use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler,MsgEncodable,MsgDecodable};
use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
use util::sha2::Sha256;
+use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
+use util::logger::Logger;
+use util::errors::APIError;
use crypto;
use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
use crypto::digest::Digest;
use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
-use crypto::chacha20::ChaCha20;
-use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
+use std::{ptr, mem};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::collections::hash_map;
-use std::{ptr, mem};
+use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
+use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
mod channel_held_info {
use ln::msgs;
/// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
+ #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
}
+ /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
+ #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
+ pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
+ Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
+ Fail(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
+ }
+
#[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
- impl PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
+ impl PendingHTLCStatus {
pub fn dummy() -> Self {
- Self {
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
onion_packet: None,
payment_hash: [0; 32],
short_channel_id: 0,
prev_short_channel_id: 0,
amt_to_forward: 0,
outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
- }
+ })
}
}
short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
next_forward: Instant,
/// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
+ /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
+ /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
+ /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
+ /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
+ /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
+ /// go to read them!
claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
}
struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
- /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<PendingForwardHTLCInfo>>,
claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], PendingOutboundHTLC>,
}
by_id: &mut self.by_id,
short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
- /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
}
}
}
+#[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
+const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
+
/// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
/// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
/// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
announce_channels_publicly: bool,
fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1,
+ latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
our_network_key: SecretKey,
pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
+
+ logger: Arc<Logger>,
}
const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
/// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
/// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
/// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
- pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
+ pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
announce_channels_publicly,
fee_proportional_millionths,
+ latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
secp_ctx,
channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
our_network_key,
pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
+
+ logger,
});
let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
/// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
/// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
/// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
- pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
+ pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
ChannelKeys {
funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
}
};
- let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id);
+ let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator)?;
let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
match channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel) {
Ok(())
}
+ #[inline]
+ fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<[u8; 32]>)) {
+ let (local_txn, failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
+ for payment_hash in failed_htlcs {
+ // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
+ }
+ for tx in local_txn {
+ self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
+ }
+ //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
+ //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
+ //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
+ //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
+ //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
+ }
+
+ /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
+ /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
+ pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
+ let mut chan = {
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+ if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
+ if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
+ channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ }
+ chan
+ } else {
+ return;
+ }
+ };
+ self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
+ let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
+ events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
+ /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
+ pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
+ for chan in self.list_channels() {
+ self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
+ }
+ }
+
#[inline]
fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
({
// can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
#[inline]
- fn construct_onion_keys_callback<FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
- let mut blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
+ let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
let mut first_iteration = true;
for hop in route.hops.iter() {
sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
if first_iteration {
- blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
+ blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
first_iteration = false;
}
let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
secp_call!(blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor))));
- blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
+ blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
}
}
// can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
- fn construct_onion_keys(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, HandleError> {
+ fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, HandleError> {
let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
}
/// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
- fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), HandleError> {
+ fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), HandleError> {
let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
- let mut cur_cltv = 0u32;
+ let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
// exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
// the intended recipient).
let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
- let cltv = if cur_cltv == 0 { hop.cltv_expiry_delta } else { cur_cltv };
+ let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
realm: 0,
data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
}
+ fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, SharedSecret, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
+ let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key, &self.our_network_key);
+ let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
+
+ macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
+ () => {
+ {
+ let mut sha = Sha256::new();
+ sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
+ let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
+ sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
+ onion_hash
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let mut channel_state = None;
+ macro_rules! return_err {
+ ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
+ {
+ log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
+ if channel_state.is_none() {
+ channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
+ }
+ return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+ reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
+ }), shared_secret, channel_state.unwrap());
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
+ //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
+ //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
+ //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
+ //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
+ //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
+ //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
+ return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
+ }
+
+ let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
+ hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
+ hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
+ if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
+ return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
+ }
+
+ let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
+ let next_hop_data = {
+ let mut decoded = [0; 65];
+ chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
+ match msgs::OnionHopData::decode(&decoded[..]) {
+ Err(err) => {
+ let error_code = match err {
+ msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1,
+ _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
+ };
+ return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
+ },
+ Ok(msg) => msg
+ }
+ };
+
+ //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds!
+
+ let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
+ // OUR PAYMENT!
+ if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
+ return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
+ }
+ if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
+ return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
+ }
+
+ // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
+ // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
+ // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
+ // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
+
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
+ onion_packet: None,
+ payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
+ short_channel_id: 0,
+ prev_short_channel_id: 0,
+ amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
+ })
+ } else {
+ let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
+ chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
+ chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
+
+ let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.clone();
+
+ let blinding_factor = {
+ let mut sha = Sha256::new();
+ sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
+ sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
+ let mut res = [0u8; 32];
+ sha.result(&mut res);
+ match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
+ Err(_) => {
+ // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
+ // channel's issue.
+ return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
+ },
+ Ok(key) => key
+ }
+ };
+
+ match new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
+ Err(_) => {
+ // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
+ // channel's issue.
+ return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
+ },
+ Ok(_) => {}
+ };
+
+ let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
+ version: 0,
+ public_key: new_pubkey,
+ hop_data: new_packet_data,
+ hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
+ };
+
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
+ onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
+ payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
+ short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
+ prev_short_channel_id: 0,
+ amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
+ })
+ };
+
+ channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
+ if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
+ if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
+ let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
+ let forwarding_id = match id_option {
+ None => {
+ return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
+ },
+ Some(id) => id.clone(),
+ };
+ if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = {
+ let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
+ if !chan.is_live() {
+ Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
+ } else {
+ let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
+ if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward {
+ Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
+ } else {
+ if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
+ Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } {
+ return_err!(err, code, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ (pending_forward_info, shared_secret, channel_state.unwrap())
+ }
+
/// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
Some(id) => id,
};
- let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap().serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
+ let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
};
let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
- let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).unwrap(); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
+ let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
signature: sig,
/// Sends a payment along a given route.
/// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
/// fields for more info.
+ /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
+ /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
+ /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
+ /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
+ /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
+ /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
/// See-also docs on Channel::send_htlc_and_commit.
/// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
session_key
}));
+ let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv)?;
- let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route)?;
+ let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash)?;
let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+
let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
None => return Err(HandleError{err: "No channel available with first hop!", action: None}),
Some(id) => id.clone()
};
+
+ let claimable_htlc_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash.clone());
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) = claimable_htlc_entry {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Already had pending HTLC with the same payment_hash", action: None});
+ }
+
let res = {
let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!", action: None});
}
- chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, onion_packet)?
+ chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash, htlc_cltv, onion_packet)?
};
let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
- if channel_state.claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
+ claimable_htlc_entry.or_insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute {
route,
session_priv,
- }).is_some() {
- // TODO: We need to track these better, we're not generating these, so a
- // third-party might make this happen:
- panic!("payment_hash was repeated! Don't let this happen");
- }
+ });
match res {
Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
}
let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- events.push(events::Event::SendHTLCs {
+ events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
node_id: first_hop_node_id,
- msgs: vec![update_add],
- commitment_msg: commitment_signed,
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ commitment_signed,
+ },
});
Ok(())
}
/// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
/// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
+ /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
+ /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
macro_rules! add_pending_event {
(chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
},
Err(e) => {
+ log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
mem::drop(channel_state);
- add_pending_event!(events::Event::DisconnectPeer {
+ add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
- msg: if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg } ) = e.action { msg } else { None },
+ action: e.action,
});
-
return;
},
}
});
let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- channel_state.by_id.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan);
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
+ panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
+ e.insert(chan);
+ }
+ }
}
fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
- let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
+ let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
Ok(Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
}))
}
- pub fn process_pending_htlc_forward(&self) {
+ /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
+ /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
+ /// Will likely generate further events.
+ pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
let mut new_events = Vec::new();
let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
{
if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
Ok(res) => res,
- Err(_) => {
+ Err(_e) => {
//TODO: Handle...this is bad!
continue;
},
};
- new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::SendHTLCs {
+ new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
- msgs: add_htlc_msgs,
- commitment_msg: commitment_msg,
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
+ },
}));
}
} else {
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() })
}
+ /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
+ /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
+ /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
+ /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
+ /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
+ /// still-available channels.
fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) -> bool {
let mut pending_htlc = {
match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash) {
}
match pending_htlc {
- PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => { panic!("WAT"); },
+ PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => unreachable!(),
PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
mem::drop(channel_state);
}
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFailHTLC {
+ pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
node_id,
- msg: msg,
- commitment_msg: commitment_msg,
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
+ commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
+ },
});
},
None => {},
pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
self.claim_funds_internal(payment_preimage, true)
}
- pub fn claim_funds_internal(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32], from_user: bool) -> bool {
+ fn claim_funds_internal(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32], from_user: bool) -> bool {
let mut sha = Sha256::new();
sha.input(&payment_preimage);
let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
}
match pending_htlc {
- PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => { panic!("WAT"); },
+ PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute { .. } => unreachable!(),
PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
if from_user {
panic!("Called claim_funds with a preimage for an outgoing payment. There is nothing we can do with this, and something is seriously wrong if you knew this...");
let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&source_short_channel_id) {
Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
- None => return false
+ None => {
+ // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
+ // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
+ // why its missing.
+ return false
+ }
};
let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(payment_preimage) {
Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
Err(_e) => {
+ // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
+ // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
//TODO: Do something with e?
return false;
},
};
mem::drop(channel_state);
- match fulfill_msgs {
- Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
- if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
- unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
- }
+ if let Some(chan_monitor) = fulfill_msgs.1 {
+ if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
+ unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
+ }
+ }
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFulfillHTLC {
- node_id: node_id,
- msg,
- commitment_msg,
- });
- },
- None => {},
+ if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: node_id,
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
+ update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
+ }
+ });
}
true
},
/// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
- PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap()
+ PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
}
/// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
let mut new_events = Vec::new();
+ let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
{
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let mut short_to_ids_to_insert = Vec::new();
- let mut short_to_ids_to_remove = Vec::new();
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
+ let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
- if let Some(funding_locked) = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched) {
+ let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
+ if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
let announcement_sigs = match self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
Ok(res) => res,
- Err(_e) => {
+ Err(e) => {
+ log_error!(self, "Got error handling message: {}!", e.err);
//TODO: push e on events and blow up the channel (it has bad keys)
return true;
}
msg: funding_locked,
announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
});
- short_to_ids_to_insert.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id()));
+ short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
+ } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
+ new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
+ node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
+ action: e.action,
+ });
+ if channel.is_shutdown() {
+ return false;
+ }
}
if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
for tx in txn_matched {
for inp in tx.input.iter() {
- if inp.prev_hash == funding_txo.txid && inp.prev_index == funding_txo.index as u32 {
+ if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- short_to_ids_to_remove.push(short_id);
+ short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
- channel.force_shutdown();
+ // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
+ // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
+ // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
+ failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
}
}
}
- if channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
+ if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- short_to_ids_to_remove.push(short_id);
+ short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
- channel.force_shutdown();
+ failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
+ // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
+ // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
+ // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
+ failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
}
true
});
- for to_remove in short_to_ids_to_remove {
- channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&to_remove);
- }
- for to_insert in short_to_ids_to_insert {
- channel_state.short_to_id.insert(to_insert.0, to_insert.1);
- }
+ }
+ for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
+ self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
}
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
pending_events.push(funding_locked);
}
+ self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
}
/// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
- let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
- let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
- channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
- if v.block_disconnected(header) {
- let tx = v.force_shutdown();
- for broadcast_tx in tx {
- self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
- }
- if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
- short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ let mut new_events = Vec::new();
+ let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
+ {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
+ let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
+ channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
+ if v.block_disconnected(header) {
+ if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
+ short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ }
+ failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
+ new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ false
+ } else {
+ true
}
- false
- } else {
- true
+ });
+ }
+ for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
+ self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
+ }
+ if !new_events.is_empty() {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
+ pending_events.push(funding_locked);
}
- });
+ }
+ self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
}
}
let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
ChannelKeys {
- funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
- revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
- payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
- delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
- htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
- channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
- channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
+ funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
+ revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
+ payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
+ delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
+ htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
+ channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
+ channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
}
} else {
}
};
- let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, self.announce_channels_publicly)?;
+ let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel()?;
channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
Ok(accept_msg)
}
fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
- //TODO: broke this - a node shouldn't be able to get their channel removed by sending a
- //funding_created a second time, or long after the first, or whatever (note this also
- //leaves the short_to_id map in a busted state.
let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- match channel_state.by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
- Some(mut chan) => {
- if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
}
- match chan.funding_created(msg) {
+ match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
- (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update)
+ (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
},
Err(e) => {
+ //TODO: Possibly remove the channel depending on e.action
return Err(e);
}
}
},
- None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
}
}; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
// note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
unimplemented!();
}
let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- channel_state.by_id.insert(funding_msg.channel_id, chan);
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
+ return Err(HandleError {
+ err: "Duplicate channel_id!",
+ action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: funding_msg.channel_id, data: "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned() } })
+ });
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
+ e.insert(chan);
+ }
+ }
Ok(funding_msg)
}
//encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
//but we should prevent it anyway.
- let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key, &self.our_network_key);
- let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
-
- macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
- () => {
- {
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
- let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
- sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
- onion_hash
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! return_err {
- ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
- return Err(msgs::HandleError {
- err: $msg,
- action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::UpdateFailHTLC {
- msg: msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
- channel_id: msg.channel_id,
- htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
- reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
- }
- }),
- });
- }
- }
-
- if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
- //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
- //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
- //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
- //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
- //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
- //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
- return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
- }
-
- let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
- hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
- hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
- if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
- return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
- }
-
- let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
- let next_hop_data = {
- let mut decoded = [0; 65];
- chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
- match msgs::OnionHopData::decode(&decoded[..]) {
- Err(err) => {
- let error_code = match err {
- msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1,
- _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
- };
- return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
- },
- Ok(msg) => msg
- }
- };
-
- let mut pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
- // OUR PAYMENT!
- if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
- return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
- }
- if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
- return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
- }
-
- // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
- // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
- // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
- // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
-
- PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
- onion_packet: None,
- payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
- short_channel_id: 0,
- prev_short_channel_id: 0,
- amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
- outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
- }
- } else {
- let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
- chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
- chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
-
- let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.clone();
-
- let blinding_factor = {
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
- sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
- let mut res = [0u8; 32];
- sha.result(&mut res);
- match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
- Err(_) => {
- // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
- // channel's issue.
- return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
- },
- Ok(key) => key
- }
- };
-
- match new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
- Err(_) => {
- // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
- // channel's issue.
- return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
- },
- Ok(_) => {}
- };
-
- let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
- version: 0,
- public_key: new_pubkey,
- hop_data: new_packet_data,
- hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
- };
-
- //TODO: Check amt_to_forward and outgoing_cltv_value are within acceptable ranges!
-
- PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
- onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
- payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
- short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
- prev_short_channel_id: 0,
- amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
- outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
- }
- };
-
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let (mut pending_forward_info, shared_secret, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
- if pending_forward_info.onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
- let forwarding_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&pending_forward_info.short_channel_id) {
- None => {
- return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
- },
- Some(id) => id.clone(),
- };
- let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
- if !chan.is_live() {
- let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap();
- return_err!("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
- }
- }
-
let claimable_htlcs_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(msg.payment_hash.clone());
// We dont correctly handle payments that route through us twice on their way to their
// destination. That's OK since those nodes are probably busted or trying to do network
// mapping through repeated loops. In either case, we want them to stop talking to us, so
// we send permanent_node_failure.
- match &claimable_htlcs_entry {
- &hash_map::Entry::Occupied(ref e) => {
+ let mut will_forward = false;
+ if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { short_channel_id, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
+ if let &hash_map::Entry::Occupied(ref e) = &claimable_htlcs_entry {
let mut acceptable_cycle = false;
- match e.get() {
- &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
- acceptable_cycle = pending_forward_info.short_channel_id == 0;
- },
- _ => {},
+ if let &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } = e.get() {
+ acceptable_cycle = short_channel_id == 0;
}
if !acceptable_cycle {
- return_err!("Payment looped through us twice", 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
+ log_info!(self, "Failed to accept incoming HTLC: Payment looped through us twice");
+ pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+ reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]),
+ });
+ } else {
+ will_forward = true;
}
- },
- _ => {},
+ } else {
+ will_forward = true;
+ }
}
let (source_short_channel_id, res) = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: None});
}
let short_channel_id = chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap();
- pending_forward_info.prev_short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
+ if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref mut forward_info) = pending_forward_info {
+ forward_info.prev_short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
+ }
(short_channel_id, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info)?)
},
- None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}), //TODO: panic?
+ None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}),
};
- match claimable_htlcs_entry {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
- let outbound_route = e.get_mut();
- let (route, session_priv) = match outbound_route {
- &mut PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
- (route.clone(), session_priv.clone())
- },
- _ => { panic!("WAT") },
- };
- *outbound_route = PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute {
- source_short_channel_id,
- incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
- route,
- session_priv,
- };
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
- e.insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData {
- source_short_channel_id,
- incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
- });
+ if will_forward {
+ match claimable_htlcs_entry {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
+ let outbound_route = e.get_mut();
+ let (route, session_priv) = match outbound_route {
+ &mut PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
+ (route.clone(), session_priv.clone())
+ },
+ _ => unreachable!(),
+ };
+ *outbound_route = PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute {
+ source_short_channel_id,
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
+ route,
+ session_priv,
+ };
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
+ e.insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData {
+ source_short_channel_id,
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
+ });
+ }
}
}
// is broken, we may have enough info to get our own money!
self.claim_funds_internal(msg.payment_preimage.clone(), false);
- let monitor = {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
- Some(chan) => {
- if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
- }
- chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)?
- },
- None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
- }
- };
- if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
- unimplemented!();
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
+ Some(chan) => {
+ if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", action: None})
+ }
+ chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
+ },
+ None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None})
}
- Ok(())
}
fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }));
secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }));
- let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
+ let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
let mut new_events = Vec::new();
+ let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
{
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
- let txn_to_broadcast = chan.force_shutdown();
- for tx in txn_to_broadcast {
- self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
- }
+ failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
}
}
}
+ for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
+ self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
+ }
if !new_events.is_empty() {
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
for event in new_events.drain(..) {
}
}
}
+
+ fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
+ if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
+ for chan in self.list_channels() {
+ if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
+ self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
+ }
+ }
}
#[cfg(test)]
use ln::msgs::{MsgEncodable,ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
use util::test_utils;
use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
+ use util::logger::Logger;
- use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes;
use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
+ use hex;
+
use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
let route = Route {
hops: vec!(
RouteHop {
- pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
},
RouteHop {
- pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
},
RouteHop {
- pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
},
RouteHop {
- pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
},
RouteHop {
- pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
},
),
};
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
// Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex_bytes("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex_bytes("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
-
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex_bytes("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex_bytes("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
-
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex_bytes("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex_bytes("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
-
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex_bytes("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex_bytes("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
-
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex_bytes("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex_bytes("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex_bytes("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex_bytes("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex_bytes("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
// Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
let payloads = vec!(
let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]).unwrap();
// Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
// anyway...
- assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
}
#[test]
let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
- assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex_bytes("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").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
}
fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
- node_id: SecretKey,
node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
router: Router,
}
static mut CHAN_COUNT: u32 = 0;
fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
- node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42).unwrap();
+ node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42).unwrap();
let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
impl SendEvent {
fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
match event {
- Event::SendHTLCs { node_id, msgs, commitment_msg } => {
- SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: msgs, commitment_msg: commitment_msg }
+ Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed } } => {
+ assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed }
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
}
};
node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
- node.node.process_pending_htlc_forward();
+ node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
{
let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
if $last_node {
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
} else {
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
- assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
+ assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
}
added_monitors.clear();
}
let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
match events[0] {
- Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => {
+ Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
- next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone()));
+ next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
match events[0] {
- Event::SendFailHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => {
+ Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
- next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone()));
+ next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
let mut nodes = Vec::new();
let mut rng = thread_rng();
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
for _ in 0..node_count {
- let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_vbyte: 1 });
- let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new());
+ let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
+ let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Arc::clone(&logger)));
let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
let node_id = {
rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
};
- let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()).unwrap();
- let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id).unwrap());
- nodes.push(Node { feeest, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node_id, node, router });
+ let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
+ let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), Arc::clone(&logger));
+ nodes.push(Node { feeest, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router });
}
nodes
res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
} else {
for tx in node_txn.iter() {
- if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].prev_hash == chan.3.txid() {
+ if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
funding_tx_map.insert(chan.3.txid(), chan.3.clone());
tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
for tx in node_txn.iter() {
- if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].prev_hash == res[0].txid() {
+ if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
funding_tx_map.insert(res[0].txid(), res[0].clone());
tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
let mut found_prev = false;
for tx in prev_txn {
- if node_txn[0].input[0].prev_hash == tx.txid() {
+ if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx.clone());
node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
+ test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
}
get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
- assert_eq!(nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
+ test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
}
get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
match events[0] {
- Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, .. } => {
+ Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
{
let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
- for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5 {
+ for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
}
header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
- for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5 {
+ for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
}
nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
{
let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
- node_txn.clear();
+ node_txn.swap_remove(0);
}
+ test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);