sync::Arc;
fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
+ let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
}
payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
- fail_reason: None,
};
out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
out
payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
- fail_reason: None,
};
out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
out
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff