use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
+use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
+use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+
use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
-use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
+use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
use util::config::UserConfig;
use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
-use util::sha2::Sha256;
use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
use util::logger::Logger;
use util::errors::APIError;
+use util::errors;
use crypto;
-use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
-use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
-use crypto::digest::Digest;
use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
use std::{cmp, ptr, mem};
mod channel_held_info {
use ln::msgs;
use ln::router::Route;
+ use ln::channelmanager::PaymentHash;
use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
/// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
- pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
+ pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
}
pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
-type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>);
+/// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
+#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
+pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
+/// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
+#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
+pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
+
+type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
/// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
/// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
/// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
/// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
/// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
+
struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
err: msgs::HandleError,
shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
}
}
-/// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
-/// after a PaymentReceived event.
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
-pub enum PaymentFailReason {
- /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
- PreimageUnknown,
- /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
- AmountMismatch,
-}
-
/// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
/// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
/// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
/// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
/// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
/// go to read them!
- claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
+ claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
/// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
/// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
- claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
+ claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
}
impl ChannelHolder {
/// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
/// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
/// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
-const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
+const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
-// Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
-// if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
-// HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
-// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
+// Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS +
+// HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY, ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
+// HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it
+// backwards ourselves before hitting the CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel
+// on-chain to time out the HTLC.
#[deny(const_err)]
#[allow(dead_code)]
-const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
+const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY;
// Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
// ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
},
Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
+ log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
$channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
},
Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
+ log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
$channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
};
for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
- // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
}
let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
#[inline]
fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
+ log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
- // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
}
for tx in local_txn {
self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
return;
}
};
+ log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
({
- let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
- let mut res = [0; 32];
- hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
- res
+ Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
},
{
- let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
- let mut res = [0; 32];
- hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
- res
+ Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
})
}
#[inline]
fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
- let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
- let mut res = [0; 32];
- hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
- res
+ Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
}
#[inline]
fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
- let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
- let mut res = [0; 32];
- hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
- res
+ Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner()
}
// can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
for hop in route.hops.iter() {
let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
- let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
- sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
+ let blinding_factor = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
}
const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
- fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
+ fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &PaymentHash) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
buf.resize(21*65, 0);
packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
}
- let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.mu);
hmac.input(&packet_data);
- hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
- hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
+ hmac.input(&associated_data.0[..]);
+ hmac_res = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
}
msgs::OnionPacket{
pad: pad,
};
- let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&um);
hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
- hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
+ packet.hmac = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
packet
}
}
fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
- macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
- () => {
+ macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
+ ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
{
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
- let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
- sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
- onion_hash
+ log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
+ return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+ sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
+ failure_code: $err_code,
+ })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
}
}
}
if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
- log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
- return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
- channel_id: msg.channel_id,
- htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
- sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
- failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
- })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
+ return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
}
let shared_secret = {
};
let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
+ if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
+ //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
+ //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
+ //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
+ //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
+ //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
+ //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
+ return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
+ }
+
+
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
+ hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
+ hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
+ if !crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
+ return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
+ }
+
let mut channel_state = None;
macro_rules! return_err {
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
}
}
- if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
- //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
- //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
- //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
- //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
- //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
- //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
- return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
- }
-
- let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
- hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
- hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
- if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
- return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
- }
-
let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
let next_hop_data = {
let mut decoded = [0; 65];
let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
let blinding_factor = {
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
sha.input(&shared_secret);
- let mut res = [0u8; 32];
- sha.result(&mut res);
- match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
- Err(_) => {
- return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
- },
- Ok(key) => key
- }
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()).expect("SHA-256 is broken?")
};
- if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
- return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
- }
+ let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
+ Err(e)
+ } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
version: 0,
- public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
+ public_key,
hop_data: new_packet_data,
hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
};
}
{
let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
- if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
- }
- else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
- }
if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
+ if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
+ }
+ else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
+ }
+ else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
+ }
res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
}
return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
/// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
/// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
/// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
- pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
}
events.append(&mut new_events);
}
- /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
- pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
+ /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
+ /// after a PaymentReceived event.
+ /// expected_value is the value you expected the payment to be for (not the amount it actually
+ /// was for from the PaymentReceived event).
+ pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, expected_value: u64) -> bool {
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
+ HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
+ HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(expected_value).to_vec() });
}
true
} else { false }
/// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
/// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
/// still-available channels.
- fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
+ fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
match source {
- HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
- if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
- let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
- if let Some(update) = channel_update {
- self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
- events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
- update,
+ match &onion_error {
+ &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
+#[cfg(test)]
+ let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
+#[cfg(not(test))]
+ let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
+ // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
+ // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
+ // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
+ if let Some(update) = channel_update {
+ self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
+ events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
+ update,
+ }
+ );
+ }
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
+ events::Event::PaymentFailed {
+ payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
+ rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
+#[cfg(test)]
+ error_code: onion_error_code
+ }
+ );
+ },
+ &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
+#[cfg(test)]
+ ref failure_code,
+ .. } => {
+ // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
+ // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
+ // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
+ // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
+ // ChannelDetails.
+ // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
+ // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
+ events::Event::PaymentFailed {
+ payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
+ rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
+#[cfg(test)]
+ error_code: Some(*failure_code),
}
);
}
- self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
- payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
- rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
- });
- } else {
- //TODO: Pass this back (see GH #243)
- self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
- payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
- rejected_by_dest: false, // We failed it ourselves, can't blame them
- });
}
},
HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
let err_packet = match onion_error {
HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
},
HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built ErrorPacket", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
}
};
/// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
///
/// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
- pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&payment_preimage);
- let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
- sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
+ pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
+ let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
true
} else { false }
}
- fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
+ fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
match source {
HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
}
};
for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
- // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
}
if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
channel_id: msg.channel_id,
htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
- ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &update.encode_with_len()[..])
+ // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
+ // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
+ // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
+ // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
+ // allowed.
+ ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
+ res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
+ res
+ }[..])
} else {
// This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
// state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
// Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
// indicating that the payment itself failed
- fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
+ fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool, Option<u16>) {
if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
- macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
- ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
- log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
- };
- ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
- log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
- };
- }
-
- const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
- const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
- const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
let mut res = None;
let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
+ let mut error_code_ret = None;
+ let mut next_route_hop_ix = 0;
+ let mut is_from_final_node = false;
// Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
+ next_route_hop_ix += 1;
if res.is_some() { return; }
- let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
- let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
+ is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
- let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&um);
hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
- let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
- hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
- if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
- if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
- // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
- // definitely came from the peer in question
- res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
- } else {
- let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
-
- match error_code & 0xff {
- 1|2|3 => {
- // either from an intermediate or final node
- // invalid_realm(PERM|1),
- // temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
- // permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
- // required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
- res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
- node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
- is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
- }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
- // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
- // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
- // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
- return;
- },
- _ => {}
- }
+ if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &err_packet.hmac) {
+ if let Some(error_code_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(0..2) {
+ const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
+ const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
+ const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
- if is_from_final_node {
- let payment_retryable = match error_code {
- c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
- c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
- 17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
- 18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
- let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
- true
- },
- 19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
- let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
- true
- },
- _ => {
- // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
- // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
- // does not coform to the spec.
- // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
- res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
- node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
- is_permanent: true,
- }), false));
- return;
- }
- };
- res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
- return;
- }
+ let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&error_code_slice);
+ error_code_ret = Some(error_code);
- // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
- match error_code {
- _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
- res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
- short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
- is_permanent: true,
- }), false));
- },
- _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
- let offset = match error_code {
- c if c == UPDATE|7 => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
- c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
- c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
- c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
- c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
- c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
- _ => {
- // node sending unknown code
- res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
- node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
- is_permanent: true,
- }), false));
- return;
- }
- };
-
- if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
- let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
- if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
- if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
- // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
- // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
- let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
- c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
- false
- },
- c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
- let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
- onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
- incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
- },
- c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
- let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
- let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
- onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
- new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
- }
- c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
- let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
- onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
- route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
- },
- c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
- let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
- onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
- chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
- },
- c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
- _ => { unreachable!(); },
- };
-
- let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
- Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
- msg: chan_update,
- })
- };
- res = Some((msg, true));
- return;
- }
+ let (debug_field, debug_field_size) = errors::get_onion_debug_field(error_code);
+
+ // indicate that payment parameter has failed and no need to
+ // update Route object
+ let payment_failed = (match error_code & 0xff {
+ 15|16|17|18|19 => true,
+ _ => false,
+ } && is_from_final_node) // PERM bit observed below even this error is from the intermediate nodes
+ || error_code == 21; // Special case error 21 as the Route object is bogus, TODO: Maybe fail the node if the CLTV was reasonable?
+
+ let mut fail_channel_update = None;
+
+ if error_code & NODE == NODE {
+ fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: route_hop.pubkey, is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM });
+ }
+ else if error_code & PERM == PERM {
+ fail_channel_update = if payment_failed {None} else {Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
+ short_channel_id: route.hops[next_route_hop_ix - if next_route_hop_ix == route.hops.len() { 1 } else { 0 }].short_channel_id,
+ is_permanent: true,
+ })};
+ }
+ else if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE {
+ if let Some(update_len_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size+2..debug_field_size+4) {
+ let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&update_len_slice) as usize;
+ if let Some(update_slice) = err_packet.failuremsg.get(debug_field_size + 4..debug_field_size + 4 + update_len) {
+ if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&update_slice)) {
+ // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
+ // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
+ let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code & 0xff {
+ 7 => false,
+ 11 => amt_to_forward > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat,
+ 12 => {
+ let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
+ new_fee.is_some() && route_hop.fee_msat >= new_fee.unwrap()
+ }
+ 13 => route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta,
+ 14 => false, // expiry_too_soon; always valid?
+ 20 => chan_update.contents.flags & 2 == 0,
+ _ => false, // unknown error code; take channel_update as valid
+ };
+ fail_channel_update = if is_chan_update_invalid {
+ // This probably indicates the node which forwarded
+ // to the node in question corrupted something.
+ Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
+ short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
+ is_permanent: true,
+ })
+ } else {
+ Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
+ msg: chan_update,
+ })
+ };
}
}
- },
- _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
- //TODO
- },
- 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
- res = Some((None, true));
- return;
}
- _ => {
- // node sending unknown code
- res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
+ if fail_channel_update.is_none() {
+ // They provided an UPDATE which was obviously bogus, not worth
+ // trying to relay through them anymore.
+ fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
is_permanent: true,
- }), false));
- return;
+ });
}
+ } else if !payment_failed {
+ // We can't understand their error messages and they failed to
+ // forward...they probably can't understand our forwards so its
+ // really not worth trying any further.
+ fail_channel_update = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
+ node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
+ is_permanent: true,
+ });
+ }
+
+ // TODO: Here (and a few other places) we assume that BADONION errors
+ // are always "sourced" from the node previous to the one which failed
+ // to decode the onion.
+ res = Some((fail_channel_update, !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
+
+ let (description, title) = errors::get_onion_error_description(error_code);
+ if debug_field_size > 0 && err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + debug_field_size {
+ log_warn!(self, "Onion Error[{}({:#x}) {}({})] {}", title, error_code, debug_field, log_bytes!(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4+debug_field_size]), description);
+ }
+ else {
+ log_warn!(self, "Onion Error[{}({:#x})] {}", title, error_code, description);
}
+ } else {
+ // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
+ // definitely came from the peer in question
+ res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
+ node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
+ is_permanent: true,
+ }), !is_from_final_node));
}
}
}
}).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
- res.unwrap_or((None, true))
- } else { ((None, true)) }
+ if let Some((channel_update, payment_retryable)) = res {
+ (channel_update, payment_retryable, error_code_ret)
+ } else {
+ // only not set either packet unparseable or hmac does not match with any
+ // payment not retryable only when garbage is from the final node
+ (None, !is_from_final_node, None)
+ }
+ } else { unreachable!(); }
}
fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
//TODO: This behavior should be documented.
for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
+ log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
} else {
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
}
}
}
//TODO: This behavior should be documented.
for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
+ log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
} else {
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
}
}
}
impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
+ let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
+ log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
{
for tx in txn_matched {
for inp in tx.input.iter() {
if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
+ log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
}
self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
- *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
+ *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
}
/// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
use chain::keysinterface;
use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
- use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason,RAACommitmentOrder};
+ use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,OnionKeys,RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor};
use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
use ln::msgs;
- use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
+ use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler,HTLCFailChannelUpdate};
use util::test_utils;
use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
use util::errors::APIError;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
+
use hex;
use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
- use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
- use crypto::digest::Digest;
-
use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
use std::cell::RefCell;
- use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
+ use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap, HashSet};
use std::default::Default;
use std::rc::Rc;
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
},
);
- let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
+ let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &PaymentHash([0x42; 32]));
// Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
// anyway...
assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
+ keys_manager: Arc<test_utils::TestKeysInterface>,
node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
router: Router,
node_seed: [u8; 32],
let as_update = match events_8[0] {
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
assert!(*announcement == *msg);
+ assert_eq!(update_msg.contents.short_channel_id, announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
+ assert_eq!(update_msg.contents.short_channel_id, bs_update.contents.short_channel_id);
update_msg
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
($node: expr) => {
{
- let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
+ let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32]);
*$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
- let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
- sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
+ let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
(payment_preimage, payment_hash)
}
}
}
- fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
+ fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) {
let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
let mut payment_event = {
(our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
}
- fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
+ fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
}
}
- fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
+ fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
}
const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
- fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
+ fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) {
let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
}
- fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
- assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
+ fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) {
+ assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, 0));
check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
assert!(rejected_by_dest);
},
}
}
- fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
+ fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) {
fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
}
let mut nodes = Vec::new();
let mut rng = thread_rng();
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
- for _ in 0..node_count {
+ for i in 0..node_count {
+ let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", i)));
let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
let mut seed = [0; 32];
rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
- let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
+ let keys_manager = Arc::new(test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone()));
let mut config = UserConfig::new();
config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
let node = ChannelManager::new(Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config).unwrap();
let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
- nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, node_seed: seed,
+ nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, keys_manager, node_seed: seed,
network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
});
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest } => {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
+ let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
+ let node_0_closing_signed = match msg_events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ (*msg).clone()
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ match msg_events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg }} => {
+ assert_eq!(msg.contents.short_channel_id, chan_1.0.contents.short_channel_id);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
}
#[test]
- fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
- // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
- // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
- let nodes = create_network(2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
+ // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
+ // ChainWatchInterface and pass the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
+ // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
+ // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
+ // First, C should claim the HTLC output via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
+ // commitment transaction was broadcast.
+ // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
+ // towards B.
+ // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
+ // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
+ // the HTLC output via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
+ // PaymentSent event).
- route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
- nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
- {
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
- assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- }
+ let nodes = create_network(3);
- let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
+ // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
+
+ let (our_payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
+
+ // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
+ // Broadcast HTLC Success transation by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
+ let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
+ nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+
+ nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
+ // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: node_txn}, 1);
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
{
- let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
- assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
+ let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
+ added_monitors.clear();
+ }
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ {
+ // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
+ // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transaction, as well as a
+ // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
+ assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
+ node_txn.clear();
+ }
+
+ // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
+ // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
+ let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone());
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success) * 2 (block-rescan)
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
+ assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
+ // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
+ // we already checked the same situation with A.
- // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
- // registering new transactions
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
+ // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
+ assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
}
#[test]
- fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
- // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
- let mut nodes = create_network(3);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+ fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
+ // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
+ // ChainWatchInterface and timeout the HTLC bacward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
+ // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
+ // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
+ // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
+ // \ \
+ // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
+ let nodes = create_network(3);
- let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ // Create some intial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
- let mut payment_event = {
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
- let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
- };
+ let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
+ // Brodacast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
+ let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
+ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
+ {
+ let mut added_monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
+ added_monitors.clear();
+ }
+ let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
- let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
- match events_1[0] {
- Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
+ // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output fron C's commitment tx on B's chain
+ // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
+ let timeout_tx;
+ {
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 6 (HTLC-Timeout tx, commitment tx, timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[7]);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_2.3.clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ timeout_tx = node_txn[0].clone();
+ node_txn.clear();
+ }
+
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![timeout_tx]}, 1);
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
+ },
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // Well... here we detect our own htlc_timeout_tx so no tx to be generated
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
- nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
- nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+ // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
+ let commitment_tx = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone());
- let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
- payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (timeout tx) * 2 block-rescan
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
+ // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
+ // and fail backward accordingly.
+
+ let nodes = create_network(3);
+
+ // Create some initial channels
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+
+ let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
+ // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ // Revoke the old state
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
+
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool) {
+ // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
+ // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
+ // commitment transaction anymore.
+ // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
+ // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
+ // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
+ // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
+ // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
+ // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
+ // transactions:
+ // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
+ // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
+ // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
+ // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
+ // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3);
+
+ // Create some initial channels
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+
+ let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
+ // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ // Revoke the old state
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
+
+ let (_, first_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
+ let (_, second_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
+ let (_, third_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
+
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash, 0));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
+ // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
+
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash, 0));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
+ let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash, 0));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
+ // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
+ let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+
+ // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
+ // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
+ let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, fourth_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, fourth_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+
+ if deliver_bs_raa {
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
+ // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, one as we generate a commitment for
+ // nodes[0] to fail first_payment_hash backwards.
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
+ }
+
+ let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ if !deliver_bs_raa {
+ // If we delivered the RAA already then we already failed first_payment_hash backwards.
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ }
+
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 });
+ match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 0 }] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ if deliver_bs_raa {
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
+ assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
+ assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+ // Due to the way backwards-failing occurs we do the updates in two steps.
+ let updates = match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ if !deliver_bs_raa {
+ // If we delievered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
+ // that we should update our routing table for.
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ bs_second_update
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
+ assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ for event in events {
+ match event {
+ MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
+ assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
+ assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive() {
+ do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false);
+ do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
+ // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
+ // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
+ let nodes = create_network(2);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
+ {
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
+ assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+
+ let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
+
+ {
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
+ assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
+ // registering new transactions
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
+ // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
+
+ let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+
+ let mut payment_event = {
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
+ };
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
+
+ let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
+ match events_1[0] {
+ Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
+ nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+
+ let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
+ payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
match events[1] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
assert!(rejected_by_dest);
},
// Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming RAA
let mut nodes = create_network(3);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
// Rebalance a bit so that we can send backwards from 2 to 1.
send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 5000000);
let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
// Fail the payment backwards, failing the monitor update on nodes[1]'s receipt of the RAA
- assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1, 0));
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
+ match msg_events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg }} => {
+ assert_eq!(msg.contents.short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
+ assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2); // temp disabled
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } = events[0] {
+ if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } = events[0] {
assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
} else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], messages_a.1, false);
let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
- if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } = events_4[0] {
+ if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } = events_4[0] {
assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
assert!(rejected_by_dest);
} else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
check_spends!(spend_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone()); // spending justice tx output on htlc success tx
}
+ #[test]
+ fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
+ // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output thanks to
+ // ChainWatchInterface and claim HTLC on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
+ // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
+ // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
+ // channel.
+ // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
+ // gets broadcast.
+
+ let nodes = create_network(3);
+
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+
+ // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
+
+ let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
+ let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
+ nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+
+ nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
+ assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
+ check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
+ check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1].clone());
+ assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
+ assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
+ assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
+
+ // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]}, 1);
+ {
+ let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 4);
+ assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[3]);
+ check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
+ check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1].clone()); // HTLC-Timeout on B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
+ assert_eq!(b_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert!(b_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
+ assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
+ check_spends!(b_txn[0], c_txn[1].clone()); // timeout tx on C remote commitment tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
+ assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
+ assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
+ b_txn.clear();
+ }
+ let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ match msg_events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match msg_events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
+ let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
+ check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
+ assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[2]); // HTLC-Success tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
+ check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
+ assert_eq!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
+ let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match msg_events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
+ // Topology : A --> B --> C
+ // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3);
+
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+
+ let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
+ *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
+ assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000).1, duplicate_payment_hash);
+
+ let commitment_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ let htlc_timeout_tx;
+ { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0], node_txn[1].input[0]);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[3], node_txn[2].clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[2].clone());
+ htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
+ }
+
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
+ }
+
+ nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
+ nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
+ let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
+ }
+ let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
+ assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5);
+ check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
+ assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0], htlc_success_txn[3]);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1], htlc_success_txn[4]);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0], htlc_success_txn[1].input[0]);
+ check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
+ check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
+
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout_tx] }, 200);
+ let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 1);
+ assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ {
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { .. } } => {
+ },
+ _ => { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
+ }
+ }
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
+ }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_success_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 0);
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
+ assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
+ }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+
#[test]
fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
let nodes = create_network(2);
assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
}
+
+ fn run_onion_failure_test<F1,F2>(_name: &str, test_case: u8, nodes: &Vec<Node>, route: &Route, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, callback_msg: F1, callback_node: F2, expected_retryable: bool, expected_error_code: Option<u16>, expected_channel_update: Option<HTLCFailChannelUpdate>)
+ where F1: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateAddHTLC),
+ F2: FnMut(),
+ {
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept(_name, test_case, nodes, route, payment_hash, callback_msg, |_|{}, callback_node, expected_retryable, expected_error_code, expected_channel_update);
+ }
+
+ // test_case
+ // 0: node1 fail backward
+ // 1: final node fail backward
+ // 2: payment completed but the user reject the payment
+ // 3: final node fail backward (but tamper onion payloads from node0)
+ // 100: trigger error in the intermediate node and tamper returnning fail_htlc
+ // 200: trigger error in the final node and tamper returnning fail_htlc
+ fn run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept<F1,F2,F3>(_name: &str, test_case: u8, nodes: &Vec<Node>, route: &Route, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, mut callback_msg: F1, mut callback_fail: F2, mut callback_node: F3, expected_retryable: bool, expected_error_code: Option<u16>, expected_channel_update: Option<HTLCFailChannelUpdate>)
+ where F1: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateAddHTLC),
+ F2: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
+ F3: FnMut(),
+ {
+ use ln::msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate;
+
+ // reset block height
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ for ix in 0..nodes.len() {
+ nodes[ix].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! expect_event {
+ ($node: expr, $event_type: path) => {{
+ let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ $event_type { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }}
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! expect_htlc_forward {
+ ($node: expr) => {{
+ expect_event!($node, Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable);
+ $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
+ $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+ }}
+ }
+
+ // 0 ~~> 2 send payment
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash.clone()).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let update_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // temper update_add (0 => 1)
+ let mut update_add_0 = update_0.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
+ if test_case == 0 || test_case == 3 || test_case == 100 {
+ callback_msg(&mut update_add_0);
+ callback_node();
+ }
+ // 0 => 1 update_add & CS
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_0).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &update_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ let update_1_0 = match test_case {
+ 0|100 => { // intermediate node failure; fail backward to 0
+ let update_1_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len()+update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()==1 && (update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len()==1 || update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()==1));
+ update_1_0
+ },
+ 1|2|3|200 => { // final node failure; forwarding to 2
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ // forwarding on 1
+ if test_case != 200 {
+ callback_node();
+ }
+ expect_htlc_forward!(&nodes[1]);
+
+ let update_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
+ assert_eq!(update_1.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ // tamper update_add (1 => 2)
+ let mut update_add_1 = update_1.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
+ if test_case != 3 && test_case != 200 {
+ callback_msg(&mut update_add_1);
+ }
+
+ // 1 => 2
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_1).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], update_1.commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ if test_case == 2 || test_case == 200 {
+ expect_htlc_forward!(&nodes[2]);
+ expect_event!(&nodes[2], Event::PaymentReceived);
+ callback_node();
+ }
+
+ let update_2_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ if test_case == 2 || test_case == 200 {
+ check_added_monitors!(&nodes[2], 1);
+ }
+ assert!(update_2_1.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1);
+
+ let mut fail_msg = update_2_1.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone();
+ if test_case == 200 {
+ callback_fail(&mut fail_msg);
+ }
+
+ // 2 => 1
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_2_1.commitment_signed, true, true);
+
+ // backward fail on 1
+ let update_1_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1);
+ update_1_0
+ },
+ _ => unreachable!(),
+ };
+
+ // 1 => 0 commitment_signed_dance
+ if update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len() > 0 {
+ let mut fail_msg = update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone();
+ if test_case == 100 {
+ callback_fail(&mut fail_msg);
+ }
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg).unwrap();
+ } else {
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ };
+
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_1_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ if let &Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash:_, ref rejected_by_dest, ref error_code } = &events[0] {
+ assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, !expected_retryable);
+ assert_eq!(*error_code, expected_error_code);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Uexpected event");
+ }
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ if expected_channel_update.is_some() {
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { ref update } => {
+ match update {
+ &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { .. } => {
+ if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { .. } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {} else {
+ panic!("channel_update not found!");
+ }
+ },
+ &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { ref short_channel_id, ref is_permanent } => {
+ if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: ref expected_short_channel_id, is_permanent: ref expected_is_permanent } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {
+ assert!(*short_channel_id == *expected_short_channel_id);
+ assert!(*is_permanent == *expected_is_permanent);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected message event");
+ }
+ },
+ &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, ref is_permanent } => {
+ if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: ref expected_node_id, is_permanent: ref expected_is_permanent } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {
+ assert!(*node_id == *expected_node_id);
+ assert!(*is_permanent == *expected_is_permanent);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected message event");
+ }
+ },
+ }
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected message event"),
+ }
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ impl msgs::ChannelUpdate {
+ fn dummy() -> msgs::ChannelUpdate {
+ use secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
+ use secp256k1::Signature;
+ msgs::ChannelUpdate {
+ signature: Signature::from(FFISignature::new()),
+ contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ chain_hash: Sha256dHash::from_data(&vec![0u8][..]),
+ short_channel_id: 0,
+ timestamp: 0,
+ flags: 0,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ fee_base_msat: 0,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ excess_data: vec![],
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_onion_failure() {
+ use ln::msgs::ChannelUpdate;
+ use ln::channelmanager::CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY;
+ use secp256k1;
+
+ const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
+ const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
+ const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
+ const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
+
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3);
+ for node in nodes.iter() {
+ *node.keys_manager.override_session_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some(SecretKey::from_slice(&Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap());
+ }
+ let channels = [create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1), create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2)];
+ let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ // positve case
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 40000);
+
+ // intermediate node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test("invalid_realm", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
+ let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ let (mut onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
+ onion_payloads[0].realm = 3;
+ msg.onion_routing_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|1), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));//XXX incremented channels idx here
+
+ // final node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test("invalid_realm", 3, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
+ let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ let (mut onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
+ onion_payloads[1].realm = 3;
+ msg.onion_routing_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
+ }, ||{}, false, Some(PERM|1), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
+
+ // the following three with run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept() test only the origin node
+ // receiving simulated fail messages
+ // intermediate node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_node_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ // trigger error
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, |msg| {
+ // and tamper returing error message
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], NODE|2, &[0;0]);
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: false}));
+
+ // final node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_node_failure", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
+ // and tamper returing error message
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], NODE|2, &[0;0]);
+ }, ||{
+ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
+ }, true, Some(NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: false}));
+
+ // intermediate node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_node_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|2, &[0;0]);
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
+
+ // final node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_node_failure", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|2, &[0;0]);
+ }, ||{
+ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
+ }, false, Some(PERM|NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
+
+ // intermediate node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_node_feature_missing", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|3, &[0;0]);
+ }, ||{
+ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
+ }, true, Some(PERM|NODE|3), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
+
+ // final node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_node_feature_missing", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|3, &[0;0]);
+ }, ||{
+ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
+ }, false, Some(PERM|NODE|3), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_version", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.version = 1; }, ||{}, true,
+ Some(BADONION|PERM|4), None);
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_hmac", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac = [3; 32]; }, ||{}, true,
+ Some(BADONION|PERM|5), None);
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_key", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key = Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey);}, ||{}, true,
+ Some(BADONION|PERM|6), None);
+
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_channel_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], UPDATE|7, &ChannelUpdate::dummy().encode_with_len()[..]);
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|7), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
+
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_channel_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|8, &[0;0]);
+ // short_channel_id from the processing node
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|8), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
+
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_channel_feature_missing", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|9, &[0;0]);
+ // short_channel_id from the processing node
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|9), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
+
+ let mut bogus_route = route.clone();
+ bogus_route.hops[1].short_channel_id -= 1;
+ run_onion_failure_test("unknown_next_peer", 0, &nodes, &bogus_route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|10),
+ Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: bogus_route.hops[1].short_channel_id, is_permanent:true}));
+
+ let amt_to_forward = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&channels[1].2).unwrap().get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() - 1;
+ let mut bogus_route = route.clone();
+ let route_len = bogus_route.hops.len();
+ bogus_route.hops[route_len-1].fee_msat = amt_to_forward;
+ run_onion_failure_test("amount_below_minimum", 0, &nodes, &bogus_route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|11), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
+
+ //TODO: with new config API, we will be able to generate both valid and
+ //invalid channel_update cases.
+ run_onion_failure_test("fee_insufficient", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, || {}, true, Some(UPDATE|12), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: channels[0].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("incorrect_cltv_expiry", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ // need to violate: cltv_expiry - cltv_expiry_delta >= outgoing_cltv_value
+ msg.cltv_expiry -= 1;
+ }, || {}, true, Some(UPDATE|13), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: channels[0].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("expiry_too_soon", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1;
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|14), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("unknown_payment_hash", 2, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
+ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
+ }, false, Some(PERM|15), None);
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("final_expiry_too_soon", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1;
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
+ }, || {}, true, Some(17), None);
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("final_incorrect_cltv_expiry", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
+ for (_, mut pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().borrow_parts().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
+ f.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value += 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }, true, Some(18), None);
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("final_incorrect_htlc_amount", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
+ // violate amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat
+ for (_, mut pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().borrow_parts().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
+ f.forward_info.amt_to_forward -= 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }, true, Some(19), None);
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("channel_disabled", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
+ // disconnect event to the channel between nodes[1] ~ nodes[2]
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ }, true, Some(UPDATE|20), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+
+ run_onion_failure_test("expiry_too_far", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let mut route = route.clone();
+ let height = 1;
+ route.hops[1].cltv_expiry_delta += CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY + route.hops[0].cltv_expiry_delta + 1;
+ let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ let (onion_payloads, _, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, height).unwrap();
+ let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
+ msg.cltv_expiry = htlc_cltv;
+ msg.onion_routing_packet = onion_packet;
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(21), None);
+ }
}