Add a method to get session secret for onion packet to KeysInterface
[rust-lightning] / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
index 561495bb47cd948a73469a9de3c6b7f70b077acf..ac4fa819f52d7447adb6bce7c181496f1a48297f 100644 (file)
@@ -1199,11 +1199,7 @@ impl ChannelManager {
                        }
                }
 
-               let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
-                       let mut session_key = [0; 32];
-                       rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
-                       session_key
-               }).expect("RNG is bad!");
+               let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
 
                let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
 
@@ -1988,10 +1984,20 @@ impl ChannelManager {
                                        // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
                                        // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
                                        if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
+                                               let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan);
                                                pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
                                                        channel_id: msg.channel_id,
                                                        htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
-                                                       reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap().encode_with_len()[..]),
+                                                       reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
+                                                               ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &update.encode_with_len()[..])
+                                                       } else {
+                                                               // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
+                                                               // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
+                                                               // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
+                                                               // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
+                                                               // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
+                                                               ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
+                                                       },
                                                }));
                                        }
                                }