use ln::msgs;
/// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
+ #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
}
+ /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
+ #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
+ pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
+ Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
+ Fail(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
+ }
+
#[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
- impl PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
+ impl PendingHTLCStatus {
pub fn dummy() -> Self {
- Self {
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
onion_packet: None,
payment_hash: [0; 32],
short_channel_id: 0,
prev_short_channel_id: 0,
amt_to_forward: 0,
outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
- }
+ })
}
}
announce_channels_publicly: bool,
fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1,
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
our_network_key: SecretKey,
}
}
+ /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
+ /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
+ pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
+ for chan in self.list_channels() {
+ self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
+ }
+ }
+
#[inline]
fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
({
// can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
#[inline]
- fn construct_onion_keys_callback<FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
- let mut blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
+ let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
let mut first_iteration = true;
for hop in route.hops.iter() {
sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
if first_iteration {
- blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
+ blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
first_iteration = false;
}
let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
secp_call!(blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor))));
- blinded_pub = secp_call!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv));
+ blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
}
}
// can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
- fn construct_onion_keys(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, HandleError> {
+ fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, HandleError> {
let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
}
+ fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, SharedSecret, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
+ let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key, &self.our_network_key);
+ let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
+
+ macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
+ () => {
+ {
+ let mut sha = Sha256::new();
+ sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
+ let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
+ sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
+ onion_hash
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let mut channel_state = None;
+ macro_rules! return_err {
+ ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
+ {
+ log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
+ if channel_state.is_none() {
+ channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
+ }
+ return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+ reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
+ }), shared_secret, channel_state.unwrap());
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
+ //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
+ //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
+ //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
+ //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
+ //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
+ //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
+ return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
+ }
+
+ let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
+ hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
+ hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
+ if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
+ return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
+ }
+
+ let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
+ let next_hop_data = {
+ let mut decoded = [0; 65];
+ chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
+ match msgs::OnionHopData::decode(&decoded[..]) {
+ Err(err) => {
+ let error_code = match err {
+ msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1,
+ _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
+ };
+ return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
+ },
+ Ok(msg) => msg
+ }
+ };
+
+ //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds!
+
+ let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
+ // OUR PAYMENT!
+ if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
+ return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
+ }
+ if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
+ return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
+ }
+
+ // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
+ // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
+ // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
+ // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
+
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
+ onion_packet: None,
+ payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
+ short_channel_id: 0,
+ prev_short_channel_id: 0,
+ amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
+ })
+ } else {
+ let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
+ chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
+ chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
+
+ let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.clone();
+
+ let blinding_factor = {
+ let mut sha = Sha256::new();
+ sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
+ sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
+ let mut res = [0u8; 32];
+ sha.result(&mut res);
+ match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
+ Err(_) => {
+ // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
+ // channel's issue.
+ return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
+ },
+ Ok(key) => key
+ }
+ };
+
+ match new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
+ Err(_) => {
+ // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
+ // channel's issue.
+ return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
+ },
+ Ok(_) => {}
+ };
+
+ let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
+ version: 0,
+ public_key: new_pubkey,
+ hop_data: new_packet_data,
+ hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
+ };
+
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
+ onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
+ payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
+ short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
+ prev_short_channel_id: 0,
+ amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
+ })
+ };
+
+ channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
+ if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
+ if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
+ let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
+ let forwarding_id = match id_option {
+ None => {
+ return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
+ },
+ Some(id) => id.clone(),
+ };
+ if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = {
+ let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
+ if !chan.is_live() {
+ Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
+ } else {
+ let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
+ if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward {
+ Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
+ } else {
+ if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
+ Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } {
+ return_err!(err, code, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ (pending_forward_info, shared_secret, channel_state.unwrap())
+ }
+
/// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
Some(id) => id,
};
- let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap().serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
+ let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
};
let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
- let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).unwrap(); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
+ let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
signature: sig,
}
let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- events.push(events::Event::SendHTLCs {
+ events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
node_id: first_hop_node_id,
- msgs: vec![update_add],
- commitment_msg: commitment_signed,
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ commitment_signed,
+ },
});
Ok(())
}
let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone())?;
let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
- let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
+ let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
Ok(Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
continue;
},
};
- new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::SendHTLCs {
+ new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
- msgs: add_htlc_msgs,
- commitment_msg: commitment_msg,
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
+ },
}));
}
} else {
}
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- //TODO: replace by HandleError ? UpdateFailHTLC in handle_update_add_htlc need also to build a CommitmentSigned
- pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFailHTLC {
+ pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
node_id,
- msg: msg,
- commitment_msg: commitment_msg,
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
+ commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
+ },
});
},
None => {},
if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 {
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push(events::Event::SendFulfillHTLC {
+ pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
node_id: node_id,
- msg,
- commitment_msg,
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
+ update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
+ }
});
}
true
/// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
- PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).unwrap()
+ PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
}
/// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
for tx in txn_matched {
for inp in tx.input.iter() {
- if inp.prev_hash == funding_txo.txid && inp.prev_index == funding_txo.index as u32 {
+ if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
//encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
//but we should prevent it anyway.
- let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key, &self.our_network_key);
- let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
-
- macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
- () => {
- {
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
- let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
- sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
- onion_hash
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! return_err {
- ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
- return Err(msgs::HandleError {
- err: $msg,
- action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::UpdateFailHTLC {
- msg: msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
- channel_id: msg.channel_id,
- htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
- reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
- }
- }),
- });
- }
- }
-
- if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
- //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
- //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
- //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
- //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
- //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
- //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
- return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
- }
-
- let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
- hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
- hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
- if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
- return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
- }
-
- let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
- let next_hop_data = {
- let mut decoded = [0; 65];
- chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
- match msgs::OnionHopData::decode(&decoded[..]) {
- Err(err) => {
- let error_code = match err {
- msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1,
- _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
- };
- return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
- },
- Ok(msg) => msg
- }
- };
-
- //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds!
-
- let mut pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
- // OUR PAYMENT!
- if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
- return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
- }
- if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
- return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
- }
-
- // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
- // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
- // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
- // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
-
- PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
- onion_packet: None,
- payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
- short_channel_id: 0,
- prev_short_channel_id: 0,
- amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
- outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
- }
- } else {
- let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
- chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
- chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
-
- let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.clone();
-
- let blinding_factor = {
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
- sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
- let mut res = [0u8; 32];
- sha.result(&mut res);
- match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
- Err(_) => {
- // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
- // channel's issue.
- return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
- },
- Ok(key) => key
- }
- };
-
- match new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
- Err(_) => {
- // Return temporary node failure as its technically our issue, not the
- // channel's issue.
- return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
- },
- Ok(_) => {}
- };
-
- let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
- version: 0,
- public_key: new_pubkey,
- hop_data: new_packet_data,
- hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
- };
-
- //TODO: Check amt_to_forward and outgoing_cltv_value are within acceptable ranges!
-
- PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
- onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
- payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
- short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
- prev_short_channel_id: 0,
- amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
- outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
- }
- };
-
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let (mut pending_forward_info, shared_secret, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
- if pending_forward_info.onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
- let forwarding_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&pending_forward_info.short_channel_id) {
- None => {
- return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
- },
- Some(id) => id.clone(),
- };
- let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
- if !chan.is_live() {
- let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap();
- return_err!("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
- }
- }
-
let claimable_htlcs_entry = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(msg.payment_hash.clone());
// We dont correctly handle payments that route through us twice on their way to their
// destination. That's OK since those nodes are probably busted or trying to do network
// mapping through repeated loops. In either case, we want them to stop talking to us, so
// we send permanent_node_failure.
- if let &hash_map::Entry::Occupied(ref e) = &claimable_htlcs_entry {
- let mut acceptable_cycle = false;
- if let &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } = e.get() {
- acceptable_cycle = pending_forward_info.short_channel_id == 0;
- }
- if !acceptable_cycle {
- return_err!("Payment looped through us twice", 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]);
+ let mut will_forward = false;
+ if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { short_channel_id, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
+ if let &hash_map::Entry::Occupied(ref e) = &claimable_htlcs_entry {
+ let mut acceptable_cycle = false;
+ if let &PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { .. } = e.get() {
+ acceptable_cycle = short_channel_id == 0;
+ }
+ if !acceptable_cycle {
+ log_info!(self, "Failed to accept incoming HTLC: Payment looped through us twice");
+ pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+ reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 2, &[0;0]),
+ });
+ } else {
+ will_forward = true;
+ }
+ } else {
+ will_forward = true;
}
}
return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: None});
}
let short_channel_id = chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap();
- pending_forward_info.prev_short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
+ if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref mut forward_info) = pending_forward_info {
+ forward_info.prev_short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
+ }
(short_channel_id, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info)?)
},
None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel", action: None}),
};
- match claimable_htlcs_entry {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
- let outbound_route = e.get_mut();
- let (route, session_priv) = match outbound_route {
- &mut PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
- (route.clone(), session_priv.clone())
- },
- _ => unreachable!(),
- };
- *outbound_route = PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute {
- source_short_channel_id,
- incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
- route,
- session_priv,
- };
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
- e.insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData {
- source_short_channel_id,
- incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
- });
+ if will_forward {
+ match claimable_htlcs_entry {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
+ let outbound_route = e.get_mut();
+ let (route, session_priv) = match outbound_route {
+ &mut PendingOutboundHTLC::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv } => {
+ (route.clone(), session_priv.clone())
+ },
+ _ => unreachable!(),
+ };
+ *outbound_route = PendingOutboundHTLC::CycledRoute {
+ source_short_channel_id,
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
+ route,
+ session_priv,
+ };
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
+ e.insert(PendingOutboundHTLC::IntermediaryHopData {
+ source_short_channel_id,
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret: shared_secret,
+ });
+ }
}
}
secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }));
secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }));
- let our_node_sig = secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key));
+ let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
}
}
}
+
+ fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
+ if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
+ for chan in self.list_channels() {
+ if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
+ self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
+ }
+ }
}
#[cfg(test)]
chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
- node_id: SecretKey,
node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
router: Router,
}
impl SendEvent {
fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
match event {
- Event::SendHTLCs { node_id, msgs, commitment_msg } => {
- SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: msgs, commitment_msg: commitment_msg }
+ Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed } } => {
+ assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed }
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
}
let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
match events[0] {
- Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => {
+ Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
- next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone()));
+ next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
match events[0] {
- Event::SendFailHTLC { ref node_id, ref msg, ref commitment_msg } => {
+ Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
- next_msgs = Some((msg.clone(), commitment_msg.clone()));
+ next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
};
let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
- let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id).unwrap(), Arc::clone(&logger));
- nodes.push(Node { feeest, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node_id, node, router });
+ let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), Arc::clone(&logger));
+ nodes.push(Node { feeest, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router });
}
nodes
res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
} else {
for tx in node_txn.iter() {
- if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].prev_hash == chan.3.txid() {
+ if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
funding_tx_map.insert(chan.3.txid(), chan.3.clone());
tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
for tx in node_txn.iter() {
- if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].prev_hash == res[0].txid() {
+ if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
funding_tx_map.insert(res[0].txid(), res[0].clone());
tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
let mut found_prev = false;
for tx in prev_txn {
- if node_txn[0].input[0].prev_hash == tx.txid() {
+ if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx.clone());
node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
match events[0] {
- Event::SendFulfillHTLC { ref node_id, .. } => {
+ Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),