use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
-use bitcoin::util::hash::{Hash160, BitcoinHash,Sha256dHash};
+use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
use bitcoin::util::bip143;
-use crypto::digest::Digest;
+use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
-use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
+use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use secp256k1;
use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
-use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
+use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
use util::logger::Logger;
use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
-use util::sha2::Sha256;
use util::{byte_utils, events};
use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
/// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
- /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
- /// to succeed at some point in the future).
+ /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
+ /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
///
/// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
/// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
/// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
/// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
/// channel operation.
+ ///
+ /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
+ /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
+ /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
TemporaryFailure,
/// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
/// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>)>>>,
logger: Arc<Logger>,
+ fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>
}
impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
{
let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
- let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster);
+ let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
outputs: spendable_outputs,
// In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
// we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given
// (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair.
- // TODO: Note that we currently don't really use this as ChannelManager
- // will fail/claim backwards after the first block. We really should delay
- // a few blocks before failing backwards (but can claim backwards
- // immediately) as long as we have a few blocks of headroom.
let mut existing_claim = false;
e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 {
pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
}
- fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
+ fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
+ let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
+ let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
+ monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash);
+ }
+ }
}
impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
/// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
/// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
- pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
+ pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
chain_monitor,
pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
logger,
+ fee_estimator: feeest,
});
let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
res
}
- /// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
+ /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
/// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
/// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
-/// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers).
-pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
-/// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a confirmed HTLC-Timeout or previous revoked commitment
-/// transaction before we fail corresponding inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards
-/// and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
-//TODO: We currently dont actually use this...we should
-pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
+/// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
+/// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
+/// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
+/// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
+/// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
+/// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
+/// accurate block height.
+/// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
+/// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
+/// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
+pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
+/// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
+/// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
+/// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
+/// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
+/// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
+/// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
+pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
enum Storage {
b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
feerate_per_kw: u64,
- htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
- htlc_sources: Vec<(PaymentHash, HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>,
+ htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
+}
+
+#[derive(PartialEq)]
+enum InputDescriptors {
+ RevokedOfferedHTLC,
+ RevokedReceivedHTLC,
+ OfferedHTLC,
+ ReceivedHTLC,
+ RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
+}
+
+/// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
+/// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
+/// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+enum TxMaterial {
+ Revoked {
+ script: Script,
+ pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
+ key: SecretKey,
+ is_htlc: bool,
+ amount: u64,
+ },
+ RemoteHTLC {
+ script: Script,
+ key: SecretKey,
+ preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
+ amount: u64,
+ },
+ LocalHTLC {
+ script: Script,
+ sigs: (Signature, Signature),
+ preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
+ amount: u64,
+ }
+}
+
+/// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
+/// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+enum OnchainEvent {
+ /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
+ /// bump-txn candidate buffer.
+ Claim {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
+ },
+ /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
+ /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
+ /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
+ HTLCUpdate {
+ htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
+ },
}
const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
- remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, Vec<(PaymentHash, HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>)>,
+ remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
/// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
/// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
/// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
destination_script: Script,
+ // Used to track outpoint in the process of being claimed by our transactions. We need to scan all transactions
+ // for inputs spending this. If height timer (u32) is expired and claim tx hasn't reached enough confirmations
+ // before, use TxMaterial to regenerate a new claim tx with a satoshis-per-1000-weight-units higher than last
+ // one (u64), if timelock expiration (u32) is near, decrease height timer, the in-between bumps delay.
+ // Last field cached (u32) is height of outpoint confirmation, which is needed to flush this tracker
+ // in case of reorgs, given block timer are scaled on timer expiration we can't deduce from it original height.
+ our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (u32, TxMaterial, u64, u32, u32)>,
+
+ // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
+ // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
+ // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
+ onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
+
// We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
// consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
// (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
logger: Arc<Logger>,
}
+macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
+ ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $spent_txid: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => {
+ {
+ $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
+ let mut fee = $used_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000;
+ if $value <= fee {
+ $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ fee = $used_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000;
+ if $value <= fee {
+ $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
+ fee = $used_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000;
+ if $value <= fee {
+ log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx spending {} as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
+ $spent_txid, fee, $value);
+ false
+ } else {
+ log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
+ $spent_txid, $value);
+ $value -= fee;
+ true
+ }
+ } else {
+ log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
+ $spent_txid, $value);
+ $value -= fee;
+ true
+ }
+ } else {
+ $value -= fee;
+ true
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
/// underlying object
self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
- self.destination_script != other.destination_script
+ self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
+ self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf != other.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf ||
+ self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf
{
false
} else {
payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
destination_script: destination_script,
+ our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf: HashMap::new(),
+
+ onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
+
last_block_hash: Default::default(),
secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
logger,
}
}
+ fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> u64 {
+ let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
+ for inp in inputs {
+ // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
+ tx_weight += match inp {
+ // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
+ &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
+ 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
+ },
+ // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
+ &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
+ 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
+ },
+ // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
+ &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
+ 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
+ },
+ // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
+ &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
+ 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
+ },
+ // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
+ &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
+ 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
+ },
+ };
+ }
+ tx_weight
+ }
+
+ fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 {
+ if timelock_expiration <= current_height || timelock_expiration - current_height <= 3 {
+ return current_height + 1
+ } else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 {
+ return current_height + 3
+ }
+ current_height + 15
+ }
+
#[inline]
fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
for i in 0..48 {
let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&res);
- sha.result(&mut res);
+ res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
}
}
res
// TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
- self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap().1 = Vec::new();
+ for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
+ *source = None;
+ }
}
}
/// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
/// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
/// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
- pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, htlc_sources: Vec<(PaymentHash, HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
+ pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
// TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
// so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
// (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
// timeouts)
- for ref htlc in &htlc_outputs {
+ for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
}
let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
+ log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
+ log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
*prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
*current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
}
- self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, (htlc_outputs, htlc_sources));
+ self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
//TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
/// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
/// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
/// case of onchain HTLC tx
- pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>, htlc_sources: Vec<(PaymentHash, HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>) {
+ pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
feerate_per_kw,
htlc_outputs,
- htlc_sources,
});
if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
let our_funding_info = funding_info;
if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
- // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
+ // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially
// easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
// Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
+ macro_rules! write_option {
+ ($thing: expr) => {
+ match $thing {
+ &Some(ref t) => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ t.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, current_remote_commitment_txid, prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
+ Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
- if let Some(ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point) = *prev_latest_per_commitment_point {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- writer.write_all(&prev_latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- }
- if let Some(ref latest_per_commitment_point) = *latest_per_commitment_point {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- writer.write_all(&latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- }
+ prev_latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
+ latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
match funding_info {
&Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
},
}
- if let Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- }
- if let Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- }
+ current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
+ prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
},
Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
}
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index))?;
+ $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
}
}
- macro_rules! serialize_htlc_source {
- ($htlc_source: expr) => {
- $htlc_source.0.write(writer)?;
- $htlc_source.1.write(writer)?;
- if let &Some(ref txo) = &$htlc_source.2 {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- txo.write(writer)?;
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- }
- }
- }
-
-
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref txid, &(ref htlc_infos, ref htlc_sources)) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
+ for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
- for ref htlc_output in htlc_infos.iter() {
+ for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
- }
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_sources.len() as u64))?;
- for ref htlc_source in htlc_sources.iter() {
- serialize_htlc_source!(htlc_source);
+ write_option!(htlc_source);
}
}
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
- for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ for &(ref htlc_output, ref sigs, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
- writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
- writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
- }
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_sources.len() as u64))?;
- for ref htlc_source in $local_tx.htlc_sources.iter() {
- serialize_htlc_source!(htlc_source);
+ if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
+ writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact())?;
+ } else {
+ 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ write_option!(htlc_source);
}
}
}
self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref outpoint, claim_tx_data) in self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.iter() {
+ outpoint.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.0))?;
+ match claim_tx_data.1 {
+ TxMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ script.write(writer)?;
+ pubkey.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&key[..])?;
+ if *is_htlc {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ }
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
+ },
+ TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ script.write(writer)?;
+ key.write(writer)?;
+ preimage.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
+ },
+ TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref script, ref sigs, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
+ writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
+ script.write(writer)?;
+ sigs.0.write(writer)?;
+ sigs.1.write(writer)?;
+ preimage.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
+ }
+ }
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(claim_tx_data.2))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.3))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.4))?;
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
+ for ev in events.iter() {
+ match *ev {
+ OnchainEvent::Claim { ref outpoint } => {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ outpoint.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
+ htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
Ok(())
}
self.write(writer, false)
}
- //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
- //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
-
/// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
/// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
/// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
/// revoked remote commitment tx
- fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
+ fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
// Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
// a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
- let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
( $thing : expr ) => {
match $thing {
Ok(a) => a,
- Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
+ Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
}
};
}
let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
- let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
+ let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
};
let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
- None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated),
+ None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
};
let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
// Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
// script_pubkey version.
- let payment_hash160 = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
- Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
+ let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
+ Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
} else { None };
let mut total_value = 0;
- let mut values = Vec::new();
let mut inputs = Vec::new();
- let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
+ let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
+ let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
sequence: 0xfffffffd,
witness: Vec::new(),
});
- htlc_idxs.push(None);
- values.push(outp.value);
+ inputs_desc.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput);
+ inputs_info.push((None, outp.value, self.our_to_self_delay as u32));
total_value += outp.value;
} else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
macro_rules! sign_input {
($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
{
- let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
+ let (sig, redeemscript, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
- let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap().0[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
+ let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
};
- let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
- (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
+ (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript, revocation_key)
},
Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
unimplemented!();
}
};
- $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
+ $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
$input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
$input.witness.push(vec!(1));
} else {
$input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
}
- $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
+ $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
+ (redeemscript, revocation_key)
}
}
}
- if let Some(&(ref per_commitment_data, _)) = per_commitment_option {
+ if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
- for (idx, ref htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
- let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
- if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
- tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
- tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
- return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
- }
- let input = TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid: commitment_txid,
- vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- };
- if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
- inputs.push(input);
- htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
- values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
- total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
- } else {
- let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
- input: vec![input],
- output: vec!(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
- }),
+ for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
+ if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
+ if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
+ tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
+ tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
+ return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
+ }
+ let input = TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid: commitment_txid,
+ vout: transaction_output_index,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
};
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
- txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
+ if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
+ inputs.push(input);
+ inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC });
+ inputs_info.push((Some(idx), tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
+ total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
+ } else {
+ let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: vec![input],
+ output: vec!(TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
+ value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ }),
+ };
+ let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]);
+ let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
+ let mut used_feerate;
+ if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
+ let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
+ assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
+ match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
+ }
+ txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
+ }
+ }
}
}
}
- if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
+ if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
// We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
+
+ macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
+ ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
+ if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
+ for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
+ if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
+ log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ let e = entry.get_mut();
+ e.retain(|ref event| {
+ match **event {
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
+ return htlc_update.0 != **source
+ },
+ _ => return true
+ }
+ });
+ e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
+ }
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
+ if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
+ check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
+ }
+ if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
+ check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
+ }
+ }
+ // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
}
- if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
+ if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
+ value: total_value,
});
let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
version: 2,
output: outputs,
};
- let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
+ let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
+
+ let mut used_feerate;
+ if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
+ return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
+ }
+
let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
- for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
- let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
+ for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
+ let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.0, info.1);
+ let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, info.2);
+ match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(input.previous_output.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: if info.0.is_some() { Some(revocation_pubkey) } else { None }, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: if info.0.is_some() { true } else { false }, amount: info.1 }, used_feerate, if !info.0.is_some() { height + info.2 } else { info.2 }, height)); }
+ }
}
+ assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
});
txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
-
- // TODO: We really should only fail backwards after our revocation claims have been
- // confirmed, but we also need to do more other tracking of in-flight pre-confirm
- // on-chain claims, so we can do that at the same time.
- if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
- if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
- if let Some(&(_, ref latest_outpoints)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
- for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
- log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from current remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, payment_hash.clone()));
- }
- }
- }
- if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
- if let Some(&(_, ref prev_outpoint)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
- for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in prev_outpoint.iter() {
- log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from previous remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, payment_hash.clone()));
- }
- }
- }
- }
- // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
} else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
// While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
// revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
+ log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
+
+ macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
+ ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
+ if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
+ $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
+ if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
+ // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
+ // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
+ // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
+ // payment_preimage.
+ // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
+ // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
+ // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
+ // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
+ // need to here.
+ for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
+ if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
+ continue $id;
+ }
+ }
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
+ match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ let e = entry.get_mut();
+ e.retain(|ref event| {
+ match **event {
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
+ return htlc_update.0 != **source
+ },
+ _ => return true
+ }
+ });
+ e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
+ }
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
+ if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
+ check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
+ }
+ if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
+ check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
+ }
+ }
+
if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
let revocation_point_option =
if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
},
};
let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
- None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated),
+ None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
};
}
let mut total_value = 0;
- let mut values = Vec::new();
let mut inputs = Vec::new();
+ let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
+ let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
macro_rules! sign_input {
($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
{
- let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
+ let (sig, redeemscript, htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
- let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap().0[$input.sequence as usize];
+ let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
- let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
- (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
+ (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript, htlc_key)
},
Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
unimplemented!();
}
};
- $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
+ $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
$input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
$input.witness.push($preimage);
- $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
+ $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
+ (redeemscript, htlc_key)
}
}
}
- for (idx, ref htlc) in per_commitment_data.0.iter().enumerate() {
- let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
- if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
- tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
- tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
- return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
- }
- if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
- let input = TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid: commitment_txid,
- vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
- witness: Vec::new(),
- };
- if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
- inputs.push(input);
- values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
- total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
- } else {
- let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
+ for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
+ if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
+ if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
+ tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
+ tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
+ return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
+ }
+ if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
+ let input = TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid: commitment_txid,
+ vout: transaction_output_index,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
+ inputs.push(input);
+ inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
+ inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
+ total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
+ } else {
+ let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: vec![input],
+ output: vec!(TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
+ value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ }),
+ };
+ let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]);
+ let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
+ let mut used_feerate;
+ if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
+ let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
+ assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
+ output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
+ });
+ match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
+ }
+ txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if !htlc.offered {
+ // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
+ // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
+ let input = TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid: commitment_txid,
+ vout: transaction_output_index,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: idx as u32,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
+ lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
input: vec![input],
output: vec!(TxOut {
script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
+ value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
}),
};
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
- spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
- output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
- });
- txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
+ let predicted_weight = timeout_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC]);
+ let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
+ let mut used_feerate;
+ if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, timeout_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
+ let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
+ assert!(predicted_weight >= timeout_tx.get_weight());
+ //TODO: track SpendableOutputDescriptor
+ match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script : redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
+ }
+ }
+ txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
}
}
- if !htlc.offered {
- // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
- // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
- let input = TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid: commitment_txid,
- vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: idx as u32,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- };
- let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
- input: vec![input],
- output: vec!(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
- }),
- };
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
- txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
- }
}
- if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
+ if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
+ value: total_value
});
let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
version: 2,
output: outputs,
};
- let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
+ let mut predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
- for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
- let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, (value.1).0.to_vec());
+ let mut used_feerate;
+ if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
+ return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
}
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
+
+ for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
+ let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec());
+ let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, info.2);
+ match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(input.previous_output.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*(info.0)), amount: info.1}, used_feerate, info.2, height)); }
+ }
+ }
+ assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
});
txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
-
- // TODO: We need to fail back HTLCs that were't included in the broadcast
- // commitment transaction, either because they didn't meet dust or because a
- // stale (but not yet revoked) commitment transaction was broadcast!
}
}
}
- (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
+ (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
}
- /// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key
- fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
+ /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
+ fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
return (None, None)
}
}
let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
- let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
+ let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
None => return (None, None),
Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
};
- let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
+ let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
if !inputs.is_empty() {
let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: amount, //TODO: - fee
+ value: amount
});
let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
input: inputs,
output: outputs,
};
+ let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]);
+ let mut used_feerate;
+ if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
+ return (None, None);
+ }
let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
- let sig = match self.key_storage {
+ let (sig, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
- let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]));
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]);
let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
- self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
+ (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), revocation_key)
}
Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
unimplemented!();
}
};
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
+ assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
+ let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap() as u32); // We can safely unwrap given we are past channel opening
+ match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value }, used_feerate, height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, height)); }
+ }
(Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
} else { (None, None) }
}
- fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>) {
+ fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>, Vec<(BitcoinOutPoint, (u32, TxMaterial, u64, u32, u32))>) {
let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
+ let mut pending_claims = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
}
}
- for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- if htlc.offered {
- let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
+ for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
+ if htlc.offered {
+ log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
+ let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
+ let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
- add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
- res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
- } else {
- if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
- let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
+ add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
+ let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
+ pending_claims.push((htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone(), (height_timer, TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}, 0, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)));
+ res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
+ } else {
+ if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
+ log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
+ let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
+ let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
- add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
- res.push(htlc_success_tx);
- }
+ add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
+ let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
+ pending_claims.push((htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone(), (height_timer, TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}, 0, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)));
+ res.push(htlc_success_tx);
+ }
+ }
+ watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
+ } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
}
- watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
}
- (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs)
+ (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs, pending_claims)
}
/// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
/// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
/// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
- fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
+ fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
- // TODO: If we find a match here we need to fail back HTLCs that were't included in the
- // broadcast commitment transaction, either because they didn't meet dust or because they
- // weren't yet included in our commitment transaction(s).
+ let mut local_txn = Vec::new();
+ let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
+ let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
+
+ macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
+ ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ let e = entry.get_mut();
+ e.retain(|ref event| {
+ match **event {
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
+ return htlc_update.0 != $source
+ },
+ _ => return true
+ }
+ });
+ e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
+ }
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
+ ($updates: expr) => {
+ local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0);
+ spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
+ watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2);
+ for claim in $updates.3 {
+ match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(claim.0) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
+ let mut is_local_tx = false;
+
if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
+ is_local_tx = true;
+ log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
- let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
- return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
+ append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
},
Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
- return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
+ append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
}
}
}
}
if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
+ is_local_tx = true;
+ log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
- let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
- return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
+ append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
},
Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
- return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
+ append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
}
}
}
}
- (Vec::new(), Vec::new(), (commitment_txid, Vec::new()))
+
+ macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
+ ($local_tx: expr) => {
+ for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
+ if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
+ if let &Some(ref source) = source {
+ wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if is_local_tx {
+ if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
+ }
+ if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
+ }
+ }
+
+ (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
}
/// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
- let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
- let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
+ let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
+ let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
}
Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
//TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
- // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
+ // comes back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
}
}
}
let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
- res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)).0);
+ res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), 0).0);
+ // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
+ // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
},
_ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
};
}
}
- fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
+ fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface
, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
}
};
if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
- let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output, mut updated) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
+ let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height, fee_estimator);
txn = remote_txn;
spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
}
}
- if updated.len() > 0 {
- htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
- }
} else {
if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
- let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number);
+ let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number, height, fee_estimator);
if let Some(tx) = tx {
txn.push(tx);
}
for tx in txn.iter() {
broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
}
- let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx);
- if updated.len() > 0 {
- htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
+ }
+ // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
+ // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
+ // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
+ let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx, height);
+ if updated.len() > 0 {
+ htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
+ }
+ for inp in &tx.input {
+ if self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.contains_key(&inp.previous_output) {
+ match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ let e = entry.get_mut();
+ e.retain(|ref event| {
+ match **event {
+ OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint } => {
+ return outpoint != inp.previous_output
+ },
+ _ => return true
+ }
+ });
+ e.push(OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint: inp.previous_output.clone()});
+ }
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint: inp.previous_output.clone()}]);
+ }
+ }
}
}
}
+ let mut pending_claims = Vec::new();
if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
- let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
+ let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, mut pending_txn) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height);
spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
+ pending_claims.append(&mut pending_txn);
if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
}
}
},
Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None);
+ let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, mut pending_txn) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None, height);
spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
+ pending_claims.append(&mut pending_txn);
if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
}
}
}
}
+ for claim in pending_claims {
+ match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(claim.0) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
+ for ev in events {
+ match ev {
+ OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint } => {
+ self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.remove(&outpoint);
+ },
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
+ log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
+ htlc_updated.push((htlc_update.0, None, htlc_update.1));
+ },
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ //TODO: iter on buffered TxMaterial in our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf, if block timer is expired generate a bumped claim tx (RBF or CPFP accordingly)
self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
(watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
}
+ fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash) {
+ if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
+ //We may discard:
+ //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
+ //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
+ }
+ self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.retain(|_, ref mut v| if v.3 == height { false } else { true });
+ self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
+ }
+
pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
- // TODO: We need to consider HTLCs which weren't included in latest local commitment
- // transaction (or in any of the latest two local commitment transactions). This probably
- // needs to use the same logic as the revoked-tx-announe logic - checking the last two
- // remote commitment transactions. This probably has implications for what data we need to
- // store in local commitment transactions.
- // TODO: We need to consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
+ // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
+ // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
+ // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
+ // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
+ // broadcast if we go on-chain.
+ // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
// strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
// to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
// updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
// easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
+ macro_rules! scan_commitment {
+ ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
+ for ref htlc in $htlcs {
+ // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
+ // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
+ // time out the HTLC first.
+ // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
+ // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
+ // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
+ // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
+ // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
+ // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
+ // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
+ // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
+ // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
+ // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
+ // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
+ // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
+ // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
+ // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
+ // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
+ // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
+ // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
+ // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
+ // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
+ // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
+ let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
+ if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
+ (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
+ log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
- // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
- // time out the HTLC first.
- // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
- // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
- // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
- // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
- // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
- // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
- // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
- // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
- // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
- // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
- // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
- // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
- // aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
- // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
- // outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
- // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
- // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
- if ( htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) ||
- (!htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
- return true;
+ scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
+ }
+
+ if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
+ if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
+ if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
+ scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
+ }
+ }
+ if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
+ if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
+ scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
}
}
}
+
false
}
/// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
/// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
- fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)> {
+ fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction
, height: u32) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)> {
let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
let mut payment_data = None;
+ let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
+ || (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
+ let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
+ let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
+
+ macro_rules! log_claim {
+ ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
+ // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
+ // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
+ // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
+ // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
+ let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
+ if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
+ (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
+ log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
+ $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
+ if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
+ if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
+ } else {
+ log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
+ $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
+ if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
+ if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
+ }
+ }
+ }
- macro_rules! scan_commitment {
- ($htlc_outputs: expr, $htlc_sources: expr, $source: expr) => {
- for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, ref vout) in $htlc_sources.iter() {
- if &Some(input.previous_output.vout) == vout {
- log_trace!(self, "Input spending {}:{} resolves HTLC with payment hash {} from {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $source);
- payment_data = Some((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
+ macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
+ ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
+ if let &Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
+ for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
+ if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
+ if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
+ log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
+ payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
}
}
- if payment_data.is_none() {
- for htlc_output in $htlc_outputs {
- if input.previous_output.vout == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
- log_info!(self, "Input spending {}:{} in {} resolves inbound HTLC with timeout from {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(), $source);
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! scan_commitment {
+ ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
+ for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
+ if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
+ if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
+ log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
+ // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
+ // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
+ // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
+ // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
+ // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
+ payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
+ } else if !$local_tx {
+ if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
+ check_htlc_valid_remote!(current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
+ }
+ if payment_data.is_none() {
+ if let Storage::Local { ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
+ check_htlc_valid_remote!(prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if payment_data.is_none() {
+ log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
continue 'outer_loop;
}
}
if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
- scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a),
- current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_sources,
- "our latest local commitment tx");
+ scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
+ "our latest local commitment tx", true);
}
}
if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
- scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a),
- prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_sources,
- "our latest local commitment tx");
+ scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
+ "our previous local commitment tx", true);
}
}
- if let Some(&(ref htlc_outputs, ref htlc_sources)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
- scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs, htlc_sources, "remote commitment tx");
+ if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
+ scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
+ "remote commitment tx", false);
}
- // If tx isn't solving htlc output from local/remote commitment tx and htlc isn't outbound we don't need
- // to broadcast solving backward
+ // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
+ // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
- if (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
- || (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33) {
- log_error!(self, "Remote used revocation sig to take a {} HTLC output at index {} from commitment_tx {}", if input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { "offered" } else { "accepted" }, input.previous_output.vout, input.previous_output.txid);
- } else if input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
- payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&tx.input[0].witness[3]);
+ if accepted_preimage_claim {
+ payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
- } else if input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
- payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&tx.input[0].witness[1]);
+ } else if offered_preimage_claim {
+ payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
} else {
- htlc_updated.push((source, None, payment_hash));
+ log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ let e = entry.get_mut();
+ e.retain(|ref event| {
+ match **event {
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
+ return htlc_update.0 != source
+ },
+ _ => return true
+ }
+ });
+ e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
+ }
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
+ }
+ }
}
}
}
let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
- let latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
+ let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
// Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
// barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
let outpoint = OutPoint {
index: Readable::read(reader)?,
};
let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
- let current_remote_commitment_txid = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
- let prev_remote_commitment_txid = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
+ let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
Storage::Local {
revocation_base_key,
htlc_base_key,
if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
} else {
- Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &second_point_slice)))))
+ Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
}
}
};
let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let transaction_output_index: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
HTLCOutputInCommitment {
offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
}
}
- macro_rules! read_htlc_source {
- () => {
- {
- (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?,
- match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- }
- )
- }
- }
- }
-
let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let outputs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..outputs_count {
- outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
+ let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
+ for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
+ htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
}
- let sources_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut sources = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(sources_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..sources_count {
- sources.push(read_htlc_source!());
- }
- if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, (outputs, sources)) {
+ if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let htlc_outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
- for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
- let out = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
- let sigs = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
- htlc_outputs.push((out, sigs.0, sigs.1));
- }
-
- let htlc_sources_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
- for _ in 0..htlc_sources_len {
- htlc_sources.push(read_htlc_source!());
+ let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
+ for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
+ let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
+ let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+ htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
}
LocalSignedTx {
txid: tx.txid(),
- tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs, htlc_sources
+ tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw,
+ htlc_outputs: htlcs
}
}
}
let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
- sha.reset();
- sha.input(&preimage.0[..]);
- let mut hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
- sha.result(&mut hash.0[..]);
+ let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
+ for _ in 0..our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len {
+ let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let tx_material = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => {
+ let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let is_htlc = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => true,
+ 1 => false,
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+ let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ TxMaterial::Revoked {
+ script,
+ pubkey,
+ key,
+ is_htlc,
+ amount
+ }
+ },
+ 1 => {
+ let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
+ script,
+ key,
+ preimage,
+ amount
+ }
+ },
+ 2 => {
+ let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let our_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ TxMaterial::LocalHTLC {
+ script,
+ sigs: (their_sig, our_sig),
+ preimage,
+ amount
+ }
+ }
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+ let last_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let timelock_expiration = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.insert(outpoint, (height_target, tx_material, last_fee, timelock_expiration, height));
+ }
+
+ let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
+ for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
+ let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
+ for _ in 0..events_len {
+ let ev = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => {
+ let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ OnchainEvent::Claim {
+ outpoint
+ }
+ },
+ 1 => {
+ let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
+ htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
+ }
+ },
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+ events.push(ev);
+ }
+ onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
+ }
+
Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
payment_preimages,
destination_script,
+
+ our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf,
+
+ onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
+
last_block_hash,
secp_ctx,
logger,
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
- use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
- use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
- use crypto::digest::Digest;
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
+ use bitcoin::util::bip143;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
use hex;
use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
- use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
+ use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, InputDescriptors};
+ use ln::chan_utils;
use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
- use util::sha2::Sha256;
use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
- use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
+ use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
use std::sync::Arc;
{
// insert_secret correct sequence
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
{
// insert_secret #1 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
{
// insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
{
// insert_secret #3 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
{
// insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
{
// insert_secret #5 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
{
// insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
{
// insert_secret #7 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
{
// insert_secret #8 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
fn test_prune_preimages() {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
- let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
+ let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
macro_rules! dummy_keys {
() => {
{
for _ in 0..20 {
let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&preimage.0[..]);
- let mut hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
- sha.result(&mut hash.0[..]);
+ let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
preimages.push((preimage, hash));
}
}
{
let mut res = Vec::new();
for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
- res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
+ res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
offered: true,
amount_msat: 0,
cltv_expiry: 0,
payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
- transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
- });
+ transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
+ }, None));
}
res
}
($preimages_slice: expr) => {
{
let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
- let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
+ let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
res
}
}
// Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
// old state.
- let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
- monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]), Vec::new());
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), Vec::new(), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
+ monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
}
// Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
// previous commitment tx's preimages too
- monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]), Vec::new());
+ monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
// But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
- monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]), Vec::new());
+ monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
}
+ #[test]
+ fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
+ // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
+ // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
+
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
+ let mut sum_actual_sigs: u64 = 0;
+
+ macro_rules! sign_input {
+ ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
+ let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
+ offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
+ amount_msat: 0,
+ cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
+ transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
+ };
+ let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
+ let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
+ $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len() as u64;
+ if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
+ $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
+ } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
+ $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
+ } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
+ $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
+ } else {
+ $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
+ }
+ $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
+ println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
+ println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
+ println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
+ }
+ }
+
+ let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
+ let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
+
+ // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
+ let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+ for i in 0..4 {
+ claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid,
+ vout: i,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ });
+ }
+ claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
+ value: 0,
+ });
+ let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
+ let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
+ for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
+ }
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
+
+ // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
+ claim_tx.input.clear();
+ sum_actual_sigs = 0;
+ for i in 0..4 {
+ claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid,
+ vout: i,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ });
+ }
+ let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
+ let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
+ for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
+ }
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
+
+ // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
+ claim_tx.input.clear();
+ sum_actual_sigs = 0;
+ claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid,
+ vout: 0,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ });
+ let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
+ let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
+ for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
+ }
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
+ }
+
// Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.
}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff