use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use secp256k1;
-use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, HandleError};
+use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use ln::chan_utils;
use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
+use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
use util::sha2::Sha256;
use util::{byte_utils, events};
-use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
/// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
/// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
/// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
+ ///
+ /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
PermanentFailure,
}
+/// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
+/// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
+/// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
+/// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
+/// Contains a human-readable error message.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
+
+/// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
+/// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
+pub struct HTLCUpdate {
+ pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
+ pub(super) source: HTLCSource
+}
+
/// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
/// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
/// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
/// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
/// any spends of it.
fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
+
+ /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
+ /// with success or failure backward
+ fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
}
/// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
+ pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>)>>>,
logger: Arc<Logger>,
}
fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
+ let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new();
{
let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
- let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster);
+ let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster);
if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
outputs: spendable_outputs,
});
}
+
for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
}
}
+ htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated);
+ }
+ }
+ {
+ // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward
+ let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
+ for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) {
+ match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
+ // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
+ // we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given
+ // (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair.
+ // TODO: Note that we currently don't really use this as ChannelManager
+ // will fail/claim backwards after the first block. We really should delay
+ // a few blocks before failing backwards (but can claim backwards
+ // immediately) as long as we have a few blocks of headroom.
+ let mut existing_claim = false;
+ e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
+ if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 {
+ if htlc_data.1.is_some() {
+ existing_claim = true;
+ true
+ } else { false }
+ } else { true }
+ });
+ if !existing_claim {
+ e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1));
+ }
+ }
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
+ e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]);
+ }
+ }
}
}
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
chain_monitor,
broadcaster,
pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
+ pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
logger,
});
let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
}
/// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
- pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
Some(orig_monitor) => {
- log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_option!(monitor.funding_txo));
+ log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
},
None => {}
};
- match &monitor.funding_txo {
- &None => {
- log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for no-funding-set channel (monitoring all txn!)");
- self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn()
- },
- &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
- log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
- self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
- self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
+ match monitor.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
+ match funding_info {
+ &None => {
+ return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
+ },
+ &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
+ self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
+ self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
+ },
+ }
},
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
+ self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
+ }
}
monitors.insert(key, monitor);
Ok(())
Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
}
}
+
+ fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
+ let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len());
+ for (k, v) in updated.drain() {
+ for htlc_data in v {
+ pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
+ payment_hash: k,
+ payment_preimage: htlc_data.1,
+ source: htlc_data.0,
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ pending_htlcs_updated
+ }
}
impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-enum KeyStorage {
- PrivMode {
+enum Storage {
+ Local {
revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
+ funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
+ current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
+ prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
},
- SigsMode {
+ Watchtower {
revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
- sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
}
}
delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
feerate_per_kw: u64,
htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
+ htlc_sources: Vec<(PaymentHash, HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>,
}
const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
/// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct ChannelMonitor {
- funding_txo: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
- key_storage: KeyStorage,
+ key_storage: Storage,
their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
// first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
- remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
+ remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, Vec<(PaymentHash, HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>)>,
/// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
/// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
/// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
/// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
/// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
/// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
- remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
+ remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
// We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
// some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
// deserialization
current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
- payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
+ payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
destination_script: Script,
/// underlying object
impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
- if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo ||
- self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
+ if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
impl ChannelMonitor {
pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
ChannelMonitor {
- funding_txo: None,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
- key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
+ key_storage: Storage::Local {
revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
latest_per_commitment_point: None,
+ funding_info: None,
+ current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
+ prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
},
their_htlc_base_key: None,
their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
/// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
/// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
/// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
- pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
for i in 0..pos {
let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", action: None})
+ return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
}
}
+ if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
+ return Ok(());
+ }
self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
+ // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
+ // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
+ // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
+ if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
+ if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
+ self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap().1 = Vec::new();
+ }
+ }
+
if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
Ok(())
}
- /// Tracks the next revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know
- /// the preimage of in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. When called at
- /// channel opening revocation point is the CURRENT one used for first commitment tx. Needed in case of sizeable push_msat.
- pub(super) fn provide_their_next_revocation_point(&mut self, their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) {
- if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
- match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
- Some(old_points) => {
- if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
- } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
- if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
- } else {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
- }
- } else {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
- }
- },
- None => {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
/// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
/// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
/// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
/// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
- pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
+ pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, htlc_sources: Vec<(PaymentHash, HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
// TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
// so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
// (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
// timeouts)
- for htlc in &htlc_outputs {
+ for ref htlc in &htlc_outputs {
self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
}
- self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
+
+ let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
+ if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
+ *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
+ *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
+ }
+ self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, (htlc_outputs, htlc_sources));
self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
+ //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
+ match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
+ Some(old_points) => {
+ if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
+ } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
+ if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
+ } else {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+ }
+ } else {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+ }
+ },
+ None => {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+ }
+ }
}
/// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
/// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
/// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
/// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
- /// Also update KeyStorage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
+ /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
/// case of onchain HTLC tx
- pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
+ pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>, htlc_sources: Vec<(PaymentHash, HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>) {
assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
feerate_per_kw,
htlc_outputs,
+ htlc_sources,
});
- self.key_storage = if let KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
- KeyStorage::PrivMode {
- revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
- htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
- delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
- payment_base_key: *payment_base_key,
- shutdown_pubkey: *shutdown_pubkey,
- prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
- latest_per_commitment_point: Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point),
- }
- } else { unimplemented!(); };
+
+ if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
+ *latest_per_commitment_point = Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
+ }
}
/// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
/// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
- pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
+ pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
}
/// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
/// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
/// chain for new blocks/transactions.
- pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- if self.funding_txo.is_some() {
- // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
- // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
- if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 != self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", action: None});
- }
- } else {
- self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo.take();
+ pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
+ match self.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
+ if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
+ let our_funding_info = funding_info;
+ if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
+ if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
+ // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
+ // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
+ if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
+ return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
+ }
+ },
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
+ if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
+ unimplemented!();
+ } else {
+ return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
+ }
+ },
}
let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
/// provides slightly better privacy.
/// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
/// value as key to add_update_monitor.
- pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
- self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
+ pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
+ match self.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
+ *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
+ },
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
+ panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
+ }
+ }
}
/// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
}
pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
- self.funding_txo = None;
+ match self.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
+ *funding_info = None;
+ },
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
+ panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
+ },
+ }
}
/// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
- match self.funding_txo {
- Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
- None => None
+ match self.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
+ match funding_info {
+ &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
+ &None => None
+ }
+ },
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
+ return None;
+ }
}
}
writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
- match &self.funding_txo {
- &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
- writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
- script.write(writer)?;
- },
- &None => {
- // We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but
- // not much to give them.
- return Ok(());
- },
- }
-
// Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
match self.key_storage {
- KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
+ Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, current_remote_commitment_txid, prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
} else {
writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
}
-
+ match funding_info {
+ &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
+ writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
+ script.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &None => {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
+ },
+ }
+ if let Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ }
+ if let Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ }
},
- KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(),
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
}
writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
- writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash)?;
+ writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index))?;
}
}
+ macro_rules! serialize_htlc_source {
+ ($htlc_source: expr) => {
+ $htlc_source.0.write(writer)?;
+ $htlc_source.1.write(writer)?;
+ if let &Some(ref txo) = &$htlc_source.2 {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ txo.write(writer)?;
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref txid, ref htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
+ for (ref txid, &(ref htlc_infos, ref htlc_sources)) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
- for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
+ for ref htlc_output in htlc_infos.iter() {
serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
}
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_sources.len() as u64))?;
+ for ref htlc_source in htlc_sources.iter() {
+ serialize_htlc_source!(htlc_source);
+ }
}
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
if for_local_storage {
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
- writer.write_all(*payment_hash)?;
+ writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
}
} else {
writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
}
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_sources.len() as u64))?;
+ for ref htlc_source in $local_tx.htlc_sources.iter() {
+ serialize_htlc_source!(htlc_source);
+ }
}
}
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
- writer.write_all(payment_preimage)?;
+ writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
}
self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
//we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
/// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
- pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
+ pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
- return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
+ return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
}
}
assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
- Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", action: None})
+ None
}
pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
/// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
/// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
/// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
- fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
+ /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
+ /// revoked remote commitment tx
+ fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
// Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
// a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
+ let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
( $thing : expr ) => {
match $thing {
Ok(a) => a,
- Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
+ Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
}
};
}
if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
- let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
- KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
+ let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
- ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
+ ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
+ Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
},
- KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
+ Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
- ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
+ ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
+ None)
},
};
let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
- None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
+ None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated),
Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
};
let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
+ let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
+ // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
+ // script_pubkey version.
+ let payment_hash160 = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
+ Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
+ } else { None };
+
let mut total_value = 0;
let mut values = Vec::new();
let mut inputs = Vec::new();
htlc_idxs.push(None);
values.push(outp.value);
total_value += outp.value;
- } else if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
- match self.key_storage {
- KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
- let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
- if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key) {
- spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
- key: local_key,
- output: outp.clone(),
- });
- }
- }
- KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
- //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
- // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
- }
- }
+ } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
+ key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
+ output: outp.clone(),
+ });
}
}
($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
{
let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
- KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
+ Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
- let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
+ let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap().0[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
};
let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
},
- KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
unimplemented!();
}
};
}
}
- if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
+ if let Some(&(ref per_commitment_data, _)) = per_commitment_option {
inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
- for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
+ for (idx, ref htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
- return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
+ return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
}
let input = TxIn {
previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
}
- if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
+ if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
});
txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
+
+ // TODO: We really should only fail backwards after our revocation claims have been
+ // confirmed, but we also need to do more other tracking of in-flight pre-confirm
+ // on-chain claims, so we can do that at the same time.
+ if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
+ if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
+ if let Some(&(_, ref latest_outpoints)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
+ for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
+ htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, payment_hash.clone()));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
+ if let Some(&(_, ref prev_outpoint)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
+ for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in prev_outpoint.iter() {
+ htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, payment_hash.clone()));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
} else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
// While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
// revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
} else { None };
if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
- KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
+ Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
},
- KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
+ Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
},
};
let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
- None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
+ None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated),
Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
};
-
for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
match self.key_storage {
- KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
+ Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
output: outp.clone(),
});
}
- }
- KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
- //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
- // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
- }
+ },
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
}
break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
}
($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
{
let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
- KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
- let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
+ Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
+ let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap().0[$input.sequence as usize];
let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
},
- KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
unimplemented!();
}
};
}
}
- for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
+ for (idx, ref htlc) in per_commitment_data.0.iter().enumerate() {
+ let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
+ if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
+ tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
+ tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
+ return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
+ }
if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
let input = TxIn {
previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
}),
};
let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
}
}
+ if !htlc.offered {
+ // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
+ // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
+ let input = TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid: commitment_txid,
+ vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: idx as u32,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
+ input: vec![input],
+ output: vec!(TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
+ value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ }),
+ };
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
+ txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
+ }
}
- if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
+ if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, (value.1).0.to_vec());
}
spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
}
}
- (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
+ (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
}
/// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key
};
}
- let secret = ignore_error!(self.get_secret(commitment_number));
+ let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
- KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
+ Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
},
- KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
+ Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
},
};
let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
let sig = match self.key_storage {
- KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
+ Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]));
let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
}
- KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
unimplemented!();
}
};
} else { (None, None) }
}
- fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
+ fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>) {
let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
+ let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
res.push(htlc_success_tx);
}
}
+ watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
}
- (res, spendable_outputs)
+ (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs)
}
/// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
/// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
/// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
- fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
+ fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
match self.key_storage {
- KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
- return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
+ Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
+ let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
+ return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
},
- KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
- return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
+ let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
+ return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
}
}
}
if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
match self.key_storage {
- KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
- return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
+ Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
+ let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
+ return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
},
- KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
- return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
+ let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
+ return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
}
}
}
}
- (Vec::new(), Vec::new())
+ (Vec::new(), Vec::new(), (commitment_txid, Vec::new()))
}
/// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
- if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
+ if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
match self.key_storage {
- KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
+ Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
}
}
}
- KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
//TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
// cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
}
if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
match self.key_storage {
- KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
+ Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)).0);
},
_ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
}
}
- fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
+ fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
+ let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
for tx in txn_matched {
if tx.input.len() == 1 {
// Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
// filters.
let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
- if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
- let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
+ let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
+ funding_info.clone()
+ }
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
+ unimplemented!();
+ }
+ };
+ if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
+ let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output, mut updated) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
txn = remote_txn;
spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
}
if txn.is_empty() {
- let (remote_txn, mut outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
- spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
- txn = remote_txn;
+ let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
+ spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
+ txn = local_txn;
+ if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
+ watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
+ }
}
- if !self.funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
+ if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) {
spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
}
}
+ if updated.len() > 0 {
+ htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
+ }
} else {
if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number);
for tx in txn.iter() {
broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
}
+ let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx);
+ if updated.len() > 0 {
+ htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
+ }
}
}
if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
match self.key_storage {
- KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
- let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
- spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
+ Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
+ let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
+ spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
+ if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
+ watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
+ }
for tx in txs {
broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
}
},
- KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
- let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None);
- spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
+ let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None);
+ spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
+ if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
+ watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
+ }
for tx in txs {
broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
}
}
}
self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
- (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs)
+ (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
}
pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
}
false
}
+
+ /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
+ /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
+ fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)> {
+ let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
+
+ 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
+ let mut payment_data = None;
+
+ macro_rules! scan_commitment {
+ ($htlc_outputs: expr, $htlc_sources: expr) => {
+ for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, ref vout) in $htlc_sources.iter() {
+ if &Some(input.previous_output.vout) == vout {
+ payment_data = Some((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
+ }
+ }
+ if payment_data.is_none() {
+ for htlc_output in $htlc_outputs {
+ if input.previous_output.vout == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
+ log_info!(self, "Inbound HTLC timeout at {} from {} resolved by {}", input.previous_output.vout, input.previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
+ continue 'outer_loop;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
+ scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_sources);
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
+ scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_sources);
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(&(ref htlc_outputs, ref htlc_sources)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
+ scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs, htlc_sources);
+ }
+
+ // If tx isn't solving htlc output from local/remote commitment tx and htlc isn't outbound we don't need
+ // to broadcast solving backward
+ if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
+ let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
+ if input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
+ payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&tx.input[0].witness[3]);
+ htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
+ } else if input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
+ payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&tx.input[0].witness[1]);
+ htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
+ } else {
+ htlc_updated.push((source, None, payment_hash));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ htlc_updated
+ }
}
const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
}
- // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
- // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
- let outpoint = OutPoint {
- txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
- index: Readable::read(reader)?,
- };
- let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
};
- KeyStorage::PrivMode {
+ // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
+ // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
+ let outpoint = OutPoint {
+ txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ index: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ };
+ let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
+ let current_remote_commitment_txid = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+ let prev_remote_commitment_txid = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+ Storage::Local {
revocation_base_key,
htlc_base_key,
delayed_payment_base_key,
shutdown_pubkey,
prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
latest_per_commitment_point,
+ funding_info,
+ current_remote_commitment_txid,
+ prev_remote_commitment_txid,
}
},
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let payment_hash: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
let transaction_output_index: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
HTLCOutputInCommitment {
}
}
+ macro_rules! read_htlc_source {
+ () => {
+ {
+ (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?,
+ match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ }
+ )
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
for _ in 0..outputs_count {
outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
}
- if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
+ let sources_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut sources = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(sources_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
+ for _ in 0..sources_count {
+ sources.push(read_htlc_source!());
+ }
+ if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, (outputs, sources)) {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
- let txid: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
- if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
+ if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
let htlc_outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
- htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
+ let out = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
+ let sigs = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
+ htlc_outputs.push((out, sigs.0, sigs.1));
+ }
+
+ let htlc_sources_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
+ for _ in 0..htlc_sources_len {
+ htlc_sources.push(read_htlc_source!());
}
LocalSignedTx {
txid: tx.txid(),
- tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
+ tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs, htlc_sources
}
}
}
let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
let mut sha = Sha256::new();
for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
- let preimage: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
sha.reset();
- sha.input(&preimage);
- let mut hash = [0; 32];
- sha.result(&mut hash);
+ sha.input(&preimage.0[..]);
+ let mut hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
+ sha.result(&mut hash.0[..]);
if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
- funding_txo,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
key_storage,
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
use crypto::digest::Digest;
use hex;
+ use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
use util::sha2::Sha256;
idx -= 1;
}
assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
- assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
+ assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
};
}
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
}
let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
macro_rules! dummy_keys {
() => {
{
- let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
TxCreationKeys {
per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
{
let mut rng = thread_rng();
for _ in 0..20 {
- let mut preimage = [0; 32];
- rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
+ let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
+ rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&preimage);
- let mut hash = [0; 32];
- sha.result(&mut hash);
+ sha.input(&preimage.0[..]);
+ let mut hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
+ sha.result(&mut hash.0[..]);
preimages.push((preimage, hash));
}
}
let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
- monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655);
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654);
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653);
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652);
+ monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]), Vec::new());
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), Vec::new(), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
}
// Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
// previous commitment tx's preimages too
- monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
+ monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]), Vec::new());
secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
// But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
- monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
+ monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]), Vec::new());
secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff