Fail back dust HTLC of local commitment tx after enough confirmations
[rust-lightning] / src / ln / functional_tests.rs
index 4b58e3b29e6a8587cdac27e19718860c05273015..0b8ce98da8ef187fb3a3a431ad2599a6e791332c 100644 (file)
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ use bitcoin::util::bip143;
 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
 use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ChildNumber, ExtendedPubKey, ExtendedPrivKey};
 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType, OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint};
 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
@@ -5513,3 +5513,143 @@ fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_upda
 
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 }
+
+fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
+       // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY
+       // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
+       // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
+
+       let nodes = create_network(2);
+       let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
+       let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis;
+
+       // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
+       let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
+       let (_, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
+       route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+
+       // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
+       let as_prev_commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+
+       // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
+       assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
+       check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+       expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+       check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+       let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+       nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+       nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+       check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+       // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
+       let as_last_commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+
+       let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+       match events[0] {
+               MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
+                       assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+               },
+               _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+       }
+       match events[1] {
+               MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
+                       assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+               },
+               _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+       }
+
+       assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
+       // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
+       let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+       if announce_latest {
+               nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&as_last_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+       } else {
+               nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&as_prev_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+       }
+
+       let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+       assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+       match events[0] {
+               MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+               _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+       }
+
+       assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+       connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true,  header.bitcoin_hash());
+       let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+       // Only 2 PaymentFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
+       assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+       let mut first_failed = false;
+       for event in events {
+               match event {
+                       Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+                               if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
+                                       assert!(!first_failed);
+                                       first_failed = true;
+                               } else {
+                                       assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
+                               }
+                       }
+                       _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+               }
+       }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
+       do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
+       do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_no_failure_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
+       // Transaction filters for failing back dust htlc based on local commitment txn infos has been
+       // prone to error, we test here that a dummy transaction don't fail them.
+
+       let nodes = create_network(2);
+       let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
+       // Rebalance a bit
+       send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
+
+       let as_dust_limit = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis;
+       let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis;
+
+       // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
+       let (preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
+       let (preimage_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], as_dust_limit*1000);
+
+       // Build a dummy invalid transaction trying to spend a commitment tx
+       let input = TxIn {
+               previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), vout: 0 },
+               script_sig: Script::new(),
+               sequence: 0,
+               witness: Vec::new(),
+       };
+
+       let outp = TxOut {
+               script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
+               value: 10000,
+       };
+
+       let dummy_tx = Transaction {
+               version: 2,
+               lock_time: 0,
+               input: vec![input],
+               output: vec![outp]
+       };
+
+       let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+       nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.block_connected(&header, 1, &[&dummy_tx], &[1;1]);
+       assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+       assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
+       // We broadcast a few more block to check everything is all right
+       connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, 20, 1, true,  header.bitcoin_hash());
+       assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+       assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
+
+       claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], preimage_1);
+       claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], preimage_2);
+}