use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
-use bitcoin::network::serialize;
-use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
+use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
+use bitcoin::util::hash::{Hash160, BitcoinHash,Sha256dHash};
use bitcoin::util::bip143;
use crypto::digest::Digest;
use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use secp256k1;
-use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, HandleError};
+use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use ln::chan_utils;
use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
-use util::ser::{Readable, Writer};
+use util::logger::Logger;
+use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
use util::sha2::Sha256;
use util::{byte_utils, events};
PermanentFailure,
}
+/// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
+/// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
+/// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
+/// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
+/// Contains a human-readable error message.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
+
/// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
/// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
/// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
+ logger: Arc<Logger>,
}
impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
- fn block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
+ fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
+ let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
{
- let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
- for monitor in monitors.values() {
- let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.broadcaster);
+ let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
+ for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
+ let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster);
if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
outputs: spendable_outputs,
impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
/// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
/// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
- pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
+ pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
chain_monitor,
broadcaster,
pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
+ logger,
});
let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
}
/// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
- pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
- Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor),
+ Some(orig_monitor) => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_option!(monitor.funding_txo));
+ return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
+ },
None => {}
};
match &monitor.funding_txo {
- &None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
+ &None => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for no-funding-set channel (monitoring all txn!)");
+ self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn()
+ },
&Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
+ log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
},
revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
+ payment_base_key: SecretKey,
+ shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
},
///
/// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
/// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
+#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct ChannelMonitor {
funding_txo: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
/// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
/// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
/// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
- remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
+ remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
/// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
/// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
/// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
+ // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
+ // deserialization
+ current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
+
payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
destination_script: Script,
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
-}
-impl Clone for ChannelMonitor {
- fn clone(&self) -> Self {
- ChannelMonitor {
- funding_txo: self.funding_txo.clone(),
- commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(),
-
- key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(),
- their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
- their_delayed_payment_base_key: self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
- their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(),
- our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
- their_to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
-
- old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
- remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
- remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
- remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(),
-
- prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
- current_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
-
- payment_preimages: self.payment_preimages.clone(),
-
- destination_script: self.destination_script.clone(),
- secp_ctx: self.secp_ctx.clone(),
- }
- }
+ // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
+ // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
+ // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
+ // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
+ // the full block_connected).
+ pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
+ logger: Arc<Logger>,
}
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
+ self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
+ self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
self.destination_script != other.destination_script
return false
}
}
- let us = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
- let them = other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
- *us == *them
+ true
}
}
}
impl ChannelMonitor {
- pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
+ pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
ChannelMonitor {
funding_txo: None,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
+ payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
+ shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
latest_per_commitment_point: None,
},
old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
- remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
+ remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
+ current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
-
destination_script: destination_script,
+
+ last_block_hash: Default::default(),
secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
+ logger,
}
}
res
}
- /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next
- /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of
- /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither
+ /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
/// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
/// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
- pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
for i in 0..pos {
let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", action: None})
+ return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
}
}
self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
- if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
- match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
- Some(old_points) => {
- if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
- } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
- if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
- } else {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
- }
- } else {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
- }
- },
- None => {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
- }
- }
- }
-
if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
Ok(())
}
+ /// Tracks the next revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know
+ /// the preimage of in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. When called at
+ /// channel opening revocation point is the CURRENT one used for first commitment tx. Needed in case of sizeable push_msat.
+ pub(super) fn provide_their_next_revocation_point(&mut self, their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) {
+ if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
+ match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
+ Some(old_points) => {
+ if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
+ } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
+ if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
+ } else {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
+ }
+ } else {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
+ }
+ },
+ None => {
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
/// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
/// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
/// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
}
self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
+ self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
}
/// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
feerate_per_kw,
htlc_outputs,
});
- self.key_storage = if let KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } = self.key_storage {
+ self.key_storage = if let KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
KeyStorage::PrivMode {
revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
+ payment_base_key: *payment_base_key,
+ shutdown_pubkey: *shutdown_pubkey,
prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
latest_per_commitment_point: Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point),
}
/// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
/// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
/// chain for new blocks/transactions.
- pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
if self.funding_txo.is_some() {
// We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
// easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 != self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
- return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", action: None});
+ return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
}
} else {
self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo.take();
let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
- self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?;
+ self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
+ }
+ if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
+ let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
+ if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
+ self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
+ }
+ }
}
+ // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
+ // local transactions to decide how to merge
if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
}
self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
}
+
+ self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
Ok(())
}
}
}
+ /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
+ /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
+ /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
+ /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
+ pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
+ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
+ for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
+ for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
+ res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
+ }
+ }
+ res
+ }
+
/// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
//TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
&Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(script.len() as u64))?;
- writer.write_all(&script[..])?;
+ script.write(writer)?;
},
&None => {
// We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but
}
// Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor))?;
+ U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
match self.key_storage {
- KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
if let Some(ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point) = *prev_latest_per_commitment_point {
writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
writer.write_all(&prev_latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
}
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
- for (txid, htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
+ for (ref txid, ref htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
}
}
- {
- let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
- for (txid, commitment_number) in remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
- writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
+ (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for script in txouts.iter() {
+ script.write(writer)?;
}
}
if for_local_storage {
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
- for (payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
- writer.write_all(payment_hash)?;
+ for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(*payment_hash)?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
}
} else {
macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
($local_tx: expr) => {
- let tx_ser = serialize::serialize(&$local_tx.tx).unwrap();
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(tx_ser.len() as u64))?;
- writer.write_all(&tx_ser)?;
+ if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
+ match e {
+ encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
+ _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
+ }
+ }
writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
}
+ if for_local_storage {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
+ }
+
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
writer.write_all(payment_preimage)?;
}
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.destination_script.len() as u64))?;
- writer.write_all(&self.destination_script[..])?;
+ self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
+ self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
Ok(())
}
/// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
+ ///
+ /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
+ /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
+ /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
+ /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
+ /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
self.write(writer, true)
}
/// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
+ ///
+ /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
+ /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
+ /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
+ /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
+ /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
self.write(writer, false)
}
//we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
/// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
- pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
+ pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
- return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
+ return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
}
}
assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
- Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", action: None})
+ None
}
pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
min
}
+ pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.current_remote_commitment_number
+ }
+
+ pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
+ if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
+ } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
+ }
+
/// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
/// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
/// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
/// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
- fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
+ fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
// Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
// a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
htlc_idxs.push(None);
values.push(outp.value);
total_value += outp.value;
- break; // There can only be one of these
+ } else if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
+ match self.key_storage {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
+ if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key) {
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
+ key: local_key,
+ output: outp.clone(),
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
+ //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
+ // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
+ }
+ }
}
}
if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
// We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
- self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
+ self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
}
if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
// not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
// insert it here.
watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
- self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
+ self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
let revocation_point_option =
Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
};
+
+ for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
+ if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
+ match self.key_storage {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
+ if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
+ key: local_key,
+ output: outp.clone(),
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
+ //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
+ // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
+ }
+ }
+ break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
+ }
+ }
+
let mut total_value = 0;
let mut values = Vec::new();
let mut inputs = Vec::new();
};
}
- let secret = ignore_error!(self.get_secret(commitment_number));
+ let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
+ macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
+ ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
+ if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
+ if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
+ if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
+ key: local_delayedkey,
+ witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
+ to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
+ output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
+ let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
+ for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
+ if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
+ add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
if htlc.offered {
let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
- if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
- if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
- if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
- spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutput {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_timeout_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
- local_delayedkey,
- witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
- to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay
- });
- }
- }
- }
+ add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
} else {
if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
- if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
- if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
- if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
- spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutput {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_success_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
- local_delayedkey,
- witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
- to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay
- });
- }
- }
- }
+ add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
res.push(htlc_success_tx);
}
}
if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
match self.key_storage {
- KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
},
KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
match self.key_storage {
- KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
},
KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
(Vec::new(), Vec::new())
}
- fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
+ /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
+ fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
+ if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
+ match self.key_storage {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
+ let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
+ let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
+ for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
+ if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
+ return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
+ output: output.clone(),
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
+ //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
+ // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ None
+ }
+
+ /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if it's copy of
+ /// the Channel was out-of-date.
+ pub(super) fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
+ if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
+ match self.key_storage {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
+ res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)).0);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
+ };
+ res
+ } else {
+ Vec::new()
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
for tx in txn_matched {
spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
txn = remote_txn;
}
+ if !self.funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
+ if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) {
+ spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
+ }
+ }
} else {
- let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
- if let Some(commitment_number) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
- let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, *commitment_number);
+ if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
+ let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number);
if let Some(tx) = tx {
txn.push(tx);
}
if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
match self.key_storage {
- KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
for tx in txs {
}
}
}
+ self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
(watch_outputs, spendable_outputs)
}
}
}
-impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for ChannelMonitor {
- fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- // TODO: read_to_end and then deserializing from that vector is really dumb, we should
- // actually use the fancy serialization framework we have instead of hacking around it.
- let mut datavec = Vec::new();
- reader.read_to_end(&mut datavec)?;
- let data = &datavec;
-
- let mut read_pos = 0;
- macro_rules! read_bytes {
- ($byte_count: expr) => {
- {
- if ($byte_count as usize) > data.len() - read_pos {
- return Err(DecodeError::ShortRead);
- }
- read_pos += $byte_count as usize;
- &data[read_pos - $byte_count as usize..read_pos]
- }
- }
- }
+const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
+impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
+ fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
($key: expr) => {
}
}
- let _ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
- let min_ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
+ let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
}
// Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
// barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
let outpoint = OutPoint {
- txid: Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)),
- index: byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)),
+ txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ index: Readable::read(reader)?,
};
- let script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
- let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Script::from(read_bytes!(script_len).to_vec())));
- let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
+ let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
+ let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
- let key_storage = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
+ let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
0 => {
- let revocation_base_key = unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32)));
- let htlc_base_key = unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32)));
- let delayed_payment_base_key = unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32)));
- let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => {
- Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))))
- },
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
};
- let latest_per_commitment_point = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => {
- Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))))
- },
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ let latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
};
KeyStorage::PrivMode {
revocation_base_key,
htlc_base_key,
delayed_payment_base_key,
+ payment_base_key,
+ shutdown_pubkey,
prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
latest_per_commitment_point,
}
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
};
- let their_htlc_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))));
- let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))));
+ let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
+ let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
let their_cur_revocation_points = {
- let first_idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
+ let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
if first_idx == 0 {
None
} else {
- let first_point = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
- let second_point_slice = read_bytes!(33);
+ let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
} else {
- Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, second_point_slice)))))
+ Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &second_point_slice)))))
}
}
};
- let our_to_self_delay = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2));
- let their_to_self_delay = Some(byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)));
+ let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
- secret.copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
- *idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
}
macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
() => {
{
- let offered = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
- 0 => false, 1 => true,
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
- let amount_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
- let cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
- let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
- payment_hash[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
- let transaction_output_index = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
+ let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let payment_hash: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let transaction_output_index: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
HTLCOutputInCommitment {
offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
}
}
- let remote_claimable_outpoints_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
- if remote_claimable_outpoints_len > data.len() as u64 / 64 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); }
- let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize);
+ let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
- let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
- let outputs_count = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
- if outputs_count > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); }
- let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(outputs_count as usize);
+ let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let outputs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
for _ in 0..outputs_count {
outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
}
}
}
- let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
- if remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); }
- let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize);
+ let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
- let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
- let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
- if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
+ let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
+ let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
+ let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
+ for _ in 0..outputs_count {
+ outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
+ }
+ if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
- let remote_hash_commitment_number_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
- if remote_hash_commitment_number_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); }
- let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize);
+ let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
- let mut txid = [0; 32];
- txid[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
- let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
+ let txid: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
macro_rules! read_local_tx {
() => {
{
- let tx_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
- let tx_ser = read_bytes!(tx_len);
- let tx: Transaction = unwrap_obj!(serialize::deserialize(tx_ser));
- if serialize::serialize(&tx).unwrap() != tx_ser {
- // We check that the tx re-serializes to the same form to ensure there is
- // no extra data, and as rust-bitcoin doesn't handle the 0-input ambiguity
- // all that well.
+ let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
+ Ok(tx) => tx,
+ Err(e) => match e {
+ encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ },
+ };
+
+ if tx.input.is_empty() {
+ // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
- let revocation_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
- let a_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
- let b_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
- let delayed_payment_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
- let feerate_per_kw = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let htlc_outputs_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
- if htlc_outputs_len > data.len() as u64 / 128 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); }
- let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs_len as usize);
+ let htlc_outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
- htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(),
- unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64))),
- unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64)))));
+ htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
}
LocalSignedTx {
}
}
- let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
+ let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
0 => None,
1 => {
Some(read_local_tx!())
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
};
- let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
+ let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
0 => None,
1 => {
Some(read_local_tx!())
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
};
- let payment_preimages_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
- if payment_preimages_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
- let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(payment_preimages_len as usize);
+ let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
+
+ let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
let mut sha = Sha256::new();
for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
- let mut preimage = [0; 32];
- preimage[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
+ let preimage: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
sha.reset();
sha.input(&preimage);
let mut hash = [0; 32];
}
}
- let destination_script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
- let destination_script = Script::from(read_bytes!(destination_script_len).to_vec());
+ let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
- Ok(ChannelMonitor {
+ Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
funding_txo,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
old_secrets,
remote_claimable_outpoints,
- remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain),
+ remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
remote_hash_commitment_number,
prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
+ current_remote_commitment_number,
payment_preimages,
destination_script,
+ last_block_hash,
secp_ctx,
- })
+ logger,
+ }))
}
}
use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
use util::sha2::Sha256;
+ use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
+ use std::sync::Arc;
#[test]
fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
macro_rules! test_secrets {
() => {
idx -= 1;
}
assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
- assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
+ assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
};
}
{
// insert_secret correct sequence
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
}
{
// insert_secret #1 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
{
// insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
{
// insert_secret #3 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
{
// insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
{
// insert_secret #5 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
{
// insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
{
// insert_secret #7 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
{
// insert_secret #8 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
test_secrets!();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
+ assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
"Previous secret did not match new one");
}
}
#[test]
fn test_prune_preimages() {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
macro_rules! dummy_keys {
// Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
// old state.
- let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
+ let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
// Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
let mut secret = [0; 32];
secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
// Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
// previous commitment tx's preimages too
monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
// But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
+ monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff