+//! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
+//! here.
+//!
+//! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
+//! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
+//! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
+//!
+//! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
+//! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
+//! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
+//! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
+//! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
+
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use secp256k1;
-use ln::msgs::HandleError;
+use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, HandleError};
use ln::chan_utils;
use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
+use util::ser::{Readable, Writer};
use util::sha2::Sha256;
-use util::byte_utils;
+use util::{byte_utils, events};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
-use std::{hash,cmp};
+use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
+/// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
+#[derive(Clone)]
pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
/// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
/// to succeed at some point in the future).
+ ///
/// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
/// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
/// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
/// the channel to an operational state.
+ ///
+ /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
+ /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
+ /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
+ ///
+ /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
+ /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
+ /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
+ /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
+ /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
+ /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
+ /// been "frozen".
+ ///
+ /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
+ /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
+ /// channel operation.
TemporaryFailure,
/// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
/// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
/// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
/// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
/// server(s).
+///
/// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
/// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
/// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
/// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
/// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
+ ///
+ /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
+ /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
+ /// any spends of it.
fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
}
/// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
/// watchtower or watch our own channels.
+///
/// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
+///
/// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
/// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
/// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
+///
/// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
/// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
+ #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
+ pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
- broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>
+ broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
+ pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
}
impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
fn block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
- let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
- for monitor in monitors.values() {
- monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.broadcaster);
+ let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
+ {
+ let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ for monitor in monitors.values() {
+ let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.broadcaster);
+ if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
+ new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
+ outputs: spendable_outputs,
+ });
+ }
+ for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
+ for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
+ self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
+ }
+ }
+ }
}
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
}
fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
}
impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
+ /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
+ /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
chain_monitor,
- broadcaster
+ broadcaster,
+ pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
});
let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
res
}
+ /// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
match &monitor.funding_txo {
&None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
&Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
- self.chain_monitor.install_watch_script(script);
+ self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
},
}
}
}
+impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
+ fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut ret = Vec::new();
+ mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
+ ret
+ }
+}
+
/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
/// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
/// HTLC-Success transaction.
-const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
+/// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
+/// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
+pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
+/// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
+/// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
+/// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers).
+pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
enum KeyStorage {
PrivMode {
revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
+ delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
+ prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
+ latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
},
SigsMode {
revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+/// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
+/// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
+///
+/// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
+/// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
pub struct ChannelMonitor {
funding_txo: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
key_storage: KeyStorage,
- delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
+ their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
// first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(),
key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(),
- delayed_payment_base_key: self.delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
+ their_delayed_payment_base_key: self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(),
our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo ||
self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
- self.delayed_payment_base_key != other.delayed_payment_base_key ||
self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
+ self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
}
impl ChannelMonitor {
- pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
+ pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
ChannelMonitor {
funding_txo: None,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
+ delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
+ prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
+ latest_per_commitment_point: None,
},
- delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
their_htlc_base_key: None,
+ their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
their_cur_revocation_points: None,
our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
/// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
/// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
/// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
+ /// Also update KeyStorage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
+ /// case of onchain HTLC tx
pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
feerate_per_kw,
htlc_outputs,
});
+ self.key_storage = if let KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } = self.key_storage {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode {
+ revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
+ htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
+ delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
+ prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
+ latest_per_commitment_point: Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point),
+ }
+ } else { unimplemented!(); };
}
/// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
}
+ /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
+ /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
+ /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
if self.funding_txo.is_some() {
// We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
/// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
/// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
/// provides slightly better privacy.
+ /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
+ /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
- //TODO: Need to register the given script here with a chain_monitor
self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
}
- pub(super) fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) {
+ /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
+ pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
+ self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
}
pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
self.funding_txo = None;
}
+ /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
match self.funding_txo {
Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
}
/// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
- fn serialize(&self, for_local_storage: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
- let mut res = Vec::new();
- res.push(SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
- res.push(MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
+ //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
+ writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
+ writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
match &self.funding_txo {
&Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
- res.extend_from_slice(&outpoint.txid[..]);
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index));
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(script.len() as u64));
- res.extend_from_slice(&script[..]);
+ writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(script.len() as u64))?;
+ writer.write_all(&script[..])?;
},
&None => {
// We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but
// not much to give them.
- return res;
+ return Ok(());
},
}
// Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor));
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor))?;
match self.key_storage {
- KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
- res.push(0);
- res.extend_from_slice(&revocation_base_key[..]);
- res.extend_from_slice(&htlc_base_key[..]);
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
+ if let Some(ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point) = *prev_latest_per_commitment_point {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ writer.write_all(&prev_latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ }
+ if let Some(ref latest_per_commitment_point) = *latest_per_commitment_point {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ writer.write_all(&latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ }
+
},
KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(),
}
- res.extend_from_slice(&self.delayed_payment_base_key.serialize());
- res.extend_from_slice(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize());
+ writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
+ writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx));
- res.extend_from_slice(&pubkey.serialize());
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
+ writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
match second_option {
Some(second_pubkey) => {
- res.extend_from_slice(&second_pubkey.serialize());
+ writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
},
None => {
- res.extend_from_slice(&[0; 33]);
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
},
}
},
None => {
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0));
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
},
}
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay));
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()));
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
- res.extend_from_slice(secret);
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx));
+ writer.write_all(secret)?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
}
macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
($htlc_output: expr) => {
- res.push($htlc_output.offered as u8);
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat));
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry));
- res.extend_from_slice(&$htlc_output.payment_hash);
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index));
+ writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
+ writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash)?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index))?;
}
}
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64));
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
for (txid, htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
- res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]);
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64));
+ writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
}
{
let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64));
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
for (txid, commitment_number) in remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
- res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]);
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number));
+ writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
}
}
if for_local_storage {
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64));
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
for (payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
- res.extend_from_slice(payment_hash);
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number));
+ writer.write_all(payment_hash)?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
}
} else {
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0));
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
}
macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
($local_tx: expr) => {
let tx_ser = serialize::serialize(&$local_tx.tx).unwrap();
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(tx_ser.len() as u64));
- res.extend_from_slice(&tx_ser);
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(tx_ser.len() as u64))?;
+ writer.write_all(&tx_ser)?;
- res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize());
- res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize());
- res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize());
- res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize());
+ writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
+ writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
+ writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
+ writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw));
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64));
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
- res.extend_from_slice(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx));
- res.extend_from_slice(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx));
+ writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
+ writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
}
}
}
if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- res.push(1);
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
} else {
- res.push(0);
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
}
if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- res.push(1);
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
} else {
- res.push(0);
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
}
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64));
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
- res.extend_from_slice(payment_preimage);
+ writer.write_all(payment_preimage)?;
}
- res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.destination_script.len() as u64));
- res.extend_from_slice(&self.destination_script[..]);
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.destination_script.len() as u64))?;
+ writer.write_all(&self.destination_script[..])?;
- res
- }
-
- /// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for writing to disk.
- pub fn serialize_for_disk(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
- self.serialize(true)
+ Ok(())
}
- /// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
- pub fn serialize_for_watchtower(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
- self.serialize(false)
+ /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
+ pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ self.write(writer, true)
}
- /// Attempts to decode a serialized monitor
- pub fn deserialize(data: &[u8]) -> Option<Self> {
- let mut read_pos = 0;
- macro_rules! read_bytes {
- ($byte_count: expr) => {
- {
- if ($byte_count as usize) > data.len() - read_pos {
- return None;
- }
- read_pos += $byte_count as usize;
- &data[read_pos - $byte_count as usize..read_pos]
- }
- }
- }
-
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
- ($key: expr) => {
- match $key {
- Ok(res) => res,
- Err(_) => return None,
- }
- }
- }
-
- let _ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
- let min_ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
- if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
- return None;
- }
-
- // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
- // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
- let outpoint = OutPoint {
- txid: Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)),
- index: byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)),
- };
- let script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
- let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Script::from(read_bytes!(script_len).to_vec())));
- let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
-
- let key_storage = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
- 0 => {
- KeyStorage::PrivMode {
- revocation_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))),
- htlc_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))),
- }
- },
- _ => return None,
- };
-
- let delayed_payment_base_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
- let their_htlc_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))));
-
- let their_cur_revocation_points = {
- let first_idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
- if first_idx == 0 {
- None
- } else {
- let first_point = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
- let second_point_slice = read_bytes!(33);
- if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
- Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
- } else {
- Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, second_point_slice)))))
- }
- }
- };
-
- let our_to_self_delay = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2));
- let their_to_self_delay = Some(byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)));
-
- let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
- for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
- secret.copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
- *idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
- }
-
- macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
- () => {
- {
- let offered = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
- 0 => false, 1 => true,
- _ => return None,
- };
- let amount_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
- let cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
- let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
- payment_hash[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
- let transaction_output_index = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
-
- HTLCOutputInCommitment {
- offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- let remote_claimable_outpoints_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
- if remote_claimable_outpoints_len > data.len() as u64 / 64 { return None; }
- let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize);
- for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
- let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
- let outputs_count = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
- if outputs_count > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
- let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(outputs_count as usize);
- for _ in 0..outputs_count {
- outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
- }
- if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
- return None;
- }
- }
-
- let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
- if remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
- let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize);
- for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
- let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
- let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
- if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
- return None;
- }
- }
-
- let remote_hash_commitment_number_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
- if remote_hash_commitment_number_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
- let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize);
- for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
- let mut txid = [0; 32];
- txid[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
- let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
- if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
- return None;
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! read_local_tx {
- () => {
- {
- let tx_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
- let tx_ser = read_bytes!(tx_len);
- let tx: Transaction = unwrap_obj!(serialize::deserialize(tx_ser));
- if serialize::serialize(&tx).unwrap() != tx_ser {
- // We check that the tx re-serializes to the same form to ensure there is
- // no extra data, and as rust-bitcoin doesn't handle the 0-input ambiguity
- // all that well.
- return None;
- }
-
- let revocation_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
- let a_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
- let b_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
- let delayed_payment_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
- let feerate_per_kw = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
-
- let htlc_outputs_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
- if htlc_outputs_len > data.len() as u64 / 128 { return None; }
- let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs_len as usize);
- for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
- htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(),
- unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64))),
- unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64)))));
- }
-
- LocalSignedTx {
- txid: tx.txid(),
- tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => {
- Some(read_local_tx!())
- },
- _ => return None,
- };
-
- let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => {
- Some(read_local_tx!())
- },
- _ => return None,
- };
-
- let payment_preimages_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
- if payment_preimages_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
- let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(payment_preimages_len as usize);
- let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
- let mut preimage = [0; 32];
- preimage[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
- sha.reset();
- sha.input(&preimage);
- let mut hash = [0; 32];
- sha.result(&mut hash);
- if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
- return None;
- }
- }
-
- let destination_script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
- let destination_script = Script::from(read_bytes!(destination_script_len).to_vec());
-
- Some(ChannelMonitor {
- funding_txo,
- commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
-
- key_storage,
- delayed_payment_base_key,
- their_htlc_base_key,
- their_cur_revocation_points,
-
- our_to_self_delay,
- their_to_self_delay,
-
- old_secrets,
- remote_claimable_outpoints,
- remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain),
- remote_hash_commitment_number,
-
- prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
- current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
-
- payment_preimages,
-
- destination_script,
- secp_ctx,
- })
+ /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
+ pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ self.write(writer, false)
}
//TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
//we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
/// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
- pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
+ pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", action: None})
}
- pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
+ pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
//TODO This can be optimized?
let mut min = 1 << 48;
for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
/// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
/// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
/// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
- /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions, and claim them using the revocation key (if
- /// applicable) as well.
- fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
+ /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
+ fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
// Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
// a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
+ let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
+ let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
+
+ let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
+ let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
+
macro_rules! ignore_error {
( $thing : expr ) => {
match $thing {
Ok(a) => a,
- Err(_) => return txn_to_broadcast
+ Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
}
};
}
- let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
- let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
-
let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
- KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
},
};
- let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.delayed_payment_base_key));
+ let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
- None => return txn_to_broadcast,
+ None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
};
if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
- return txn_to_broadcast; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
+ return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
}
let input = TxIn {
previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
};
let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
- txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); // TODO: This is not yet tested in ChannelManager!
+ txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
}
}
}
if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
// We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
- // TODO: Register all outputs in commitment_tx with the ChainWatchInterface!
+ watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
}
- if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
+ if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
}
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
+ output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
+ });
txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
} else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
// While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
// already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
// not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
// insert it here.
- // TODO: Register all outputs in commitment_tx with the ChainWatchInterface!
+ watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
} else { None };
if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
- KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
},
},
};
let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
- None => return txn_to_broadcast,
+ None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
};
};
let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
+ output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
+ });
txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
}
}
}
- if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
+ if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
}
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
+ output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
+ });
txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
}
}
- } else {
- //TODO: For each input check if its in our remote_commitment_txn_on_chain map!
}
- txn_to_broadcast
+ (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
}
- fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> Vec<Transaction> {
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
-
- for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- if htlc.offered {
- let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
+ /// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key
+ fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
+ if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
+ return (None, None)
+ }
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
+ macro_rules! ignore_error {
+ ( $thing : expr ) => {
+ match $thing {
+ Ok(a) => a,
+ Err(_) => return (None, None)
+ }
+ };
+ }
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ let secret = ignore_error!(self.get_secret(commitment_number));
+ let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
+ let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
+ ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
+ },
+ KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
+ ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
+ },
+ };
+ let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
+ None => return (None, None),
+ Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
+ };
+ let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
+ let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
+ let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
+
+ let mut inputs = Vec::new();
+ let mut amount = 0;
+
+ if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
+ inputs.push(TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid: htlc_txid,
+ vout: 0,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ });
+ amount = tx.output[0].value;
+ }
+
+ if !inputs.is_empty() {
+ let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
+ value: amount, //TODO: - fee
+ });
+
+ let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: inputs,
+ output: outputs,
+ };
+
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
+
+ let sig = match self.key_storage {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
+ let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]));
+ let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
+ self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
+ }
+ KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
+ unimplemented!();
+ }
+ };
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
+
+ let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
+ let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
+ (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
+ } else { (None, None) }
+ }
+
+ fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
+ let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
+
+ for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ if htlc.offered {
+ let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
+
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
+
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
+ if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
+ if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
+ if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutput {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_timeout_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
+ local_delayedkey,
+ witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
+ to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ }
res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
} else {
if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
+ if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
+ if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
+ if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutput {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_success_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
+ local_delayedkey,
+ witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
+ to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ }
res.push(htlc_success_tx);
}
}
}
- res
+ (res, spendable_outputs)
}
/// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
/// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
/// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
- fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
+ fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
- return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
+ match self.key_storage {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
+ return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
+ },
+ KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
+ return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
+ }
+ }
}
}
if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
- return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
+ match self.key_storage {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
+ return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
+ },
+ KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
+ return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
+ }
+ }
}
}
- Vec::new()
+ (Vec::new(), Vec::new())
}
- fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface) {
+ fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
+ let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
+ let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
for tx in txn_matched {
- for txin in tx.input.iter() {
- if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (txin.previous_output.txid == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && txin.previous_output.vout == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
- let mut txn = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
+ if tx.input.len() == 1 {
+ // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
+ // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
+ // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
+ // filters.
+ let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
+ let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
+ if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
+ let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
+ txn = remote_txn;
+ spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
+ if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
+ watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
+ }
if txn.is_empty() {
- txn = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
+ let (remote_txn, mut outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
+ spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
+ txn = remote_txn;
}
- for tx in txn.iter() {
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
+ } else {
+ let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
+ if let Some(commitment_number) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
+ let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, *commitment_number);
+ if let Some(tx) = tx {
+ txn.push(tx);
+ }
+ if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
+ spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
+ }
}
}
+ for tx in txn.iter() {
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
+ }
}
}
if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- let mut needs_broadcast = false;
- for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
- if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
- needs_broadcast = true;
+ if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
+ match self.key_storage {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
+ let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
+ spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
+ for tx in txs {
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
+ }
+ },
+ KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
+ let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None);
+ spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
+ for tx in txs {
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
+ }
}
}
}
+ }
+ (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs)
+ }
- if needs_broadcast {
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
- for tx in self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx) {
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
+ pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
+ if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
+ // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
+ // time out the HTLC first.
+ // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
+ // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
+ // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
+ // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
+ // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
+ // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
+ // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
+ // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
+ // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
+ // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
+ // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
+ // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
+ // aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
+ // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
+ // outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
+ // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
+ // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
+ if ( htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) ||
+ (!htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
+ return true;
}
}
}
+ false
}
+}
- pub fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
- if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
- if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
- return true;
+impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for ChannelMonitor {
+ fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ // TODO: read_to_end and then deserializing from that vector is really dumb, we should
+ // actually use the fancy serialization framework we have instead of hacking around it.
+ let mut datavec = Vec::new();
+ reader.read_to_end(&mut datavec)?;
+ let data = &datavec;
+
+ let mut read_pos = 0;
+ macro_rules! read_bytes {
+ ($byte_count: expr) => {
+ {
+ if ($byte_count as usize) > data.len() - read_pos {
+ return Err(DecodeError::ShortRead);
}
+ read_pos += $byte_count as usize;
+ &data[read_pos - $byte_count as usize..read_pos]
}
}
}
- false
+
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
+ ($key: expr) => {
+ match $key {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let _ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
+ let min_ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
+ if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
+ return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
+ }
+
+ // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
+ // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
+ let outpoint = OutPoint {
+ txid: Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)),
+ index: byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)),
+ };
+ let script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Script::from(read_bytes!(script_len).to_vec())));
+ let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
+
+ let key_storage = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
+ 0 => {
+ let revocation_base_key = unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32)));
+ let htlc_base_key = unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32)));
+ let delayed_payment_base_key = unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32)));
+ let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => {
+ Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))))
+ },
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+ let latest_per_commitment_point = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => {
+ Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))))
+ },
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode {
+ revocation_base_key,
+ htlc_base_key,
+ delayed_payment_base_key,
+ prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
+ latest_per_commitment_point,
+ }
+ },
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+
+ let their_htlc_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))));
+ let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))));
+
+ let their_cur_revocation_points = {
+ let first_idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
+ if first_idx == 0 {
+ None
+ } else {
+ let first_point = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
+ let second_point_slice = read_bytes!(33);
+ if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
+ Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
+ } else {
+ Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, second_point_slice)))))
+ }
+ }
+ };
+
+ let our_to_self_delay = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2));
+ let their_to_self_delay = Some(byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)));
+
+ let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
+ for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
+ secret.copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
+ *idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
+ () => {
+ {
+ let offered = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
+ 0 => false, 1 => true,
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+ let amount_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ let cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
+ let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
+ payment_hash[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
+ let transaction_output_index = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
+
+ HTLCOutputInCommitment {
+ offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let remote_claimable_outpoints_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ if remote_claimable_outpoints_len > data.len() as u64 / 64 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); }
+ let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize);
+ for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
+ let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
+ let outputs_count = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ if outputs_count > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); }
+ let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(outputs_count as usize);
+ for _ in 0..outputs_count {
+ outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
+ }
+ if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+
+ let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ if remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); }
+ let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize);
+ for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
+ let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
+ let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
+ if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+
+ let remote_hash_commitment_number_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ if remote_hash_commitment_number_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); }
+ let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize);
+ for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
+ let mut txid = [0; 32];
+ txid[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
+ let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
+ if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! read_local_tx {
+ () => {
+ {
+ let tx_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ let tx_ser = read_bytes!(tx_len);
+ let tx: Transaction = unwrap_obj!(serialize::deserialize(tx_ser));
+ if serialize::serialize(&tx).unwrap() != tx_ser {
+ // We check that the tx re-serializes to the same form to ensure there is
+ // no extra data, and as rust-bitcoin doesn't handle the 0-input ambiguity
+ // all that well.
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+
+ let revocation_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
+ let a_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
+ let b_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
+ let delayed_payment_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
+ let feerate_per_kw = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+
+ let htlc_outputs_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ if htlc_outputs_len > data.len() as u64 / 128 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); }
+ let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs_len as usize);
+ for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
+ htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(),
+ unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64))),
+ unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64)))));
+ }
+
+ LocalSignedTx {
+ txid: tx.txid(),
+ tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => {
+ Some(read_local_tx!())
+ },
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+
+ let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => {
+ Some(read_local_tx!())
+ },
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+
+ let payment_preimages_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ if payment_preimages_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
+ let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(payment_preimages_len as usize);
+ let mut sha = Sha256::new();
+ for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
+ let mut preimage = [0; 32];
+ preimage[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
+ sha.reset();
+ sha.input(&preimage);
+ let mut hash = [0; 32];
+ sha.result(&mut hash);
+ if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+
+ let destination_script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ let destination_script = Script::from(read_bytes!(destination_script_len).to_vec());
+
+ Ok(ChannelMonitor {
+ funding_txo,
+ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
+
+ key_storage,
+ their_htlc_base_key,
+ their_delayed_payment_base_key,
+ their_cur_revocation_points,
+
+ our_to_self_delay,
+ their_to_self_delay,
+
+ old_secrets,
+ remote_claimable_outpoints,
+ remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain),
+ remote_hash_commitment_number,
+
+ prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
+ current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
+
+ payment_preimages,
+
+ destination_script,
+ secp_ctx,
+ })
}
+
}
#[cfg(test)]
};
}
- let delayed_payment_base_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
-
{
// insert_secret correct sequence
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
{
// insert_secret #1 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
{
// insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
{
// insert_secret #3 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
{
// insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
{
// insert_secret #5 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
{
// insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
{
// insert_secret #7 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
{
// insert_secret #8 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
// Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
// old state.
- let delayed_payment_base_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
- let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff