+//! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
+//!
+//! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
+//! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
+//! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
+//!
+//! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
+//! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
+//! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
+
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelKeys};
+use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelKeys};
use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
use ln::msgs;
-use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler,MsgEncodable};
+use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler};
use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
use util::sha2::Sha256;
-use util::ser::Readable;
+use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
use util::logger::Logger;
use util::errors::APIError;
Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
}
- #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
- impl PendingHTLCStatus {
- pub fn dummy() -> Self {
- let secp_ctx = ::secp256k1::Secp256k1::signing_only();
- PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
- onion_packet: None,
- incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret::new(&secp_ctx,
- &::secp256k1::key::PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[1; 32]).unwrap()),
- &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[1; 32]).unwrap()),
- payment_hash: [0; 32],
- short_channel_id: 0,
- amt_to_forward: 0,
- outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
- })
- }
- }
-
/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
session_priv: SecretKey,
},
}
- #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ #[cfg(test)]
impl HTLCSource {
pub fn dummy() -> Self {
HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
}
#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
- pub enum HTLCFailReason {
+ pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
ErrorPacket {
err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
},
data: Vec<u8>,
}
}
-
- #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
- impl HTLCFailReason {
- pub fn dummy() -> Self {
- HTLCFailReason::Reason {
- failure_code: 0, data: Vec::new(),
- }
- }
- }
}
-#[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
-pub use self::channel_held_info::*;
-#[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
-pub(crate) use self::channel_held_info::*;
+pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
err: msgs::HandleError,
fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
}
+ #[inline]
+ fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
+ Self {
+ err: match err {
+ ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
+ err: msg,
+ action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
+ },
+ ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
+ err: msg,
+ action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id,
+ data: msg.to_string()
+ },
+ }),
+ },
+ },
+ needs_channel_force_close: false,
+ }
+ }
+ #[inline]
+ fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
+ Self {
+ err: match err {
+ ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
+ err: msg,
+ action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
+ },
+ ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
+ err: msg,
+ action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id,
+ data: msg.to_string()
+ },
+ }),
+ },
+ },
+ needs_channel_force_close: true,
+ }
+ }
}
/// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
/// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
/// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
+///
/// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
/// to individual Channels.
pub struct ChannelManager {
mu: [u8; 32],
}
+/// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
pub struct ChannelDetails {
/// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
/// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
/// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
/// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
+ /// The node_id of our counterparty
pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
+ /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
/// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
pub user_id: u64,
}
impl ChannelManager {
- /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. This is
- /// the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements ChannelMessageHandler.
+ /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
+ ///
+ /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
+ /// ChannelMessageHandler.
+ ///
/// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
/// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
+ ///
/// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
}
/// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
+ ///
/// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
/// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
/// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
/// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
+ ///
/// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
/// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
+ ///
/// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- match channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel) {
- Some(_) => panic!("RNG is bad???"),
- None => {}
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
+ if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
+ } else {
+ panic!("RNG is bad???");
+ }
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
}
let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
/// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
/// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
/// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
+ ///
/// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
let (mut res, node_id, chan_option) = {
match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
Err(err) => {
let error_code = match err {
- msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRealmByte => 0x4000 | 1,
+ msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
_ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
};
return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
}
/// Sends a payment along a given route.
+ ///
/// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
/// fields for more info.
+ ///
/// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
/// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
/// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
/// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
/// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
/// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
- /// See-also docs on Channel::send_htlc_and_commit.
+ ///
/// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
+ ///
/// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
/// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fee: None,
commitment_signed,
},
});
}
/// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
+ ///
/// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
+ ///
/// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
/// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
}
/// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
+ ///
/// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
/// Will likely generate further events.
pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fee: None,
commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
},
}));
update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fee: None,
commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
},
});
/// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
/// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
/// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
+ ///
/// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
let mut sha = Sha256::new();
update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fee: None,
commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
}
});
}
};
- let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger)).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(e))?;
+ let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger))
+ .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
Ok(accept_msg)
//TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
}
- chan.accept_channel(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
+ chan.accept_channel(&msg)
+ .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
(chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
},
//TODO: same as above
//TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- chan.funding_locked(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
+ chan.funding_locked(&msg)
+ .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
},
None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
//TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?.clone()
+ chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
+ .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
},
None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
};
//TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
+ chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
+ .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
},
None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
}?;
//TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
+ if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) != 0 {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION set", msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
+ .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
Ok(())
},
None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
//TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
+ chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
},
None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
}
let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
- .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
+ .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
+ let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
+ .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
(Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update)), channel_monitor)
},
None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
}
res
}
+
+ /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
+ /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
+ /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
+ /// Note: This API is likely to change!
+ #[doc(hidden)]
+ pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
+ None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
+ Some(chan) => {
+ if !chan.is_usable() {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Channel is not in usuable state"});
+ }
+ if !chan.is_outbound() {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
+ }
+ if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
+ if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
+ unimplemented!();
+ }
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fee: Some(update_fee),
+ commitment_signed,
+ },
+ });
+ }
+ },
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
}
impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
use ln::msgs;
- use ln::msgs::{MsgEncodable,ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
+ use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
use util::test_utils;
use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
- use util::logger::Logger;
use util::errors::APIError;
+ use util::logger::Logger;
+ use util::ser::Writeable;
use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
use std::cell::RefCell;
- use std::collections::HashMap;
+ use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
use std::default::Default;
use std::rc::Rc;
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
}
impl Drop for Node {
fn drop(&mut self) {
- // Check that we processed all pending events
- assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
- assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
+ if !::std::thread::panicking() {
+ // Check that we processed all pending events
+ assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
+ }
}
}
(chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
}
+ macro_rules! check_spends {
+ ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
+ {
+ let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
+ let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
+ funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
+ $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
}
assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
- let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
- funding_tx_map.insert(funding_tx.txid(), funding_tx);
- tx_a.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
+ check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
impl SendEvent {
fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
match event {
- Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, commitment_signed } } => {
+ Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee, commitment_signed } } => {
assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fee.is_none());
SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed }
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
}
}
+ macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
+ ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
+ {
+ let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
+ added_monitors.clear();
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
{
- {
- let added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
- }
+ check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
- {
- let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
- {
- let added_monitors = $node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
- }
+ check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
+ check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
- {
- let mut added_monitors = $node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
+ check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
assert!(bs_none.is_none());
- {
- let mut added_monitors = $node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
+ check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
if $fail_backwards {
assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
}
}
}
+ macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
+ ($node: expr) => {
+ {
+ let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
+ *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
+ let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
+ let mut sha = Sha256::new();
+ sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
+ sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
+ (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
- let our_payment_preimage = [*origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
- *origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
- let our_payment_hash = {
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
- let mut ret = [0; 32];
- sha.result(&mut ret);
- ret
- };
+ let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
let mut payment_event = {
origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- {
- let mut added_monitors = origin_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
+ check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- {
- let added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
- }
-
+ check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
} else {
- {
- let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
+ check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
}
fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
- {
- let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
+ check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
{
$node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
- {
- let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- if $last_node {
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
- } else {
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- }
- added_monitors.clear();
+ if $last_node {
+ check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
+ } else {
+ check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
}
commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
}
if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
match events[0] {
- Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
+ Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fee.is_none());
expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
},
assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
}
- let our_payment_preimage = [*origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
- *origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
- let our_payment_hash = {
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
- let mut ret = [0; 32];
- sha.result(&mut ret);
- ret
- };
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
match err {
fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
- {
- let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
+ check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
match events[0] {
- Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
+ Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fee.is_none());
expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
},
nodes
}
+ #[test]
+ fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let channel_id = chan.2;
+
+ macro_rules! get_feerate {
+ ($node: expr) => {{
+ let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
+ chan.get_feerate()
+ }}
+ }
+
+ // balancing
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
+
+ // A B
+ // update_fee ->
+ // send (1) commitment_signed -.
+ // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
+ // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
+ // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
+ // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
+ // (2) RAA is delivered ->
+ // .- send (4) commitment_signed
+ // <- (3) RAA is delivered
+ // send (5) commitment_signed -.
+ // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
+ // send (6) RAA -.
+ // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
+ // <- RAA
+ // (6) RAA is delivered ->
+
+ // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
+ nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
+ let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
+ Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
+ (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
+
+ // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let payment_event = {
+ let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
+ SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
+ };
+ assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
+
+ // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
+ assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ // deliver(1), generate (3):
+ let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let bs_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
+ assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
+ assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
+ assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
+ assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
+ assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let as_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
+ assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
+ assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
+ assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
+ assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
+ assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
+ assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none()); // only (6)
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
+ assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
+ match events_2[0] {
+ Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (6)
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
+ // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
+ // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let channel_id = chan.2;
+
+ macro_rules! get_feerate {
+ ($node: expr) => {{
+ let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
+ chan.get_feerate()
+ }}
+ }
+
+ // balancing
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
+
+ // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
+ nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
+ let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
+ Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
+ update_fee.as_ref()
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
+
+ // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let payment_event = {
+ let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
+ SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
+ };
+ assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
+
+ // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
+ assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (2)
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let channel_id = chan.2;
+
+ macro_rules! get_feerate {
+ ($node: expr) => {{
+ let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
+ chan.get_feerate()
+ }}
+ }
+
+ // A B
+ // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
+ // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
+ // update_fee (never committed) ->
+ // (3) update_fee ->
+ // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
+ // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
+ // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
+ // <- (1) RAA delivered
+ // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
+ // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
+ // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
+ // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
+ // revoke_and_ack ->
+ // B should send no response here
+ // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
+ // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
+ // revoke_and_ack ->
+
+ // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
+ let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
+ let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
+ Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
+ (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
+ let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
+ // transaction:
+ nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+ // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
+ let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
+ channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
+ feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
+ };
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
+
+ update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
+ // Deliver (3)
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
+
+ // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
+ let as_second_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
+ assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
+ assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
+
+ // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
+ let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), bs_commitment_signed.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
+
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ // Delever (4)
+ let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ assert!(as_second_commitment.is_none());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let channel_id = chan.2;
+
+ macro_rules! get_feerate {
+ ($node: expr) => {{
+ let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
+ chan.get_feerate()
+ }}
+ }
+
+ let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
+
+ let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
+ let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
+ Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
+ (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
+
+ let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
+ assert!(resp_option.is_none());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
+ assert!(resp_option.is_none());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let channel_id = chan.2;
+
+ macro_rules! get_feerate {
+ ($node: expr) => {{
+ let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
+ chan.get_feerate()
+ }}
+ }
+
+ // balancing
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
+
+ let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
+
+ let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
+ let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
+ Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
+ (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+
+ let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
+
+ // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
+ nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ {
+ let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
+ added_monitors.clear();
+ }
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
+ // node[1] has nothing to do
+
+ let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
+ assert!(resp_option.is_none());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
+ // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
+
+ let commitment_update = resp_option.unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
+ let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert!(resp_option.is_none());
+
+ let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
+ let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ assert!(resp_option.is_none());
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
+ nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
+
+ send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
+ close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_update_fee() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let channel_id = chan.2;
+
+ macro_rules! get_feerate {
+ ($node: expr) => {{
+ let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
+ chan.get_feerate()
+ }}
+ }
+
+ // A B
+ // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
+ // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
+ // .- send (3) commitment_signed
+ // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
+ // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
+ // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
+ // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
+ // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
+ // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
+ // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
+ // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
+ // revoke_and_ack ->
+
+ // Create and deliver (1)...
+ let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
+
+ let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
+ let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
+ Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
+ (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
+
+ // Generate (2) and (3):
+ let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ let commitment_signed_0 = commitment_signed.unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ // Deliver (2):
+ let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
+ assert!(resp_option.is_none());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ // Create and deliver (4)...
+ nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
+ let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
+ let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
+ Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
+ (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
+
+ let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ // ... creating (5)
+ assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ // Handle (3), creating (6):
+ let (revoke_msg_0, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
+ assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ // Deliver (5):
+ let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
+ assert!(resp_option.is_none());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ // Deliver (6), creating (7):
+ let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
+ let commitment_signed = resp_option.unwrap().commitment_signed;
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ // Deliver (7)
+ let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
+ assert!(resp_option.is_none());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
+ assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
+ close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
+ }
+
#[test]
fn fake_network_test() {
// Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
node_txn.retain(|tx| {
if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
- let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
- funding_tx_map.insert(chan.3.txid(), chan.3.clone());
- tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
+ check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
if commitment_tx.is_none() {
res.push(tx.clone());
}
if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
node_txn.retain(|tx| {
if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
- let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
- funding_tx_map.insert(res[0].txid(), res[0].clone());
- tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
+ check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
} else {
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
node_txn.retain(|tx| {
if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
- let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
- funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_tx.txid(), revoked_tx.clone());
- tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
+ check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
false
} else { true }
});
for tx in prev_txn {
if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
- let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
- funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx.clone());
- node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
-
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
{
assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
- {
- let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
+ check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
// Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
// Revoke the old state
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
- let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
- funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
- node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
node_txn.swap_remove(0);
}
test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
}
+ #[test]
+ fn revoked_output_claim() {
+ // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
+ // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
+ let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
+ // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
+ // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
+
+ // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
+
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
+
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
+
+ // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
+ // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
+ let nodes = create_network(2);
+
+ // Create some new channel:
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
+ // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
+ // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
+ let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
+ let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
+
+ // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
+ check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+
+ //Revoke the old state
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
+
+ {
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
+
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
+
+ let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
+ witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
+ witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
+ witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
+ assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
+ assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
+ assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
+
+ // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
+
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
+ let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
+ }
+ get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
+ // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
+ let nodes = create_network(2);
+
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
+ // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
+ // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
+ // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
+ let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
+ let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
+
+ // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+
+ //Revoke the old state
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
+
+ {
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
+
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
+
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
+
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
+
+ let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
+ revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+ node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
+ node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
+ node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
+
+ let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
+ witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
+ witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
+ witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
+ assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
+ assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
+ assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
+
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
+
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
+ let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
+ }
+ get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+ }
+
#[test]
fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
// Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
- let our_payment_preimage = [*nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
- *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
- let our_payment_hash = {
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
- let mut ret = [0; 32];
- sha.result(&mut ret);
- ret
- };
+ let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
let mut payment_event = {
nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- {
- let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
- {
- let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
-
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
-
- {
- let mut added_monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
// nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
// state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
- let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
- funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx);
- node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
+
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
}
#[test]
for msg in reestablish_1 {
resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
}
- {
- let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- if pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- } else {
- assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
- }
- added_monitors.clear();
+ if pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
+ check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
+ } else {
+ check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
}
let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
for msg in reestablish_2 {
resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
}
- {
- let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- if pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- } else {
- assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
- }
- added_monitors.clear();
+ if pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
+ check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
+ } else {
+ check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
}
// We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff