use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
-use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
-use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
+use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
+
+use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
+use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
-use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
+use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
use util::config::UserConfig;
use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
-use util::sha2::Sha256;
use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
use util::logger::Logger;
use util::errors::APIError;
+use util::errors;
use crypto;
-use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
-use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
-use crypto::digest::Digest;
use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
use std::{cmp, ptr, mem};
mod channel_held_info {
use ln::msgs;
use ln::router::Route;
+ use ln::channelmanager::PaymentHash;
use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
/// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
- pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
+ pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
}
/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
- #[derive(Clone)]
+ #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
}
/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
- #[derive(Clone)]
+ #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
pub enum HTLCSource {
PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
OutboundRoute {
}
pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
+/// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
+#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
+pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
+/// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
+#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
+pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
+
+type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
+
+/// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
+/// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
+/// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
+/// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
+/// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
+
struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
err: msgs::HandleError,
- needs_channel_force_close: bool,
+ shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
}
impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
#[inline]
},
}),
},
- needs_channel_force_close: false,
+ shutdown_finish: None,
}
}
#[inline]
- fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
+ fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
+ Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
+ }
+ #[inline]
+ fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
Self {
err: HandleError {
err,
},
}),
},
- needs_channel_force_close: true,
+ shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
}
}
#[inline]
- fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
- Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
- }
- #[inline]
- fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
- Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
- }
- #[inline]
fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
Self {
err: match err {
}),
},
},
- needs_channel_force_close: false,
- }
- }
- #[inline]
- fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
- Self {
- err: match err {
- ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
- err: msg,
- action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
- },
- ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
- err: msg,
- action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
- msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
- channel_id,
- data: msg.to_string()
- },
- }),
- },
- },
- needs_channel_force_close: true,
+ shutdown_finish: None,
}
}
}
-/// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
-/// after a PaymentReceived event.
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
-pub enum PaymentFailReason {
- /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
- PreimageUnknown,
- /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
- AmountMismatch,
-}
-
/// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
/// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
/// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
/// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
/// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
/// go to read them!
- claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
+ claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
/// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
/// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
- claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
+ claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
}
impl ChannelHolder {
/// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
/// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
/// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
-const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
+const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
-// Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
-// if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
-// HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
-// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
+// Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS +
+// HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY, ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
+// HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it
+// backwards ourselves before hitting the CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel
+// on-chain to time out the HTLC.
#[deny(const_err)]
#[allow(dead_code)]
-const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
+const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY;
// Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
// ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
pub user_id: u64,
}
+macro_rules! handle_error {
+ ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
+ match $internal {
+ Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
+ Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
+ if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
+ $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
+ if let Some(update) = update_option {
+ let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ Err(err)
+ },
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
+ ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
+ match $res {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
+ break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
+ },
+ Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
+ log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
+ let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
+ if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
+ $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ }
+ break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
+ },
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
+ ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
+ match $res {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
+ },
+ Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
+ log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
+ let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
+ if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
+ $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ }
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
+ },
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
+ ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
+ return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
+ };
+ ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
+ if $action_type != RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst { panic!("Bad return_monitor_err call!"); }
+ return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $raa_first_dropped_cs)
+ };
+ ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
+ return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, false)
+ };
+ ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
+ match $err {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
+ let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
+ if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
+ $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ }
+ // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
+ // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
+ // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
+ // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
+ // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
+ // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
+ // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
+ // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
+ // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
+ },
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
+ $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $raa_first_dropped_cs);
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()));
+ },
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+// Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
+macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
+ ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
+ match $err {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
+ let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
+ if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
+ $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ }
+ break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
+ },
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
+ $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), false);
+ },
+ }
+ }
+}
+
impl ChannelManager {
/// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
///
}
};
for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
- // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
}
let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
}
#[inline]
- fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
+ fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
+ log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
- // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
}
for tx in local_txn {
self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
}
- //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
- //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
- //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
- //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
- //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
- //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
- //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
}
/// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
return;
}
};
+ log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
}
}
- fn handle_monitor_update_fail(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, channel_id: &[u8; 32], err: ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, reason: RAACommitmentOrder) {
- match err {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
- let mut chan = {
- let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
- let chan = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
- if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
- channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
- chan
- };
- mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
- self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
- }
- },
- ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
- let channel = channel_state_lock.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
- channel.monitor_update_failed(reason);
- },
- }
- }
-
#[inline]
fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
({
- let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
- let mut res = [0; 32];
- hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
- res
+ Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
},
{
- let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
- let mut res = [0; 32];
- hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
- res
+ Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
})
}
#[inline]
fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
- let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
- let mut res = [0; 32];
- hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
- res
+ Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
}
#[inline]
fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
- let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
- let mut res = [0; 32];
- hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
- res
+ Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
}
// can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
for hop in route.hops.iter() {
let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
- let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
- sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
+ let blinding_factor = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
}
const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
- fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
+ fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &PaymentHash) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
buf.resize(21*65, 0);
packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
}
- let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.mu);
hmac.input(&packet_data);
- hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
- hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
+ hmac.input(&associated_data.0[..]);
+ hmac_res = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
}
msgs::OnionPacket{
pad: pad,
};
- let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&um);
hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
- hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
+ packet.hmac = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
packet
}
}
fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
- macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
- () => {
+ macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
+ ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
{
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
- let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
- sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
- onion_hash
+ log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
+ return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+ sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
+ failure_code: $err_code,
+ })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
}
}
}
if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
- log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
- return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
- channel_id: msg.channel_id,
- htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
- sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
- failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
- })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
+ return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
}
let shared_secret = {
};
let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
+ if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
+ //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
+ //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
+ //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
+ //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
+ //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
+ //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
+ return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
+ }
+
+
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
+ hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
+ hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
+ if !crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
+ return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
+ }
+
let mut channel_state = None;
macro_rules! return_err {
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
}
}
- if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
- //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
- //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
- //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
- //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
- //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
- //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
- return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
- }
-
- let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
- hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
- hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
- if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
- return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
- }
-
let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
let next_hop_data = {
let mut decoded = [0; 65];
let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
let blinding_factor = {
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
sha.input(&shared_secret);
- let mut res = [0u8; 32];
- sha.result(&mut res);
- match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
- Err(_) => {
- return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
- },
- Ok(key) => key
- }
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()).expect("SHA-256 is broken?")
};
- if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
- return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
- }
+ let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
+ Err(e)
+ } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
version: 0,
- public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
+ public_key,
hop_data: new_packet_data,
hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
};
}
{
let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
- if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
- }
- else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
- }
if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
+ if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
+ }
+ else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
+ }
+ else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
+ }
res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
}
return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
/// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
///
/// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
- /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
- pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
+ /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
+ /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
+ /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
+ /// relevant updates.
+ ///
+ /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
+ /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
+ /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
+ /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
+ /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
+ pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
}
}
}
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
- let mut session_key = [0; 32];
- rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
- session_key
- }).expect("RNG is bad!");
+ let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
- None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
- Some(id) => id.clone(),
- };
+ let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let res = {
- let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
- if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
- return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
- }
- if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
- return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
- }
- if !chan.is_live() {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
- }
- chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
- route: route.clone(),
- session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
- first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
- }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: he.err})?
- };
- match res {
- Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
- if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
- self.handle_monitor_update_fail(channel_state, &id, e, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
- return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
- }
+ let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
+ None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
+ Some(id) => id.clone(),
+ };
+
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
+ match {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
+ return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
+ }
+ if !chan.get().is_live() {
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
+ }
+ break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
+ route: route.clone(),
+ session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
+ first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
+ }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
+ } {
+ Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
+ maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
+ // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
+ // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
+ // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
+ // something else in case we will resend later!
+ return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
+ }
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
- updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
- update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fee: None,
- commitment_signed,
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fee: None,
+ commitment_signed,
+ },
+ });
},
- });
+ None => {},
+ }
+ } else { unreachable!(); }
+ return Ok(());
+ };
+
+ match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
+ Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
+ Err(e) => {
+ if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
+ } else {
+ log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
+ action: e.action,
+ });
+ }
+ Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
},
- None => {},
}
-
- Ok(())
}
/// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
- Some(mut chan) => {
- match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
- Ok(funding_msg) => {
- (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
- },
- Err(e) => {
- log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
- action: e.action,
- });
- return;
- },
- }
+ let (res, chan) = {
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
+ Some(mut chan) => {
+ (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
+ .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
+ MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
+ } else { unreachable!(); })
+ , chan)
+ },
+ None => return
+ }
+ };
+ match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
+ Ok(funding_msg) => {
+ (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
+ },
+ Err(e) => {
+ log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
+ action: e.action,
+ });
+ return;
},
- None => return
}
};
// Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => {
- if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
- } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
- } else {
+ if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
}
//TODO: Handle...this is bad!
},
};
if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
- unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
+ unimplemented!();
}
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
events.append(&mut new_events);
}
- /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
- pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
+ /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
+ /// after a PaymentReceived event.
+ /// expected_value is the value you expected the payment to be for (not the amount it actually
+ /// was for from the PaymentReceived event).
+ pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, expected_value: u64) -> bool {
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
+ HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
+ HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(expected_value).to_vec() });
}
true
} else { false }
/// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
/// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
/// still-available channels.
- fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
+ fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
match source {
- HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
- if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
- let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
- if let Some(update) = channel_update {
- self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
- events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
- update,
+ match &onion_error {
+ &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
+#[cfg(test)]
+ let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
+#[cfg(not(test))]
+ let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
+ // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
+ // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
+ // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
+ if let Some(update) = channel_update {
+ self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
+ events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
+ update,
+ }
+ );
+ }
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
+ events::Event::PaymentFailed {
+ payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
+ rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
+#[cfg(test)]
+ error_code: onion_error_code
+ }
+ );
+ },
+ &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
+#[cfg(test)]
+ ref failure_code,
+ .. } => {
+ // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
+ // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
+ // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
+ // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
+ // ChannelDetails.
+ // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
+ // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
+ events::Event::PaymentFailed {
+ payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
+ rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
+#[cfg(test)]
+ error_code: Some(*failure_code),
}
);
}
- self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
- payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
- rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
- });
- } else {
- panic!("should have onion error packet here");
}
},
HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
let err_packet = match onion_error {
HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
},
HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built ErrorPacket", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
}
};
/// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
///
/// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
- pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&payment_preimage);
- let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
- sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
+ pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
+ let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
true
} else { false }
}
- fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
+ fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
match source {
HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
match e {
ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
+ // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
+ // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
+ // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
+ // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
+ // on-chain confirmations.
+ // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once its merged a test
+ // should be written.
if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
- Some(chan) => {
- if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
//TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
}
- chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration)
- .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
- (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration), channel_state, chan);
+ (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
},
//TODO: same as above
- None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
}
};
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
}
fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
//TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
}
- match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
- Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
- (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
- },
- Err(e) => {
- return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
- }
- }
+ (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
}
fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
- Some(chan) => {
- if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
//TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
+ let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
unimplemented!();
}
- (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id())
+ (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
},
- None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
}
};
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
- match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
- Some(chan) => {
- if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
//TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- chan.funding_locked(&msg)
- .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
- if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan) {
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
+ if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
msg: announcement_sigs,
}
Ok(())
},
- None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
}
}
//TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
+ let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
}
};
for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
- // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
}
if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
//TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- let (closing_signed, tx) = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
+ let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
- match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
- Some(chan) => {
- if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
//TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- if !chan.is_usable() {
+ if !chan.get().is_usable() {
// If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
// but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
// want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
+ let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
channel_id: msg.channel_id,
htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
- reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap().encode_with_len()[..]),
+ reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
+ // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
+ // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
+ // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
+ // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
+ // allowed.
+ ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
+ res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
+ res
+ }[..])
+ } else {
+ // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
+ // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
+ // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
+ // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
+ // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
+ ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
+ },
}));
}
}
- chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
},
- None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
}
+ Ok(())
}
fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
- Some(chan) => {
- if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
- //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
- }
- chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
- .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
- },
- None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let htlc_source = {
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ }
};
- self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
+ self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
Ok(())
}
// Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
// indicating that the payment itself failed
- fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
+ fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool, Option<u16>) {
if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
- macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
- ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
- log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
- };
- ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
- log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
- };
- }
-
- const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
- const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
- const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
let mut res = None;
let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
+ let mut error_code_ret = None;
+ let mut next_route_hop_ix = 0;
+ let mut is_from_final_node = false;
// Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
+ next_route_hop_ix += 1;
if res.is_some() { return; }
- let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
- let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
+ is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
- let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&um);
hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
- let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
- hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
- if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
- if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
- // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
- // definitely came from the peer in question
- res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
- } else {
- let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
-
- match error_code & 0xff {
- 1|2|3 => {
- // either from an intermediate or final node
- // invalid_realm(PERM|1),
- // temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
- // permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
- // required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
- res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
- node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
- is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
- }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
- // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
- // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
- // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
- return;
- },
- _ => {}
- }
+ if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &err_packet.hmac) {
+ if let Some(error_code_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(0..2) {
+ const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
+ const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
+ const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
- if is_from_final_node {
- let payment_retryable = match error_code {
- c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
- c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
- 17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
- 18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
- let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
- true
- },
- 19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
- let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
- true
- },
- _ => {
- // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
- // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
- // does not coform to the spec.
- // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
- res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
- node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
- is_permanent: true,
- }), false));
- return;
- }
- };
- res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
- return;
- }
+ let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&error_code_slice);
+ error_code_ret = Some(error_code);
- // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
- match error_code {
- _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
- res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
- short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
- is_permanent: true,
- }), false));
- },
- _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
- let offset = match error_code {
- c if c == UPDATE|7 => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
- c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
- c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
- c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
- c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
- c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
- _ => {
- // node sending unknown code
- res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
- node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
- is_permanent: true,
- }), false));
- return;
- }
- };
-
- if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
- let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
- if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
- if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
- // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
- // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
- let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
- c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
- false
- },
- c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
- let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
- onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
- incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
- },
- c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
- let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
- let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
- onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
- new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
- }
- c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
- let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
- onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
- route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
- },
- c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
- let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
- onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
- chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
- },
- c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
- _ => { unreachable!(); },
- };
-
- let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
- Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
- msg: chan_update,
- })
- };
- res = Some((msg, true));
- return;
- }
+ let (debug_field, debug_field_size) = errors::get_onion_debug_field(error_code);
+
+ // indicate that payment parameter has failed and no need to
+ // update Route object
+ let payment_failed = (match error_code & 0xff {
+ 15|16|17|18|19 => true,
+ _ => false,
+ } && is_from_final_node) // PERM bit observed below even this error is from the intermediate nodes
+ || error_code == 21; // Special case error 21 as the Route object is bogus, TODO: Maybe fail the node if the CLTV was reasonable?
+
+ let mut fail_channel_update = None;
+
+ if error_code & NODE == NODE {
+ fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: route_hop.pubkey, is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM });
+ }
+ else if error_code & PERM == PERM {
+ fail_channel_update = if payment_failed {None} else {Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
+ short_channel_id: route.hops[next_route_hop_ix - if next_route_hop_ix == route.hops.len() { 1 } else { 0 }].short_channel_id,
+ is_permanent: true,
+ })};
+ }
+ else if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE {
+ if let Some(update_len_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size+2..debug_field_size+4) {
+ let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&update_len_slice) as usize;
+ if let Some(update_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size + 4..debug_field_size + 4 + update_len) {
+ if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&update_slice)) {
+ // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
+ // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
+ let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code & 0xff {
+ 7 => false,
+ 11 => amt_to_forward > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat,
+ 12 => {
+ let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
+ new_fee.is_some() && route_hop.fee_msat >= new_fee.unwrap()
+ }
+ 13 => route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta,
+ 14 => false, // expiry_too_soon; always valid?
+ 20 => chan_update.contents.flags & 2 == 0,
+ _ => false, // unknown error code; take channel_update as valid
+ };
+ fail_channel_update = if is_chan_update_invalid {
+ // This probably indicates the node which forwarded
+ // to the node in question corrupted something.
+ Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
+ short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
+ is_permanent: true,
+ })
+ } else {
+ Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
+ msg: chan_update,
+ })
+ };
}
}
- },
- _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
- //TODO
- },
- 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
- res = Some((None, true));
- return;
}
- _ => {
- // node sending unknown code
- res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
+ if fail_channel_update.is_none() {
+ // They provided an UPDATE which was obviously bogus, not worth
+ // trying to relay through them anymore.
+ fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
is_permanent: true,
- }), false));
- return;
+ });
}
+ } else if !payment_failed {
+ // We can't understand their error messages and they failed to
+ // forward...they probably can't understand our forwards so its
+ // really not worth trying any further.
+ fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
+ node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
+ is_permanent: true,
+ });
+ }
+
+ // TODO: Here (and a few other places) we assume that BADONION errors
+ // are always "sourced" from the node previous to the one which failed
+ // to decode the onion.
+ res = Some((fail_channel_update, !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
+
+ let (description, title) = errors::get_onion_error_description(error_code);
+ if debug_field_size > 0 && err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + debug_field_size {
+ log_warn!(self, "Onion Error[{}({:#x}) {}({})] {}", title, error_code, debug_field, log_bytes!(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4+debug_field_size]), description);
+ }
+ else {
+ log_warn!(self, "Onion Error[{}({:#x})] {}", title, error_code, description);
}
+ } else {
+ // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
+ // definitely came from the peer in question
+ res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
+ node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
+ is_permanent: true,
+ }), !is_from_final_node));
}
}
}
}).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
- res.unwrap_or((None, true))
- } else { ((None, true)) }
+ if let Some((channel_update, payment_retryable)) = res {
+ (channel_update, payment_retryable, error_code_ret)
+ } else {
+ // only not set either packet unparseable or hmac does not match with any
+ // payment not retryable only when garbage is from the final node
+ (None, !is_from_final_node, None)
+ }
+ } else { unreachable!(); }
}
fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
- Some(chan) => {
- if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
//TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
- .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
},
- None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
- }?;
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ }
Ok(())
}
fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
- Some(chan) => {
- if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
//TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) != 0 {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION set", msg.channel_id));
+ if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
+ try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
}
- chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
- .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
Ok(())
},
- None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
}
}
fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
- match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
- Some(chan) => {
- if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
//TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
- if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
- unimplemented!();
+ let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
+ return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, commitment_signed.is_some());
+ //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
}
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
}
Ok(())
},
- None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
}
}
let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
- match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
- Some(chan) => {
- if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
//TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
- if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
- unimplemented!();
+ let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
+ return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, pending_forwards, pending_failures);
}
if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
msg,
});
}
- (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
+ (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
},
- None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
}
};
for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
}
fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
- Some(chan) => {
- if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
//TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
},
- None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
}
+ Ok(())
}
fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
- match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
- Some(chan) => {
- if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- if !chan.is_usable() {
+ if !chan.get().is_usable() {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
}
let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
- let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
- .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
+ let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
- let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
- secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
- secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
+ if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
+ self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
+ try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
+ }
let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
contents: announcement,
},
- update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
+ update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
});
},
- None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
}
Ok(())
}
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
- match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
- Some(chan) => {
- if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order, shutdown) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
- .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
+ let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
- if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
- unimplemented!();
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
+ // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
+ // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
+ // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
+ if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
+ order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
+ }
+ if commitment_update.is_none() {
+ order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
+ }
+ return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order);
+ //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
}
}
if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
}
Ok(())
},
- None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
}
}
#[doc(hidden)]
pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+ let their_node_id;
+ let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
- match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
- None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
- Some(chan) => {
- if !chan.is_outbound() {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
- }
- if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
- return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
- }
- if !chan.is_live() {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
- }
- if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
- if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
- unimplemented!();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
}
- channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
- updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fee: Some(update_fee),
- commitment_signed,
- },
+ if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
+ return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
+ }
+ if !chan.get().is_live() {
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
+ }
+ their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
+ if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
+ break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
+ {
+ if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
+ unimplemented!();
+ }
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fee: Some(update_fee),
+ commitment_signed,
+ },
+ });
+ }
+ },
+ }
+ return Ok(())
+ };
+
+ match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
+ Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
+ Err(e) => {
+ if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
+ } else {
+ log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: their_node_id,
+ action: e.action,
});
}
+ Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
},
}
- Ok(())
}
}
impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
+ // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
+ // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
+ // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
+ {
+ //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
+ for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
+ if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
+ log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
+ self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
let mut ret = Vec::new();
let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
+ // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
+ // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
+ // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
+ {
+ //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
+ for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
+ if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
+ log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
+ self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
let mut ret = Vec::new();
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
+ let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
+ log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
{
} else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
- action: e.action,
+ action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
});
- if channel.is_shutdown() {
- return false;
- }
+ return false;
}
if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
for tx in txn_matched {
for inp in tx.input.iter() {
if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
+ log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
}
self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
- *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
+ *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
}
/// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
}
}
-macro_rules! handle_error {
- ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
- match $internal {
- Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
- Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
- if needs_channel_force_close {
- match &err.action {
- &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
- if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
- $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
- } else {
- $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
- }
- },
- &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
- &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
- &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
- if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
- $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
- } else {
- $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
- }
- },
- &None => {},
- }
- }
- Err(err)
- },
- }
- }
-}
-
impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
//TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
if no_connection_possible {
+ log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
}
});
} else {
+ log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
//TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
}
fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
+ log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
+
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
use chain::chaininterface;
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface};
- use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
+ use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
use chain::keysinterface;
- use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason,RAACommitmentOrder};
+ use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
+ use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,OnionKeys,RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor};
+ use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
use ln::msgs;
- use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
+ use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler,HTLCFailChannelUpdate};
use util::test_utils;
use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
use util::errors::APIError;
use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, ReadableArgs};
use util::config::UserConfig;
- use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
+ use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
+ use bitcoin::util::bip143;
+ use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
+ use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ChildNumber, ExtendedPubKey, ExtendedPrivKey};
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
- use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType};
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
- use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
- use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
+
+ use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
use hex;
use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
- use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
- use crypto::digest::Digest;
-
use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
use std::cell::RefCell;
- use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
+ use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap, HashSet};
use std::default::Default;
use std::rc::Rc;
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
},
);
- let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
+ let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &PaymentHash([0x42; 32]));
// Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
// anyway...
assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
+ keys_manager: Arc<test_utils::TestKeysInterface>,
node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
router: Router,
node_seed: [u8; 32],
}
}
+ macro_rules! get_feerate {
+ ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
+ {
+ let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
+ chan.get_feerate()
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+
fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
}]};
- funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
+ funding_output = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
let as_update = match events_8[0] {
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
assert!(*announcement == *msg);
+ assert_eq!(update_msg.contents.short_channel_id, announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
+ assert_eq!(update_msg.contents.short_channel_id, bs_update.contents.short_channel_id);
update_msg
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
}
- fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
+ fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Transaction) {
let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
let (tx_a, tx_b);
assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
- (as_update, bs_update)
+ (as_update, bs_update, tx_a)
}
struct SendEvent {
_ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
}
}
+
+ fn from_node(node: &Node) -> SendEvent {
+ let mut events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap())
+ }
}
macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, false);
}
};
- ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */) => {
+ ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => {
{
let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
}
+ (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack)
+ }
+ };
+ ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => {
+ {
+ check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
+ assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
+ let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true);
+ assert!(extra_msg_option.is_none());
+ bs_revoke_and_ack
+ }
+ };
+ ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */) => {
+ {
+ let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true);
$node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
{
let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
($node: expr) => {
{
- let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
+ let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32]);
*$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
- let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
- sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
+ let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
(payment_preimage, payment_hash)
}
}
}
- fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
+ fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) {
let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
let mut payment_event = {
(our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
}
- fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
+ fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
}
}
- fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
+ fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
}
const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
- fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
+ fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) {
let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
}
- fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
- assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
+ fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) {
+ assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, 0));
check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
assert!(rejected_by_dest);
},
}
}
- fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
+ fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) {
fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
}
let mut nodes = Vec::new();
let mut rng = thread_rng();
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
- for _ in 0..node_count {
+ for i in 0..node_count {
+ let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", i)));
let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
let mut seed = [0; 32];
rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
- let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
+ let keys_manager = Arc::new(test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone()));
let mut config = UserConfig::new();
config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
let node = ChannelManager::new(Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config).unwrap();
let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
- nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, node_seed: seed,
+ nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, keys_manager, node_seed: seed,
network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
});
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
let channel_id = chan.2;
- macro_rules! get_feerate {
- ($node: expr) => {{
- let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
- chan.get_feerate()
- }}
- }
-
// balancing
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
// (6) RAA is delivered ->
// First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
- nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
let channel_id = chan.2;
- macro_rules! get_feerate {
- ($node: expr) => {{
- let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
- chan.get_feerate()
- }}
- }
-
// balancing
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
// First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
- nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
let channel_id = chan.2;
- macro_rules! get_feerate {
- ($node: expr) => {{
- let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
- chan.get_feerate()
- }}
- }
-
// A B
// update_fee/commitment_signed ->
// .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
// revoke_and_ack ->
// First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
- let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
+ let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
let channel_id = chan.2;
- macro_rules! get_feerate {
- ($node: expr) => {{
- let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
- chan.get_feerate()
- }}
- }
-
- let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
+ let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
+ nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+25).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
}
+ #[test]
+ fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let channel_value = 1888;
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000);
+ let channel_id = chan.2;
+
+ let feerate = 260;
+ nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
+
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
+
+ //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
+ //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
+ {
+ let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
+
+ //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
+ let num_htlcs = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len() - 2;
+ let total_fee: u64 = feerate * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
+ let mut actual_fee = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
+ actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
+ assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
+ } //drop the mutex
+
+ //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
+ //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
+ nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+2).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
+
+ //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
+ //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
+ //Should produce and error.
+ let err = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed).unwrap_err();
+
+ assert!(match err.err {
+ "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee" => true,
+ _ => false,
+ });
+
+ //clear the message we could not handle
+ nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ }
+
#[test]
fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
let mut nodes = create_network(2);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
let channel_id = chan.2;
- macro_rules! get_feerate {
- ($node: expr) => {{
- let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
- chan.get_feerate()
- }}
- }
-
// balancing
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
- let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
+ let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
let channel_id = chan.2;
- macro_rules! get_feerate {
- ($node: expr) => {{
- let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
- chan.get_feerate()
- }}
- }
-
// A B
// (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
// <- (2) revoke_and_ack
// revoke_and_ack ->
// Create and deliver (1)...
- let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
+ let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
- assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
+ assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
+ assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
}
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest } => {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
+ let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
+ let node_0_closing_signed = match msg_events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ (*msg).clone()
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ match msg_events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg }} => {
+ assert_eq!(msg.contents.short_channel_id, chan_1.0.contents.short_channel_id);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
}
- #[test]
- fn update_fee_async_shutdown() {
- // Test update_fee works after shutdown start if messages are delivered out-of-order
- let nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
-
- let starting_feerate = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().get_feerate();
- nodes[0].node.update_fee(chan_1.2.clone(), starting_feerate + 20).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fee.is_some());
-
- nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
- let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
- // Note that we don't actually test normative behavior here. The spec indicates we could
- // actually send a closing_signed here, but is kinda unclear and could possibly be amended
- // to require waiting on the full commitment dance before doing so (see
- // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/499). In any case, to avoid
- // ambiguity, we should wait until after the full commitment dance to send closing_signed.
- let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
- let node_0_closing_signed = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, true);
-
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), match node_0_closing_signed.unwrap() {
- MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- msg
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }).unwrap();
- let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
- let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
- }
-
fn do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(recv_count: u8) {
// Test that shutdown/closing_signed is re-sent on reconnect with a variable number of
// messages delivered prior to disconnect
false
} else { true }
});
- assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
+ assert!(res.len() == 2 || res.len() == 3);
+ if res.len() == 3 {
+ assert_eq!(res[1], res[2]);
+ }
}
assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
}}
}
- #[test]
- fn channel_reserve_test() {
+ fn do_channel_reserve_test(test_recv: bool) {
use util::rng;
use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
use ln::msgs::HandleError;
onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
};
- let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
- match err {
- HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
+ if test_recv {
+ let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
+ match err {
+ HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
+ }
+ // If we send a garbage message, the channel should get closed, making the rest of this test case fail.
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
+ let channel_close_broadcast = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(channel_close_broadcast.len(), 1);
+ match channel_close_broadcast[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ return;
}
}
assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
}
+ #[test]
+ fn channel_reserve_test() {
+ do_channel_reserve_test(false);
+ do_channel_reserve_test(true);
+ }
+
#[test]
fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
// Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_justice_tx() {
+ // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
+ let nodes = create_network(2);
// Create some new channels:
let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
// Revoke the old state
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
}
get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
- }
+
+ // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
+ // Create some new channels:
+ let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
+ // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
+ let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
+ // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
+ // Revoke the old state
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
+ {
+ let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
+
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+ node_txn.swap_remove(0);
+ }
+ test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
+
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
+ header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
+ test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone());
+ }
+ get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+ }
#[test]
fn revoked_output_claim() {
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
// node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
- let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
+ let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
// Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
//Revoke the old state
{
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
-
nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
-
nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
- assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
- assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
+ assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
+ assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
// Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
+ assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
// node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
// time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
- let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
+ let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
// Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
{
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
-
nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
-
nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
+
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
- assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
- assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
+ assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
+ assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
+ assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
}
#[test]
- fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
- // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
- // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
- let nodes = create_network(2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
+ // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
+ // ChainWatchInterface and pass the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
+ // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
+ // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
+ // First, C should claim the HTLC output via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
+ // commitment transaction was broadcast.
+ // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
+ // towards B.
+ // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
+ // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
+ // the HTLC output via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
+ // PaymentSent event).
- route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
- nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
- {
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
- assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- }
+ let nodes = create_network(3);
- let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
+ // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
+
+ let (our_payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
+
+ // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
+ // Broadcast HTLC Success transation by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
+ let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
+ nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
+
+ // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: node_txn}, 1);
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
{
- let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
- assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
+ let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
+ added_monitors.clear();
+ }
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ {
+ // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
+ // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transaction, as well as a
+ // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
+ assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
+ node_txn.clear();
+ }
+
+ // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
+ // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
+ let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone());
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success) * 2 (block-rescan)
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
+ assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
+ // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
+ // we already checked the same situation with A.
- // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
- // registering new transactions
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
+ // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
+ assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
}
#[test]
- fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
- // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
- let mut nodes = create_network(3);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+ fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
+ // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
+ // ChainWatchInterface and timeout the HTLC bacward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
+ // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
+ // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
+ // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
+ // \ \
+ // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
-
- let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ let nodes = create_network(3);
- let mut payment_event = {
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ // Create some intial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
- let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
- };
+ // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
+ let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
- let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
- match events_1[0] {
- Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
+ // Brodacast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
+ let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
+ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
+ {
+ let mut added_monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
+ added_monitors.clear();
+ }
+ let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
+ },
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
+ nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
- nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
- nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
-
- let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
- payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
- assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
-
+ // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output fron C's commitment tx on B's chain
+ // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
+ let timeout_tx;
+ {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 6 (HTLC-Timeout tx, commitment tx, timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[7]);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_2.3.clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ timeout_tx = node_txn[0].clone();
+ node_txn.clear();
+ }
+
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![timeout_tx]}, 1);
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
- let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
- // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
- // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
-
- nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
- let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
- match events_3[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
- assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
- },
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
-
- let tx = {
- let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
- // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
- // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
- node_txn.remove(0)
+ match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // Well... here we detect our own htlc_timeout_tx so no tx to be generated
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
+ // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
+ let commitment_tx = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone());
- let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
- assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
- match events_4[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
- assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
- },
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
-
- // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
- {
- let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
- monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
- .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
- }
- nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
- let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
-
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
+ let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (timeout tx) * 2 block-rescan
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
}
#[test]
- fn test_unconf_chan() {
- // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
- let nodes = create_network(2);
+ fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
+ // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
+ // and fail backward accordingly.
+
+ let nodes = create_network(3);
+
+ // Create some initial channels
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
- let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
- mem::drop(channel_state);
+ let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
+ // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ // Revoke the old state
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
- let mut headers = Vec::new();
- let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- headers.push(header.clone());
- for _i in 2..100 {
- header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- headers.push(header.clone());
- }
- while !headers.is_empty() {
- nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
- }
- {
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
- assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
- assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
- }
+ match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
- macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
- ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
- {
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
- for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
- if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
- res.push(msg.clone());
- } else {
- panic!("Unexpected event")
- }
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- res
- }
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
}
- macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
- ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
- {
- let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- let mut idx = 0;
- let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
- idx += 1;
- assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
- Some(msg.clone())
- } else {
- None
- };
+ fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool) {
+ // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
+ // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
+ // commitment transaction anymore.
+ // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
+ // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
+ // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
+ // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
+ // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
+ // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
+ // transactions:
+ // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
+ // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
+ // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
+ // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
+ // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3);
- let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
- let mut commitment_update = None;
- let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
- idx += 1;
- match ev {
- &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
- revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
- RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
- },
- &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
- commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
- RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- } else {
- RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
- };
+ // Create some initial channels
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
- if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
- match ev {
- &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
- revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
- },
- &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
- commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- }
+ let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
+ // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ // Revoke the old state
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
- (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
- }
+ let (_, first_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
+ let (_, second_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
+ let (_, third_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
+
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash, 0));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
+ // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
+
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash, 0));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
+ let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash, 0));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
+ // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
+ let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+
+ // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
+ // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
+ let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, fourth_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, fourth_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+
+ if deliver_bs_raa {
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
+ // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, one as we generate a commitment for
+ // nodes[0] to fail first_payment_hash backwards.
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
}
- }
- /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
- /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
- fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
- node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
- node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
+ let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
- for msg in reestablish_1 {
- node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
- resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
- check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
- } else {
- check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
+
+ if !deliver_bs_raa {
+ // If we delivered the RAA already then we already failed first_payment_hash backwards.
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
}
- let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
- for msg in reestablish_2 {
- node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
- resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 });
+ match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 0 }] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
- check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
- } else {
- check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
+ if deliver_bs_raa {
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
+ assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
+ assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
}
+ // Due to the way backwards-failing occurs we do the updates in two steps.
+ let updates = match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
- // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
- assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
- (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
- if pre_all_htlcs {
- node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
- let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
- assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
- if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
- //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
- } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
- }
- } else {
- assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
- }
- if pending_raa.0 {
- assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
- node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
- assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
- } else {
- assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
- }
- if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
- let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
- if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
- assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
- } else {
- assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- }
- assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
- assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
- assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
- node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
- }
- for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
- node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
+ if !deliver_bs_raa {
+ // If we delievered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
+ // that we should update our routing table for.
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
}
- for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
- node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
- commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
- } else {
- node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
- let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
- }
- } else {
- assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
+ bs_second_update
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
+ assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ for event in events {
+ match event {
+ MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
}
- for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
- if pre_all_htlcs {
- node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
- let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
- assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
- if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
- //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
- } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
- }
- } else {
- assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
- }
- if pending_raa.1 {
- assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
- node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
- assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
- } else {
- assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
+ assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
+ assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive() {
+ do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false);
+ do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
+ // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
+ // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
+ let nodes = create_network(2);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
+ {
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
+ assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
- let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
- if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
- assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
- }
- assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
- assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
- assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
- node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
- }
- for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
- node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
- }
- for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
- node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
- }
+ }
- if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
- commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
- } else {
- node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
- let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
- }
- } else {
- assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
+ let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
+
+ {
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
+ assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
}
+
+ // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
+ // registering new transactions
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
}
#[test]
- fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
- // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
- let nodes = create_network(3);
+ fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
+ // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
- let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
- let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
- fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
+ let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ let mut payment_event = {
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
- let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
- let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
- let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
+ };
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
- claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
- fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
+ let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
+ match events_1[0] {
+ Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
+ nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+
+ let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
+ payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
+ assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
+
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
+ // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
+ // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
+
+ nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
+ let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
+ match events_3[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
+ assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ let tx = {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
+ // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
+ // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+ node_txn.remove(0)
+ };
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
+
+ let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
+ assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
+ match events_4[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
+ assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
+ // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
{
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
+ .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
+ }
+ nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
+ let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
+
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_unconf_chan() {
+ // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
+ let nodes = create_network(2);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
+ let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
+ mem::drop(channel_state);
+
+ let mut headers = Vec::new();
+ let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ headers.push(header.clone());
+ for _i in 2..100 {
+ header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ headers.push(header.clone());
+ }
+ while !headers.is_empty() {
+ nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
+ }
+ {
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
+ assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- match events[1] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
- assert!(rejected_by_dest);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
+ ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
+ {
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
+ for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
+ if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
+ res.push(msg.clone());
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected event")
+ }
+ }
+ res
}
}
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
+ ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
+ {
+ let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ let mut idx = 0;
+ let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
+ idx += 1;
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
+ Some(msg.clone())
+ } else {
+ None
+ };
+
+ let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
+ let mut commitment_update = None;
+ let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
+ idx += 1;
+ match ev {
+ &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
+ revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
+ RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
+ },
+ &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
+ commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
+ RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ } else {
+ RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
+ };
+
+ if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
+ match ev {
+ &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
+ revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
+ },
+ &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
+ commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+
+ (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
+ /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
+ fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, send_funding_locked: (bool, bool), pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
+ node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
+ node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
+
+ if send_funding_locked.0 {
+ // If a expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack
+ // from b
+ for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() {
+ assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
+ }
+ }
+ if send_funding_locked.1 {
+ // If b expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack
+ // from a
+ for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() {
+ assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
+ }
+ }
+ if send_funding_locked.0 || send_funding_locked.1 {
+ // If we expect any funding_locked's, both sides better have set
+ // next_local_commitment_number to 1
+ for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() {
+ assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1);
+ }
+ for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() {
+ assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
+ for msg in reestablish_1 {
+ node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
+ resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
+ }
+ if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
+ check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
+ } else {
+ check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
+ }
+
+ let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
+ for msg in reestablish_2 {
+ node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
+ resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
+ }
+ if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
+ check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
+ } else {
+ check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
+ }
+
+ // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
+ assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
+ (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
+
+ for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
+ if send_funding_locked.0 {
+ node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
+ assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
+ if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
+ //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
+ } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
+ }
+ } else {
+ assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
+ }
+ if pending_raa.0 {
+ assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
+ node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
+ } else {
+ assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
+ }
+ if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
+ let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
+ if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
+ assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
+ } else {
+ assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ }
+ assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
+ assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
+ node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
+ }
+ for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
+ node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
+ }
+ for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
+ node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
+ }
+
+ if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
+ commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
+ } else {
+ node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
+ let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
+ }
+ } else {
+ assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
+ }
+ }
+
+ for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
+ if send_funding_locked.1 {
+ node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
+ assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
+ if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
+ //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
+ } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
+ }
+ } else {
+ assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
+ }
+ if pending_raa.1 {
+ assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
+ node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
+ } else {
+ assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
+ }
+ if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
+ let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
+ if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
+ assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
+ }
+ assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
+ assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
+ node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
+ }
+ for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
+ node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
+ }
+ for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
+ node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
+ }
+
+ if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
+ commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
+ } else {
+ node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
+ let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
+ }
+ } else {
+ assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
+ // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
+ let nodes = create_network(3);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+
+ let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
+ let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
+ fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+
+ let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
+ let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
+ let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
+ let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+
+ claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
+ fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
+
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
+ {
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
+ assert!(rejected_by_dest);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
+ fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
+ }
+
+ fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
+ // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2);
+ if messages_delivered == 0 {
+ create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
+ // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
+ } else {
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ }
+
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+
+ let payment_event = {
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
+ };
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
+
+ if messages_delivered < 2 {
+ // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
+ } else {
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ if messages_delivered >= 3 {
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ if messages_delivered >= 4 {
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ if messages_delivered >= 5 {
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ if messages_delivered >= 6 {
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ if messages_delivered < 3 {
+ // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
+ // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
+ // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
+ } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
+ // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
+ // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
+ } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
+ // Everything was delivered...
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ }
+
+ let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
+ match events_1[0] {
+ Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+
+ nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
+ nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+
+ let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
+ match events_2[0] {
+ Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
+ assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
+ let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+ (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ if messages_delivered >= 1 {
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
+
+ let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
+ match events_4[0] {
+ Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ if messages_delivered >= 2 {
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ if messages_delivered >= 3 {
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ if messages_delivered >= 4 {
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ if messages_delivered >= 5 {
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ if messages_delivered < 2 {
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
+ //if messages_delivered < 1 {
+ let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
+ match events_4[0] {
+ Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ //}
+ } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
+ // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
+ } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
+ // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
+ // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
+ } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
+ // Everything was delivered...
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ }
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+
+ // Channel should still work fine...
+ let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
+ do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
+ do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
+ do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
+ do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
+ do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
+ do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
+ do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
+ // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
+ let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
+ let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
+ match events_1[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
+ let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
+ match events_2[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events_2[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+
+ // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
+ // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
+
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
+ // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
+ // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
+ let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+
+ // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
+ match events_1[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
+ match events_2[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fee.is_none());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
+ match events_3[0] {
+ Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
+ assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
+ assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
+ assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
+ let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
+ let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
+
+ assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
+ assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
+
+ assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
+ assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
+
+ assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
+
+ assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
+ let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
+ match events_4[0] {
+ Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
+ nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+
+ let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
+ match events_5[0] {
+ Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
+ // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+
+ *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
+ if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
+ match events_1[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ match events_1[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, .. } => assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
+ // PaymentFailed event
+
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+ }
+
+ fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
+ // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
+ // a disconnect in between
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+
+ *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
+
+ if disconnect {
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ }
+
+ *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
+ let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+
+ let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
+ match events_3[0] {
+ Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
+ assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
+
+ // Now set it to failed again...
+ let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
+
+ if disconnect {
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ }
+
+ // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
+ *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
+ nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
+ match events_5[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
+ // PaymentFailed event
+
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
+ do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
+ do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
+ }
+
+ fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
+ let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
+
+ // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
+ // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
+ // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
+ // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
+ // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
+ // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
+ // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
+ // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
+ // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
+ // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
+ // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
+ // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
+ // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
+ // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
+ // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
+ // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
+ // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
+ let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+
+ // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+
+ *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
+
+ // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
+ // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
+ let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fee.is_none());
+
+ if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
+ match events_3[0] {
+ Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
+ assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
+ } else { panic!(); }
+ }
+
+ (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ }
+
+ // Now fix monitor updating...
+ *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
+ assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
+ assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
+ let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
+ let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
+
+ assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
+ assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
+
+ (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
+ } } }
+
+ let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
+ assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
+ assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
+ let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+ let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
+
+ assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
+ assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
+
+ assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
+ if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
+ assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
+
+ assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
+ assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
+ assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
+ } else {
+ assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
+ assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
+ assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
+
+ assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
+ match events_3[0] {
+ Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
+ assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
+ bs_resp.2 = None;
+ }
+
+ if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
+ let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
+
+ if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
+ assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
+ assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
+ }
+ assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
+ assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
+ }
+
+ (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
+ } else {
+ let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
+ (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ msg.clone()
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ })
+ };
+
+ assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
+ let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
+ let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
+
+ assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
+ assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
+
+ assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
+ assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
+ }
+
+ let as_commitment_update;
+ let bs_second_commitment_update;
+
+ macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ } }
+
+ macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ } }
+
+ if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
+ handle_bs_raa!();
+
+ if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
+ let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
+
+ assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
+ assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
+
+ assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
+ assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
+
+ assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
+ }
+
+ handle_initial_raa!();
+
+ if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
+ let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
+
+ assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
+ assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
+
+ assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
+ assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
+ }
+ } else {
+ handle_initial_raa!();
+
+ if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
+ let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
+
+ assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
+ assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
+
+ assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
+ assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
+
+ assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
+ }
+
+ handle_bs_raa!();
+
+ if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
+ let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
+
+ assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
+ assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
+
+ assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
+ assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
+ }
+ }
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+
+ let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
+ match events_5[0] {
+ Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
+ assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
+ }
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
- fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
+ #[test]
+ fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
+ do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
}
- fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
- // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
+ #[test]
+ fn test_monitor_update_fail_cs() {
+ // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming commitment_signed
let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- if messages_delivered == 0 {
- create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
- // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
- } else {
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- }
-
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
-
- let payment_event = {
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
- };
- assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- if messages_delivered < 2 {
- // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
- } else {
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- if messages_delivered >= 3 {
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- if messages_delivered >= 4 {
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg).unwrap_err() {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
+ } else { panic!(); }
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- if messages_delivered >= 5 {
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let responses = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(responses.len(), 2);
- if messages_delivered >= 6 {
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- }
- }
- }
- }
+ match responses[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, ref node_id } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
+ match responses[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, ref node_id } => {
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- if messages_delivered < 3 {
- // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
- // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
- // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
- } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
- // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
- // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
- } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
- // Everything was delivered...
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap_err() {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
+ } else { panic!(); }
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
- match events_1[0] {
+ *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &final_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
-
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
-
nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
- let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
- match events_2[0] {
- Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
+ events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, amt } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
+ };
- nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
+ }
- let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
- let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
- (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
- },
+ fn do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(test_ignore_second_cs: bool) {
+ // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming RAA
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+
+ // Rebalance a bit so that we can send backwards from 2 to 1.
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 5000000);
+
+ // Route a first payment that we'll fail backwards
+ let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
+
+ // Fail the payment backwards, failing the monitor update on nodes[1]'s receipt of the RAA
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1, 0));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+
+ let bs_revoke_and_ack = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
+
+ // While the second channel is AwaitingRAA, forward a second payment to get it into the
+ // holding cell.
+ let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let mut send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false);
+
+ let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
+ match events_1[0] {
+ Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
- if messages_delivered >= 1 {
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
+ nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
- match events_4[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
+ // Now fail monitor updating.
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
+ if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap_err() {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
+ } else { panic!(); }
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- if messages_delivered >= 2 {
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // Attempt to forward a third payment but fail due to the second channel being unavailable
+ // for forwarding.
- if messages_delivered >= 3 {
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let (_, payment_hash_3) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_3).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- if messages_delivered >= 4 {
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); // We succeed in updating the monitor for the first channel
+ send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
- if messages_delivered >= 5 {
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
+ let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
+ match events_2.remove(0) {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- if messages_delivered < 2 {
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
- //if messages_delivered < 1 {
- let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
- match events_4[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
+ match msg_events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg }} => {
+ assert_eq!(msg.contents.short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
+ assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2); // temp disabled
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- //}
- } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
- // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
- } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
- // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
- // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
- } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
- // Everything was delivered...
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- }
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } = events[0] {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
+ assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
+ } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
+ };
- // Channel should still work fine...
- let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
- }
+ let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = if test_ignore_second_cs {
+ // Try to route another payment backwards from 2 to make sure 1 holds off on responding
+ let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ let route = nodes[2].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_4).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+
+ send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg) {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
+ } else { panic!(); }
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ (Some(payment_preimage_4), Some(payment_hash_4))
+ } else { (None, None) };
+
+ // Restore monitor updating, ensuring we immediately get a fail-back update and a
+ // update_add update.
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
+
+ let mut events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ if test_ignore_second_cs {
+ assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 3);
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
+ }
- #[test]
- fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
- do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
- do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
- do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
- do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
- }
+ // Note that the ordering of the events for different nodes is non-prescriptive, though the
+ // ordering of the two events that both go to nodes[2] have to stay in the same order.
+ let messages_a = match events_3.pop().unwrap() {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, mut updates } => {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+ (updates.update_fail_htlcs.remove(0), updates.commitment_signed)
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
+ };
+ let raa = if test_ignore_second_cs {
+ match events_3.remove(1) {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ Some(msg.clone())
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ } else { None };
+ let send_event_b = SendEvent::from_event(events_3.remove(0));
+ assert_eq!(send_event_b.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
- #[test]
- fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
- do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
- do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
- do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
- }
+ // Now deliver the new messages...
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &messages_a.0).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], messages_a.1, false);
+ let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
+ if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } = events_4[0] {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
+ assert!(rejected_by_dest);
+ } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
+
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ if test_ignore_second_cs {
+ nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.commitment_msg).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(bs_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(bs_cs.update_fee.is_none());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(as_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_cs.update_fee.is_none());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
- #[test]
- fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
- // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
- let nodes = create_network(2);
- let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
+ nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ let bs_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
- let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
- match events_1[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ } else {
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], send_event_b.commitment_msg, false);
}
- confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
- let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
- match events_2[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- },
+ let events_5 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
+ match events_5[0] {
+ Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
+ };
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
+ nodes[2].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
- // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
- // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
+ let events_6 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
+ match events_6[0] {
+ Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => { assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2); },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
- }
+ if test_ignore_second_cs {
+ let events_7 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
+ match events_7[0] {
+ Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
- #[test]
- fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
- // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
- // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
+ nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+ send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
+ assert_eq!(send_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert_eq!(send_event.msgs.len(), 1);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], send_event.commitment_msg, false);
- // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ let events_8 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
+ match events_8[0] {
+ Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
+ nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
- let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
- match events_1[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ let events_9 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_9.len(), 1);
+ match events_9[0] {
+ Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_4.unwrap()),
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4.unwrap());
}
- assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
+ }
- let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
- match events_2[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fee.is_none());
+ #[test]
+ fn test_monitor_update_fail_raa() {
+ do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(false);
+ do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(true);
+ }
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
- match events_3[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
- assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
+ #[test]
+ fn test_monitor_update_fail_reestablish() {
+ // Simple test for message retransmission after monitor update failure on
+ // channel_reestablish generating a monitor update (which comes from freeing holding cell
+ // HTLCs).
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
+ let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
- assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
- assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
- let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
- nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
- let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
-
- assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
- assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
- assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
- assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
+ let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
+ if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap_err() {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
+ } else { panic!(); }
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
- let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ assert!(as_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
+ assert!(bs_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
+ nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
- match events_4[0] {
- Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
+ updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false);
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage),
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
+ }
+ }
- nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
- nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+ #[test]
+ fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
+ //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let nodes = create_network(2);
- let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
- match events_5[0] {
- Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
+
+ let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
+ let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
+
+ let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
+
+ let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
+ let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
+
+ let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
+ let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
+
+ let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
+
+ let mut chan_announcement;
+
+ macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
+ () => {
+ msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
+ features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
+ chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
+ short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
+ node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
+ node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
+ bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
+ bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
+ excess_data: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! sign_msg {
+ ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
+ let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
+ let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
+ let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
+ let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
+ let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
+ chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
+ node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
+ node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
+ bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
+ bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
+ contents: $unsigned_msg
+ }
+ }
}
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
+ sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
+ let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
+
+ // Configured with Network::Testnet
+ let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
+ unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
+ sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
+ assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
+
+ let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
+ unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
+ sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
+ assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
+ }
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
+ struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
+ impl Writer for VecWriter {
+ fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
+ Ok(())
+ }
+ fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
+ self.0.reserve_exact(size);
+ }
}
#[test]
- fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
- // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
+ fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
-
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
-
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
- if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
- match events_1[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
- // PaymentFailed event
+ let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
- }
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
- // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
- // a disconnect in between
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
+ let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
+ nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
+ let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
+ let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
+ assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
- if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
+ let config = UserConfig::new();
+ let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
+ let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
+ let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
+ channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
+ <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
+ default_config: config,
+ keys_manager,
+ fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
+ monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
+ chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
+ tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
+ logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
+ channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
+ }).unwrap()
+ };
+ assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
+ nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
+ let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc<ChainListener> = nodes[0].node.clone();
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener));
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
-
- if disconnect {
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- }
-
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
- let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
- assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
-
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
-
- let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
- match events_3[0] {
- Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
- assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
-
- // Now set it to failed again...
- let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
- if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
-
- if disconnect {
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- }
-
- // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
- nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
- match events_5[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
+ let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
+ for node in nodes.iter() {
+ assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
+ node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
+ node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
}
- // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
- // PaymentFailed event
-
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
}
#[test]
- fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
- do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
- do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
- }
-
- fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
- let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
-
- // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
- // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
- // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
- // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
- // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
- // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
- // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
- // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
- // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
- // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
- // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
- // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
- // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
- // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
- // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
- // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
- // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
+ fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
let mut nodes = create_network(2);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
-
- // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
-
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
- if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
+ let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
- // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
- // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
- assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
- let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fee.is_none());
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
- match events_3[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
- assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
+ let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
+ let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
+ nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
- if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
- assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
- } else { panic!(); }
- }
+ nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
+ let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
+ let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
+ assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
- (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
+ let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
+ let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
+ let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
+ channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
+ <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
+ default_config: UserConfig::new(),
+ keys_manager,
+ fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
+ monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
+ chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
+ tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
+ logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
+ channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
+ }).unwrap()
};
+ assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
- if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- }
-
- // Now fix monitor updating...
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
+ assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
+ nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
- assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
- assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
+ fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
+ }
- nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
- let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
- nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
- let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
+ #[test]
+ fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
+ // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with a out-of-date ChannelMonitor
+ let mut nodes = create_network(4);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
+ let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
- assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
- assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
+ let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
- (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
- } } }
+ // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
+ let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
- let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
- assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
- assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
+ // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
+ // nodes[3])
+ let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
+ for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
+ let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
+ monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
+ node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
+ }
- nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
- let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
- nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
- let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
+ let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
+ for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
+ let mut read = &serialized[..];
+ let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
+ assert!(read.is_empty());
+ node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
+ }
- assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
- assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
+ let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
+ let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
+ let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
+ default_config: UserConfig::new(),
+ keys_manager,
+ fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
+ monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
+ chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
+ tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
+ logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
+ channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(),
+ }).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
- if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
- assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
+ { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx
+ let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
+ assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid());
+ }
- assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
- assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
- assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
- } else {
- assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
- assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
- assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
+ for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
+ assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ }
+ nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
- assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
+ // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ //... and we can even still claim the payment!
+ claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
- match events_3[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
- assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
+ if let Err(msgs::HandleError { action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }), .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) {
+ assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
+ } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
+ ($node: expr, $der_idx: expr) => {
+ {
+ let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ let mut txn = Vec::new();
+ for event in events {
+ match event {
+ Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
+ for outp in outputs {
+ match *outp {
+ SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref output } => {
+ let input = TxIn {
+ previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ let outp = TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
+ value: output.value,
+ };
+ let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: vec![input],
+ output: vec![outp],
+ };
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let remotepubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &key);
+ let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&remotepubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
+ let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
+ let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotepubkey.serialize().to_vec());
+ txn.push(spend_tx);
+ },
+ SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref witness_script, ref to_self_delay, ref output } => {
+ let input = TxIn {
+ previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: *to_self_delay as u32,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ let outp = TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
+ value: output.value,
+ };
+ let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: vec![input],
+ output: vec![outp],
+ };
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
+ let local_delaysig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(local_delaysig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(0));
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
+ txn.push(spend_tx);
+ },
+ SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let input = TxIn {
+ previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ let outp = TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
+ value: output.value,
+ };
+ let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: vec![input],
+ output: vec![outp.clone()],
+ };
+ let secret = {
+ match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(&secp_ctx, Network::Testnet, &$node.node_seed) {
+ Ok(master_key) => {
+ match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx($der_idx)) {
+ Ok(key) => key,
+ Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
+ }
+ }
+ Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
+ }
+ };
+ let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &secret).public_key;
+ let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
+ let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
+ let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.secret_key);
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
+ txn.push(spend_tx);
+ },
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
}
+ txn
+ }
+ }
+ }
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ #[test]
+ fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
+ // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
+ let nodes = create_network(2);
- as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
- bs_resp.2 = None;
- }
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
- if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
- let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
+ }
- if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
- assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
- assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
- }
- assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
- assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
- }
+ #[test]
+ fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
+ // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
+ // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
- (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
- } else {
- let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
- (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- msg.clone()
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- })
- };
+ let nodes = create_network(2);
- assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
- let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
+ }
- if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
- let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
+ #[test]
+ fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
+ // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
+ // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
- assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
- assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
+ let nodes = create_network(2);
- assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
- assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]); // to_local output on local commitment tx
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
+ }
- let as_commitment_update;
- let bs_second_commitment_update;
+ #[test]
+ fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2);
- macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- } }
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- } }
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
- if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
- handle_bs_raa!();
+ let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
- if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
- let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
+ // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
+ }
- assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
- assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
+ // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 1 (local commitment tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (1 preimage tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
- assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
- assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); // , 0, 0, 1, 1);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
+ }
- assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
- }
+ #[test]
+ fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2);
- handle_initial_raa!();
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
- let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
- assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
- assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
- assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
- assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
- }
- } else {
- handle_initial_raa!();
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
- if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
- let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
+ }
- assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
- assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
+ #[test]
+ fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2);
- assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
- assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
- }
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
- handle_bs_raa!();
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
- if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
- let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
+
+ // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
- assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
- assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
- assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
- assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
- }
- }
+ // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[3].clone());
+ }
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ #[test]
+ fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2);
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
- match events_5[0] {
- Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
- assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
- },
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+
+ // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
- }
+ let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
- #[test]
- fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
+ // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 5);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone()); // spending justice tx output from revoked local tx htlc received output
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone()); // spending justice tx output on htlc success tx
}
#[test]
- fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
- }
+ fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
+ // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output thanks to
+ // ChainWatchInterface and claim HTLC on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
+ // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
+ // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
+ // channel.
+ // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
+ // gets broadcast.
- #[test]
- fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
- }
+ let nodes = create_network(3);
- #[test]
- fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
- //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let nodes = create_network(2);
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
- let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
+ // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
- let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
- let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
+ let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
+ let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
+ nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
+ nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
- let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
- let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
+ let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
+ assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
+ check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
+ check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1].clone());
+ assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
+ assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
+ assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
- let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
- let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
+ // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]}, 1);
+ {
+ let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 4);
+ assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[3]);
+ check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
+ check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1].clone()); // HTLC-Timeout on B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
+ assert_eq!(b_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert!(b_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
+ assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
+ check_spends!(b_txn[0], c_txn[1].clone()); // timeout tx on C remote commitment tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
+ assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
+ assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
+ b_txn.clear();
+ }
+ let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ match msg_events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match msg_events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
+ let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
+ check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
+ assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[2]); // HTLC-Success tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
+ check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
+ assert_eq!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
+ let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match msg_events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
- let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
+ #[test]
+ fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
+ // Topology : A --> B --> C
+ // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3);
- let mut chan_announcement;
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
- macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
- () => {
- msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
- features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
- chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
- short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
- node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
- node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
- bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
- bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
- excess_data: Vec::new(),
- };
- }
- }
+ let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
+ *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
+ assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000).1, duplicate_payment_hash);
- macro_rules! sign_msg {
- ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
- let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
- let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
- let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
- let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
- let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
- chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
- node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
- bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
- bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
- contents: $unsigned_msg
- }
- }
- }
+ let commitment_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
- let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
- sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
- let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ let htlc_timeout_tx;
+ { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0], node_txn[1].input[0]);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[3], node_txn[2].clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[2].clone());
+ htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
+ }
- // Configured with Network::Testnet
- let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
- unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
- sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
- assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
+ }
- let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
- unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
- sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
- assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
- }
+ nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
+ nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
+ let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
+ }
+ let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
+ assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5);
+ check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
+ assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0], htlc_success_txn[3]);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1], htlc_success_txn[4]);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0], htlc_success_txn[1].input[0]);
+ check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
+ check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
+
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout_tx] }, 200);
+ let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 1);
+ assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
- impl Writer for VecWriter {
- fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
- Ok(())
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ {
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { .. } } => {
+ },
+ _ => { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
+ }
+ }
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
+ }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
- self.0.reserve_exact(size);
+
+ // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_success_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 0);
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
+ assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
+ }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
}
#[test]
- fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
-
- let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
+ fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
- let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
- nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
+ let local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
- nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
- let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
- let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
- assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
+ // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
+ nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
+ }
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
- let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
- let config = UserConfig::new();
- let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
- let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
- let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
- channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
- <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
- default_config: config,
- keys_manager,
- fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
- monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
- chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
- tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
- logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
- channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
- }).unwrap()
- };
- assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
+ // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone());
+ }
- assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
- nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
- let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc<ChainListener> = nodes[0].node.clone();
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener));
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ #[test]
+ fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2);
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
+ let local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
- let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
- let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
- for node in nodes.iter() {
- assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
- node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
- node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
+ // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
}
-
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+ let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
+
+ // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 8);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[4]);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[6]);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[5]);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[7]);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
}
#[test]
- fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2);
- let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
+ let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
- let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
- let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
- nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 2);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx.clone());
+
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 2);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
+ }
+
+ fn run_onion_failure_test<F1,F2>(_name: &str, test_case: u8, nodes: &Vec<Node>, route: &Route, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, callback_msg: F1, callback_node: F2, expected_retryable: bool, expected_error_code: Option<u16>, expected_channel_update: Option<HTLCFailChannelUpdate>)
+ where F1: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateAddHTLC),
+ F2: FnMut(),
+ {
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept(_name, test_case, nodes, route, payment_hash, callback_msg, |_|{}, callback_node, expected_retryable, expected_error_code, expected_channel_update);
+ }
+
+ // test_case
+ // 0: node1 fail backward
+ // 1: final node fail backward
+ // 2: payment completed but the user reject the payment
+ // 3: final node fail backward (but tamper onion payloads from node0)
+ // 100: trigger error in the intermediate node and tamper returnning fail_htlc
+ // 200: trigger error in the final node and tamper returnning fail_htlc
+ fn run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept<F1,F2,F3>(_name: &str, test_case: u8, nodes: &Vec<Node>, route: &Route, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, mut callback_msg: F1, mut callback_fail: F2, mut callback_node: F3, expected_retryable: bool, expected_error_code: Option<u16>, expected_channel_update: Option<HTLCFailChannelUpdate>)
+ where F1: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateAddHTLC),
+ F2: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
+ F3: FnMut(),
+ {
+ use ln::msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate;
+
+ // reset block height
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ for ix in 0..nodes.len() {
+ nodes[ix].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
+ }
- nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
- let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
- let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
- assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
+ macro_rules! expect_event {
+ ($node: expr, $event_type: path) => {{
+ let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ $event_type { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }}
+ }
- let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
- let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
- let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
- let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
- channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
- <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
- default_config: UserConfig::new(),
- keys_manager,
- fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
- monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
- chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
- tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
- logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
- channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
- }).unwrap()
- };
- assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
+ macro_rules! expect_htlc_forward {
+ ($node: expr) => {{
+ expect_event!($node, Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable);
+ $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
+ $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+ }}
+ }
- assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
- nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
+ // 0 ~~> 2 send payment
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash.clone()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let update_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // temper update_add (0 => 1)
+ let mut update_add_0 = update_0.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
+ if test_case == 0 || test_case == 3 || test_case == 100 {
+ callback_msg(&mut update_add_0);
+ callback_node();
+ }
+ // 0 => 1 update_add & CS
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_0).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &update_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ let update_1_0 = match test_case {
+ 0|100 => { // intermediate node failure; fail backward to 0
+ let update_1_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len()+update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()==1 && (update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len()==1 || update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()==1));
+ update_1_0
+ },
+ 1|2|3|200 => { // final node failure; forwarding to 2
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ // forwarding on 1
+ if test_case != 200 {
+ callback_node();
+ }
+ expect_htlc_forward!(&nodes[1]);
+
+ let update_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
+ assert_eq!(update_1.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ // tamper update_add (1 => 2)
+ let mut update_add_1 = update_1.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
+ if test_case != 3 && test_case != 200 {
+ callback_msg(&mut update_add_1);
+ }
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ // 1 => 2
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_1).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], update_1.commitment_signed, false, true);
- fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
- }
+ if test_case == 2 || test_case == 200 {
+ expect_htlc_forward!(&nodes[2]);
+ expect_event!(&nodes[2], Event::PaymentReceived);
+ callback_node();
+ }
- #[test]
- fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
- // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with a out-of-date ChannelMonitor
- let mut nodes = create_network(4);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
- let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
+ let update_2_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ if test_case == 2 || test_case == 200 {
+ check_added_monitors!(&nodes[2], 1);
+ }
+ assert!(update_2_1.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1);
- let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
+ let mut fail_msg = update_2_1.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone();
+ if test_case == 200 {
+ callback_fail(&mut fail_msg);
+ }
- // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
- let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
+ // 2 => 1
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_2_1.commitment_signed, true, true);
- route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ // backward fail on 1
+ let update_1_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1);
+ update_1_0
+ },
+ _ => unreachable!(),
+ };
- // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
- // nodes[3])
- let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
- for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
- let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
- monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
- node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
- }
+ // 1 => 0 commitment_signed_dance
+ if update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len() > 0 {
+ let mut fail_msg = update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone();
+ if test_case == 100 {
+ callback_fail(&mut fail_msg);
+ }
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg).unwrap();
+ } else {
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ };
- nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
- let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
- for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
- let mut read = &serialized[..];
- let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
- assert!(read.is_empty());
- node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_1_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ if let &Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash:_, ref rejected_by_dest, ref error_code } = &events[0] {
+ assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, !expected_retryable);
+ assert_eq!(*error_code, expected_error_code);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Uexpected event");
}
- let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
- let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
- let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
- default_config: UserConfig::new(),
- keys_manager,
- fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
- monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
- chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
- tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
- logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
- channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(),
- }).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ if expected_channel_update.is_some() {
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { ref update } => {
+ match update {
+ &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { .. } => {
+ if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { .. } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {} else {
+ panic!("channel_update not found!");
+ }
+ },
+ &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { ref short_channel_id, ref is_permanent } => {
+ if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: ref expected_short_channel_id, is_permanent: ref expected_is_permanent } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {
+ assert!(*short_channel_id == *expected_short_channel_id);
+ assert!(*is_permanent == *expected_is_permanent);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected message event");
+ }
+ },
+ &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, ref is_permanent } => {
+ if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: ref expected_node_id, is_permanent: ref expected_is_permanent } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {
+ assert!(*node_id == *expected_node_id);
+ assert!(*is_permanent == *expected_is_permanent);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected message event");
+ }
+ },
+ }
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected message event"),
+ }
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
+ }
+ }
- { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx
- let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
- assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid());
+ impl msgs::ChannelUpdate {
+ fn dummy() -> msgs::ChannelUpdate {
+ use secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
+ use secp256k1::Signature;
+ msgs::ChannelUpdate {
+ signature: Signature::from(FFISignature::new()),
+ contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ chain_hash: Sha256dHash::from_data(&vec![0u8][..]),
+ short_channel_id: 0,
+ timestamp: 0,
+ flags: 0,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ fee_base_msat: 0,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ excess_data: vec![],
+ }
+ }
}
+ }
- for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
- assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ #[test]
+ fn test_onion_failure() {
+ use ln::msgs::ChannelUpdate;
+ use ln::channelmanager::CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY;
+ use secp256k1;
+
+ const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
+ const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
+ const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
+ const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
+
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3);
+ for node in nodes.iter() {
+ *node.keys_manager.override_session_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some(SecretKey::from_slice(&Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap());
}
- nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
+ let channels = [create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1), create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2)];
+ let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ // positve case
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 40000);
- // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- //... and we can even still claim the payment!
- claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
+ // intermediate node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test("invalid_realm", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
+ let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ let (mut onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
+ onion_payloads[0].realm = 3;
+ msg.onion_routing_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|1), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));//XXX incremented channels idx here
+
+ // final node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test("invalid_realm", 3, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
+ let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ let (mut onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
+ onion_payloads[1].realm = 3;
+ msg.onion_routing_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
+ }, ||{}, false, Some(PERM|1), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
+
+ // the following three with run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept() test only the origin node
+ // receiving simulated fail messages
+ // intermediate node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_node_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ // trigger error
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, |msg| {
+ // and tamper returing error message
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], NODE|2, &[0;0]);
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: false}));
+
+ // final node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_node_failure", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
+ // and tamper returing error message
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], NODE|2, &[0;0]);
+ }, ||{
+ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
+ }, true, Some(NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: false}));
+
+ // intermediate node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_node_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|2, &[0;0]);
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
+
+ // final node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_node_failure", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|2, &[0;0]);
+ }, ||{
+ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
+ }, false, Some(PERM|NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
+
+ // intermediate node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_node_feature_missing", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|3, &[0;0]);
+ }, ||{
+ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
+ }, true, Some(PERM|NODE|3), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
+
+ // final node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_node_feature_missing", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|3, &[0;0]);
+ }, ||{
+ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
+ }, false, Some(PERM|NODE|3), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_version", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.version = 1; }, ||{}, true,
+ Some(BADONION|PERM|4), None);
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_hmac", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac = [3; 32]; }, ||{}, true,
+ Some(BADONION|PERM|5), None);
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_key", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key = Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey);}, ||{}, true,
+ Some(BADONION|PERM|6), None);
+
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_channel_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], UPDATE|7, &ChannelUpdate::dummy().encode_with_len()[..]);
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|7), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
+
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_channel_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|8, &[0;0]);
+ // short_channel_id from the processing node
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|8), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
+
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_channel_feature_missing", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|9, &[0;0]);
+ // short_channel_id from the processing node
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|9), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
+
+ let mut bogus_route = route.clone();
+ bogus_route.hops[1].short_channel_id -= 1;
+ run_onion_failure_test("unknown_next_peer", 0, &nodes, &bogus_route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|10),
+ Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: bogus_route.hops[1].short_channel_id, is_permanent:true}));
+
+ let amt_to_forward = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&channels[1].2).unwrap().get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() - 1;
+ let mut bogus_route = route.clone();
+ let route_len = bogus_route.hops.len();
+ bogus_route.hops[route_len-1].fee_msat = amt_to_forward;
+ run_onion_failure_test("amount_below_minimum", 0, &nodes, &bogus_route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|11), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
+
+ //TODO: with new config API, we will be able to generate both valid and
+ //invalid channel_update cases.
+ run_onion_failure_test("fee_insufficient", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, || {}, true, Some(UPDATE|12), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: channels[0].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("incorrect_cltv_expiry", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ // need to violate: cltv_expiry - cltv_expiry_delta >= outgoing_cltv_value
+ msg.cltv_expiry -= 1;
+ }, || {}, true, Some(UPDATE|13), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: channels[0].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("expiry_too_soon", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1;
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|14), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
- nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
- if let Err(msgs::HandleError { action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }), .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) {
- assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
- } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); }
+ run_onion_failure_test("unknown_payment_hash", 2, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
+ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
+ }, false, Some(PERM|15), None);
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("final_expiry_too_soon", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1;
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
+ }, || {}, true, Some(17), None);
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("final_incorrect_cltv_expiry", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
+ for (_, mut pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().borrow_parts().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
+ f.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value += 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }, true, Some(18), None);
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("final_incorrect_htlc_amount", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
+ // violate amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat
+ for (_, mut pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().borrow_parts().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
+ f.forward_info.amt_to_forward -= 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }, true, Some(19), None);
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("channel_disabled", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
+ // disconnect event to the channel between nodes[1] ~ nodes[2]
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ }, true, Some(UPDATE|20), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("expiry_too_far", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let mut route = route.clone();
+ let height = 1;
+ route.hops[1].cltv_expiry_delta += CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY + route.hops[0].cltv_expiry_delta + 1;
+ let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ let (onion_payloads, _, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, height).unwrap();
+ let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
+ msg.cltv_expiry = htlc_cltv;
+ msg.onion_routing_packet = onion_packet;
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(21), None);
}
}