use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
-use bitcoin::util::hash::{Hash160, BitcoinHash,Sha256dHash};
+use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash,Sha256dHash};
use bitcoin::util::bip143;
-use crypto::digest::Digest;
+use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
use util::logger::Logger;
use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
-use util::sha2::Sha256;
use util::{byte_utils, events};
use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
/// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
/// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers).
pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
+/// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a confirmed HTLC-Timeout or previous revoked commitment
+/// transaction before we fail corresponding inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards
+/// and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
+//TODO: We currently dont actually use this...we should
+pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
enum Storage {
let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&res);
- sha.result(&mut res);
+ res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
}
}
res
}
let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
+ log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
+ log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
*prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
*current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
// Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
// script_pubkey version.
- let payment_hash160 = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
+ let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
} else { None };
watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
+ log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
+
if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
let revocation_point_option =
if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
});
txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
+
+ // TODO: We need to fail back HTLCs that were't included in the broadcast
+ // commitment transaction, either because they didn't meet dust or because a
+ // stale (but not yet revoked) commitment transaction was broadcast!
}
}
}
/// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
+ // TODO: If we find a match here we need to fail back HTLCs that were't included in the
+ // broadcast commitment transaction, either because they didn't meet dust or because they
+ // weren't yet included in our commitment transaction(s).
if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
match self.key_storage {
if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
- let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
+ let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
}
pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
+ // TODO: We need to consider HTLCs which weren't included in latest local commitment
+ // transaction (or in any of the latest two local commitment transactions). This probably
+ // needs to use the same logic as the revoked-tx-announe logic - checking the last two
+ // remote commitment transactions. This probably has implications for what data we need to
+ // store in local commitment transactions.
+ // TODO: We need to consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
+ // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
+ // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
+ // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
+ // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
// For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
}
if payment_data.is_none() {
for htlc_output in $htlc_outputs {
- if input.previous_output.vout == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
+ if input.previous_output.vout == htlc_output.transaction_output_index && !htlc_output.offered {
log_info!(self, "Input spending {}:{} in {} resolves inbound HTLC with timeout from {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(), $source);
continue 'outer_loop;
+ } else if input.previous_output.vout == htlc_output.transaction_output_index && tx.lock_time > 0 {
+ log_info!(self, "Input spending {}:{} in {} resolves offered HTLC with HTLC-timeout from {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(), $source);
+ continue 'outer_loop;
}
}
}
let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
- sha.reset();
- sha.input(&preimage.0[..]);
- let mut hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
- sha.result(&mut hash.0[..]);
+ let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
mod tests {
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
- use crypto::digest::Digest;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use hex;
use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
- use util::sha2::Sha256;
use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
for _ in 0..20 {
let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&preimage.0[..]);
- let mut hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
- sha.result(&mut hash.0[..]);
+ let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
preimages.push((preimage, hash));
}
}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff