use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
-use bitcoin::util::hash::{Hash160, BitcoinHash,Sha256dHash};
+use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash,Sha256dHash};
use bitcoin::util::bip143;
-use crypto::digest::Digest;
+use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
use util::logger::Logger;
use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
-use util::sha2::Sha256;
use util::{byte_utils, events};
use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
feerate_per_kw: u64,
- htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
- htlc_sources: Vec<(PaymentHash, HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>,
+ htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
}
const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
- remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, Vec<(PaymentHash, HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>)>,
+ remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
/// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
/// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
/// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&res);
- sha.result(&mut res);
+ res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
}
}
res
// TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
- self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap().1 = Vec::new();
+ for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
+ *source = None;
+ }
}
}
/// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
/// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
/// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
- pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, htlc_sources: Vec<(PaymentHash, HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
+ pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
// TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
// so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
// (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
// timeouts)
- for ref htlc in &htlc_outputs {
+ for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
}
let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
+ log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
+ log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
*prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
*current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
}
- self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, (htlc_outputs, htlc_sources));
+ self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
//TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
/// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
/// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
/// case of onchain HTLC tx
- pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>, htlc_sources: Vec<(PaymentHash, HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>) {
+ pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
feerate_per_kw,
htlc_outputs,
- htlc_sources,
});
if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
// Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
+ macro_rules! write_option {
+ ($thing: expr) => {
+ match $thing {
+ &Some(ref t) => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ t.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, current_remote_commitment_txid, prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
+ Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
},
}
- if let Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- }
- if let Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- }
+ write_option!(current_remote_commitment_txid);
+ write_option!(prev_remote_commitment_txid);
},
Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
}
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index))?;
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! serialize_htlc_source {
- ($htlc_source: expr) => {
- $htlc_source.0.write(writer)?;
- $htlc_source.1.write(writer)?;
- if let &Some(ref txo) = &$htlc_source.2 {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- txo.write(writer)?;
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- }
+ write_option!(&$htlc_output.transaction_output_index);
}
}
-
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref txid, &(ref htlc_infos, ref htlc_sources)) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
+ for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
- for ref htlc_output in htlc_infos.iter() {
+ for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
- }
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_sources.len() as u64))?;
- for ref htlc_source in htlc_sources.iter() {
- serialize_htlc_source!(htlc_source);
+ write_option!(htlc_source);
}
}
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
- for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ for &(ref htlc_output, ref sigs, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
- writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
- writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
- }
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_sources.len() as u64))?;
- for ref htlc_source in $local_tx.htlc_sources.iter() {
- serialize_htlc_source!(htlc_source);
+ if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
+ writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
+ } else {
+ 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ write_option!(htlc_source);
}
}
}
self.write(writer, false)
}
- //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
- //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
-
/// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
// Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
// script_pubkey version.
- let payment_hash160 = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
+ let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
} else { None };
let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
- let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap().0[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
+ let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
};
let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
}
}
- if let Some(&(ref per_commitment_data, _)) = per_commitment_option {
+ if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
- for (idx, ref htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
- let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
- if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
- tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
- tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
- return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
- }
- let input = TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid: commitment_txid,
- vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- };
- if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
- inputs.push(input);
- htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
- values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
- total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
- } else {
- let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
- input: vec![input],
- output: vec!(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
- }),
+ for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
+ if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
+ if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
+ tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
+ tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
+ return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
+ }
+ let input = TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid: commitment_txid,
+ vout: transaction_output_index,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
};
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
- txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
+ if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
+ inputs.push(input);
+ htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
+ values.push(tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value);
+ total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
+ } else {
+ let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: vec![input],
+ output: vec!(TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
+ value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
+ }),
+ };
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
+ txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
+ }
}
}
}
- if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
+ if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
// We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
+
+ // TODO: We really should only fail backwards after our revocation claims have been
+ // confirmed, but we also need to do more other tracking of in-flight pre-confirm
+ // on-chain claims, so we can do that at the same time.
+ macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
+ ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
+ if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&$txid) {
+ for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
+ if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
+ htlc_updated.push(((**source).clone(), None, htlc.payment_hash.clone()));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
+ if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
+ check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
+ }
+ if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
+ check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
+ }
+ }
+ // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
}
if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
});
txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
-
- // TODO: We really should only fail backwards after our revocation claims have been
- // confirmed, but we also need to do more other tracking of in-flight pre-confirm
- // on-chain claims, so we can do that at the same time.
- if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
- if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
- if let Some(&(_, ref latest_outpoints)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
- for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
- log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from current remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, payment_hash.clone()));
- }
- }
- }
- if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
- if let Some(&(_, ref prev_outpoint)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
- for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in prev_outpoint.iter() {
- log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from previous remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, payment_hash.clone()));
- }
- }
- }
- }
- // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
} else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
// While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
// revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
+ log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
+
+ // TODO: We really should only fail backwards after our revocation claims have been
+ // confirmed, but we also need to do more other tracking of in-flight pre-confirm
+ // on-chain claims, so we can do that at the same time.
+ macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
+ ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
+ if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&$txid) {
+ $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
+ if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
+ // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
+ // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
+ // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
+ // payment_preimage.
+ // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
+ // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
+ // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
+ // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
+ // need to here.
+ for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
+ if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
+ continue $id;
+ }
+ }
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
+ htlc_updated.push(((**source).clone(), None, htlc.payment_hash.clone()));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
+ if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
+ check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
+ }
+ if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
+ check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
+ }
+ }
+
if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
let revocation_point_option =
if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
{
let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
- let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap().0[$input.sequence as usize];
+ let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
}
}
- for (idx, ref htlc) in per_commitment_data.0.iter().enumerate() {
- let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
- if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
- tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
- tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
- return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
- }
- if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
- let input = TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid: commitment_txid,
- vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
- witness: Vec::new(),
- };
- if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
- inputs.push(input);
- values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
- total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
- } else {
- let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
+ for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
+ if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
+ if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
+ tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
+ tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
+ return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
+ }
+ if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
+ let input = TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid: commitment_txid,
+ vout: transaction_output_index,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
+ inputs.push(input);
+ values.push((tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
+ total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
+ } else {
+ let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: vec![input],
+ output: vec!(TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
+ value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
+ }),
+ };
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
+ output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
+ });
+ txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
+ }
+ }
+ if !htlc.offered {
+ // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
+ // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
+ let input = TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid: commitment_txid,
+ vout: transaction_output_index,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: idx as u32,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
+ lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
input: vec![input],
output: vec!(TxOut {
script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
+ value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
}),
};
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
- spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
- output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
- });
- txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
+ txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
}
}
- if !htlc.offered {
- // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
- // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
- let input = TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid: commitment_txid,
- vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: idx as u32,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- };
- let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
- input: vec![input],
- output: vec!(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
- }),
- };
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
- txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
- }
}
if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
}
}
- for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- if htlc.offered {
- let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
+ for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
+ if htlc.offered {
+ let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
- add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
- res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
- } else {
- if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
- let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
+ add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
+ res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
+ } else {
+ if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
+ let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
- add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
- res.push(htlc_success_tx);
- }
+ add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
+ res.push(htlc_success_tx);
+ }
+ }
+ watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
+ } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
}
- watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
}
(res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs)
/// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
+ // TODO: If we find a match here we need to fail back HTLCs that were't included in the
+ // broadcast commitment transaction, either because they didn't meet dust or because they
+ // weren't yet included in our commitment transaction(s).
if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
match self.key_storage {
if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
- let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
+ let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
for tx in txn.iter() {
broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
}
- let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx);
- if updated.len() > 0 {
- htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
- }
+ }
+ // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
+ // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
+ // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
+ let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx);
+ if updated.len() > 0 {
+ htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
}
}
if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
}
pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
+ // TODO: We need to consider HTLCs which weren't included in latest local commitment
+ // transaction (or in any of the latest two local commitment transactions). This probably
+ // needs to use the same logic as the revoked-tx-announe logic - checking the last two
+ // remote commitment transactions. This probably has implications for what data we need to
+ // store in local commitment transactions.
+ // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
+ // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
+ // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
+ // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
+ // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
// For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
let mut payment_data = None;
+ let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
+ || (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
+ let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
+ let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
+
+ macro_rules! log_claim {
+ ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
+ // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
+ // as we have no corresponding source. This implies either it is an
+ // inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
+ let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
+ if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
+ (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
+ log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
+ $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
+ if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
+ if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
+ } else {
+ log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
+ $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
+ if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
+ if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
+ }
+ }
+ }
macro_rules! scan_commitment {
- ($htlc_outputs: expr, $htlc_sources: expr, $source: expr) => {
- for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, ref vout) in $htlc_sources.iter() {
- if &Some(input.previous_output.vout) == vout {
- log_trace!(self, "Input spending {}:{} resolves HTLC with payment hash {} from {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $source);
- payment_data = Some((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
- }
- }
- if payment_data.is_none() {
- for htlc_output in $htlc_outputs {
- if input.previous_output.vout == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
- log_info!(self, "Input spending {}:{} in {} resolves inbound HTLC with timeout from {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(), $source);
+ ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
+ for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
+ if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
+ if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
+ log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
+ // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
+ // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
+ // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
+ // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
+ // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
+ payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
+ } else {
+ log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
continue 'outer_loop;
}
}
if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
- scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a),
- current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_sources,
- "our latest local commitment tx");
+ scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
+ "our latest local commitment tx", true);
}
}
if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
- scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a),
- prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_sources,
- "our latest local commitment tx");
+ scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
+ "our previous local commitment tx", true);
}
}
- if let Some(&(ref htlc_outputs, ref htlc_sources)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
- scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs, htlc_sources, "remote commitment tx");
+ if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
+ scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
+ "remote commitment tx", false);
}
- // If tx isn't solving htlc output from local/remote commitment tx and htlc isn't outbound we don't need
- // to broadcast solving backward
+ // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
+ // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
- if (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
- || (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33) {
- log_error!(self, "Remote used revocation sig to take a {} HTLC output at index {} from commitment_tx {}", if input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { "offered" } else { "accepted" }, input.previous_output.vout, input.previous_output.txid);
- } else if input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
- payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&tx.input[0].witness[3]);
+ if accepted_preimage_claim {
+ payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
- } else if input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
- payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&tx.input[0].witness[1]);
+ } else if offered_preimage_claim {
+ payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
} else {
htlc_updated.push((source, None, payment_hash));
}
}
}
+ macro_rules! read_option { () => {
+ match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ }
+ } }
let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
index: Readable::read(reader)?,
};
let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
- let current_remote_commitment_txid = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
- let prev_remote_commitment_txid = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
+ let current_remote_commitment_txid = read_option!();
+ let prev_remote_commitment_txid = read_option!();
Storage::Local {
revocation_base_key,
htlc_base_key,
let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let transaction_output_index: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = read_option!();
HTLCOutputInCommitment {
offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
}
}
- macro_rules! read_htlc_source {
- () => {
- {
- (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?,
- match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- }
- )
- }
- }
- }
-
let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let outputs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..outputs_count {
- outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
- }
- let sources_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut sources = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(sources_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..sources_count {
- sources.push(read_htlc_source!());
+ let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
+ for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
+ htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), read_option!().map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
}
- if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, (outputs, sources)) {
+ if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let htlc_outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
- for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
- let out = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
- let sigs = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
- htlc_outputs.push((out, sigs.0, sigs.1));
- }
-
- let htlc_sources_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
- for _ in 0..htlc_sources_len {
- htlc_sources.push(read_htlc_source!());
+ let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
+ for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
+ let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
+ let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+ htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, read_option!()));
}
LocalSignedTx {
txid: tx.txid(),
- tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs, htlc_sources
+ tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw,
+ htlc_outputs: htlcs
}
}
}
let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
- sha.reset();
- sha.input(&preimage.0[..]);
- let mut hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
- sha.result(&mut hash.0[..]);
+ let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
mod tests {
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
- use crypto::digest::Digest;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use hex;
use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
- use util::sha2::Sha256;
use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
- use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
+ use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
use std::sync::Arc;
fn test_prune_preimages() {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
- let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
macro_rules! dummy_keys {
for _ in 0..20 {
let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&preimage.0[..]);
- let mut hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
- sha.result(&mut hash.0[..]);
+ let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
preimages.push((preimage, hash));
}
}
{
let mut res = Vec::new();
for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
- res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
+ res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
offered: true,
amount_msat: 0,
cltv_expiry: 0,
payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
- transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
- });
+ transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
+ }, None));
}
res
}
($preimages_slice: expr) => {
{
let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
- let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
+ let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
res
}
}
let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
- monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]), Vec::new());
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), Vec::new(), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
+ monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
}
// Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
// previous commitment tx's preimages too
- monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]), Vec::new());
+ monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
// But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
- monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]), Vec::new());
+ monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);