use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use ln::chan_utils;
use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
+use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
use util::sha2::Sha256;
use util::{byte_utils, events};
-use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
+/// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
+/// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
+pub struct HTLCUpdate {
+ pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
+ pub(super) source: HTLCSource
+}
+
/// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
/// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
/// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
/// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
/// any spends of it.
fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
+
+ /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
+ /// with success or failure backward
+ fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
}
/// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
+ pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>)>>>,
logger: Arc<Logger>,
}
fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
+ let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new();
{
let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
- let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster);
+ let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster);
if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
outputs: spendable_outputs,
});
}
+
for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
}
}
+ htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated);
+ }
+ }
+ {
+ // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward
+ let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
+ for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) {
+ match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
+ // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
+ // we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given
+ // (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair.
+ // TODO: Note that we currently don't really use this as ChannelManager
+ // will fail/claim backwards after the first block. We really should delay
+ // a few blocks before failing backwards (but can claim backwards
+ // immediately) as long as we have a few blocks of headroom.
+ let mut existing_claim = false;
+ e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
+ if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 {
+ if htlc_data.1.is_some() {
+ existing_claim = true;
+ true
+ } else { false }
+ } else { true }
+ });
+ if !existing_claim {
+ e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1));
+ }
+ }
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
+ e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]);
+ }
+ }
}
}
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
chain_monitor,
broadcaster,
pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
+ pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
logger,
});
let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
}
}
+
+ fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
+ let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len());
+ for (k, v) in updated.drain() {
+ for htlc_data in v {
+ pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
+ payment_hash: k,
+ payment_preimage: htlc_data.1,
+ source: htlc_data.0,
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ pending_htlcs_updated
+ }
}
impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
+ current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
+ prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
},
Watchtower {
revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
feerate_per_kw: u64,
htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
+ htlc_sources: Vec<(PaymentHash, HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>,
}
const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
- remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
+ remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, Vec<(PaymentHash, HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>)>,
/// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
/// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
/// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
/// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
/// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
/// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
- remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
+ remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
// We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
// some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
// deserialization
current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
- payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
+ payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
destination_script: Script,
prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
latest_per_commitment_point: None,
funding_info: None,
+ current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
+ prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
},
their_htlc_base_key: None,
their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
}
}
+ if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
+ return Ok(());
+ }
self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
+ // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
+ // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
+ // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
+ if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
+ if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
+ self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap().1 = Vec::new();
+ }
+ }
+
if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
/// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
/// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
/// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
- pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
+ pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, htlc_sources: Vec<(PaymentHash, HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
// TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
// so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
// (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
// timeouts)
- for htlc in &htlc_outputs {
+ for ref htlc in &htlc_outputs {
self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
}
- self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
+
+ let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
+ if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
+ *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
+ *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
+ }
+ self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, (htlc_outputs, htlc_sources));
self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
//TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
/// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
/// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
/// case of onchain HTLC tx
- pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
+ pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>, htlc_sources: Vec<(PaymentHash, HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>) {
assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
feerate_per_kw,
htlc_outputs,
+ htlc_sources,
});
if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
/// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
/// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
- pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
+ pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
}
U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info } => {
+ Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, current_remote_commitment_txid, prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
},
}
+ if let Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ }
+ if let Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ }
},
Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
}
writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
- writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash)?;
+ writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index))?;
}
}
+ macro_rules! serialize_htlc_source {
+ ($htlc_source: expr) => {
+ $htlc_source.0.write(writer)?;
+ $htlc_source.1.write(writer)?;
+ if let &Some(ref txo) = &$htlc_source.2 {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ txo.write(writer)?;
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref txid, ref htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
+ for (ref txid, &(ref htlc_infos, ref htlc_sources)) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
- for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
+ for ref htlc_output in htlc_infos.iter() {
serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
}
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_sources.len() as u64))?;
+ for ref htlc_source in htlc_sources.iter() {
+ serialize_htlc_source!(htlc_source);
+ }
}
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
if for_local_storage {
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
- writer.write_all(*payment_hash)?;
+ writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
}
} else {
writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
}
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_sources.len() as u64))?;
+ for ref htlc_source in $local_tx.htlc_sources.iter() {
+ serialize_htlc_source!(htlc_source);
+ }
}
}
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
- writer.write_all(payment_preimage)?;
+ writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
}
self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
/// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
/// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
/// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
- fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
+ /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
+ /// revoked remote commitment tx
+ fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
// Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
// a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
+ let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
( $thing : expr ) => {
match $thing {
Ok(a) => a,
- Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
+ Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
}
};
}
};
let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
- None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
+ None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated),
Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
};
let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
- let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
+ let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap().0[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
};
let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
}
}
- if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
+ if let Some(&(ref per_commitment_data, _)) = per_commitment_option {
inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
- for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
+ for (idx, ref htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
- return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
+ return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
}
let input = TxIn {
previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
}
- if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
+ if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
});
txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
+
+ // TODO: We really should only fail backwards after our revocation claims have been
+ // confirmed, but we also need to do more other tracking of in-flight pre-confirm
+ // on-chain claims, so we can do that at the same time.
+ if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
+ if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
+ if let Some(&(_, ref latest_outpoints)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
+ for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
+ htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, payment_hash.clone()));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
+ if let Some(&(_, ref prev_outpoint)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
+ for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in prev_outpoint.iter() {
+ htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, payment_hash.clone()));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
} else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
// While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
// revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
},
};
let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
- None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
+ None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated),
Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
};
{
let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
- let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
+ let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap().0[$input.sequence as usize];
let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
}
}
- for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
+ for (idx, ref htlc) in per_commitment_data.0.iter().enumerate() {
let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
- return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
+ return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
}
if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
let input = TxIn {
}),
};
let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
}
}
+ if !htlc.offered {
+ // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
+ // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
+ let input = TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid: commitment_txid,
+ vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: idx as u32,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
+ input: vec![input],
+ output: vec!(TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
+ value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ }),
+ };
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
+ txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
+ }
}
- if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
+ if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, (value.1).0.to_vec());
}
spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
}
}
- (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
+ (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
}
/// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key
htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
}
}
- fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
+ fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
+ let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
for tx in txn_matched {
if tx.input.len() == 1 {
// Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
}
};
if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
- let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
+ let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output, mut updated) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
txn = remote_txn;
spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
}
}
+ if updated.len() > 0 {
+ htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
+ }
} else {
if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number);
for tx in txn.iter() {
broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
}
+ let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx);
+ if updated.len() > 0 {
+ htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
+ }
}
}
if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
}
}
self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
- (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs)
+ (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
}
pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
}
false
}
+
+ /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
+ /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
+ fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)> {
+ let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
+
+ 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
+ let mut payment_data = None;
+
+ macro_rules! scan_commitment {
+ ($htlc_outputs: expr, $htlc_sources: expr) => {
+ for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, ref vout) in $htlc_sources.iter() {
+ if &Some(input.previous_output.vout) == vout {
+ payment_data = Some((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
+ }
+ }
+ if payment_data.is_none() {
+ for htlc_output in $htlc_outputs {
+ if input.previous_output.vout == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
+ log_info!(self, "Inbound HTLC timeout at {} from {} resolved by {}", input.previous_output.vout, input.previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
+ continue 'outer_loop;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
+ scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_sources);
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
+ scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_sources);
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(&(ref htlc_outputs, ref htlc_sources)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
+ scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs, htlc_sources);
+ }
+
+ // If tx isn't solving htlc output from local/remote commitment tx and htlc isn't outbound we don't need
+ // to broadcast solving backward
+ if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
+ let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
+ if input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
+ payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&tx.input[0].witness[3]);
+ htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
+ } else if input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
+ payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&tx.input[0].witness[1]);
+ htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
+ } else {
+ htlc_updated.push((source, None, payment_hash));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ htlc_updated
+ }
}
const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
index: Readable::read(reader)?,
};
let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
+ let current_remote_commitment_txid = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+ let prev_remote_commitment_txid = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
Storage::Local {
revocation_base_key,
htlc_base_key,
prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
latest_per_commitment_point,
funding_info,
+ current_remote_commitment_txid,
+ prev_remote_commitment_txid,
}
},
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let payment_hash: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
let transaction_output_index: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
HTLCOutputInCommitment {
}
}
+ macro_rules! read_htlc_source {
+ () => {
+ {
+ (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?,
+ match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ }
+ )
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
for _ in 0..outputs_count {
outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
}
- if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
+ let sources_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut sources = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(sources_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
+ for _ in 0..sources_count {
+ sources.push(read_htlc_source!());
+ }
+ if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, (outputs, sources)) {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
- let txid: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
- if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
+ if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
let htlc_outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
- htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
+ let out = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
+ let sigs = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
+ htlc_outputs.push((out, sigs.0, sigs.1));
+ }
+
+ let htlc_sources_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
+ for _ in 0..htlc_sources_len {
+ htlc_sources.push(read_htlc_source!());
}
LocalSignedTx {
txid: tx.txid(),
- tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
+ tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs, htlc_sources
}
}
}
let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
let mut sha = Sha256::new();
for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
- let preimage: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
sha.reset();
- sha.input(&preimage);
- let mut hash = [0; 32];
- sha.result(&mut hash);
+ sha.input(&preimage.0[..]);
+ let mut hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
+ sha.result(&mut hash.0[..]);
if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
use crypto::digest::Digest;
use hex;
+ use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
use util::sha2::Sha256;
{
let mut rng = thread_rng();
for _ in 0..20 {
- let mut preimage = [0; 32];
- rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
+ let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
+ rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
let mut sha = Sha256::new();
- sha.input(&preimage);
- let mut hash = [0; 32];
- sha.result(&mut hash);
+ sha.input(&preimage.0[..]);
+ let mut hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
+ sha.result(&mut hash.0[..]);
preimages.push((preimage, hash));
}
}
let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
- monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
+ monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]), Vec::new());
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), Vec::new(), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
}
// Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
// previous commitment tx's preimages too
- monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
+ monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]), Vec::new());
secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
// But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
- monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
+ monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]), Vec::new());
secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff