+//! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
+//! here.
+//!
+//! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
+//! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
+//! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
+//!
+//! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
+//! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
+//! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
+//! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
+//! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
+
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
-use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
+use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
+use bitcoin::util::hash::{Hash160, BitcoinHash,Sha256dHash};
use bitcoin::util::bip143;
use crypto::digest::Digest;
use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+use secp256k1;
-use ln::msgs::HandleError;
+use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use ln::chan_utils;
use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
+use util::logger::Logger;
+use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
use util::sha2::Sha256;
+use util::{byte_utils, events};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
-use std::{hash,cmp};
+use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
+/// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
+#[derive(Clone)]
pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
/// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
/// to succeed at some point in the future).
+ ///
/// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
/// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
/// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
/// the channel to an operational state.
+ ///
+ /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
+ /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
+ /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
+ ///
+ /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
+ /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
+ /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
+ /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
+ /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
+ /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
+ /// been "frozen".
+ ///
+ /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
+ /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
+ /// channel operation.
TemporaryFailure,
/// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
/// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
PermanentFailure,
}
+/// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
+/// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
+/// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
+/// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
+/// Contains a human-readable error message.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
+
/// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
/// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
/// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
/// server(s).
+///
/// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
/// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
/// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
/// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
/// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
+ ///
+ /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
+ /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
+ /// any spends of it.
fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
}
/// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
/// watchtower or watch our own channels.
+///
/// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
+///
/// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
/// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
/// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
+///
/// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
/// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
+ #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
+ pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
- broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>
+ broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
+ pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
+ logger: Arc<Logger>,
}
impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
- fn block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
- let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
- for monitor in monitors.values() {
- monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.broadcaster);
+ fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
+ let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
+ let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
+ {
+ let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
+ let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster);
+ if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
+ new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
+ outputs: spendable_outputs,
+ });
+ }
+ for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
+ for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
+ self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
+ }
+ }
+ }
}
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
}
fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
}
impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
- pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
+ /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
+ /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
+ pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
chain_monitor,
- broadcaster
+ broadcaster,
+ pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
+ logger,
});
let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
res
}
- pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ /// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
+ pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
- Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor),
+ Some(orig_monitor) => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_option!(monitor.funding_txo));
+ return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
+ },
None => {}
};
- match monitor.funding_txo {
- None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
- Some(outpoint) => self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32)),
+ match &monitor.funding_txo {
+ &None => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for no-funding-set channel (monitoring all txn!)");
+ self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn()
+ },
+ &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
+ self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
+ self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
+ },
}
monitors.insert(key, monitor);
Ok(())
}
}
+impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
+ fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
+ let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut ret = Vec::new();
+ mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
+ ret
+ }
+}
+
/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
/// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
/// HTLC-Success transaction.
-const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
-
-#[derive(Clone)]
+/// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
+/// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
+pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
+/// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
+/// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
+/// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers).
+pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
+
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
enum KeyStorage {
PrivMode {
revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
+ delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
+ payment_base_key: SecretKey,
+ shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
+ prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
+ latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
},
SigsMode {
revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
}
}
-#[derive(Clone)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
struct LocalSignedTx {
/// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
txid: Sha256dHash,
htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
}
+const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+
+/// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
+/// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
+///
+/// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
+/// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
+#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct ChannelMonitor {
- funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
+ funding_txo: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
key_storage: KeyStorage,
- delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
+ their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
// first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
/// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
/// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
/// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
- remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
+ remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
/// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
/// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
/// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
+ // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
+ // deserialization
+ current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
+
payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
destination_script: Script,
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
-}
-impl Clone for ChannelMonitor {
- fn clone(&self) -> Self {
- ChannelMonitor {
- funding_txo: self.funding_txo.clone(),
- commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(),
-
- key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(),
- delayed_payment_base_key: self.delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
- their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
- their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(),
- our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
- their_to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
-
- old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
- remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
- remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
- remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(),
-
- prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
- current_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
-
- payment_preimages: self.payment_preimages.clone(),
+ // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
+ // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
+ // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
+ // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
+ // the full block_connected).
+ pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
+ logger: Arc<Logger>,
+}
- destination_script: self.destination_script.clone(),
- secp_ctx: self.secp_ctx.clone(),
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
+/// underlying object
+impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
+ fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
+ if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo ||
+ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
+ self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
+ self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
+ self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
+ self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
+ self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
+ self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
+ self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
+ self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
+ self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
+ self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
+ self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
+ self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
+ self.destination_script != other.destination_script
+ {
+ false
+ } else {
+ for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
+ if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
+ return false
+ }
+ }
+ true
}
}
}
impl ChannelMonitor {
- pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
+ pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
ChannelMonitor {
funding_txo: None,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
+ delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
+ payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
+ shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
+ prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
+ latest_per_commitment_point: None,
},
- delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
their_htlc_base_key: None,
+ their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
their_cur_revocation_points: None,
our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
- remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
+ remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
+ current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
-
destination_script: destination_script,
+
+ last_block_hash: Default::default(),
secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
+ logger,
}
}
res
}
- /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next
- /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of
- /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither
+ /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
/// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
/// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
- pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
for i in 0..pos {
let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", msg: None})
+ return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
}
}
self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
- if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
- match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
- Some(old_points) => {
- if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
- } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
- if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
- } else {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
- }
- } else {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
- }
- },
- None => {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
- }
- }
- }
-
if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
/// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
/// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
/// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
- pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
+ pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
// TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
// so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
// (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
}
self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
+ self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
+ //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
+ match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
+ Some(old_points) => {
+ if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
+ } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
+ if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
+ } else {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+ }
+ } else {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+ }
+ },
+ None => {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+ }
+ }
}
/// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
/// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
/// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
/// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
+ /// Also update KeyStorage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
+ /// case of onchain HTLC tx
pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
feerate_per_kw,
htlc_outputs,
});
+ self.key_storage = if let KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode {
+ revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
+ htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
+ delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
+ payment_base_key: *payment_base_key,
+ shutdown_pubkey: *shutdown_pubkey,
+ prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
+ latest_per_commitment_point: Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point),
+ }
+ } else { unimplemented!(); };
}
/// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
}
- pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
- match self.funding_txo {
- Some(txo) => if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.unwrap() != txo {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", msg: None});
- },
- None => if other.funding_txo.is_some() {
- self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo;
+ /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
+ /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
+ /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
+ pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
+ if self.funding_txo.is_some() {
+ // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
+ // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
+ if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 != self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
+ return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
}
+ } else {
+ self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo.take();
}
let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
- self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?;
+ self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
}
+ if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
+ let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
+ if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
+ self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
+ // local transactions to decide how to merge
if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
}
self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
}
+
+ self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
Ok(())
}
/// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
/// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
/// provides slightly better privacy.
- pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: OutPoint) {
+ /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
+ /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
+ pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
}
- pub(super) fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) {
+ /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
+ pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
+ self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
}
pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
self.funding_txo = None;
}
+ /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
- self.funding_txo
+ match self.funding_txo {
+ Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
+ None => None
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
+ /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
+ /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
+ /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
+ pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
+ for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
+ for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
+ res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
+ }
+ }
+ res
+ }
+
+ /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
+ //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
+ writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
+ writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
+
+ match &self.funding_txo {
+ &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
+ writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
+ script.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &None => {
+ // We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but
+ // not much to give them.
+ return Ok(());
+ },
+ }
+
+ // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
+ U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
+
+ match self.key_storage {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
+ if let Some(ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point) = *prev_latest_per_commitment_point {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ writer.write_all(&prev_latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ }
+ if let Some(ref latest_per_commitment_point) = *latest_per_commitment_point {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ writer.write_all(&latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ }
+
+ },
+ KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(),
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
+ writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
+
+ match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
+ Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
+ writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
+ match second_option {
+ Some(second_pubkey) => {
+ writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
+ },
+ None => {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
+ },
+ }
+ },
+ None => {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
+ },
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
+
+ for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(secret)?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
+ ($htlc_output: expr) => {
+ writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
+ writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash)?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index))?;
+ }
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref txid, ref htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
+ for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
+ }
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
+ (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for script in txouts.iter() {
+ script.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if for_local_storage {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(*payment_hash)?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
+ }
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
+ ($local_tx: expr) => {
+ if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
+ match e {
+ encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
+ _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
+ }
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
+ writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
+ writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
+ writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
+ for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
+ writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
+ writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ }
+
+ if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ }
+
+ if for_local_storage {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
+ for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
+ writer.write_all(payment_preimage)?;
+ }
+
+ self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
+ self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
+
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
+ ///
+ /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
+ /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
+ /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
+ /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
+ /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
+ pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ self.write(writer, true)
+ }
+
+ /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
+ ///
+ /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
+ /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
+ /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
+ /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
+ /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
+ pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ self.write(writer, false)
}
//TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
//we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
/// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
- pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
+ pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
- return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
+ return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
}
}
assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
- Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", msg: None})
+ None
}
- pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
+ pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
//TODO This can be optimized?
let mut min = 1 << 48;
for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
min
}
+ pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.current_remote_commitment_number
+ }
+
+ pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
+ if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
+ } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
+ }
+
/// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
/// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
/// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
- /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions, and claim them using the revocation key (if
- /// applicable) as well.
- fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
+ /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
+ fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
// Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
// a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
+ let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
+ let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
+
+ let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
+ let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
+
macro_rules! ignore_error {
( $thing : expr ) => {
match $thing {
Ok(a) => a,
- Err(_) => return txn_to_broadcast
+ Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
}
};
}
- let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
- let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
-
- let commitment_number = (((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
+ let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
- let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
- KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
- let per_commitment_point = ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
- (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))),
- ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key)))))
+ let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
+ (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
+ ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
+ Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
},
KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
- let per_commitment_point = ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
- ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
+ ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
+ None)
},
};
- let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &self.delayed_payment_base_key));
+ let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
- None => return txn_to_broadcast,
- Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &their_htlc_base_key)),
+ None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
+ Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
};
let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
+ let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
+ // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
+ // script_pubkey version.
+ let payment_hash160 = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
+ Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
+ } else { None };
+
let mut total_value = 0;
let mut values = Vec::new();
let mut inputs = Vec::new();
for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
inputs.push(TxIn {
- prev_hash: commitment_txid,
- prev_index: idx as u32,
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid: commitment_txid,
+ vout: idx as u32,
+ },
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: 0xfffffffd,
witness: Vec::new(),
htlc_idxs.push(None);
values.push(outp.value);
total_value += outp.value;
- break; // There can only be one of these
+ } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
+ key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
+ output: outp.clone(),
+ });
}
}
};
let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
- (ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)), redeemscript)
+ (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
},
KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
unimplemented!();
} else {
$input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
}
- $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_vec());
+ $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
}
}
}
if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
- return txn_to_broadcast; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
+ return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
}
let input = TxIn {
- prev_hash: commitment_txid,
- prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index,
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid: commitment_txid,
+ vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
+ },
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: 0xfffffffd,
witness: Vec::new(),
};
let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
- txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); // TODO: This is not yet tested in ChannelManager!
+ txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
}
}
}
if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
// We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
- // TODO: Register commitment_txid with the ChainWatchInterface!
- self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
+ watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
+ self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
}
- if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
+ if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
}
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
+ output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
+ });
txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
} else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
// While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
// already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
// not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
// insert it here.
- self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
+ watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
+ self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
let revocation_point_option =
} else { None };
if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
- KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
- (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))),
- ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key)))))
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
+ (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
+ ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
},
KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
},
};
let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
- None => return txn_to_broadcast,
+ None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
};
+ for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
+ if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
+ match self.key_storage {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
+ if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
+ key: local_key,
+ output: outp.clone(),
+ });
+ }
+ },
+ KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {}
+ }
+ break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
+ }
+ }
+
let mut total_value = 0;
let mut values = Vec::new();
let mut inputs = Vec::new();
let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
- (ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key)), redeemscript)
+ (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
},
KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
unimplemented!();
$input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
$input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
$input.witness.push($preimage);
- $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_vec());
+ $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
}
}
}
for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
let input = TxIn {
- prev_hash: commitment_txid,
- prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index,
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid: commitment_txid,
+ vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
+ },
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
witness: Vec::new(),
};
let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
+ output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
+ });
txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
}
}
}
- if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
+ if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
}
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
+ output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
+ });
txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
}
}
- } else {
- //TODO: For each input check if its in our remote_commitment_txn_on_chain map!
}
- txn_to_broadcast
+ (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
}
- fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> Vec<Transaction> {
+ /// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key
+ fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
+ if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
+ return (None, None)
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! ignore_error {
+ ( $thing : expr ) => {
+ match $thing {
+ Ok(a) => a,
+ Err(_) => return (None, None)
+ }
+ };
+ }
+
+ let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
+ let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
+ let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
+ ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
+ },
+ KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
+ ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
+ },
+ };
+ let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
+ None => return (None, None),
+ Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
+ };
+ let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
+ let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
+ let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
+
+ let mut inputs = Vec::new();
+ let mut amount = 0;
+
+ if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
+ inputs.push(TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid: htlc_txid,
+ vout: 0,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ });
+ amount = tx.output[0].value;
+ }
+
+ if !inputs.is_empty() {
+ let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
+ value: amount, //TODO: - fee
+ });
+
+ let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: inputs,
+ output: outputs,
+ };
+
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
+
+ let sig = match self.key_storage {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
+ let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]));
+ let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
+ self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
+ }
+ KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
+ unimplemented!();
+ }
+ };
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
+
+ let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
+ let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
+ (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
+ } else { (None, None) }
+ }
+
+ fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
+ let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
+
+ macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
+ ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
+ if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
+ if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
+ if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
+ key: local_delayedkey,
+ witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
+ to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
+ output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
+ let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
+ for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
+ if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
+ add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
if htlc.offered {
htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_vec());
+ htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
+ add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
} else {
if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_vec());
+ htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
+ add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
res.push(htlc_success_tx);
}
}
}
- res
+ (res, spendable_outputs)
}
/// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
/// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
/// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
- fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
+ fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
- return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
+ match self.key_storage {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
+ return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
+ },
+ KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
+ return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
+ }
+ }
}
}
if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
- return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
+ match self.key_storage {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
+ return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
+ },
+ KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
+ return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
+ }
+ }
}
}
- Vec::new()
+ (Vec::new(), Vec::new())
}
- fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface) {
+ /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
+ fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
+ if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
+ match self.key_storage {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
+ let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
+ let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
+ for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
+ if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
+ return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
+ output: output.clone(),
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
+ //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
+ // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ None
+ }
+
+ /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if it's copy of
+ /// the Channel was out-of-date.
+ pub(super) fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
+ if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
+ match self.key_storage {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
+ res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)).0);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
+ };
+ res
+ } else {
+ Vec::new()
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
+ let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
+ let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
for tx in txn_matched {
- for txin in tx.input.iter() {
- if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (txin.prev_hash == self.funding_txo.unwrap().txid && txin.prev_index == self.funding_txo.unwrap().index as u32) {
- let mut txn = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
+ if tx.input.len() == 1 {
+ // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
+ // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
+ // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
+ // filters.
+ let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
+ let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
+ if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
+ let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
+ txn = remote_txn;
+ spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
+ if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
+ watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
+ }
if txn.is_empty() {
- txn = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
+ let (remote_txn, mut outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
+ spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
+ txn = remote_txn;
}
- for tx in txn.iter() {
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
+ if !self.funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
+ if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) {
+ spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
+ }
}
+ } else {
+ if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
+ let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number);
+ if let Some(tx) = tx {
+ txn.push(tx);
+ }
+ if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
+ spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ for tx in txn.iter() {
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
}
}
}
if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- let mut needs_broadcast = false;
- for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
- if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
- needs_broadcast = true;
+ if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
+ match self.key_storage {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
+ let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
+ spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
+ for tx in txs {
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
+ }
+ },
+ KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
+ let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None);
+ spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
+ for tx in txs {
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
+ }
}
}
}
+ }
+ self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
+ (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs)
+ }
- if needs_broadcast {
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
- for tx in self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx) {
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
+ pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
+ if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
+ // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
+ // time out the HTLC first.
+ // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
+ // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
+ // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
+ // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
+ // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
+ // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
+ // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
+ // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
+ // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
+ // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
+ // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
+ // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
+ // aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
+ // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
+ // outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
+ // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
+ // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
+ if ( htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) ||
+ (!htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
+ return true;
}
}
}
+ false
}
+}
- pub fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
- if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
- if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
- return true;
+const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
+
+impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
+ fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
+ ($key: expr) => {
+ match $key {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
+ return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
+ }
+
+ // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
+ // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
+ let outpoint = OutPoint {
+ txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ index: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ };
+ let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
+ let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
+
+ let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => {
+ let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+ let latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode {
+ revocation_base_key,
+ htlc_base_key,
+ delayed_payment_base_key,
+ payment_base_key,
+ shutdown_pubkey,
+ prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
+ latest_per_commitment_point,
+ }
+ },
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+
+ let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
+ let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
+
+ let their_cur_revocation_points = {
+ let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
+ if first_idx == 0 {
+ None
+ } else {
+ let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
+ Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
+ } else {
+ Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &second_point_slice)))))
+ }
+ }
+ };
+
+ let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
+
+ let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
+ for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
+ *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
+ () => {
+ {
+ let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let payment_hash: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let transaction_output_index: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ HTLCOutputInCommitment {
+ offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
}
}
}
}
- false
+
+ let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
+ for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
+ let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let outputs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
+ for _ in 0..outputs_count {
+ outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
+ }
+ if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+
+ let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
+ for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
+ let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
+ let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
+ let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
+ for _ in 0..outputs_count {
+ outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
+ }
+ if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+
+ let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
+ for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
+ let txid: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
+ if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! read_local_tx {
+ () => {
+ {
+ let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
+ Ok(tx) => tx,
+ Err(e) => match e {
+ encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ },
+ };
+
+ if tx.input.is_empty() {
+ // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+
+ let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let htlc_outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
+ for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
+ htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
+ }
+
+ LocalSignedTx {
+ txid: tx.txid(),
+ tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => {
+ Some(read_local_tx!())
+ },
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+
+ let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => {
+ Some(read_local_tx!())
+ },
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+
+ let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
+
+ let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
+ let mut sha = Sha256::new();
+ for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
+ let preimage: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ sha.reset();
+ sha.input(&preimage);
+ let mut hash = [0; 32];
+ sha.result(&mut hash);
+ if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ }
+
+ let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
+ funding_txo,
+ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
+
+ key_storage,
+ their_htlc_base_key,
+ their_delayed_payment_base_key,
+ their_cur_revocation_points,
+
+ our_to_self_delay,
+ their_to_self_delay,
+
+ old_secrets,
+ remote_claimable_outpoints,
+ remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
+ remote_hash_commitment_number,
+
+ prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
+ current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
+ current_remote_commitment_number,
+
+ payment_preimages,
+
+ destination_script,
+ last_block_hash,
+ secp_ctx,
+ logger,
+ }))
}
+
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
- use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
use crypto::digest::Digest;
+ use hex;
use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
use util::sha2::Sha256;
+ use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
+ use std::sync::Arc;
#[test]
fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
macro_rules! test_secrets {
() => {
idx -= 1;
}
assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
- assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
+ assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
};
}
{
// insert_secret correct sequence
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
}
{
// insert_secret #1 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
{
// insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
{
// insert_secret #3 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
{
// insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
{
// insert_secret #5 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
{
// insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
{
// insert_secret #7 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
{
// insert_secret #8 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
+ secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
}
#[test]
fn test_prune_preimages() {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
+ let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
macro_rules! dummy_keys {
() => {
- TxCreationKeys {
- per_commitment_point: PublicKey::new(),
- revocation_key: PublicKey::new(),
- a_htlc_key: PublicKey::new(),
- b_htlc_key: PublicKey::new(),
- a_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey::new(),
- b_payment_key: PublicKey::new(),
+ {
+ TxCreationKeys {
+ per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
+ revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
+ a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
+ b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
+ a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
+ b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
+ }
}
}
}
// Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
// old state.
- let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655);
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654);
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653);
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652);
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
}
// Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
let mut secret = [0; 32];
- secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
// Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
- secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
// Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
// previous commitment tx's preimages too
monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
- secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
// But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
- secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
+ secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
}