use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
+use bitcoin::network::serialize;
use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
use bitcoin::util::bip143;
use ln::chan_utils;
use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
+use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use util::sha2::Sha256;
+use util::byte_utils;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
/// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
/// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
- /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given funding_txid+funding_output_index.
- fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16), monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
+ /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
+ fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
}
/// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
/// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
/// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
/// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
-/// (Sha256dHash, u16) as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
+/// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
};
match monitor.funding_txo {
None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
- Some((funding_txid, funding_output_index)) => self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((funding_txid, funding_output_index as u32)),
+ Some(outpoint) => self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32)),
}
monitors.insert(key, monitor);
Ok(())
}
}
-impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<(Sha256dHash, u16)> {
- fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16), monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
+impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
+ fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
Ok(_) => Ok(()),
Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
/// HTLC-Success transaction.
const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
-#[derive(Clone)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
enum KeyStorage {
PrivMode {
revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
}
}
-#[derive(Clone)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
struct LocalSignedTx {
+ /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
txid: Sha256dHash,
tx: Transaction,
revocation_key: PublicKey,
htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
}
+const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+
pub struct ChannelMonitor {
- funding_txo: Option<(Sha256dHash, u16)>,
+ funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
key_storage: KeyStorage,
old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
- remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
- //hash to commitment number mapping use to determine the state of transaction owning it
- // (revoked/non-revoked) and so lightnen pruning
+ /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
+ /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
+ /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
+ /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
+ /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
+ remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
+ /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
+ /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
+ /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
+ /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
// We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
- remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
+ remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(),
prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
}
}
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
+/// underlying object
+impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
+ fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
+ if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo ||
+ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
+ self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
+ self.delayed_payment_base_key != other.delayed_payment_base_key ||
+ self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
+ self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
+ self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
+ self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
+ self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
+ self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
+ self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
+ self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
+ self.destination_script != other.destination_script
+ {
+ false
+ } else {
+ for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
+ if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
+ return false
+ }
+ }
+ let us = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
+ let them = other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
+ *us == *them
+ }
+ }
+}
+
impl ChannelMonitor {
pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
ChannelMonitor {
old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
- remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
+ remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
/// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither
/// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
/// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
- pub fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
for i in 0..pos {
let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
}
}
- let mut waste_hash_state : Vec<[u8;32]> = Vec::new();
- {
- let local_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx;
- let remote_hash_commitment_number = &self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
+ if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
+ let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
+ let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
+ let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
+
self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
- for &(ref htlc, _s1, _s2) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !").htlc_outputs {
+ for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
+ if k == htlc.payment_hash {
+ return true
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
if k == htlc.payment_hash {
return true
}
}
- if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
- if *cn < min_idx {
- return true
- }
+ }
+ let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
+ if *cn < min_idx {
+ return true
}
- waste_hash_state.push(k);
- false
- });
- }
- for h in waste_hash_state {
- self.remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&h);
+ true
+ } else { false };
+ if contains {
+ remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
+ }
+ false
+ });
}
Ok(())
/// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
/// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
/// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
- pub fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
+ pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
// TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
// so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
// (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
/// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
/// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
/// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
- pub fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
+ pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
/// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
/// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
- pub fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
+ pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
}
}
/// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
- pub fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
+ pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
}
/// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
/// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
/// provides slightly better privacy.
- pub fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_txid: Sha256dHash, funding_output_index: u16) {
- self.funding_txo = Some((funding_txid, funding_output_index));
+ pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: OutPoint) {
+ self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
}
- pub fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) {
+ pub(super) fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) {
self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
}
- pub fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
+ pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
}
- pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
+ pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
self.funding_txo = None;
}
- pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<(Sha256dHash, u16)> {
+ pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
self.funding_txo
}
+ /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
+ fn serialize(&self, for_local_storage: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
+ let mut res = Vec::new();
+ res.push(SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
+ res.push(MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
+
+ match self.funding_txo {
+ Some(outpoint) => {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&outpoint.txid[..]);
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index));
+ },
+ None => {
+ // We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but
+ // not much to give them.
+ return res;
+ },
+ }
+
+ // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor));
+
+ match self.key_storage {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
+ res.push(0);
+ res.extend_from_slice(&revocation_base_key[..]);
+ res.extend_from_slice(&htlc_base_key[..]);
+ },
+ KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(),
+ }
+
+ res.extend_from_slice(&self.delayed_payment_base_key.serialize());
+ res.extend_from_slice(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize());
+
+ match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
+ Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx));
+ res.extend_from_slice(&pubkey.serialize());
+ match second_option {
+ Some(second_pubkey) => {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&second_pubkey.serialize());
+ },
+ None => {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&[0; 33]);
+ },
+ }
+ },
+ None => {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0));
+ },
+ }
+
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay));
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()));
+
+ for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
+ res.extend_from_slice(secret);
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx));
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
+ ($htlc_output: expr) => {
+ res.push($htlc_output.offered as u8);
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat));
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry));
+ res.extend_from_slice(&$htlc_output.payment_hash);
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index));
+ }
+ }
+
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64));
+ for (txid, htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]);
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64));
+ for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
+ }
+ }
+
+ {
+ let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64));
+ for (txid, commitment_number) in remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]);
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number));
+ }
+ }
+
+ if for_local_storage {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64));
+ for (payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
+ res.extend_from_slice(payment_hash);
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number));
+ }
+ } else {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0));
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
+ ($local_tx: expr) => {
+ let tx_ser = serialize::serialize(&$local_tx.tx).unwrap();
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(tx_ser.len() as u64));
+ res.extend_from_slice(&tx_ser);
+
+ res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize());
+ res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize());
+ res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize());
+ res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize());
+
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw));
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64));
+ for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
+ res.extend_from_slice(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx));
+ res.extend_from_slice(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ res.push(1);
+ serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
+ } else {
+ res.push(0);
+ }
+
+ if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ res.push(1);
+ serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
+ } else {
+ res.push(0);
+ }
+
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64));
+ for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
+ res.extend_from_slice(payment_preimage);
+ }
+
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.destination_script.len() as u64));
+ res.extend_from_slice(&self.destination_script[..]);
+
+ res
+ }
+
+ /// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for writing to disk.
+ pub fn serialize_for_disk(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
+ self.serialize(true)
+ }
+
+ /// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
+ pub fn serialize_for_watchtower(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
+ self.serialize(false)
+ }
+
+ /// Attempts to decode a serialized monitor
+ pub fn deserialize(data: &[u8]) -> Option<Self> {
+ let mut read_pos = 0;
+ macro_rules! read_bytes {
+ ($byte_count: expr) => {
+ {
+ if ($byte_count as usize) > data.len() - read_pos {
+ return None;
+ }
+ read_pos += $byte_count as usize;
+ &data[read_pos - $byte_count as usize..read_pos]
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
+ ($key: expr) => {
+ match $key {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(_) => return None,
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let _ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
+ let min_ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
+ if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
+ return None;
+ }
+
+ // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
+ // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
+ let funding_txo = Some(OutPoint {
+ txid: Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)),
+ index: byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)),
+ });
+ let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
+
+ let key_storage = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
+ 0 => {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode {
+ revocation_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))),
+ htlc_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))),
+ }
+ },
+ _ => return None,
+ };
+
+ let delayed_payment_base_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
+ let their_htlc_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))));
+
+ let their_cur_revocation_points = {
+ let first_idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
+ if first_idx == 0 {
+ None
+ } else {
+ let first_point = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
+ let second_point_slice = read_bytes!(33);
+ if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
+ Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
+ } else {
+ Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, second_point_slice)))))
+ }
+ }
+ };
+
+ let our_to_self_delay = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2));
+ let their_to_self_delay = Some(byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)));
+
+ let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
+ for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
+ secret.copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
+ *idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
+ () => {
+ {
+ let offered = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
+ 0 => false, 1 => true,
+ _ => return None,
+ };
+ let amount_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ let cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
+ let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
+ payment_hash[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
+ let transaction_output_index = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
+
+ HTLCOutputInCommitment {
+ offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let remote_claimable_outpoints_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ if remote_claimable_outpoints_len > data.len() as u64 / 64 { return None; }
+ let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize);
+ for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
+ let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
+ let outputs_count = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ if outputs_count > data.len() as u64 * 32 { return None; }
+ let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(outputs_count as usize);
+ for _ in 0..outputs_count {
+ outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
+ }
+ if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
+ return None;
+ }
+ }
+
+ let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ if remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
+ let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize);
+ for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
+ let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
+ let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
+ if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
+ return None;
+ }
+ }
+
+ let remote_hash_commitment_number_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ if remote_hash_commitment_number_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
+ let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize);
+ for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
+ let mut txid = [0; 32];
+ txid[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
+ let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
+ if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
+ return None;
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! read_local_tx {
+ () => {
+ {
+ let tx_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ let tx: Transaction = unwrap_obj!(serialize::deserialize(read_bytes!(tx_len)));
+
+ let revocation_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
+ let a_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
+ let b_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
+ let delayed_payment_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
+ let feerate_per_kw = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+
+ let htlc_outputs_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ if htlc_outputs_len > data.len() as u64 / 128 { return None; }
+ let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs_len as usize);
+ for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
+ htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(),
+ unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64))),
+ unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64)))));
+ }
+
+ LocalSignedTx {
+ txid: tx.txid(),
+ tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => {
+ Some(read_local_tx!())
+ },
+ _ => return None,
+ };
+
+ let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => {
+ Some(read_local_tx!())
+ },
+ _ => return None,
+ };
+
+ let payment_preimages_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ if payment_preimages_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
+ let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(payment_preimages_len as usize);
+ let mut sha = Sha256::new();
+ for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
+ let mut preimage = [0; 32];
+ preimage[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
+ sha.reset();
+ sha.input(&preimage);
+ let mut hash = [0; 32];
+ sha.result(&mut hash);
+ if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
+ return None;
+ }
+ }
+
+ let destination_script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ let destination_script = Script::from(read_bytes!(destination_script_len).to_vec());
+
+ Some(ChannelMonitor {
+ funding_txo,
+ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
+
+ key_storage,
+ delayed_payment_base_key,
+ their_htlc_base_key,
+ their_cur_revocation_points,
+
+ our_to_self_delay,
+ their_to_self_delay,
+
+ old_secrets,
+ remote_claimable_outpoints,
+ remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain),
+ remote_hash_commitment_number,
+
+ prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
+ current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
+
+ payment_preimages,
+
+ destination_script,
+ secp_ctx,
+ })
+ }
+
//TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
//we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
}
}
- if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() {
+ if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
// We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
// TODO: Register commitment_txid with the ChainWatchInterface!
- self.remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
+ self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
}
if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
} else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
+ // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
+ // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
+ // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
+ // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
+ // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
+ // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
+ // insert it here.
+ self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
+
if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
let revocation_point_option =
if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
}
}
} else {
- //TODO: For each input check if its in our remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain map!
+ //TODO: For each input check if its in our remote_commitment_txn_on_chain map!
}
txn_to_broadcast
fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface) {
for tx in txn_matched {
for txin in tx.input.iter() {
- if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (txin.prev_hash == self.funding_txo.unwrap().0 && txin.prev_index == self.funding_txo.unwrap().1 as u32) {
+ if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (txin.prev_hash == self.funding_txo.unwrap().txid && txin.prev_index == self.funding_txo.unwrap().index as u32) {
let mut txn = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
if txn.is_empty() {
txn = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
mod tests {
use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
- use bitcoin::util::hash::{Hash160,Sha256dHash};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
+ use crypto::digest::Digest;
use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
- use ln::channelmonitor::LocalSignedTx;
- use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
+ use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
+ use util::sha2::Sha256;
use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
- use std::collections::HashMap;
#[test]
fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
}
}
- macro_rules! gen_local_tx {
- ($hex : expr, $monitor : expr, $htlcs : expr, $rng : expr, $preimage : expr, $hash : expr) => {
- {
-
- let mut htlcs = Vec::new();
-
- for _i in 0..$htlcs {
- $rng.fill_bytes(&mut $preimage);
- $hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&$preimage)[0..20]);
- $monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&$hash, &$preimage);
- htlcs.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
- offered : true,
- amount_msat : 0,
- cltv_expiry : 0,
- payment_hash : $hash.clone(),
- transaction_output_index : 0,
- }, Signature::from_der(&Secp256k1::new(), $hex).unwrap(),
- Signature::from_der(&Secp256k1::new(), $hex).unwrap()))
- }
+ #[test]
+ fn test_prune_preimages() {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- Some(LocalSignedTx {
- txid: Sha256dHash::from_data(&[]),
- tx: Transaction {
- version: 0,
- lock_time: 0,
- input: Vec::new(),
- output: Vec::new(),
- },
+ macro_rules! dummy_keys {
+ () => {
+ TxCreationKeys {
+ per_commitment_point: PublicKey::new(),
revocation_key: PublicKey::new(),
a_htlc_key: PublicKey::new(),
b_htlc_key: PublicKey::new(),
- delayed_payment_key: PublicKey::new(),
- feerate_per_kw: 0,
- htlc_outputs: htlcs,
- })
+ a_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey::new(),
+ b_payment_key: PublicKey::new(),
+ }
}
}
- }
+ let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
- macro_rules! gen_remote_outpoints {
- ($monitor : expr, $tx : expr, $htlcs : expr, $rng : expr, $preimage : expr, $hash: expr, $number : expr) => {
- {
- let mut commitment_number = $number;
-
- for i in 0..$tx {
-
- let tx_zero = Transaction {
- version : 0,
- lock_time : i,
- input : Vec::new(),
- output: Vec::new(),
- };
+ let mut preimages = Vec::new();
+ {
+ let mut rng = thread_rng();
+ for _ in 0..20 {
+ let mut preimage = [0; 32];
+ rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
+ let mut sha = Sha256::new();
+ sha.input(&preimage);
+ let mut hash = [0; 32];
+ sha.result(&mut hash);
+ preimages.push((preimage, hash));
+ }
+ }
- let mut htlcs = Vec::new();
-
- for _i in 0..$htlcs {
- $rng.fill_bytes(&mut $preimage);
- $hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&$preimage)[0..20]);
- $monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&$hash, &$preimage);
- htlcs.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
- offered : true,
- amount_msat : 0,
- cltv_expiry : 0,
- payment_hash : $hash.clone(),
- transaction_output_index : 0,
+ macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
+ ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
+ {
+ let mut res = Vec::new();
+ for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
+ res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
+ offered: true,
+ amount_msat: 0,
+ cltv_expiry: 0,
+ payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
+ transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
});
}
- commitment_number -= 1;
- $monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&tx_zero, htlcs, commitment_number);
+ res
}
}
}
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn test_prune_preimages() {
-
- let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
- let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let mut preimage: [u8;32] = [0;32];
- let mut hash: [u8;32] = [0;32];
- let mut rng = thread_rng();
-
- {
- // insert 30 random hash, 10 from local, 10 from remote, prune 30/50
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
-
- for _i in 0..30 {
- rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
- hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&preimage)[0..20]);
- monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&hash, &preimage);
+ macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
+ ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
+ {
+ let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
+ let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
+ res
+ }
}
- monitor.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = gen_local_tx!(&hex_bytes("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..], monitor, 10, rng, preimage, hash);
- gen_remote_outpoints!(monitor, 1, 10, rng, preimage, hash, 281474976710654);
- secrets.clear();
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None);
- assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 20);
}
-
- {
- // insert 30 random hash, prune 30/30
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
-
- for _i in 0..30 {
- rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
- hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&preimage)[0..20]);
- monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&hash, &preimage);
+ macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
+ ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
+ for preimage in $preimages_slice {
+ assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
+ }
}
- monitor.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = gen_local_tx!(&hex_bytes("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..], monitor, 0, rng, preimage, hash);
- gen_remote_outpoints!(monitor, 0, 0, rng, preimage, hash, 281474976710655);
- secrets.clear();
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None);
- assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 0);
}
- {
- // insert 30 random hash, 25 on 5 remotes, prune 30/55
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
-
- for _i in 0..30 {
- rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
- hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&preimage)[0..20]);
- monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&hash, &preimage);
- }
- monitor.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = gen_local_tx!(&hex_bytes("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..], monitor, 0, rng, preimage, hash);
- gen_remote_outpoints!(monitor, 5, 5, rng, preimage, hash, 281474976710654);
- secrets.clear();
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None);
- assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 25);
+ // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
+ // old state.
+ let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
+
+ monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655);
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654);
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653);
+ monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652);
+ for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
+ monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
}
- {
- // insert 30 random hash, 25 from local, prune 30/55
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
-
- for _i in 0..30 {
- rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
- hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&preimage)[0..20]);
- monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&hash, &preimage);
- }
- monitor.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = gen_local_tx!(&hex_bytes("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..], monitor, 25, rng, preimage, hash);
- gen_remote_outpoints!(monitor, 0, 0, rng, preimage, hash, 281474976710655);
- secrets.clear();
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None);
- assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 25);
- }
+ // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
+ let mut secret = [0; 32];
+ secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
+ test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
+ test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
+
+ // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
+ secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
+ test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
+ test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
+
+ // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
+ // previous commitment tx's preimages too
+ monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
+ secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
+ test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
+ test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
+
+ // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
+ monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
+ secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
+ test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
}
// Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff