use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
-use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
-use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
+use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
+
+use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
+use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
-use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
+use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
use secp256k1;
use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelKeys};
-use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
-use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
+use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
+use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
+use ln::router::Route;
use ln::msgs;
-use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler};
-use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
-use util::sha2::Sha256;
-use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
-use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
+use ln::onion_utils;
+use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
+use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
+use util::config::UserConfig;
+use util::{byte_utils, events, rng};
+use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
+use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
use util::logger::Logger;
use util::errors::APIError;
-use crypto;
-use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
-use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
-use crypto::digest::Digest;
-use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
-
-use std::{ptr, mem};
-use std::collections::HashMap;
-use std::collections::hash_map;
+use std::{cmp, mem};
+use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
use std::io::Cursor;
-use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
+use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
-/// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
-///
-/// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
-/// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
-/// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
-///
-/// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
-/// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
-/// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
-/// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
-/// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
-/// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
-mod channel_held_info {
- use ln::msgs;
- use ln::router::Route;
- use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
- use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
-
- /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
- #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
- pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
- pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
- pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
- pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
- pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
- pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
- pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
- }
-
- #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
- pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
- Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
- Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
- }
-
- /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
- #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
- pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
- Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
- Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
- }
-
- /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
- #[derive(Clone)]
- pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
- pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
- pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
- pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
- }
-
- /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
- #[derive(Clone)]
- pub enum HTLCSource {
- PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
- OutboundRoute {
- route: Route,
- session_priv: SecretKey,
- },
- }
- #[cfg(test)]
- impl HTLCSource {
- pub fn dummy() -> Self {
- HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
- route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
- session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
- }
+// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
+//
+// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
+// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
+// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
+//
+// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
+// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
+// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
+// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
+// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
+// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
+/// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
+#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
+pub(super) struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
+ onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
+ incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ short_channel_id: u64,
+ pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
+ pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
+pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
+ Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
+ Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
+}
+
+/// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
+#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
+pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
+ Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
+ Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
+}
+
+/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
+ short_channel_id: u64,
+ htlc_id: u64,
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
+}
+
+/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
+ PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
+ OutboundRoute {
+ route: Route,
+ session_priv: SecretKey,
+ /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
+ /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
+ first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
+ },
+}
+#[cfg(test)]
+impl HTLCSource {
+ pub fn dummy() -> Self {
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
+ route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
+ session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
+ first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
}
}
+}
- #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
- pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
- ErrorPacket {
- err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
- },
- Reason {
- failure_code: u16,
- data: Vec<u8>,
- }
+#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
+pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
+ ErrorPacket {
+ err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
+ },
+ Reason {
+ failure_code: u16,
+ data: Vec<u8>,
}
}
-pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
+
+/// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
+#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
+pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
+/// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
+#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
+pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
+
+type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
+
+/// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
+/// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
+/// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
+/// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
+/// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
err: msgs::HandleError,
- needs_channel_force_close: bool,
+ shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
}
impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
#[inline]
},
}),
},
- needs_channel_force_close: false,
+ shutdown_finish: None,
+ }
+ }
+ #[inline]
+ fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
+ Self {
+ err: HandleError {
+ err,
+ action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
+ },
+ shutdown_finish: None,
}
}
#[inline]
- fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
+ fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
+ Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
+ }
+ #[inline]
+ fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
Self {
err: HandleError {
err,
},
}),
},
- needs_channel_force_close: true,
+ shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
}
}
#[inline]
- fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
- Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
- }
- #[inline]
- fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
- Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
+ fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
+ Self {
+ err: match err {
+ ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
+ err: msg,
+ action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
+ },
+ ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
+ err: msg,
+ action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id,
+ data: msg.to_string()
+ },
+ }),
+ },
+ },
+ shutdown_finish: None,
+ }
}
}
/// probably increase this significantly.
const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
-struct HTLCForwardInfo {
- prev_short_channel_id: u64,
- prev_htlc_id: u64,
- forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
+pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
+ AddHTLC {
+ prev_short_channel_id: u64,
+ prev_htlc_id: u64,
+ forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
+ },
+ FailHTLC {
+ htlc_id: u64,
+ err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
+ },
+}
+
+/// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
+/// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
+/// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
+/// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
+ /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
+ CommitmentFirst,
+ /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
+ RevokeAndACKFirst,
}
-struct ChannelHolder {
- by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
- short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
- next_forward: Instant,
+// Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
+pub(super) struct ChannelHolder {
+ pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
+ pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
+ pub(super) next_forward: Instant,
/// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
/// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
- /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
+ /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
/// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
- forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
+ pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
+ /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
+ /// can be failed/claimed by the user
/// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
/// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
/// go to read them!
- claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
+ pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
+ /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
+ /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
+ pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
}
-struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
- by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
- short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
- next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
- forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
- claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
+pub(super) struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
+ pub(super) by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
+ pub(super) short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
+ pub(super) next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
+ pub(super) forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
+ pub(super) claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
+ pub(super) pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
}
impl ChannelHolder {
- fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
+ pub(super) fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
MutChannelHolder {
by_id: &mut self.by_id,
short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
+ pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
}
}
}
///
/// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
/// to individual Channels.
+///
+/// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
+/// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
+/// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
+/// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
+///
+/// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
+/// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
+/// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
+/// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
+/// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
+/// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
+/// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
+///
+/// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
+/// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
+/// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
+/// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
+/// object!
pub struct ChannelManager {
+ default_configuration: UserConfig,
genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
- announce_channels_publicly: bool,
- fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
+ last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
our_network_key: SecretKey,
pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
+ /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
+ /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
+ /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
+ total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
+
+ keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
logger: Arc<Logger>,
}
-const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
+/// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
+/// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
+/// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
+/// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
+/// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
+const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
+pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
+
+// Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
+// ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
+// LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
+// then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
+// failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
+// LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
+#[deny(const_err)]
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
+
+// Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
+// ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
+#[deny(const_err)]
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
macro_rules! secp_call {
( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
};
}
-struct OnionKeys {
- #[cfg(test)]
- shared_secret: SharedSecret,
- #[cfg(test)]
- blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
- ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
- rho: [u8; 32],
- mu: [u8; 32],
-}
-
/// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
pub struct ChannelDetails {
/// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
pub user_id: u64,
}
+macro_rules! handle_error {
+ ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
+ match $internal {
+ Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
+ Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
+ if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
+ $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
+ if let Some(update) = update_option {
+ let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ Err(err)
+ },
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
+ ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
+ match $res {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
+ break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
+ },
+ Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
+ log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
+ let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
+ if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
+ $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ }
+ break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
+ },
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
+ ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
+ match $res {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
+ },
+ Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
+ log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
+ let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
+ if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
+ $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ }
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
+ },
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
+ handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
+ };
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
+ match $err {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
+ log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
+ let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
+ if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
+ $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ }
+ // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
+ // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
+ // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
+ // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
+ // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
+ // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
+ // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
+ // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
+ // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
+ let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
+ res
+ },
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
+ log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
+ log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
+ if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
+ match $action_type {
+ RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
+ RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
+ }
+ } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
+ else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
+ else { "nothing" },
+ (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
+ (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
+ if !$resend_commitment {
+ debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
+ }
+ if !$resend_raa {
+ debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
+ }
+ $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
+ Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
+ },
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
+ return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
+ };
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
+ return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
+ }
+}
+
+// Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
+macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
+ ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
+ match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
+ (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
+ break e;
+ },
+ (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
+ }
+ }
+}
+
impl ChannelManager {
/// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
///
/// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
/// ChannelMessageHandler.
///
- /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
/// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
///
/// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
- pub fn new(
our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
+ pub fn new(
network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
+ default_configuration: config.clone(),
genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
monitor: monitor.clone(),
chain_monitor,
tx_broadcaster,
- announce_channels_publicly,
- fee_proportional_millionths,
- latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
+ latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
+ last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
secp_ctx,
channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
next_forward: Instant::now(),
forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
+ pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
}),
- our_network_key,
+ our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
+ total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
+
+ keys_manager,
logger,
});
/// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
/// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
///
- /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
+ /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
/// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
///
- /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
+ /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
+ /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
- ChannelKeys {
- funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
- revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
- payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
- delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
- htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
- channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
- channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
- commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
- }
- } else {
- let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
- rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
- match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
- Ok(key) => key,
- Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
- }
- };
+ if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
+ }
- let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
+ let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
+
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
}
-
- let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
node_id: their_network_key,
msg: res,
});
let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
- if channel.is_usable() {
+ // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
+ // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
+ // really wanted anyway.
+ if channel.is_live() {
res.push(ChannelDetails {
channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
/// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
/// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
///
- /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
- pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- let (mut res, node_id, chan_option) = {
+ /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
+ pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+
+ let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
- let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
+ let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
+ node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
+ msg: shutdown_msg
+ });
if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
- (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
- } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
+ (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
+ } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", action: None})
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
}
};
- for htlc_source in res.1.drain(..) {
- // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
+ for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
}
let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
} else { None }
} else { None };
- let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
if let Some(update) = chan_update {
- events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
});
}
- events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
- node_id,
- msg: res.0
- });
Ok(())
}
#[inline]
- fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
+ fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
+ log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
- // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
}
for tx in local_txn {
self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
}
- //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
- //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
- //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
- //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
- //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
- //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
- //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
}
/// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
/// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+
let mut chan = {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
return;
}
};
+ log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
- let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
- events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
});
}
}
}
- #[inline]
- fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
- ({
- let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
- hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
- let mut res = [0; 32];
- hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
- res
- },
- {
- let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
- hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
- let mut res = [0; 32];
- hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
- res
- })
- }
-
- #[inline]
- fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
- let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
- hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
- let mut res = [0; 32];
- hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
- res
- }
-
- #[inline]
- fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
- let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
- hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
- let mut res = [0; 32];
- hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
- res
- }
-
- // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
- #[inline]
- fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
- let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
- let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
-
- for hop in route.hops.iter() {
- let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
-
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
- sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
- let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
- sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
-
- let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
-
- blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
- blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
-
- callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
- }
-
- Ok(())
- }
-
- // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
- fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
-
- Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
- let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
-
- res.push(OnionKeys {
- #[cfg(test)]
- shared_secret,
- #[cfg(test)]
- blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
- ephemeral_pubkey,
- rho,
- mu,
- });
- })?;
-
- Ok(res)
- }
-
- /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
- fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
- let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
- let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
- let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
- let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
- internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
- unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
-
- for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
- // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
- // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
- // the intended recipient).
- let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
- let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
- res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
- realm: 0,
- data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
- short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
- amt_to_forward: value_msat,
- outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
- },
- hmac: [0; 32],
- };
- cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
- if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
- return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
- }
- cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
- if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
- return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
- }
- last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
- }
- Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
- }
-
- #[inline]
- fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
- unsafe {
- ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
- }
- for i in 0..65 {
- arr[i] = 0;
- }
- }
-
- #[inline]
- fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
- assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
-
- for i in 0..dst.len() {
- dst[i] ^= src[i];
- }
- }
-
- const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
- fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
- let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
- buf.resize(21*65, 0);
-
- let filler = {
- let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
- let end_len = iters * 65;
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
- res.resize(end_len, 0);
-
- for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
- if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
- let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
- chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
- ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
- }
- res
- };
-
- let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
- let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
-
- for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
- ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
- payload.hmac = hmac_res;
- packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
-
- let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
- chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
- packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
-
- if i == 0 {
- packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
+ const ZERO:[u8; 65] = [0; 65];
+ fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
+ macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
+ ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
+ {
+ log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
+ return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+ sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
+ failure_code: $err_code,
+ })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
+ }
}
-
- let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
- hmac.input(&packet_data);
- hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
- hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
- }
-
- msgs::OnionPacket{
- version: 0,
- public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
- hop_data: packet_data,
- hmac: hmac_res,
}
- }
- /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
- /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
- fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
- let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
-
- let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
- packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
- let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
- chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
- msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
- data: packet_crypted,
+ if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
+ return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
}
- }
-
- fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
- assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
- let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
-
- let failuremsg = {
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
- res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
- res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
- res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
- res
- };
- let pad = {
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
- res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
- res
+ let shared_secret = {
+ let mut arr = [0; 32];
+ arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
+ arr
};
- let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
- hmac: [0; 32],
- failuremsg: failuremsg,
- pad: pad,
- };
-
- let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
- hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
- hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
+ let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
- packet
- }
-
- #[inline]
- fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
- let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
- ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
- }
-
- fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
- macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
- () => {
- {
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
- let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
- sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
- onion_hash
- }
- }
+ if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
+ //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
+ //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
+ //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
+ //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
+ //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
+ //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
+ return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
}
- if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
- log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
- return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
- channel_id: msg.channel_id,
- htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
- sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
- failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
- })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
+ let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
+ hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
+ hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
+ if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
+ return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
}
- let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
- let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
-
let mut channel_state = None;
macro_rules! return_err {
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
channel_id: msg.channel_id,
htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
- reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
+ reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
})), channel_state.unwrap());
}
}
}
- if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
- //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
- //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
- //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
- //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
- //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
- //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
- return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
- }
-
- let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
- hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
- hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
- if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
- return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
- }
-
let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
let next_hop_data = {
let mut decoded = [0; 65];
}
};
- //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds!
-
let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
// OUR PAYMENT!
- if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
+ // final_expiry_too_soon
+ if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
+ return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
+ }
+ // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
+ if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
}
+ // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
}
onion_packet: None,
payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
short_channel_id: 0,
- incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
+ incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
})
} else {
let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
- chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
+ chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[..], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
let blinding_factor = {
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
- sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
- let mut res = [0u8; 32];
- sha.result(&mut res);
- match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
- Err(_) => {
- return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
- },
- Ok(key) => key
- }
+ sha.input(&shared_secret);
+ Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
};
- if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
- return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
- }
+ let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
+ Err(e)
+ } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
version: 0,
- public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
+ public_key,
hop_data: new_packet_data,
hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
};
onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
- incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
+ incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
})
if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
let forwarding_id = match id_option {
- None => {
+ None => { // unknown_next_peer
return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
},
Some(id) => id.clone(),
};
- if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = {
+ if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
- if !chan.is_live() {
- Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
- } else {
- let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
- if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward {
- Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
- } else {
- if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
- Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
- } else {
- None
- }
+
+ // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
+ // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
+ // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
+ // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
+ // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
+ if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
+ break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
+ }
+ if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
+ break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
+ }
+ let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
+ if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
+ break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
+ }
+ if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
+ break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
+ }
+ let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
+ // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
+ if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
+ break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
+ }
+ if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
+ break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
+ }
+ break None;
+ }
+ {
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
+ if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
+ if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
+ }
+ else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
}
+ else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
+ }
+ res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
}
- } {
- return_err!(err, code, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
+ return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
}
}
}
}
/// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
+ /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
- fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
excess_data: Vec::new(),
};
- let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
- let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
+ let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
+ let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
signature: sig,
/// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
/// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
///
- /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
+ /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
///
/// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
- /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
- pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
+ /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
+ /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
+ /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
+ /// relevant updates.
+ ///
+ /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
+ /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
+ /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
+ /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
+ /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
+ pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
}
}
}
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
- let mut session_key = [0; 32];
- rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
- session_key
- }).expect("RNG is bad!");
+ let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
- let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
+ let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
- let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
- let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
+ let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
+ let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
- let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
- let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+
+ let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
- None => return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
+ let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
+ None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
Some(id) => id.clone(),
};
- let res = {
- let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
- if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
- return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
- }
- if !chan.is_live() {
- return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
- }
- chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
- route: route.clone(),
- session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
- }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::RouteError{err: he.err})?
- };
-
- let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
+ match {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
+ return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
+ }
+ if !chan.get().is_live() {
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
+ }
+ break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
+ route: route.clone(),
+ session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
+ first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
+ }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
+ } {
+ Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
+ maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
+ // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
+ // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
+ // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
+ // something else in case we will resend later!
+ return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
+ }
- match res {
- Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
- None => return Ok(()),
- }
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fee: None,
+ commitment_signed,
+ },
+ });
+ },
+ None => {},
+ }
+ } else { unreachable!(); }
+ return Ok(());
};
- if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
- unimplemented!();
- }
-
- let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: first_hop_node_id,
- updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
- update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- commitment_signed,
+ match handle_error!(self, err) {
+ Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
+ Err(e) => {
+ if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
+ } else {
+ log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
+ action: e.action,
+ });
+ }
+ Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
},
- });
- Ok(())
+ }
}
/// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
///
+ /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
+ /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
+ ///
/// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
///
/// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
/// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
-
- macro_rules! add_pending_event {
- ($event: expr) => {
- {
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push($event);
- }
- }
- }
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
- Some(mut chan) => {
- match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
- Ok(funding_msg) => {
- (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
- },
- Err(e) => {
- log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
- mem::drop(channel_state);
- add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
- node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
- action: e.action,
- });
- return;
- },
- }
+ let (res, chan) = {
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
+ Some(mut chan) => {
+ (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
+ .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
+ MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
+ } else { unreachable!(); })
+ , chan)
+ },
+ None => return
+ }
+ };
+ match handle_error!(self, res) {
+ Ok(funding_msg) => {
+ (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
+ },
+ Err(e) => {
+ log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
+ action: e.action,
+ });
+ return;
},
- None => return
}
- }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
+ };
+ // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
+ // lock before add_update_monitor
if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
unimplemented!();
}
- add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
+
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
msg: msg,
});
-
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
Ok(res) => res,
Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
};
- let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
+ let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
/// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
///
- /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
+ /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
/// Will likely generate further events.
pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+
let mut new_events = Vec::new();
let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
+ let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
{
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
None => {
failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
- for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
- let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
- short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
- htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
- incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
- });
- failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
+ match forward_info {
+ HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
+ let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
+ short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
+ htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
+ });
+ failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ },
+ HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
+ // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
+ // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
+ // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
+ // problem, not ours.
+ }
+ }
}
continue;
}
};
- let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
-
- let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
- for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
- let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
- short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
- htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
- incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
- });
- match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
- Err(_e) => {
- let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
- failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
- continue;
- },
- Ok(update_add) => {
- match update_add {
- Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
- None => {
- // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
- // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
- // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
- // commitment_signed messages when we can.
- // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
- // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
- // this channel currently :/.
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
+ let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
+ let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
+ for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
+ match forward_info {
+ HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
+ let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
+ short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
+ htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
+ });
+ match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
+ Err(e) => {
+ if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
+ log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), msg);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
+ }
+ let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
+ failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
+ continue;
+ },
+ Ok(update_add) => {
+ match update_add {
+ Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
+ None => {
+ // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
+ // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
+ // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
+ // commitment_signed messages when we can.
+ // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
+ // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
+ // this channel currently :/.
+ }
+ }
+ }
}
- }
+ },
+ HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
+ match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
+ Err(e) => {
+ if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
+ log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
+ }
+ // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
+ // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
+ // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
+ continue;
+ },
+ Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
+ Ok(None) => {
+ // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
+ // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
+ // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
+ // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
+ // messages when we can.
+ // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
+ // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
+ // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
+ }
+ }
+ },
}
}
- }
- if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
- let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
- Ok(res) => res,
- Err(e) => {
- if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
- } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
- } else {
- panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
- }
- //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
+ if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
+ let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(e) => {
+ if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
+ panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
+ }
+ //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
+ continue;
+ },
+ };
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
+ handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
continue;
- },
- };
- new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
- updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
- update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
- },
- }));
+ }
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fee: None,
+ commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
+ },
+ });
+ }
+ } else {
+ unreachable!();
}
} else {
- for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
- let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
- short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
- htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
- incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
- };
- match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
- };
- new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
- payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
- amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
- }));
+ for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
+ match forward_info {
+ HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
+ let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
+ short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
+ htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
+ };
+ match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
+ };
+ new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
+ payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
+ amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
+ });
+ },
+ HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
+ panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
+ }
+ }
}
}
}
};
}
- if new_events.is_empty() { return }
-
- new_events.retain(|event| {
- if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
- if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
- unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
- }
+ for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
+ match handle_error!(self, err) {
+ Ok(_) => {},
+ Err(e) => {
+ if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
+ } else {
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: their_node_id,
+ action: e.action,
+ });
+ }
+ },
}
- true
- });
+ }
+ if new_events.is_empty() { return }
let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- events.reserve(new_events.len());
- for event in new_events.drain(..) {
- events.push(event.1);
- }
+ events.append(&mut new_events);
}
- /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
- pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
+ /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
+ /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
+ /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
+ /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
+ /// HTLC backwards has been started.
+ pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+
let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
- for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
+ for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() });
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
+ HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
+ HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
}
true
} else { false }
/// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
/// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
/// still-available channels.
- fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
+ fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
+ //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
+ //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
+ //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
+ //timer handling.
match source {
- HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
- mem::drop(channel_state);
-
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
- payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
- });
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
+ match &onion_error {
+ &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
+#[cfg(test)]
+ let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
+#[cfg(not(test))]
+ let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
+ // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
+ // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
+ // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
+ if let Some(update) = channel_update {
+ self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
+ events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
+ update,
+ }
+ );
+ }
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
+ events::Event::PaymentFailed {
+ payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
+ rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
+#[cfg(test)]
+ error_code: onion_error_code
+ }
+ );
+ },
+ &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
+#[cfg(test)]
+ ref failure_code,
+ .. } => {
+ // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
+ // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
+ // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
+ // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
+ // ChannelDetails.
+ // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
+ // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
+ events::Event::PaymentFailed {
+ payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
+ rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
+#[cfg(test)]
+ error_code: Some(*failure_code),
+ }
+ );
+ }
+ }
},
HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
let err_packet = match onion_error {
HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
- let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
- ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
+ let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
+ onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
},
HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
- ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
- }
- };
-
- let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
- let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
- Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
- None => return
- };
-
- let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
- match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
- Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
- Err(_e) => {
- //TODO: Do something with e?
- return;
- },
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built ErrorPacket", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
}
};
- match fail_msgs {
- Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
- mem::drop(channel_state);
-
- if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
- unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
- }
-
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id,
- updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
- },
- });
+ let mut forward_event = None;
+ if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
+ forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
+ channel_state_lock.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
+ }
+ match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
},
- None => {},
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
+ }
+ }
+ mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
+ if let Some(time) = forward_event {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
+ time_forwardable: time
+ });
}
},
}
/// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
///
/// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
- pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&payment_preimage);
- let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
- sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
+ pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
+ let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
+
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
- for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
+ // TODO: We should require the user specify the expected amount so that we can claim
+ // only payments for the correct amount, and reject payments for incorrect amounts
+ // (which are probably middle nodes probing to break our privacy).
+ for (_, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
}
true
} else { false }
}
- fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
- match source {
- HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
- mem::drop(channel_state);
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
- payment_preimage
- });
- },
- HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
- //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
- let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
+ fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
+ let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
+ match source {
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
+ mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
+ payment_preimage
+ });
+ },
+ HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
+ //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+
let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
None => {
// TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
// learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
- // why its missing.
+ // why it's missing.
return
}
};
- let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
- match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
- Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
- Err(_e) => {
- // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
- // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
- //TODO: Do something with e?
- return
- },
- }
- };
-
- mem::drop(channel_state);
- if let Some(chan_monitor) = fulfill_msgs.1 {
- if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
- unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
- }
- }
-
- if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 {
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
- node_id: node_id,
- updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
- update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
- update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
+ let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
+ match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
+ Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
+ if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
+ if was_frozen_for_monitor {
+ assert!(msgs.is_none());
+ } else {
+ break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
+ update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fee: None,
+ commitment_signed,
+ }
+ });
+ }
+ },
+ Err(_e) => {
+ // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
+ // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
+ //TODO: Do something with e?
+ return
+ },
}
+ } else { unreachable!(); }
+ },
+ }
+ return;
+ };
+
+ match handle_error!(self, err) {
+ Ok(_) => {},
+ Err(e) => {
+ if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
+ } else {
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: their_node_id,
+ action: e.action,
});
}
},
/// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
/// operation.
pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
- unimplemented!();
+ let mut close_results = Vec::new();
+ let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
+ let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+
+ {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
+ let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
+ let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
+ channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
+ if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
+ let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
+ match e {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
+ // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
+ // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
+ // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
+ // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
+ // on-chain confirmations.
+ // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test
+ // should be written.
+ if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
+ short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ }
+ close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ false
+ },
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
+ }
+ } else {
+ let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
+ if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
+ htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
+ }
+ htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
+
+ macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
+ if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
+ updates: update,
+ });
+ }
+ } }
+ macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
+ if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
+ node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
+ msg: revoke_and_ack,
+ });
+ }
+ } }
+ match order {
+ RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
+ handle_cs!();
+ handle_raa!();
+ },
+ RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
+ handle_raa!();
+ handle_cs!();
+ },
+ }
+ true
+ }
+ } else { true }
+ });
+ }
+
+ for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
+ }
+ self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
+
+ for res in close_results.drain(..) {
+ self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
+ }
}
- fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
}
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
- }
-
- let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
- ChannelKeys {
- funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
- revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
- payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
- delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
- htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
- channel_close_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
- channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
- commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
- }
- } else {
- let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
- rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
- match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
- Ok(key) => key,
- Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
- }
- };
- let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger)).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(e))?;
- let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
- channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
- Ok(accept_msg)
+ let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
+ .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
+ });
+ entry.insert(channel);
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(())
}
fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
- Some(chan) => {
- if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
//TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
}
- chan.accept_channel(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
- (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration), channel_state, chan);
+ (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
},
//TODO: same as above
- None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
}
};
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
Ok(())
}
- fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
//TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
}
- match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
- Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
- (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
- },
- Err(e) => {
- return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
- }
- }
+ (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
}
- }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
- // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
- // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
- // for a bogus channel.
+ };
+ // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
+ // lock before add_update_monitor
if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
unimplemented!();
}
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg: funding_msg,
+ });
e.insert(chan);
}
}
- Ok(funding_msg)
+ Ok(())
}
fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
- Some(chan) => {
- if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
//TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
- (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
- },
- None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
+ if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
+ unimplemented!();
+ }
+ (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
}
};
- if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
- unimplemented!();
- }
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
funding_txo: funding_txo,
Ok(())
}
- fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
- Some(chan) => {
- if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
//TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- chan.funding_locked(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
- return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
+ if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg: announcement_sigs,
+ });
+ }
+ Ok(())
},
- None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
- };
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ }
}
- fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let (mut res, chan_option) = {
+ fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
//TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
+ let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
+ if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
+ if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
- (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
- } else { (res, None) }
+ (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
+ } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
}
};
- for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) {
- // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
+ for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
}
if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
- let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
});
}
}
- Ok((res.0, res.1))
+ Ok(())
}
- fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let (res, chan_option) = {
+ fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ let (tx, chan_option) = {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
//TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
- if res.1.is_some() {
+ let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
+ if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
+ if tx.is_some() {
// We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
// will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
// also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
- (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
- } else { (res, None) }
+ (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
+ } else { (tx, None) }
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
}
};
- if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
+ if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
}
if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
- let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
});
}
}
- Ok(res.0)
+ Ok(())
}
fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
//
//TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
//us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
- //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
+ //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
//but we should prevent it anyway.
- let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
+ let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
- match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
- Some(chan) => {
- if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
//TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- if !chan.is_usable() {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
+ if !chan.get().is_usable() {
+ // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
+ // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
+ // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
+ if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
+ let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
+ pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+ reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
+ // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
+ // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
+ // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
+ // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
+ // allowed.
+ onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
+ res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
+ res
+ }[..])
+ } else {
+ // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
+ // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
+ // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
+ // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
+ // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
+ onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
+ },
+ }));
+ }
}
- chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
},
- None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
}
+ Ok(())
}
fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
- Some(chan) => {
- if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let htlc_source = {
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ }
+ };
+ self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
//TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?.clone()
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
},
- None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
- };
- self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ }
Ok(())
}
- fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
- Some(chan) => {
- if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
//TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
- },
- None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
- }?;
-
- match htlc_source {
- &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, .. } => {
- // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
- let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
- let mut res = None;
- Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
- if res.is_some() { return; }
-
- let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
-
- let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
- decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
- let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
- chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
- packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
-
- if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
- if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
- let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
-
- let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
- hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
- let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
- hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
- if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
- const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
- const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
- match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
- TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
- if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
- let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
- if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
- if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len])) {
- res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
- msg: chan_update,
- });
- }
- }
- }
- },
- UNKNOWN_CHAN => {
- // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
- // current node as the HMAC validated.
- res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
- short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id
- });
- },
- _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }).unwrap();
- Ok(res)
+ if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
+ try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
+ }
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
+ Ok(())
},
- _ => { Ok(None) },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
}
}
- fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
- Some(chan) => {
- if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
//TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
+ let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
+ return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
+ //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
+ }
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg: revoke_and_ack,
+ });
+ if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fee: None,
+ commitment_signed: msg,
+ },
+ });
+ }
+ if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
Ok(())
},
- None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
}
}
- fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
- Some(chan) => {
- if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
- //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
+ #[inline]
+ fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
+ for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
+ let mut forward_event = None;
+ if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
+ forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
+ channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
+ }
+ for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
+ match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
+ }
}
- chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?
- },
- None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ }
+ }
+ match forward_event {
+ Some(time) => {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
+ time_forwardable: time
+ });
+ }
+ None => {},
}
- };
- if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
- unimplemented!();
}
-
- Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
}
- fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let ((res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor), short_channel_id) = {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
- Some(chan) => {
- if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
//TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- (chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
+ let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
+ let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
+ if was_frozen_for_monitor {
+ assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
+ } else {
+ return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ updates,
+ });
+ }
+ if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
+ (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
},
- None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
}
};
- if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
- unimplemented!();
- }
for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
}
+ self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
- let mut forward_event = None;
- if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
- forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
- channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
- }
- for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
- match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
- }
- }
- }
- }
- match forward_event {
- Some(time) => {
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
- time_forwardable: time
- });
- }
- None => {},
- }
-
- Ok(res)
+ Ok(())
}
fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
- Some(chan) => {
- if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
//TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
}
- chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
},
- None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
}
+ Ok(())
}
fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
- Some(chan) => {
- if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
- }
- if !chan.is_usable() {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
- }
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ if !chan.get().is_usable() {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
+ }
- let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
- let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
- .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
+ let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
+ let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
- let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
- let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
- let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
- secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
- secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
+ let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
+ let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
+ if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
+ self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
+ try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
+ }
- let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
+ let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
- (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
+ msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
contents: announcement,
- }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
- },
- None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
- }
- };
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
+ },
+ update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
+ });
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ }
Ok(())
}
- fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let (res, chan_monitor) = {
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
- Some(chan) => {
- if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
- return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
+ fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
+ return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
+ }
+ let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
+ if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
+ if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
+ // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
+ // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
+ // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
+ if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
+ order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
+ }
+ if commitment_update.is_none() {
+ order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
+ }
+ return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
+ //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg
+ });
+ }
+ macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
+ if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg
+ });
+ }
+ } }
+ macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
+ if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ updates
+ });
+ }
+ } }
+ match order {
+ RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
+ send_raa!();
+ send_cu!();
+ },
+ RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
+ send_cu!();
+ send_raa!();
+ },
+ }
+ if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
+ node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
+ msg,
+ });
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
+ /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
+ /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
+ /// Note: This API is likely to change!
+ #[doc(hidden)]
+ pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let their_node_id;
+ let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+
+ match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
+ if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
+ }
+ if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
+ return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
+ }
+ if !chan.get().is_live() {
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
+ }
+ their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
+ if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
+ break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
+ {
+ if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
+ unimplemented!();
+ }
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
+ node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
+ updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fee: Some(update_fee),
+ commitment_signed,
+ },
+ });
}
- let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
- (Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update)), channel_monitor)
},
- None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
}
+ return Ok(())
};
- if let Some(monitor) = chan_monitor {
- if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
- unimplemented!();
+
+ match handle_error!(self, err) {
+ Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
+ Err(e) => {
+ if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
+ } else {
+ log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: their_node_id,
+ action: e.action,
+ });
+ }
+ Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
+ },
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
+ fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
+ // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
+ // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
+ // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
+ {
+ //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
+ for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
+ if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
+ log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
+ self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
+ }
}
}
- res
+
+ let mut ret = Vec::new();
+ let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
+ ret
}
}
impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
+ // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
+ // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
+ {
+ //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
+ for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
+ if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
+ log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
+ self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
let mut ret = Vec::new();
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
ret
}
impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
- let mut new_events = Vec::new();
+ let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
+ log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
{
let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
+ let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
- let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
- new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
msg: funding_locked,
- announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
});
+ if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
+ node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
+ msg: announcement_sigs,
+ });
+ }
short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
} else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
- new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
- action: e.action,
+ action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
});
- if channel.is_shutdown() {
- return false;
- }
+ return false;
}
if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
for tx in txn_matched {
for inp in tx.input.iter() {
if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
+ log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
// some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
- new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
});
}
// hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
- new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
});
}
for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
}
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
- pending_events.push(funding_locked);
- }
self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
+ *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
}
/// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
- fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
- let mut new_events = Vec::new();
+ fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
{
let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
+ let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
if v.block_disconnected(header) {
if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
}
failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
- new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
});
}
for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
}
- if !new_events.is_empty() {
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
- pending_events.push(funding_locked);
- }
- }
self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
- }
-}
-
-macro_rules! handle_error {
- ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
- match $internal {
- Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
- Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
- if needs_channel_force_close {
- match &err.action {
- &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
- if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
- $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
- } else {
- $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
- }
- },
- &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
- &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
- &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
- if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
- $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
- } else {
- $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
- }
- },
- &None => {},
- }
- }
- Err(err)
- },
- }
+ *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
}
}
impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
//TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
- fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
+ fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg))
}
fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg))
}
- fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
+ fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg))
}
fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg))
}
- fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
+ fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg))
}
- fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
+ fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg))
}
- fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
+ fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg))
}
fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
}
fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
}
- fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
+ fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
}
fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
}
- fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
+ fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg))
}
- fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
+ fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg))
}
fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg))
}
fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg))
}
- fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), HandleError> {
- handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
+ fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg))
}
fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
- let mut new_events = Vec::new();
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
{
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
+ let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
if no_connection_possible {
+ log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
}
failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
- new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
});
}
}
});
} else {
+ log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
//TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
true
})
}
+ pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
+ match msg {
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
+ }
+ });
}
for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
}
- if !new_events.is_empty() {
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- for event in new_events.drain(..) {
- pending_events.push(event);
- }
- }
for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
}
}
- fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<msgs::ChannelReestablish> {
- let mut res = Vec::new();
- let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
+ log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
+
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
+ let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
if !chan.have_received_message() {
// drop it.
false
} else {
- res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish());
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
+ node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
+ msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
+ });
true
}
} else { true }
});
//TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
- res
}
fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+
if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
for chan in self.list_channels() {
if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
}
}
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- use chain::chaininterface;
- use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
- use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
- use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
- use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
- use ln::msgs;
- use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
- use util::test_utils;
- use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
- use util::errors::APIError;
- use util::logger::Logger;
- use util::ser::Writeable;
-
- use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
- use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
- use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
- use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
- use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
- use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
- use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
-
- use hex;
-
- use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
- use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
-
- use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
- use crypto::digest::Digest;
-
- use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
-
- use std::cell::RefCell;
- use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
- use std::default::Default;
- use std::rc::Rc;
- use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
- use std::time::Instant;
- use std::mem;
-
- fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
- // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+
+impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ self.onion_packet.write(writer)?;
+ self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
+ self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
+ self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
+ self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
+ self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
- let route = Route {
- hops: vec!(
- RouteHop {
- pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
- },
- RouteHop {
- pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
- },
- RouteHop {
- pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
- },
- RouteHop {
- pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
- },
- RouteHop {
- pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
- short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
- },
- ),
- };
-
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
-
- let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
- onion_keys
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn onion_vectors() {
- // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
- let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
-
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
-
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
-
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
-
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
-
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
-
- // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
- let payloads = vec!(
- msgs::OnionHopData {
- realm: 0,
- data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
- short_channel_id: 0,
- amt_to_forward: 0,
- outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
- },
- hmac: [0; 32],
- },
- msgs::OnionHopData {
- realm: 0,
- data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
- short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
- amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
- outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
- },
- hmac: [0; 32],
- },
- msgs::OnionHopData {
- realm: 0,
- data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
- short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
- amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
- outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
- },
- hmac: [0; 32],
- },
- msgs::OnionHopData {
- realm: 0,
- data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
- short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
- amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
- outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
- },
- hmac: [0; 32],
- },
- msgs::OnionHopData {
- realm: 0,
- data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
- short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
- amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
- outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
- },
- hmac: [0; 32],
- },
- );
-
- let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
- // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
- // anyway...
- assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
- // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
-
- let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
- let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
- assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
-
- let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
-
- let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
-
- let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("a5d3e8634cfe78b2307d87c6d90be6fe7855b4f2cc9b1dfb19e92e4b79103f61ff9ac25f412ddfb7466e74f81b3e545563cdd8f5524dae873de61d7bdfccd496af2584930d2b566b4f8d3881f8c043df92224f38cf094cfc09d92655989531524593ec6d6caec1863bdfaa79229b5020acc034cd6deeea1021c50586947b9b8e6faa83b81fbfa6133c0af5d6b07c017f7158fa94f0d206baf12dda6b68f785b773b360fd0497e16cc402d779c8d48d0fa6315536ef0660f3f4e1865f5b38ea49c7da4fd959de4e83ff3ab686f059a45c65ba2af4a6a79166aa0f496bf04d06987b6d2ea205bdb0d347718b9aeff5b61dfff344993a275b79717cd815b6ad4c0beb568c4ac9c36ff1c315ec1119a1993c4b61e6eaa0375e0aaf738ac691abd3263bf937e3").unwrap());
-
- let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
-
- let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
- assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
- }
-
- fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
- assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
- let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
- for i in 2..100 {
- header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
- }
+impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
+ fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
+ Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
+ onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ })
}
+}
- struct Node {
- chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
- tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
- chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
- node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
- router: Router,
- network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
- network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
- }
- impl Drop for Node {
- fn drop(&mut self) {
- if !::std::thread::panicking() {
- // Check that we processed all pending events
- assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
- assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
+impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ match self {
+ &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
+ 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ fail_msg.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ fail_msg.write(writer)?;
}
}
+ Ok(())
}
+}
- fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
- node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42).unwrap();
-
- let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
- let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
- Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
- node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
-
- let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
- let tx;
- let funding_output;
-
- let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
- match events_2[0] {
- Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
- assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000);
- assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
-
- tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
- value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
- }]};
- funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
-
- node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
- let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
- added_monitors.clear();
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
- let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
- Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
- let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
- let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
- added_monitors.clear();
- res
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
- {
- let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
-
- let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
- match events_4[0] {
- Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
- assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
- assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
- let events_5 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
- match events_5[0] {
- Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
- node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- let channel_id;
-
- confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
- let events_6 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
- let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
- Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
- channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
- let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
- node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
- as_announcement_sigs
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- let events_7 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
- let (announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
- Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
- (msg, update_msg)
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
- let events_8 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
- let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
- Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
- assert!(*announcement == *msg);
- update_msg
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
-
- ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx)
- }
-
- fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
- let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[a], &nodes[b]);
- for node in nodes {
- assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
- node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
- node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
+impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
+ fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
+ match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
+ 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
+ _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
}
- (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
}
+}
- fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
- let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
- let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
- let (tx_a, tx_b);
-
- node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
- let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
- let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
- Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
- msg.clone()
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
- if !close_inbound_first {
- assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
- }
- let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
- assert!(empty_a.is_none());
- if close_inbound_first {
- assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
- closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
- tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
-
- let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
- assert!(empty_b.is_none());
- assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
- tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
- } else {
- closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
- tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
-
- let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
- assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
- assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
- tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
- }
- assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
- let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
- funding_tx_map.insert(funding_tx.txid(), funding_tx);
- tx_a.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
-
- let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
- let as_update = match events_2[0] {
- Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
- msg.clone()
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
- let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
- Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
- msg.clone()
+impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ match self {
+ &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
+ 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ forward_info.write(writer)?;
},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- (as_update, bs_update)
- }
-
- struct SendEvent {
- node_id: PublicKey,
- msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
- commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
- }
- impl SendEvent {
- fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
- match event {
- Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, commitment_signed } } => {
- assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed }
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
- ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
- {
- {
- let added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
- }
- let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
- {
- let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
- {
- let added_monitors = $node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
- }
- assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
- {
- let mut added_monitors = $node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
- let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
- assert!(bs_none.is_none());
- {
- let mut added_monitors = $node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
- if $fail_backwards {
- assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- }
- assert!($node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
- {
- let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- if $fail_backwards {
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
- assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
- } else {
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- }
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
+ &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ fail_msg.write(writer)?;
}
}
+ Ok(())
}
+}
- fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
- let our_payment_preimage = [*origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
- *origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
- let our_payment_hash = {
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
- let mut ret = [0; 32];
- sha.result(&mut ret);
- ret
- };
-
- let mut payment_event = {
- origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- {
- let mut added_monitors = origin_node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
-
- let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
- };
- let mut prev_node = origin_node;
-
- for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
- assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
-
- node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- {
- let added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
- }
-
- commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
-
- let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
- match events_1[0] {
- Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
- node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
-
- let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
- if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
- match events_2[0] {
- Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
- assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
- assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- } else {
- {
- let mut added_monitors = node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
- payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
- assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
- }
-
- prev_node = node;
+impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
+ fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
+ match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
+ 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
+ _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
}
-
- (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
}
+}
- fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
- assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
- {
- let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
-
- let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
- macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
- ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
- {
- $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
- {
- let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- if $last_node {
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
- } else {
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- }
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
- commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
- }
- }
- }
-
- let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
- let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
- for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
- assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
- if next_msgs.is_some() {
- update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
- }
-
- let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
- assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
- next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- } else {
- assert!(events.is_empty());
- }
- if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
- assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
- }
-
- prev_node = node;
- }
-
- if !skip_last {
- update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
- let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
+ short_channel_id,
+ htlc_id,
+ incoming_packet_shared_secret
+});
+
+impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ match self {
+ &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
+ 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ hop_data.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ route.write(writer)?;
+ session_priv.write(writer)?;
+ first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
}
}
+ Ok(())
}
+}
- fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
- claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
- }
-
- const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
-
- fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
- let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
- for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
- assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
+impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
+ fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
+ match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
+ 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
+ route: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ }),
+ _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
}
-
- send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
}
+}
- fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
- let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
- for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
- assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
- }
-
- let our_payment_preimage = [*origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
- *origin_node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
- let our_payment_hash = {
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
- let mut ret = [0; 32];
- sha.result(&mut ret);
- ret
- };
-
- let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
- match err {
- APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
- _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
- };
- }
-
- fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
- let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
- claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
- }
-
- fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
- assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
- {
- let mut added_monitors = expected_route.last().unwrap().chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
-
- let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
- macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
- ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
- {
- $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
- }
- }
- }
-
- let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
- let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
- for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
- assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
- if next_msgs.is_some() {
- // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
- // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
- // second-to-last node!
- update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
- }
-
- let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed } } => {
- assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
- next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- } else {
- assert!(events.is_empty());
- }
- if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
- assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
- }
-
- prev_node = node;
- }
-
- if !skip_last {
- update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
-
- let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ match self {
+ &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
+ 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ err.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ failure_code.write(writer)?;
+ data.write(writer)?;
}
}
+ Ok(())
}
+}
- fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
- fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
- }
-
- fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
- let mut nodes = Vec::new();
- let mut rng = thread_rng();
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
-
- let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
- let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
-
- for _ in 0..node_count {
- let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
- let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
- let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
- let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
- let node_id = {
- let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
- rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
- SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
- };
- let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
- let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
- nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
- network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
- network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
- });
- }
-
- nodes
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn fake_network_test() {
- // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
- // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
- let nodes = create_network(4);
-
- // Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
- let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
-
- // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
-
- // Send some more payments
- send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
-
- // Test failure packets
- let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
- fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
-
- // Add a new channel that skips 3
- let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
-
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
-
- // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
- let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
- hops.push(RouteHop {
- pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
- short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
- fee_msat: 0,
- cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
- });
- hops.push(RouteHop {
- pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
- short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
- fee_msat: 0,
- cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
- });
- hops.push(RouteHop {
- pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
- short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
- fee_msat: 1000000,
- cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
- });
- hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
- hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
- let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
-
- let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
- hops.push(RouteHop {
- pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
- short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
- fee_msat: 0,
- cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
- });
- hops.push(RouteHop {
- pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
- short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
- fee_msat: 0,
- cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
- });
- hops.push(RouteHop {
- pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
- short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
- fee_msat: 1000000,
- cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
- });
- hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
- hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
- let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
-
- // Claim the rebalances...
- fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
- claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
-
- // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
- let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
-
- // Send some payments across both channels
- let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
- let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
- let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
-
- route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
-
- //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
-
- // Close down the channels...
- close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
- close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
- close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
- close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
- close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
- // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
- // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
- let mut nodes = create_network(6);
-
- // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
-
- let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
-
- *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
- assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
-
- *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
- assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
- fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
- claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
- }
-
- #[derive(PartialEq)]
- enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
- /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
- ///
- /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
- /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
- /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
- ///
- /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
- /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
- ///
- /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
- /// also fail.
- fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
- let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
-
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
- node_txn.retain(|tx| {
- if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
- let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
- funding_tx_map.insert(chan.3.txid(), chan.3.clone());
- tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
- if commitment_tx.is_none() {
- res.push(tx.clone());
- }
- false
- } else { true }
- });
- if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
- res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
- }
-
- assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
-
- if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
- node_txn.retain(|tx| {
- if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
- let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
- funding_tx_map.insert(res[0].txid(), res[0].clone());
- tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
- if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
- assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
- } else {
- assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
- }
- res.push(tx.clone());
- false
- } else { true }
- });
- assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
- }
-
- assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
- res
- }
-
- /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
- /// HTLC transaction.
- fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
- let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
- node_txn.retain(|tx| {
- if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
- let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
- funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_tx.txid(), revoked_tx.clone());
- tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
- false
- } else { true }
- });
- assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
- }
-
- fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
- let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
-
- assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- let mut found_prev = false;
-
- for tx in prev_txn {
- if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
- let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
- funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx.clone());
- node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
-
- assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
- assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
-
- found_prev = true;
- break;
- }
+impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
+ fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
+ match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
+ 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
+ failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ data: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ }),
+ _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
}
- assert!(found_prev);
-
- let mut res = Vec::new();
- mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
- res
}
+}
- fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
- let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
- let as_update = match events_1[0] {
- Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
- msg.clone()
+impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ match self {
+ &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
+ 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
+ prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
+ forward_info.write(writer)?;
},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
- let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
- Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
- msg.clone()
+ &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ htlc_id.write(writer)?;
+ err_packet.write(writer)?;
},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- for node in nodes {
- node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
- node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
}
+ Ok(())
}
+}
- #[test]
- fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
- // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
- // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
- let nodes = create_network(5);
-
- // Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
- let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
- let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
-
- // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
-
- // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
- {
- let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
- test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
- }
- get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
- assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
-
- // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
- let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
-
- // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
- {
- let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
- test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
- }
- get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
- assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
- assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
-
- macro_rules! claim_funds {
- ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
- {
- assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
- {
- let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
-
- let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
- assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
- }
- }
- }
-
- // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
- // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
- nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
- {
- let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
-
- // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
- claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
-
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
-
- check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
- }
- get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
- assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
- assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
-
- // One pending HTLC to time out:
- let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
-
- {
- let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
- for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
- header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
- }
-
- let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
-
- // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
- claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
-
- header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
- for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
- header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
- }
-
- test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
-
- header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
-
- check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
- }
- get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
- assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
- assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
-
- // Create some new channels:
- let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
-
- // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
- let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
- // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
- let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
- // Revoke the old state
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
-
- {
- let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- {
- let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
- assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
-
- let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
- funding_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
- node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
- node_txn.swap_remove(0);
- }
- test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
-
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
- header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
- test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
- }
- get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
- assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn revoked_output_claim() {
- // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
- // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
- let nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
- let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
- // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
- // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
-
- // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
-
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
-
- let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
- revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
- node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
-
- revoked_tx_map.clear();
- revoked_tx_map.insert(chan_1.3.txid(), chan_1.3.clone());
- node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
-
- // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
- // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
- let nodes = create_network(2);
-
- // Create some new channel:
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
-
- // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
- // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
- let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
- let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
-
- // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
- let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
-
- //Revoke the old state
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
-
- {
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
-
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
-
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
-
- let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
- revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
-
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
- node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
-
- let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
- witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
- witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
- witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
- assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
- assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
- assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
- assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
-
- // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
-
- assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
- let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
- assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
- assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
- assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
+impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
+ fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
+ match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
+ prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ }),
+ 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
+ htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ }),
+ _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
}
- get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
- assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
}
+}
- #[test]
- fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
- // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
- let nodes = create_network(2);
-
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
-
- // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
- // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
- // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
- let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
- let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
-
- // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
- let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
-
- //Revoke the old state
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
-
- {
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
-
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
-
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
-
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
- assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
-
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
-
- let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
- revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
- node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
- node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
- node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
-
- let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
- witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
- witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
- witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
- assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
- assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
- assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
- assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
-
- let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
- funding_tx_map.insert(chan_1.3.txid(), chan_1.3.clone());
- node_txn[3].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
-
- assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
- let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
- assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
- assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
- assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
- }
- get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
- assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
- // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
- // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
- let nodes = create_network(2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
-
- route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
- nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
- {
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
- assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- }
+impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
- let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
+ writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
+ writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
+ self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
+ (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
+ self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
- {
- let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
- assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
+ for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
+ if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
+ unfunded_channels += 1;
}
}
-
- // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
- // registering new transactions
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
- // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
- let mut nodes = create_network(3);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
-
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
-
- let our_payment_preimage = [*nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
- *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
- let our_payment_hash = {
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&our_payment_preimage[..]);
- let mut ret = [0; 32];
- sha.result(&mut ret);
- ret
- };
-
- let mut payment_event = {
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- {
- let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- added_monitors.clear();
+ ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
+ if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
+ channel.write(writer)?;
}
-
- let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
- };
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
-
- let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
- match events_1[0] {
- Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
-
- nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
- nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
-
- let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
- payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
- assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
-
- {
- let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
-
- nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
-
- {
- let mut added_monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- added_monitors.clear();
}
- // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
- // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
- // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
-
- nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
- let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
- match events_3[0] {
- Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
- assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- let tx = {
- let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
- // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
- // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
- node_txn.remove(0)
- };
-
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
-
- let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
- assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
- match events_4[0] {
- Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
- assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
- {
- let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
- monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
- .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
- }
- nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
- let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
- let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
- funding_tx_map.insert(tx.txid(), tx);
- node_txn[0].verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn test_unconf_chan() {
- // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
- let nodes = create_network(2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
-
- let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
- mem::drop(channel_state);
-
- let mut headers = Vec::new();
- let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- headers.push(header.clone());
- for _i in 2..100 {
- header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- headers.push(header.clone());
- }
- while !headers.is_empty() {
- nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
- }
- {
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
- assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
+ short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
+ (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for forward in pending_forwards {
+ forward.write(writer)?;
}
}
- let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
- assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
- }
-
- fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_htlc_fails: (usize, usize)) {
- let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
- let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
- for msg in reestablish_1 {
- resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
- }
- {
- let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- if pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- } else {
- assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
+ (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
+ payment_hash.write(writer)?;
+ (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
+ recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
+ previous_hop.write(writer)?;
}
- added_monitors.clear();
}
- let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
- for msg in reestablish_2 {
- resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
- }
- {
- let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
- if pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
- assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
- } else {
- assert!(added_monitors.is_empty());
- }
- added_monitors.clear();
- }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
- // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
- assert!((pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_fails.0 == 0) || (pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
+/// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
+///
+/// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
+/// is:
+/// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
+/// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
+/// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
+/// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
+/// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
+/// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
+/// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
+/// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
+/// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
+/// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
+/// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
+/// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
+pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
+ /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
+ /// deserialization.
+ pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
+
+ /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
+ ///
+ /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
+ pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
+ /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
+ ///
+ /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
+ /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
+ /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
+ pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
+ /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
+ ///
+ /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
+ pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
+ /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
+ /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
+ /// force-closed during deserialization.
+ pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
+ /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
+ /// deserialization.
+ pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
+ /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
+ /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
+ pub default_config: UserConfig,
+
+ /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
+ /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
+ ///
+ /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
+ /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
+ /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
+ /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
+ ///
+ /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
+ /// this struct.
+ pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
+}
- for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
- if pre_all_htlcs {
- let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
- //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
- } else {
- assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
- }
- assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
- if pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
- let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
- assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // We can't relay while disconnected
- assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0);
- assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_fails.0);
- assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
- node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
- }
- for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
- node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
+impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
+ fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
+ return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
+ }
+
+ let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
+
+ let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
+ let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
+ let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
+ for _ in 0..channel_count {
+ let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
+ if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+
+ let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
+ funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
+ if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
+ if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
+ channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
+ channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
+ let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
+ force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
+ closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
+ } else {
+ if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
+ short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
+ }
+ by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
}
-
- commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
} else {
- assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
- for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
- if pre_all_htlcs {
- let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
- //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
- } else {
- assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
+ for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
+ if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
+ closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
}
- assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
- if pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
- let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
- assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // We can't relay while disconnected
- assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0);
- assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_fails.0);
- assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
- node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
- }
- for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
- node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
- }
+ }
- commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
- } else {
- assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
+ let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
+ for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
+ let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
+ for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
+ pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
}
+ forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
}
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
- // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
- let nodes = create_network(3);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
-
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0));
-
- let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
- let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
- fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
-
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0));
-
- let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
- let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
- let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
- let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
-
- claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
- fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
-
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (1, 0), (1, 0));
- {
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- match events[1] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
+ for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
+ let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
+ for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
+ previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
}
+ claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
}
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
- fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
- //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let nodes = create_network(2);
-
- let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
-
- let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
- let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
-
- let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
-
- let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
- let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
+ let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
+ genesis_hash,
+ fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
+ monitor: args.monitor,
+ chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
+ tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
- let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
- let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
+ latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
+ last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
- let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
-
- let mut chan_announcement;
+ channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
+ by_id,
+ short_to_id,
+ next_forward: Instant::now(),
+ forward_htlcs,
+ claimable_htlcs,
+ pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
+ }),
+ our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
- macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
- () => {
- msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
- features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
- chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
- short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
- node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
- node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
- bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
- bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
- excess_data: Vec::new(),
- };
- }
- }
+ pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
+ total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
+ keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
+ logger: args.logger,
+ default_configuration: args.default_config,
+ };
- macro_rules! sign_msg {
- ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
- let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
- let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
- let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
- let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
- let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
- chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
- node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
- bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
- bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
- contents: $unsigned_msg
- }
- }
+ for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
+ channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
+ //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
+ //connection or two.
}
- let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
- sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
- let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
-
- // Configured with Network::Testnet
- let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
- unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
- sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
- assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
-
- let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
- unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
- sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
- assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
+ Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
}
}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff