}
let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
+ log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
+ log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
*prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
*current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
self.write(writer, false)
}
- //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
- //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
-
/// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
}
}
- if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
+ if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
// We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
+
+ // TODO: We really should only fail backwards after our revocation claims have been
+ // confirmed, but we also need to do more other tracking of in-flight pre-confirm
+ // on-chain claims, so we can do that at the same time.
+ macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
+ ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
+ if let Some(&(_, ref outpoints)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&$txid) {
+ for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in outpoints.iter() {
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
+ htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, payment_hash.clone()));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
+ if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
+ check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
+ }
+ if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
+ check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
+ }
+ }
+ // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
}
if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
});
txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
+ } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
+ // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
+ // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
+ // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
+ // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
+ // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
+ // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
+ // insert it here.
+ watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
+ self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
+
+ log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
// TODO: We really should only fail backwards after our revocation claims have been
// confirmed, but we also need to do more other tracking of in-flight pre-confirm
// on-chain claims, so we can do that at the same time.
- if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
- if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
- if let Some(&(_, ref latest_outpoints)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
- for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
- log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from current remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
+ ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
+ if let Some(&(_, ref latest_outpoints)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&$txid) {
+ $id: for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
+ // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
+ // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
+ // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
+ // payment_preimage.
+ // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
+ // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
+ // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
+ // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
+ // need to here.
+ for &(_, ref broadcast_source, ref output_idx) in per_commitment_data.1.iter() {
+ if output_idx.is_some() && source == broadcast_source {
+ continue $id;
+ }
+ }
+ log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, payment_hash.clone()));
}
}
}
+ }
+ if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
+ if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
+ check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
+ }
if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
- if let Some(&(_, ref prev_outpoint)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
- for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in prev_outpoint.iter() {
- log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from previous remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
- htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, payment_hash.clone()));
- }
- }
+ check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
}
}
- // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
- } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
- // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
- // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
- // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
- // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
- // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
- // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
- // insert it here.
- watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
- self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
let revocation_point_option =
output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
});
txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
-
- // TODO: We need to fail back HTLCs that were't included in the broadcast
- // commitment transaction, either because they didn't meet dust or because a
- // stale (but not yet revoked) commitment transaction was broadcast!
}
}
}
for tx in txn.iter() {
broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
}
- let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx);
- if updated.len() > 0 {
- htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
- }
+ }
+ // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
+ // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
+ // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
+ let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx);
+ if updated.len() > 0 {
+ htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
}
}
if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
let mut payment_data = None;
+ let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
+ || (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
+ let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
+ let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
+
+ macro_rules! log_claim {
+ ($source: expr, $local_tx: expr, $outbound_htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
+ // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
+ // as we have no corresponding source. This implies either it is an
+ // inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
+ if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
+ ($outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
+ log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
+ $source, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
+ if $outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($payment_hash.0),
+ if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
+ } else {
+ log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
+ $source, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
+ if $outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($payment_hash.0),
+ if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
+ }
+ }
+ }
macro_rules! scan_commitment {
- ($htlc_outputs: expr, $htlc_sources: expr, $source: expr) => {
+ ($htlc_outputs: expr, $htlc_sources: expr, $source: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, ref vout) in $htlc_sources.iter() {
if &Some(input.previous_output.vout) == vout {
- log_trace!(self, "Input spending {}:{} resolves HTLC with payment hash {} from {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $source);
+ log_claim!($source, $local_tx, true, payment_hash, true);
+ // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
+ // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
+ // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
+ // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
+ // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
payment_data = Some((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
}
}
if payment_data.is_none() {
for htlc_output in $htlc_outputs {
if input.previous_output.vout == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
- log_info!(self, "Input spending {}:{} in {} resolves inbound HTLC with timeout from {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(), $source);
+ log_claim!($source, $local_tx, $local_tx == htlc_output.offered, htlc_output.payment_hash, false);
continue 'outer_loop;
}
}
if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a),
current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_sources,
- "our latest local commitment tx");
+ "our latest local commitment tx", true);
}
}
if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a),
prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_sources,
- "our latest local commitment tx");
+ "our previous local commitment tx", true);
}
}
if let Some(&(ref htlc_outputs, ref htlc_sources)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
- scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs, htlc_sources, "remote commitment tx");
+ scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs, htlc_sources, "remote commitment tx", false);
}
- // If tx isn't solving htlc output from local/remote commitment tx and htlc isn't outbound we don't need
- // to broadcast solving backward
+ // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
+ // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
- if (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
- || (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33) {
- log_error!(self, "Remote used revocation sig to take a {} HTLC output at index {} from commitment_tx {}", if input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { "offered" } else { "accepted" }, input.previous_output.vout, input.previous_output.txid);
- } else if input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
- payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&tx.input[0].witness[3]);
+ if accepted_preimage_claim {
+ payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
- } else if input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
- payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&tx.input[0].witness[1]);
+ } else if offered_preimage_claim {
+ payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
} else {
htlc_updated.push((source, None, payment_hash));
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff