/// HTLC-Success transaction.
const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
-#[derive(Clone)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
enum KeyStorage {
PrivMode {
revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
}
}
-#[derive(Clone)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
struct LocalSignedTx {
/// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
txid: Sha256dHash,
}
}
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
+/// underlying object
+impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
+ fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
+ if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo ||
+ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
+ self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
+ self.delayed_payment_base_key != other.delayed_payment_base_key ||
+ self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
+ self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
+ self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
+ self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
+ self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
+ self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
+ self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
+ self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
+ self.destination_script != other.destination_script
+ {
+ false
+ } else {
+ for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
+ if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
+ return false
+ }
+ }
+ let us = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
+ let them = other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
+ *us == *them
+ }
+ }
+}
+
impl ChannelMonitor {
pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
ChannelMonitor {
macro_rules! read_bytes {
($byte_count: expr) => {
{
- if ($byte_count as usize) + read_pos > data.len() {
+ if ($byte_count as usize) > data.len() - read_pos {
return None;
}
read_pos += $byte_count as usize;
() => {
{
let tx_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
- let tx: Transaction = unwrap_obj!(serialize::deserialize(read_bytes!(tx_len)));
+ let tx_ser = read_bytes!(tx_len);
+ let tx: Transaction = unwrap_obj!(serialize::deserialize(tx_ser));
+ if serialize::serialize(&tx).unwrap() != tx_ser {
+ // We check that the tx re-serializes to the same form to ensure there is
+ // no extra data, and as rust-bitcoin doesn't handle the 0-input ambiguity
+ // all that well.
+ return None;
+ }
let revocation_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
let a_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
- let commitment_number = (((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
+ let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));