//! claim outputs on-chain.
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface};
-use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
+use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, ChainWatchInterfaceUtil};
+use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor, KeysManager};
use chain::keysinterface;
-use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
-use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,HTLCForwardInfo,RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
-use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor};
-use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
+use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
+use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,HTLCForwardInfo,RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
+use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
+use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, Channel, ChannelError};
use ln::onion_utils;
use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop};
use ln::msgs;
-use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler,HTLCFailChannelUpdate};
+use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler,HTLCFailChannelUpdate, LocalFeatures, ErrorAction};
use util::test_utils;
use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
use util::errors::APIError;
use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
use util::config::UserConfig;
-use util::rng;
+use util::logger::Logger;
-use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
+use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
use bitcoin::util::bip143;
use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ChildNumber, ExtendedPubKey, ExtendedPrivKey};
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType, OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap, HashSet};
use std::default::Default;
-use std::sync::Arc;
+use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
-use std::time::Instant;
use std::mem;
+use rand::{thread_rng, Rng};
+
use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
+#[test]
+fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
+ // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+ // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
+ // funding satoshis
+ let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
+ let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
+ let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
+
+ // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
+
+ // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
+ let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
+ // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
+ let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
+ match nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone())) {
+ Err(msgs::LightningError{ err: error_str, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..}}) => {
+ assert_eq!(error_str, expected_error_str, "unexpected LightningError string (expected `{}`, actual `{}`)", expected_error_str, error_str)
+ },
+ Err(msgs::LightningError{..}) => {panic!("unexpected LightningError action")},
+ _ => panic!("insane OpenChannel message was somehow Ok"),
+ }
+ };
+
+ use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
+ use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
+
+ // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
+ insane_open_helper("funding value > 2^24", |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
+
+ insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
+
+ insane_open_helper("push_msat larger than funding value", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
+
+ insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
+
+ insane_open_helper("Bogus; channel reserve is less than dust limit", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis + 1; msg });
+
+ insane_open_helper("Minimum htlc value is full channel value", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
+
+ insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
+
+ insane_open_helper("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
+
+ insane_open_helper("max_accpted_htlcs > 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
+}
+
#[test]
fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let channel_id = chan.2;
// balancing
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
// A B
// update_fee ->
fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
// Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
// crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let channel_id = chan.2;
// balancing
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
// First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
#[test]
fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
- let nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let channel_id = chan.2;
// A B
#[test]
fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
- let nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let channel_id = chan.2;
let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
#[test]
fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
- let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
let channel_value = 1888;
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let channel_id = chan.2;
let feerate = 260;
#[test]
fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let channel_id = chan.2;
// balancing
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
- claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage, 800_000);
- send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000, 800_000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000, 800_000);
close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
}
#[test]
fn test_update_fee() {
- let nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let channel_id = chan.2;
// A B
#[test]
fn pre_funding_lock_shutdown_test() {
// Test sending a shutdown prior to funding_locked after funding generation
- let nodes = create_network(2);
- let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 8000000, 0);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 8000000, 0, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
#[test]
fn updates_shutdown_wait() {
// Test sending a shutdown with outstanding updates pending
- let mut nodes = create_network(3);
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let route_1 = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
let route_2 = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[1].node.send_payment(route_2, payment_hash) {}
else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
- assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage, 100_000));
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
#[test]
fn htlc_fail_async_shutdown() {
// Test HTLCs fail if shutdown starts even if messages are delivered out-of-order
- let mut nodes = create_network(3);
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
fn do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(recv_count: u8) {
// Test that shutdown/closing_signed is re-sent on reconnect with a variable number of
// messages delivered prior to disconnect
- let nodes = create_network(3);
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage, 100_000));
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
// transaction.
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- if let Err(msgs::HandleError{action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg}), ..}) =
+ if let Err(msgs::LightningError{action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg}, ..}) =
nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish) {
nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
let msgs::ErrorMessage {ref channel_id, ..} = msg;
fn fake_network_test() {
// Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
// tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
- let nodes = create_network(4);
+ let nodes = create_network(4, &[None, None, None, None]);
// Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
- let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
// Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
// Send some more payments
- send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000, 1_000_000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000, 1_000_000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000, 1_000_000);
// Test failure packets
let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
// Add a new channel that skips 3
- let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
+ let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000, 1_000_000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000, 1_000_000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
// Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
// Claim the rebalances...
fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
- claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1, 1_000_000);
// Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
- let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
+ let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
// Send some payments across both channels
let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
//TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3, 3_000_000);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4, 3_000_000);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5, 3_000_000);
// Close down the channels...
close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
}
+#[test]
+fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
+ // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
+ // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
+ // commitment dance rounds.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let mut payments = Vec::new();
+ for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
+ let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash).unwrap();
+ payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
+ }
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
+ // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
+ // another HTLC.
+ let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ if let APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err } = nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1).unwrap_err() {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs");
+ } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
+
+ // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
+ // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
+ // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg }} => {
+ assert_eq!(msg.contents.short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
+ assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+
+ let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update).unwrap();
+ }
+ nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
+
+ let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
+ for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
+ match event {
+ &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ }
+
+ for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
+ claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage, 100_000);
+ }
+
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000, 1_000_000);
+}
+
#[test]
fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
// Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
- // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
- let mut nodes = create_network(6);
+ // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
+ let mut nodes = create_network(6, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
// Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
*nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage, 1_000_000);
fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
- claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage, 1_000_000);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
+ // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
+ // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
+ // in opposite directions.
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ // balancing
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
+
+ let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
+
+ let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800_000, payment_hash);
+
+ // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
+ nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage, 800_000);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
+ let remote_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+
+ assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
+ let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
+ for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
+ if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
+ has_both_htlcs += 1;
+ } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
+ has_both_htlcs += 1;
+ }
+ }
+ assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x2000_0000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![remote_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+
+ // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
+ let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
+ let htlc_pair = if claim_txn[0].output[0].value == 800_000 / 1000 { (claim_txn[0].clone(), claim_txn[1].clone()) } else { (claim_txn[1].clone(), claim_txn[0].clone()) };
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 6);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_pair.0.input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_pair.0.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
+ check_spends!(htlc_pair.0, remote_txn[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(htlc_pair.1.input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_pair.1.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
+ check_spends!(htlc_pair.1, remote_txn[0].clone());
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ for e in events {
+ match e {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
}
fn do_channel_reserve_test(test_recv: bool) {
- use util::rng;
- use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
- use ln::msgs::HandleError;
+ use ln::msgs::LightningError;
- let mut nodes = create_network(3);
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
match err {
- APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
+ APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept"),
_ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
}
}
if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
break;
}
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0, recv_value_0);
htlc_id += 1;
let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
match err {
- APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
+ APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over their reserve value"),
_ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
}
}
{
let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
- APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
+ APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over their reserve value"),
_ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
}
}
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&{
let mut session_key = [0; 32];
- rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
+ let mut rng = thread_rng();
+ rng.fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
session_key
}).expect("RNG is bad!");
if test_recv {
let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
match err {
- HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
+ LightningError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
}
// If we send a garbage message, the channel should get closed, making the rest of this test case fail.
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
{
let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
- APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
+ APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over their reserve value"),
_ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
}
}
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1, recv_value_1);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21, recv_value_21);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22, recv_value_22);
let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
do_channel_reserve_test(true);
}
+#[test]
+fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
+ // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
+ // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
+ // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
+ // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
+ // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
+ // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
+ // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
+ // To test this we:
+ // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
+ // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
+ // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
+ // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
+ // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
+ // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
+ // * deliver the first fulfill from B
+ // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
+ // claim,
+ // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
+ // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
+ // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
+ // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
+ // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
+ // Route the first two HTLCs.
+ let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
+ let (payment_preimage_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
+
+ // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
+ let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ let send_1 = {
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_3).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
+ };
+
+ // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
+ // initial fulfill/CS.
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1, b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
+ // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2, 20000));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
+ let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
+ // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
+ // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
+ // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
+ // on-chain as necessary).
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, 100000);
+
+ // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
+ // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
+ // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
+ let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
+ let send_2 = {
+ let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 10000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_4).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
+ };
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
+ expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, 10000);
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4, 10_000);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3, 100_000);
+}
+
#[test]
fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
// Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
// tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
- let nodes = create_network(5);
+ let nodes = create_network(5, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
// Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
- let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
- let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
// Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
// Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
macro_rules! claim_funds {
- ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
+ ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $amount: expr) => {
{
- assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
+ assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage, $amount));
check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
// Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
- claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
+ claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, 3_000_000);
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
{
let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
- for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
+ for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1 {
header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
}
let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
// Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
- claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
+ claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, 3_000_000);
header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
fn test_justice_tx() {
// Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
- let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let mut alice_config = UserConfig::new();
+ alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+ alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
+ alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
+ let mut bob_config = UserConfig::new();
+ bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+ bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
+ bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
// Create some new channels:
- let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
// A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
// Revoke the old state
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3, 3_000_000);
{
let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
// We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
// Create some new channels:
- let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
// A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
// Revoke the old state
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4, 3_000_000);
{
let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
fn revoked_output_claim() {
// Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
// transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
- let nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
// node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
// Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
// Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000, 5_000_000);
// Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
#[test]
fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
// Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
- let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
// Create some new channel:
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
// Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
// node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
//Revoke the old state
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1, 3_000_000);
{
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
#[test]
fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
// Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
- let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
// Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
// node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
// time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
//Revoke the old state
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1, 3_000_000);
{
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 200, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
}
let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 22); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan) + 5 * (1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx)
assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcasted by ChannelManger
assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
+ for i in 12..22 {
+ if i % 2 == 0 { assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[i]); } else { assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[i]); }
+ }
+
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
- let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
- revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
- node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
- node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
- node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
+ fn get_txout(out_point: &BitcoinOutPoint, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<TxOut> {
+ if out_point.txid == tx.txid() {
+ tx.output.get(out_point.vout as usize).cloned()
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
+ }
+ node_txn[0].verify(|out|get_txout(out, &revoked_local_txn[0])).unwrap();
+ node_txn[1].verify(|out|get_txout(out, &revoked_local_txn[0])).unwrap();
+ node_txn[2].verify(|out|get_txout(out, &revoked_local_txn[0])).unwrap();
let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
#[test]
fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
- // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
+ // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
// ChainWatchInterface and pass the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
// broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
// We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
// the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
// PaymentSent event).
- let nodes = create_network(3);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
// Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
// Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
let (our_payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
let (our_payment_preimage_2, _payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
// Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
- // Broadcast HTLC Success transation by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
+ // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
- nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
- nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
+ nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage, 3_000_000);
+ nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2, 3_000_000);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
#[test]
fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
- // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
- // ChainWatchInterface and timeout the HTLC bacward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
+ // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to
+ // ChainWatchInterface and timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
// broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
// A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
// B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
// \ \
// B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
- let nodes = create_network(3);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
// Create some intial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
// Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
- // Brodacast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
+ // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
- nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
+ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
- // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output fron C's commitment tx on B's chain
+ // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
// Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
let timeout_tx;
}
nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![timeout_tx]}, 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
// Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
// and fail backward accordingly.
- let nodes = create_network(3);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
// Create some initial channels
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
// Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
// Revoke the old state
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage, 3_000_000);
route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
// * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
// and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
// commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
- let mut nodes = create_network(3);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
// Create some initial channels
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
// Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
// Revoke the old state
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage, if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000});
let value = if use_dust {
// The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
let (_, second_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
let (_, third_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
- assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash, 0));
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
// Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
- assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash, 0));
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
- assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash, 0));
+ assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 2 });
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
}
- nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- // If we delievered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
+ // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
// that we should update our routing table for.
assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 3 });
for event in events {
fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
// Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
// ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
- let nodes = create_network(2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
#[test]
fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
// Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
- let mut nodes = create_network(3);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
// Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
{
let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
- monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
+ monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_slice(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]).unwrap(), 0)).unwrap()
.provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
}
nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
#[test]
fn test_unconf_chan() {
// After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
- let nodes = create_network(2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
headers.push(header.clone());
}
+ let mut height = 99;
while !headers.is_empty() {
- nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
+ nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap(), height);
+ height -= 1;
}
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
#[test]
fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
// Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
- let nodes = create_network(3);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1, 1_000_000);
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
+ claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3, 1_000_000);
fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
}
}
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4, 1_000_000);
fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
}
fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
// Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
if messages_delivered == 0 {
- create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
+ create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
// nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
} else {
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
}
let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
+ nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1, 1_000_000);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
// Channel should still work fine...
let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2, 1_000_000);
}
#[test]
#[test]
fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
// Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
- let nodes = create_network(2);
- let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage, 1_000_000);
}
#[test]
fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
// Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
// commitment_updates when we disconnect.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1, 1_000_000));
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2, 1_000_000);
}
#[test]
-fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
- // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
-
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
-
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
- if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
+ //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
- match events_1[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
- match events_1[1] {
- MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, .. } => assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
+ let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
- // PaymentFailed event
+ let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
+ let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
-}
+ let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
-fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
- // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
- // a disconnect in between
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
+ let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
+ let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
- if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
+ let mut chan_announcement;
- if disconnect {
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
+ () => {
+ msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
+ features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
+ chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
+ short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
+ node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
+ node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
+ bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
+ bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
+ excess_data: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ }
}
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ macro_rules! sign_msg {
+ ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
+ let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::hash(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
+ let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
+ let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
+ let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].keys_manager.get_node_secret());
+ let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].keys_manager.get_node_secret());
+ chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
+ node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
+ node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
+ bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
+ bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
+ contents: $unsigned_msg
+ }
+ }
+ }
- let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
- let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
- assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
+ let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
+ sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
+ let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ // Configured with Network::Testnet
+ let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
+ unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
+ sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
+ assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
- let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
- match events_3[0] {
- Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
- assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
-
- // Now set it to failed again...
- let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
- if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
-
- if disconnect {
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- }
-
- // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
- nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
-
- // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
- // PaymentFailed event
-
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
+ let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
+ unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
+ sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
+ assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
}
#[test]
-fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
- do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
- do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
-}
-
-fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
- let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
-
- // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
- // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
- // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
- // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
- // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
- // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
- // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
- // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
- // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
- // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
- // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
- // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
- // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
- // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
- // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
- // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
- // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
-
- let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
-
- // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
-
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
- if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
+ let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
- // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
- assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
- let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fee.is_none());
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
- match events_3[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
- assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
+ let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
+ let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
+ nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
- if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
- assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
- } else { panic!(); }
- }
+ nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 })));
+ let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
+ let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
+ assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
- (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
+ let config = UserConfig::new();
+ let keys_manager = Arc::new(test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
+ let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
+ let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
+ channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
+ <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
+ default_config: config,
+ keys_manager,
+ fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
+ monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
+ chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
+ tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
+ logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
+ channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
+ }).unwrap()
};
+ assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
- if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- }
-
- // Now fix monitor updating...
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
+ assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
+ nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
+ let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc<ChainListener> = nodes[0].node.clone();
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener));
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
-
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
- assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
- assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
- let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
- nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
- let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
- assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
+ let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
+ let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
+ for node in nodes.iter() {
+ assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
+ node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
+ node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
+ }
- (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
- } } }
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000, 1_000_000);
+}
- let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+#[test]
+fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
- assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
- assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
- let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
- nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
- let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
+ let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
- assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
- assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
- if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
- assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
+ let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
+ let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
+ nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
- assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
- assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
- assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
- } else {
- assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
- assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
- assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
+ nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 })));
+ let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
+ let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
+ assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
- assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
+ let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
+ let keys_manager = Arc::new(test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
+ let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
+ let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
+ channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
+ <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
+ default_config: UserConfig::new(),
+ keys_manager,
+ fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
+ monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
+ chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
+ tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
+ logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
+ channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
+ }).unwrap()
+ };
+ assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
- match events_3[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
- assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
+ assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
+ nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
- bs_resp.2 = None;
- }
+ fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage, 1_000_000);
+}
- if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
- let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
+#[test]
+fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
+ // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
+ let mut nodes = create_network(4, &[None, None, None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
- assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
- assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
- }
- assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
- assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
- }
+ let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
- (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
- } else {
- let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
- (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- msg.clone()
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- })
- };
+ // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
+ let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
- assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
- let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
+ // nodes[3])
+ let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
+ for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
+ let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
+ monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
+ node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
+ }
- if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
- let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
+ nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 })));
+ let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
+ for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
+ let mut read = &serialized[..];
+ let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
+ assert!(read.is_empty());
+ node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
+ }
- assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
- assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
+ let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
+ let keys_manager = Arc::new(test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
+ let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
+ default_config: UserConfig::new(),
+ keys_manager,
+ fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
+ monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
+ chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
+ tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
+ logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
+ channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(),
+ }).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
- assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
- assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
+ { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx
+ let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
+ assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid());
}
- let as_commitment_update;
- let bs_second_commitment_update;
-
- macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
+ for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
+ assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- } }
-
- macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- } }
-
- if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
- handle_bs_raa!();
-
- if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
- let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
-
- assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
- assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
-
- assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
- assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
-
- assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
- }
-
- handle_initial_raa!();
-
- if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
- let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
-
- assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
- assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
-
- assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
- assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
- }
- } else {
- handle_initial_raa!();
-
- if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
- let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
-
- assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
- assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
-
- assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
- assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
-
- assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
- }
-
- handle_bs_raa!();
-
- if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
- let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
-
- assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
- assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
-
- assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
- assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
- }
}
+ nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ //... and we can even still claim the payment!
+ claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage, 1_000_000);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
+ if let Err(msgs::LightningError { action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }, .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) {
+ assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
+ } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); }
+}
- let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
- match events_5[0] {
- Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
- assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
+ ($node: expr, $der_idx: expr) => {
+ {
+ let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ let mut txn = Vec::new();
+ for event in events {
+ match event {
+ Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
+ for outp in outputs {
+ match *outp {
+ SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref output } => {
+ let input = TxIn {
+ previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ let outp = TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
+ value: output.value,
+ };
+ let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: vec![input],
+ output: vec![outp],
+ };
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let remotepubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &key);
+ let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, key: remotepubkey}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
+ let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
+ let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotepubkey.serialize().to_vec());
+ txn.push(spend_tx);
+ },
+ SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref witness_script, ref to_self_delay, ref output } => {
+ let input = TxIn {
+ previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: *to_self_delay as u32,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ let outp = TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
+ value: output.value,
+ };
+ let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: vec![input],
+ output: vec![outp],
+ };
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
+ let local_delaysig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(local_delaysig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(0));
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
+ txn.push(spend_tx);
+ },
+ SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let input = TxIn {
+ previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ };
+ let outp = TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
+ value: output.value,
+ };
+ let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: vec![input],
+ output: vec![outp.clone()],
+ };
+ let secret = {
+ match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(Network::Testnet, &$node.node_seed) {
+ Ok(master_key) => {
+ match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx($der_idx).expect("key space exhausted")) {
+ Ok(key) => key,
+ Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
+ }
+ }
+ Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
+ }
+ };
+ let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &secret).public_key;
+ let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
+ let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
+ let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.private_key.key);
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(pubkey.key.serialize().to_vec());
+ txn.push(spend_tx);
+ },
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ }
+ txn
+ }
}
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
}
#[test]
-fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
-}
+fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
+ // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
-#[test]
-fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
-}
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
-#[test]
-fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
- do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
}
#[test]
-fn test_monitor_update_fail_cs() {
- // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming commitment_signed
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
-
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
+ // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
+ // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
- if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg).unwrap_err() {
- assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
- } else { panic!(); }
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let responses = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(responses.len(), 2);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
- match responses[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, ref node_id } => {
- assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- match responses[1] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, ref node_id } => {
- assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
- assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
- if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap_err() {
- assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
- } else { panic!(); }
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
+}
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+#[test]
+fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
+ // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
+ // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
- let final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &final_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
- let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, amt } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
- assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage, 3_000_000);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]); // to_local output on local commitment tx
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
}
#[test]
-fn test_monitor_update_fail_no_rebroadcast() {
- // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when no message rebroadcasting on
- // test_restore_channel_monitor() is required. Backported from
- // chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz tests.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage_1, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false, true, false, true);
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
- if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap_err() {
- assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
- } else { panic!(); }
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage, 3_000_000));
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
-
- let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
- },
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
+ match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
+ }
+
+ // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 1 (local commitment tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (1 preimage tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); // , 0, 0, 1, 1);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
}
#[test]
-fn test_monitor_update_raa_while_paused() {
- // Tests handling of an RAA while monitor updating has already been marked failed.
- // Backported from chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz tests as this used to be broken.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
-
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 5000000);
+fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage_1, our_payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let send_event_1 = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (payment_preimage_2, our_payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash_2).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let send_event_2 = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage, 3_000_000);
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_2.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_2.commitment_msg).unwrap_err() {
- assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
- } else { panic!(); }
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
- if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap_err() {
- assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA");
- } else { panic!(); }
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
- *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let as_update_raa = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update_raa.0).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update_raa.1).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let bs_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
- expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash_2, 1000000);
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash_1, 1000000);
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
- claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_2);
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
}
-fn do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(test_ignore_second_cs: bool) {
- // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming RAA
- let mut nodes = create_network(3);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
-
- // Rebalance a bit so that we can send backwards from 2 to 1.
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 5000000);
-
- // Route a first payment that we'll fail backwards
- let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
-
- // Fail the payment backwards, failing the monitor update on nodes[1]'s receipt of the RAA
- assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1, 0));
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
-
- let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
-
- let bs_revoke_and_ack = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
-
- // While the second channel is AwaitingRAA, forward a second payment to get it into the
- // holding cell.
- let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- let mut send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false);
-
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
-
- // Now fail monitor updating.
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
- if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap_err() {
- assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
- } else { panic!(); }
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
-
- // Attempt to forward a third payment but fail due to the second channel being unavailable
- // for forwarding.
-
- let (_, payment_hash_3) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_3).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
-
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); // We succeed in updating the monitor for the first channel
- send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
-
- let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
- match events_2.remove(0) {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
- assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
-
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
+#[test]
+fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
- match msg_events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg }} => {
- assert_eq!(msg.contents.short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
- assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2); // temp disabled
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } = events[0] {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
- assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
- } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
- };
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
- let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = if test_ignore_second_cs {
- // Try to route another payment backwards from 2 to make sure 1 holds off on responding
- let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- let route = nodes[2].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- nodes[2].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_4).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
-
- send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg) {
- assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
- } else { panic!(); }
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- (Some(payment_preimage_4), Some(payment_hash_4))
- } else { (None, None) };
-
- // Restore monitor updating, ensuring we immediately get a fail-back update and a
- // update_add update.
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage, 3_000_000);
- let mut events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- if test_ignore_second_cs {
- assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 3);
- } else {
- assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
- }
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
- // Note that the ordering of the events for different nodes is non-prescriptive, though the
- // ordering of the two events that both go to nodes[2] have to stay in the same order.
- let messages_a = match events_3.pop().unwrap() {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, mut updates } => {
- assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
- (updates.update_fail_htlcs.remove(0), updates.commitment_signed)
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
- };
- let raa = if test_ignore_second_cs {
- match events_3.remove(1) {
- MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, msg } => {
- assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
- Some(msg.clone())
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- } else { None };
- let send_event_b = SendEvent::from_event(events_3.remove(0));
- assert_eq!(send_event_b.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
- // Now deliver the new messages...
+ // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &messages_a.0).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], messages_a.1, false);
- let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
- if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } = events_4[0] {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
- assert!(rejected_by_dest);
- } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
-
- nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- if test_ignore_second_cs {
- nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.commitment_msg).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
- let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa.unwrap()).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
- let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(bs_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(bs_cs.update_fee.is_none());
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(as_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(as_cs.update_fee.is_none());
-
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
- nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
- let bs_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[3].clone());
+}
- nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
- assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+#[test]
+fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_raa).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- } else {
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], send_event_b.commitment_msg, false);
- }
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
+ let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
- let events_6 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
- match events_6[0] {
- Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => { assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2); },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage, 3_000_000);
- if test_ignore_second_cs {
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+ let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
- assert_eq!(send_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert_eq!(send_event.msgs.len(), 1);
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], send_event.commitment_msg, false);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
+ // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
- let events_9 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_9.len(), 1);
- match events_9[0] {
- Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_4.unwrap()),
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
- claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4.unwrap());
- }
+ let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
+ // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 5);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone()); // spending justice tx output from revoked local tx htlc received output
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone()); // spending justice tx output on htlc success tx
}
#[test]
-fn test_monitor_update_fail_raa() {
- do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(false);
- do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(true);
-}
+fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
+ // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output thanks to
+ // ChainWatchInterface and claim HTLC on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
+ // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
+ // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
+ // channel.
+ // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
+ // gets broadcast.
-#[test]
-fn test_monitor_update_fail_reestablish() {
- // Simple test for message retransmission after monitor update failure on
- // channel_reestablish generating a monitor update (which comes from freeing holding cell
- // HTLCs).
- let mut nodes = create_network(3);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
- let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
- assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
+ let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
+ let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
+ nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage, 3_000_000);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
- let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
-
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2]);
- nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap();
+ let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
+ assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
+ assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
+ check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
+ check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1].clone());
+ assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
+ assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
+ assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
- if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap_err() {
- assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor");
- } else { panic!(); }
+ // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]}, 1);
+ {
+ let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 4);
+ assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[3]);
+ check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
+ check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1].clone()); // HTLC-Timeout on B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
+ assert_eq!(b_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert!(b_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
+ assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
+ check_spends!(b_txn[0], c_txn[1].clone()); // timeout tx on C remote commitment tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
+ assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
+ assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
+ b_txn.clear();
+ }
+ let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ match msg_events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match msg_events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+ // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
+ let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
+ check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
+ assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[2]); // HTLC-Success tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
+ check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
+ assert_eq!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
-
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+}
- assert!(as_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
- assert!(bs_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
+#[test]
+fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
+ // Topology : A --> B --> C
+ // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
- nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap();
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
+ *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
+ assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000).1, duplicate_payment_hash);
+
+ let commitment_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+
+ let htlc_timeout_tx;
+ { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0], node_txn[1].input[0]);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[3], node_txn[2].clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[2].clone());
+ htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
+ }
+
+ nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage, 900_000);
+ nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
+ let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
+ }
+ let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
+ assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5);
+ check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
+ assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0], htlc_success_txn[3]);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1], htlc_success_txn[4]);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0], htlc_success_txn[1].input[0]);
+ check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
+ check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
- *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
- nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout_tx] }, 200);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 200, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 1);
+ assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ {
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { .. } } => {
+ },
+ _ => { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
+ }
+ }
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
+ }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_success_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 0);
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage),
+ Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
+ assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
+ }
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
}
#[test]
-fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
- //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let nodes = create_network(2);
+fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
- let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
+ let local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
- let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
+ // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
+ nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage, 9_000_000);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
+ }
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
- let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
- let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
+ // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone());
+}
- let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
- let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
+fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
+ // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
+ // unrevoked commitment transaction.
+ // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
+ // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
+ // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
+ // use the same payment hashes.
+ // Thus, we use a six-node network:
+ //
+ // A \ / E
+ // - C - D -
+ // B / \ F
+ // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
+ let nodes = create_network(6, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
- let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let mut chan_announcement;
+ // Rebalance and check output sanity...
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000, 500_000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000, 500_000);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
- macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
- () => {
- msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
- features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
- chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
- short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
- node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
- node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
- bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
- bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
- excess_data: Vec::new(),
- };
- }
- }
+ let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ // 0th HTLC:
+ let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
+ // 1st HTLC:
+ let (_, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
+ let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), ds_dust_limit*1000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ // 2nd HTLC:
+ send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
+ // 3rd HTLC:
+ send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
+ // 4th HTLC:
+ let (_, payment_hash_3) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
+ // 5th HTLC:
+ let (_, payment_hash_4) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
+ let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ // 6th HTLC:
+ send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 1000000, payment_hash_3);
+ // 7th HTLC:
+ send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 1000000, payment_hash_4);
- macro_rules! sign_msg {
- ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
- let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
- let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
- let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
- let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].keys_manager.get_node_secret());
- let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].keys_manager.get_node_secret());
- chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
- node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
- bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
- bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
- contents: $unsigned_msg
- }
- }
- }
+ // 8th HTLC:
+ let (_, payment_hash_5) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
+ // 9th HTLC:
+ let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), ds_dust_limit*1000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
- let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
- sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
- let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
+ // 10th HTLC:
+ let (_, payment_hash_6) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
+ // 11th HTLC:
+ let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 1000000, payment_hash_6);
- // Configured with Network::Testnet
- let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
- unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
- sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
- assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
+ // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
+ // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
+ // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
+ assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len(), 8);
- let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
- unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
- sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
- assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
-}
+ // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
+ // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
+ assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
+ assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
+ assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
+ assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
-#[test]
-fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
+ let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
+ nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]).unwrap();
+ nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
- let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
+ // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
+ assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
+ assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
- let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
- let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
- nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
+ let ds_prev_commitment_tx = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
- let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
- let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
- assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
+ let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]).unwrap();
+ if deliver_last_raa {
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
+ } else {
+ let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
+ }
- let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
- let config = UserConfig::new();
- let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
- let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
- let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
- channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
- <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
- default_config: config,
- keys_manager,
- fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
- monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
- chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
- tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
- logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
- channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
- }).unwrap()
- };
- assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
+ // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
+ // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
+ // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
+ // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
+ //
+ // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
+ // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
+ // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
+ //
+ // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
+ // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
+ let ds_last_commitment_tx = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
- nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
- let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc<ChainListener> = nodes[0].node.clone();
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener));
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ if announce_latest {
+ nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&ds_last_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+ } else {
+ nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+ }
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[2].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2]);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
- nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
+ let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
+ let mut a_done = false;
+ for msg in cs_msgs {
+ match msg {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
+ // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
+ // should be failed-backwards here.
+ let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
+ // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
+ for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
+ assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
+ }
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
+ assert!(!a_done);
+ a_done = true;
+ &nodes[0]
+ } else {
+ // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
+ for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
+ assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
+ }
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
+ &nodes[1]
+ };
+ target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
+ target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]).unwrap();
+ if announce_latest {
+ target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]).unwrap();
+ if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
+ target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]).unwrap();
+ }
+ }
+ commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
- nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
+ let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
+ for event in as_events.iter() {
+ if let &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, .. } = event {
+ assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
+ if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
+ assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
+ } else {
+ assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
+ }
+ } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
+ }
+ assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
+ assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
+ if announce_latest {
+ assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
+ assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
+ }
+ assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
- let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
- let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
- for node in nodes.iter() {
- assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
- node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
- node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
+ let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
+ let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
+ for event in bs_events.iter() {
+ if let &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, .. } = event {
+ assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
+ if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
+ assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
+ } else {
+ assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
+ }
+ } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
+ }
+ assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
+ assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
+ if announce_latest {
+ assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
}
+ assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+ // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
+ // get a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due
+ // to unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
+ // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2
+ // PaymentFailureNetworkUpdates.
+ let as_msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(as_msg_events.len(), if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
+ let bs_msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(bs_msg_events.len(), if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
+ for event in as_msg_events.iter().chain(bs_msg_events.iter()) {
+ match event {
+ &MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
}
#[test]
-fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
+ do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
+}
- let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+#[test]
+fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
+ do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
+}
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+#[test]
+fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
+ do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
+ // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
+ // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
+}
- let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
- let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
- nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
+#[test]
+fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
- let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
- let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
- assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
+ // Create some initial channels
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
- let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
- let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
- let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
- channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
- <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
- default_config: UserConfig::new(),
- keys_manager,
- fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
- monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
- chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
- tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
- logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
- channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
- }).unwrap()
- };
- assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
+ let local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
- assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
- nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
- fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
+ // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 8);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[4]);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[6]);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[5]);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[7]);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
}
#[test]
-fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
- // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with a out-of-date ChannelMonitor
- let mut nodes = create_network(4);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
- let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
+fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
- let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
+ let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
- route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 2);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx.clone());
- // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
- // nodes[3])
- let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
- for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
- let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
- monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
- node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
- }
-
- nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
- let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
- for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
- let mut read = &serialized[..];
- let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
- assert!(read.is_empty());
- node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
- }
-
- let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
- let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
- let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
- default_config: UserConfig::new(),
- keys_manager,
- fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
- monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
- chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
- tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
- logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
- channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(),
- }).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
-
- { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx
- let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
- assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid());
- }
-
- for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
- assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok());
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- }
- nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
-
- // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- //... and we can even still claim the payment!
- claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
-
- nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
- if let Err(msgs::HandleError { action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }), .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) {
- assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
- } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); }
-}
-
-macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
- ($node: expr, $der_idx: expr) => {
- {
- let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- let mut txn = Vec::new();
- for event in events {
- match event {
- Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
- for outp in outputs {
- match *outp {
- SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref output } => {
- let input = TxIn {
- previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- };
- let outp = TxOut {
- script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
- value: output.value,
- };
- let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
- input: vec![input],
- output: vec![outp],
- };
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let remotepubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &key);
- let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&remotepubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
- let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
- let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotepubkey.serialize().to_vec());
- txn.push(spend_tx);
- },
- SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref witness_script, ref to_self_delay, ref output } => {
- let input = TxIn {
- previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: *to_self_delay as u32,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- };
- let outp = TxOut {
- script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
- value: output.value,
- };
- let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
- input: vec![input],
- output: vec![outp],
- };
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
- let local_delaysig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(local_delaysig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(0));
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
- txn.push(spend_tx);
- },
- SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let input = TxIn {
- previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- };
- let outp = TxOut {
- script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
- value: output.value,
- };
- let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
- input: vec![input],
- output: vec![outp.clone()],
- };
- let secret = {
- match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(Network::Testnet, &$node.node_seed) {
- Ok(master_key) => {
- match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx($der_idx)) {
- Ok(key) => key,
- Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
- }
- }
- Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
- }
- };
- let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &secret).public_key;
- let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
- let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
- let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.secret_key);
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
- txn.push(spend_tx);
- },
- }
- }
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
- }
- txn
- }
- }
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
- // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
- let nodes = create_network(2);
-
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
- nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
-
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
- // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
- // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
-
- let nodes = create_network(2);
-
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
- nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
-
- let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
-
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
- check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
- // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
- // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
-
- let nodes = create_network(2);
-
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
- let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
- let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
-
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
- check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]); // to_local output on local commitment tx
- check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
- let nodes = create_network(2);
-
- // Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
-
- let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
-
- let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
-
- // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()] }, 1);
- let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- match events[1] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
- }
-
- // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 1 (local commitment tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (1 preimage tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
-
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); // , 0, 0, 1, 1);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
- check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
- let nodes = create_network(2);
-
- // Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
-
- let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
- let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
-
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
-
- let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
- assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
-
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
- check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
- let nodes = create_network(2);
-
- // Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
-
- let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
- let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
-
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
-
- let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
- check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
-
- // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
-
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
-
- // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
- check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
- check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[3].clone());
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
- let nodes = create_network(2);
-
- // Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
-
- let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
- let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
-
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
-
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
- let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
-
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
-
- // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
-
- let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
-
- // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 5);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
- check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
- check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone()); // spending justice tx output from revoked local tx htlc received output
- check_spends!(spend_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone()); // spending justice tx output on htlc success tx
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
- // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output thanks to
- // ChainWatchInterface and claim HTLC on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
- // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
- // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
- // channel.
- // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
- // gets broadcast.
-
- let nodes = create_network(3);
-
- // Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
-
- // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
-
- let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
- let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone());
- nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
- let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
-
- nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2]);
-
- let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
- assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
- assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
- assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
- check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
- check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1].clone());
- assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
- assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
- assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
-
- // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]}, 1);
- {
- let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 4);
- assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[3]);
- check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
- check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1].clone()); // HTLC-Timeout on B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
- assert_eq!(b_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- assert!(b_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
- assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
- check_spends!(b_txn[0], c_txn[1].clone()); // timeout tx on C remote commitment tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
- assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
- assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx
- b_txn.clear();
- }
- let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- match msg_events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- match msg_events[1] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
- assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
- // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
- let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
- let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
- check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
- assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[2]); // HTLC-Success tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
- check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
- assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
- assert_eq!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
-
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 2);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
}
-#[test]
-fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
- // Topology : A --> B --> C
- // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
- let mut nodes = create_network(3);
-
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
-
- let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
- *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
- assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000).1, duplicate_payment_hash);
-
- let commitment_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
-
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
-
- let htlc_timeout_tx;
- { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
- assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0], node_txn[1].input[0]);
- check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
- check_spends!(node_txn[3], node_txn[2].clone());
- check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[2].clone());
- htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
- }
+fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
- nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
- let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- match events[1] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
- }
- let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
- assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5);
- check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
- assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0], htlc_success_txn[3]);
- assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1], htlc_success_txn[4]);
- assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0], htlc_success_txn[1].input[0]);
- check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
- check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
+ let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout_tx] }, 200);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 1);
- assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
+ // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage, if use_dust { 50_000 } else { 3_000_000 }));
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- {
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { .. } } => {
- },
- _ => { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
- }
- }
+ let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
- assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
- }
+ Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
+ },
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_success_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
- let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 0);
- assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
-
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
- assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
- }
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
- let nodes = create_network(2);
-
- // Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
-
- let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
- let local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
-
- // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
- nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
- let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- match events[1] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
+ let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 {
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new());
+ header.prev_blockhash = header.bitcoin_hash();
}
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
-
- // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
- check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
- check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone());
+ test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
}
-fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
- // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
- // unrevoked commitment transaction.
- // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
- // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
- // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
- // use the same payment hashes.
- // Thus, we use a six-node network:
- //
- // A \ / E
- // - C - D -
- // B / \ F
- // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
- let nodes = create_network(6);
-
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
-
- // Rebalance and check output sanity...
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
- send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
- assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
-
- let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis;
- // 0th HTLC:
- let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
- // 1st HTLC:
- let (_, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
- let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), ds_dust_limit*1000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- // 2nd HTLC:
- send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
- // 3rd HTLC:
- send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
- // 4th HTLC:
- let (_, payment_hash_3) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
- // 5th HTLC:
- let (_, payment_hash_4) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
- let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- // 6th HTLC:
- send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 1000000, payment_hash_3);
- // 7th HTLC:
- send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 1000000, payment_hash_4);
-
- // 8th HTLC:
- let (_, payment_hash_5) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
- // 9th HTLC:
- let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), ds_dust_limit*1000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
-
- // 10th HTLC:
- let (_, payment_hash_6) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
- // 11th HTLC:
- let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 1000000, payment_hash_6);
-
- // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
- // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
- // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
- assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len(), 8);
-
- // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
- // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
- assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1, ds_dust_limit*1000));
- assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3, 1000000));
- assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5, 1000000));
- assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6, ds_dust_limit*1000));
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
-
- let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
- nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]).unwrap();
- nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
-
- // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
- assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2, ds_dust_limit*1000));
- assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4, 1000000));
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
+fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let ds_prev_commitment_tx = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
- let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
- nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]).unwrap();
- nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]).unwrap();
- nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]).unwrap();
- nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]).unwrap();
- if deliver_last_raa {
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
- } else {
- let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
+ // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
+ // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
+ // to "time out" the HTLC.
+
+ let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 {
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new());
+ header.prev_blockhash = header.bitcoin_hash();
}
+ test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
+}
- // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
- // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
- // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
- // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
- //
- // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
- // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
- // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
- //
- // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
- // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
- let ds_last_commitment_tx = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- if announce_latest {
- nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&ds_last_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
- } else {
- nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
- }
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2]);
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
+ // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
+ // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
+ // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
+ // actually revoked.
+ let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
- let mut a_done = false;
- for msg in cs_msgs {
- match msg {
- MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
- // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
- // should be failed-backwards here.
- let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
- // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
- for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
- assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
- }
- assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
- assert!(!a_done);
- a_done = true;
- &nodes[0]
- } else {
- // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
- for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
- assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
- }
- assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
- &nodes[1]
- };
- target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
- target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]).unwrap();
- if announce_latest {
- target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]).unwrap();
- if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
- target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]).unwrap();
- }
- }
- commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- }
+ let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
- let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
- for event in as_events.iter() {
- if let &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, .. } = event {
- assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
- if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
- assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
- } else {
- assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
- }
- } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
- }
- assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
- assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
- if announce_latest {
- assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
- assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
+ if check_revoke_no_close {
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
}
- assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
- let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
- let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
- for event in bs_events.iter() {
- if let &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, .. } = event {
- assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
- if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
- assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
- } else {
- assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
- }
- } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
- }
- assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
- assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
- if announce_latest {
- assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
+ let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 {
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new());
+ header.prev_blockhash = header.bitcoin_hash();
}
- assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
-
- // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
- // get a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due
- // to unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
- // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2
- // PaymentFailureNetworkUpdates.
- let as_msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(as_msg_events.len(), if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
- let bs_msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(bs_msg_events.len(), if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
- for event in as_msg_events.iter().chain(bs_msg_events.iter()) {
- match event {
- &MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
+ if !check_revoke_no_close {
+ test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
+ } else {
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
+ assert!(rejected_by_dest);
+ },
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
}
}
+// Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
+// There are only a few cases to test here:
+// * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
+// broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
+// * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
+// * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
+// We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
+// non-dust HTLCs.
+// Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
+// assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
+// tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
#[test]
-fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
- do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
+fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
+ do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
+ do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
+
+ do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
+ do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
}
#[test]
-fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
- do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
+fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
+ do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
+ do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
+ do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
+ do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
+}
+
+fn run_onion_failure_test<F1,F2>(_name: &str, test_case: u8, nodes: &Vec<Node>, route: &Route, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, callback_msg: F1, callback_node: F2, expected_retryable: bool, expected_error_code: Option<u16>, expected_channel_update: Option<HTLCFailChannelUpdate>)
+ where F1: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateAddHTLC),
+ F2: FnMut(),
+{
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept(_name, test_case, nodes, route, payment_hash, callback_msg, |_|{}, callback_node, expected_retryable, expected_error_code, expected_channel_update);
}
-#[test]
-fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
- do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
- // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
- // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
-}
+// test_case
+// 0: node1 fails backward
+// 1: final node fails backward
+// 2: payment completed but the user rejects the payment
+// 3: final node fails backward (but tamper onion payloads from node0)
+// 100: trigger error in the intermediate node and tamper returning fail_htlc
+// 200: trigger error in the final node and tamper returning fail_htlc
+fn run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept<F1,F2,F3>(_name: &str, test_case: u8, nodes: &Vec<Node>, route: &Route, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, mut callback_msg: F1, mut callback_fail: F2, mut callback_node: F3, expected_retryable: bool, expected_error_code: Option<u16>, expected_channel_update: Option<HTLCFailChannelUpdate>)
+ where F1: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateAddHTLC),
+ F2: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
+ F3: FnMut(),
+{
+
+ // reset block height
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ for ix in 0..nodes.len() {
+ nodes[ix].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! expect_event {
+ ($node: expr, $event_type: path) => {{
+ let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ $event_type { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }}
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! expect_htlc_forward {
+ ($node: expr) => {{
+ expect_event!($node, Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable);
+ $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+ }}
+ }
+
+ // 0 ~~> 2 send payment
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash.clone()).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let update_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // temper update_add (0 => 1)
+ let mut update_add_0 = update_0.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
+ if test_case == 0 || test_case == 3 || test_case == 100 {
+ callback_msg(&mut update_add_0);
+ callback_node();
+ }
+ // 0 => 1 update_add & CS
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_0).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &update_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ let update_1_0 = match test_case {
+ 0|100 => { // intermediate node failure; fail backward to 0
+ let update_1_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len()+update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()==1 && (update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len()==1 || update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()==1));
+ update_1_0
+ },
+ 1|2|3|200 => { // final node failure; forwarding to 2
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ // forwarding on 1
+ if test_case != 200 {
+ callback_node();
+ }
+ expect_htlc_forward!(&nodes[1]);
-#[test]
-fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
- let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let update_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
+ assert_eq!(update_1.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ // tamper update_add (1 => 2)
+ let mut update_add_1 = update_1.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
+ if test_case != 3 && test_case != 200 {
+ callback_msg(&mut update_add_1);
+ }
- // Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ // 1 => 2
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_1).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], update_1.commitment_signed, false, true);
- route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
- let local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
- assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
+ if test_case == 2 || test_case == 200 {
+ expect_htlc_forward!(&nodes[2]);
+ expect_event!(&nodes[2], Event::PaymentReceived);
+ callback_node();
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
+ }
- // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
+ let update_2_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ if test_case == 2 || test_case == 200 {
+ check_added_monitors!(&nodes[2], 1);
+ }
+ assert!(update_2_1.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1);
- let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
+ let mut fail_msg = update_2_1.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone();
+ if test_case == 200 {
+ callback_fail(&mut fail_msg);
+ }
- // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 8);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[4]);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[6]);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[5]);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[7]);
- check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
- check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
-}
+ // 2 => 1
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg).unwrap();
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_2_1.commitment_signed, true);
-#[test]
-fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
- let nodes = create_network(2);
+ // backward fail on 1
+ let update_1_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1);
+ update_1_0
+ },
+ _ => unreachable!(),
+ };
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ // 1 => 0 commitment_signed_dance
+ if update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len() > 0 {
+ let mut fail_msg = update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone();
+ if test_case == 100 {
+ callback_fail(&mut fail_msg);
+ }
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg).unwrap();
+ } else {
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ };
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
- let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_1_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 2);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx.clone());
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ if let &Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash:_, ref rejected_by_dest, ref error_code } = &events[0] {
+ assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, !expected_retryable);
+ assert_eq!(*error_code, expected_error_code);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Uexpected event");
+ }
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
- let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 2);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ if expected_channel_update.is_some() {
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { ref update } => {
+ match update {
+ &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { .. } => {
+ if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { .. } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {} else {
+ panic!("channel_update not found!");
+ }
+ },
+ &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { ref short_channel_id, ref is_permanent } => {
+ if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: ref expected_short_channel_id, is_permanent: ref expected_is_permanent } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {
+ assert!(*short_channel_id == *expected_short_channel_id);
+ assert!(*is_permanent == *expected_is_permanent);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected message event");
+ }
+ },
+ &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, ref is_permanent } => {
+ if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: ref expected_node_id, is_permanent: ref expected_is_permanent } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {
+ assert!(*node_id == *expected_node_id);
+ assert!(*is_permanent == *expected_is_permanent);
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected message event");
+ }
+ },
+ }
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected message event"),
+ }
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
+ }
}
-fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
- let nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+impl msgs::ChannelUpdate {
+ fn dummy() -> msgs::ChannelUpdate {
+ use secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
+ use secp256k1::Signature;
+ msgs::ChannelUpdate {
+ signature: Signature::from(FFISignature::new()),
+ contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ chain_hash: Sha256dHash::hash(&vec![0u8][..]),
+ short_channel_id: 0,
+ timestamp: 0,
+ flags: 0,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ fee_base_msat: 0,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ excess_data: vec![],
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
- let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
+#[test]
+fn test_onion_failure() {
+ use ln::msgs::ChannelUpdate;
+ use ln::channelmanager::CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY;
+ use secp256k1;
- // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
- // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
- assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
+ const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
+ const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
+ const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
- let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ for node in nodes.iter() {
+ *node.keys_manager.override_session_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some(SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap());
}
+ let channels = [create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new()), create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new())];
+ let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ // positve case
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 40000, 40_000);
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ // intermediate node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test("invalid_realm", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ let (mut onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
+ onion_payloads[0].realm = 3;
+ msg.onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|1), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));//XXX incremented channels idx here
- let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 {
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new());
- header.prev_blockhash = header.bitcoin_hash();
- }
- test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
-}
+ // final node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test("invalid_realm", 3, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ let (mut onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
+ onion_payloads[1].realm = 3;
+ msg.onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
+ }, ||{}, false, Some(PERM|1), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
+
+ // the following three with run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept() test only the origin node
+ // receiving simulated fail messages
+ // intermediate node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_node_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ // trigger error
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, |msg| {
+ // and tamper returning error message
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], NODE|2, &[0;0]);
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: false}));
+
+ // final node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_node_failure", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
+ // and tamper returning error message
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], NODE|2, &[0;0]);
+ }, ||{
+ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
+ }, true, Some(NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: false}));
+
+ // intermediate node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_node_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|2, &[0;0]);
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
-fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ // final node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_node_failure", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|2, &[0;0]);
+ }, ||{
+ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
+ }, false, Some(PERM|NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ // intermediate node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_node_feature_missing", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|3, &[0;0]);
+ }, ||{
+ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
+ }, true, Some(PERM|NODE|3), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
- let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // final node failure
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_node_feature_missing", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|3, &[0;0]);
+ }, ||{
+ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
+ }, false, Some(PERM|NODE|3), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
- // As far as A is concerened, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
- // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
- // to "time out" the HTLC.
+ run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_version", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.version = 1; }, ||{}, true,
+ Some(BADONION|PERM|4), None);
- let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 {
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new());
- header.prev_blockhash = header.bitcoin_hash();
- }
- test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
-}
+ run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_hmac", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac = [3; 32]; }, ||{}, true,
+ Some(BADONION|PERM|5), None);
-fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
- let nodes = create_network(3);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_key", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key = Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey);}, ||{}, true,
+ Some(BADONION|PERM|6), None);
- // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
- // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
- // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
- // actually revoked.
- let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, htlc_value));
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_channel_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], UPDATE|7, &ChannelUpdate::dummy().encode_with_len()[..]);
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|7), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
- let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_channel_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|8, &[0;0]);
+ // short_channel_id from the processing node
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|8), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
- if check_revoke_no_close {
- nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- }
+ run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_channel_feature_missing", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|9, &[0;0]);
+ // short_channel_id from the processing node
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|9), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
- let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 {
- nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new());
- header.prev_blockhash = header.bitcoin_hash();
- }
- if !check_revoke_no_close {
- test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
- } else {
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
- assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
- assert!(rejected_by_dest);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- }
- }
-}
+ let mut bogus_route = route.clone();
+ bogus_route.hops[1].short_channel_id -= 1;
+ run_onion_failure_test("unknown_next_peer", 0, &nodes, &bogus_route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|10),
+ Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: bogus_route.hops[1].short_channel_id, is_permanent:true}));
-// Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
-// There are only a few cases to test here:
-// * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
-// broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
-// * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
-// * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
-// We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
-// non-dust HTLCs.
-// Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
-// assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
-// tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
-#[test]
-fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
- do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
- do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
+ let amt_to_forward = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&channels[1].2).unwrap().get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() - 1;
+ let mut bogus_route = route.clone();
+ let route_len = bogus_route.hops.len();
+ bogus_route.hops[route_len-1].fee_msat = amt_to_forward;
+ run_onion_failure_test("amount_below_minimum", 0, &nodes, &bogus_route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|11), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
- do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
- do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
-}
+ //TODO: with new config API, we will be able to generate both valid and
+ //invalid channel_update cases.
+ run_onion_failure_test("fee_insufficient", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, || {}, true, Some(UPDATE|12), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: channels[0].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
-#[test]
-fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
- do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
- do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
- do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
- do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
-}
+ run_onion_failure_test("incorrect_cltv_expiry", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ // need to violate: cltv_expiry - cltv_expiry_delta >= outgoing_cltv_value
+ msg.cltv_expiry -= 1;
+ }, || {}, true, Some(UPDATE|13), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: channels[0].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
-fn run_onion_failure_test<F1,F2>(_name: &str, test_case: u8, nodes: &Vec<Node>, route: &Route, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, callback_msg: F1, callback_node: F2, expected_retryable: bool, expected_error_code: Option<u16>, expected_channel_update: Option<HTLCFailChannelUpdate>)
- where F1: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateAddHTLC),
- F2: FnMut(),
-{
- run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept(_name, test_case, nodes, route, payment_hash, callback_msg, |_|{}, callback_node, expected_retryable, expected_error_code, expected_channel_update);
-}
+ run_onion_failure_test("expiry_too_soon", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1;
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|14), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
-// test_case
-// 0: node1 fail backward
-// 1: final node fail backward
-// 2: payment completed but the user reject the payment
-// 3: final node fail backward (but tamper onion payloads from node0)
-// 100: trigger error in the intermediate node and tamper returnning fail_htlc
-// 200: trigger error in the final node and tamper returnning fail_htlc
-fn run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept<F1,F2,F3>(_name: &str, test_case: u8, nodes: &Vec<Node>, route: &Route, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, mut callback_msg: F1, mut callback_fail: F2, mut callback_node: F3, expected_retryable: bool, expected_error_code: Option<u16>, expected_channel_update: Option<HTLCFailChannelUpdate>)
- where F1: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateAddHTLC),
- F2: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
- F3: FnMut(),
-{
- use ln::msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate;
+ run_onion_failure_test("unknown_payment_hash", 2, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
+ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
+ }, false, Some(PERM|15), None);
- // reset block height
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- for ix in 0..nodes.len() {
- nodes[ix].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
- }
+ run_onion_failure_test("final_expiry_too_soon", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1;
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
+ }, || {}, true, Some(17), None);
- macro_rules! expect_event {
- ($node: expr, $event_type: path) => {{
- let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- $event_type { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ run_onion_failure_test("final_incorrect_cltv_expiry", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
+ for (_, pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().borrow_parts().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
+ match f {
+ &mut HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref mut forward_info, .. } =>
+ forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value += 1,
+ _ => {},
+ }
}
- }}
- }
-
- macro_rules! expect_htlc_forward {
- ($node: expr) => {{
- expect_event!($node, Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable);
- $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
- $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
- }}
- }
-
- // 0 ~~> 2 send payment
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash.clone()).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let update_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- // temper update_add (0 => 1)
- let mut update_add_0 = update_0.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
- if test_case == 0 || test_case == 3 || test_case == 100 {
- callback_msg(&mut update_add_0);
- callback_node();
- }
- // 0 => 1 update_add & CS
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_0).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &update_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
+ }
+ }, true, Some(18), None);
- let update_1_0 = match test_case {
- 0|100 => { // intermediate node failure; fail backward to 0
- let update_1_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len()+update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()==1 && (update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len()==1 || update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()==1));
- update_1_0
- },
- 1|2|3|200 => { // final node failure; forwarding to 2
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
- // forwarding on 1
- if test_case != 200 {
- callback_node();
+ run_onion_failure_test("final_incorrect_htlc_amount", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
+ // violate amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat
+ for (_, pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().borrow_parts().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
+ match f {
+ &mut HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref mut forward_info, .. } =>
+ forward_info.amt_to_forward -= 1,
+ _ => {},
+ }
}
- expect_htlc_forward!(&nodes[1]);
+ }
+ }, true, Some(19), None);
- let update_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
- check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
- assert_eq!(update_1.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
- // tamper update_add (1 => 2)
- let mut update_add_1 = update_1.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
- if test_case != 3 && test_case != 200 {
- callback_msg(&mut update_add_1);
- }
+ run_onion_failure_test("channel_disabled", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
+ // disconnect event to the channel between nodes[1] ~ nodes[2]
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ }, true, Some(UPDATE|20), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- // 1 => 2
- nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_1).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], update_1.commitment_signed, false, true);
+ run_onion_failure_test("expiry_too_far", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
+ let mut route = route.clone();
+ let height = 1;
+ route.hops[1].cltv_expiry_delta += CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY + route.hops[0].cltv_expiry_delta + 1;
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ let (onion_payloads, _, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, height).unwrap();
+ let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
+ msg.cltv_expiry = htlc_cltv;
+ msg.onion_routing_packet = onion_packet;
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(21), None);
+}
- if test_case == 2 || test_case == 200 {
- expect_htlc_forward!(&nodes[2]);
- expect_event!(&nodes[2], Event::PaymentReceived);
- callback_node();
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
- }
+#[test]
+#[should_panic]
+fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ //Force duplicate channel ids
+ for node in nodes.iter() {
+ *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
+ }
- let update_2_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- if test_case == 2 || test_case == 200 {
- check_added_monitors!(&nodes[2], 1);
- }
- assert!(update_2_1.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1);
+ // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
+ let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
+ let push_msat=10001;
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
+ let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel).unwrap();
- let mut fail_msg = update_2_1.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone();
- if test_case == 200 {
- callback_fail(&mut fail_msg);
- }
+ //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42).is_err());
+}
- // 2 => 1
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg).unwrap();
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_2_1.commitment_signed, true);
+#[test]
+fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+ // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
+ let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
+ let push_msat=10001;
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42).is_err());
+
+ // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
+ let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
+ // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
+ let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42).is_err());
+
+ // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
+ let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
+ let push_msat=10001;
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
+ let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
+
+ // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
+ // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
+ assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
+
+ // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
+ assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
+ assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
+
+ // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
+ let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash();
+ assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
+
+ // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
+ assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
+ assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
+ assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
+ assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
+ assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
+}
- // backward fail on 1
- let update_1_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1);
- update_1_0
- },
- _ => unreachable!(),
- };
+// BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
+// BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
+//TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
- // 1 => 0 commitment_signed_dance
- if update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len() > 0 {
- let mut fail_msg = update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone();
- if test_case == 100 {
- callback_fail(&mut fail_msg);
- }
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg).unwrap();
- } else {
- nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- };
+#[test]
+fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
+ //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
+ //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let mut route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_1_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
+ route.hops[0].fee_msat = 0;
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- if let &Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash:_, ref rejected_by_dest, ref error_code } = &events[0] {
- assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, !expected_retryable);
- assert_eq!(*error_code, expected_error_code);
+ let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash);
+
+ if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value");
} else {
- panic!("Uexpected event");
+ assert!(false);
}
+}
- let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- if expected_channel_update.is_some() {
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { ref update } => {
- match update {
- &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { .. } => {
- if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { .. } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {} else {
- panic!("channel_update not found!");
- }
- },
- &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { ref short_channel_id, ref is_permanent } => {
- if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: ref expected_short_channel_id, is_permanent: ref expected_is_permanent } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {
- assert!(*short_channel_id == *expected_short_channel_id);
- assert!(*is_permanent == *expected_is_permanent);
- } else {
- panic!("Unexpected message event");
- }
- },
- &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, ref is_permanent } => {
- if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: ref expected_node_id, is_permanent: ref expected_is_permanent } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {
- assert!(*node_id == *expected_node_id);
- assert!(*is_permanent == *expected_is_permanent);
- } else {
- panic!("Unexpected message event");
- }
- },
- }
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected message event"),
- }
+#[test]
+fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
+ //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
+ //It is enforced when constructing a route.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 0, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000000, 500000001).unwrap();
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+
+ let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash);
+
+ if let Err(APIError::RouteError{err}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Channel CLTV overflowed?!");
} else {
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
+ assert!(false);
}
}
-impl msgs::ChannelUpdate {
- fn dummy() -> msgs::ChannelUpdate {
- use secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
- use secp256k1::Signature;
- msgs::ChannelUpdate {
- signature: Signature::from(FFISignature::new()),
- contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
- chain_hash: Sha256dHash::from_data(&vec![0u8][..]),
- short_channel_id: 0,
- timestamp: 0,
- flags: 0,
- cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
- htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- fee_base_msat: 0,
- fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- excess_data: vec![],
+#[test]
+fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
+ //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
+ //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
+ //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().their_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
+
+ for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ let payment_event = {
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
+ assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
+ } else {
+ assert!(false);
}
- }
+ SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
+ };
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100000);
+ }
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash);
+
+ if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs");
+ } else {
+ assert!(false);
}
}
#[test]
-fn test_onion_failure() {
- use ln::msgs::ChannelUpdate;
- use ln::channelmanager::CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY;
- use secp256k1;
+fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
+ //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let channel_value = 100000;
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
- const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
- const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
- const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
- const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight, max_in_flight);
- let mut nodes = create_network(3);
- for node in nodes.iter() {
- *node.keys_manager.override_session_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some(SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap());
- }
- let channels = [create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1), create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2)];
- let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- // positve case
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 40000);
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], max_in_flight+1, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash);
- // intermediate node failure
- run_onion_failure_test("invalid_realm", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
- let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
- let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- let (mut onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
- onion_payloads[0].realm = 3;
- msg.onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
- }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|1), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));//XXX incremented channels idx here
+ if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept");
+ } else {
+ assert!(false);
+ }
- // final node failure
- run_onion_failure_test("invalid_realm", 3, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
- let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
- let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- let (mut onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
- onion_payloads[1].realm = 3;
- msg.onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
- }, ||{}, false, Some(PERM|1), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight, max_in_flight);
+}
- // the following three with run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept() test only the origin node
- // receiving simulated fail messages
- // intermediate node failure
- run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_node_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- // trigger error
- msg.amount_msat -= 1;
- }, |msg| {
- // and tamper returing error message
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
- let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], NODE|2, &[0;0]);
- }, ||{}, true, Some(NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: false}));
+// BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
+#[test]
+fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
+ //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
+ {
+ let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
+ htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat();
+ }
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], htlc_minimum_msat, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
+ let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
+ if let Err(msgs::LightningError{err, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..}}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value");
+ } else {
+ assert!(false);
+ }
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+}
- // final node failure
- run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_node_failure", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
- // and tamper returing error message
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
- let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], NODE|2, &[0;0]);
- }, ||{
- nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
- }, true, Some(NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: false}));
+#[test]
+fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
+ //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- // intermediate node failure
- run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_node_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- msg.amount_msat -= 1;
- }, |msg| {
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
- let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|2, &[0;0]);
- }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
+ let their_channel_reserve = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).channel_reserve_msat;
- // final node failure
- run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_node_failure", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
- let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|2, &[0;0]);
- }, ||{
- nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
- }, false, Some(PERM|NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 5000000-their_channel_reserve, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- // intermediate node failure
- run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_node_feature_missing", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- msg.amount_msat -= 1;
- }, |msg| {
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
- let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|3, &[0;0]);
- }, ||{
- nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
- }, true, Some(PERM|NODE|3), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
+ updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 5000000-their_channel_reserve+1;
+ let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
- // final node failure
- run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_node_feature_missing", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| {
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
- let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|3, &[0;0]);
- }, ||{
- nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
- }, false, Some(PERM|NODE|3), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: true}));
+ if let Err(msgs::LightningError{err, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..}}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value");
+ } else {
+ assert!(false);
+ }
- run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_version", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.version = 1; }, ||{}, true,
- Some(BADONION|PERM|4), None);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+}
- run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_hmac", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac = [3; 32]; }, ||{}, true,
- Some(BADONION|PERM|5), None);
+#[test]
+fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
+ //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
+ //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 3999999, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_key", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key = Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey);}, ||{}, true,
- Some(BADONION|PERM|6), None);
+ let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&{
+ let mut session_key = [0; 32];
+ let mut rng = thread_rng();
+ rng.fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
+ session_key
+ }).expect("RNG is bad!");
- run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_channel_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- msg.amount_msat -= 1;
- }, |msg| {
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
- let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], UPDATE|7, &ChannelUpdate::dummy().encode_with_len()[..]);
- }, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|7), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
+ let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
+ let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+ let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
+ let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
- run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_channel_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- msg.amount_msat -= 1;
- }, |msg| {
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
- let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|8, &[0;0]);
- // short_channel_id from the processing node
- }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|8), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
+ let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
+ channel_id: chan.2,
+ htlc_id: 0,
+ amount_msat: 1000,
+ payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
+ cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
+ onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
+ };
- run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_channel_feature_missing", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- msg.amount_msat -= 1;
- }, |msg| {
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
- let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|9, &[0;0]);
- // short_channel_id from the processing node
- }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|9), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
+ for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
+ msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
+ }
+ msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
+ let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
- let mut bogus_route = route.clone();
- bogus_route.hops[1].short_channel_id -= 1;
- run_onion_failure_test("unknown_next_peer", 0, &nodes, &bogus_route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|10),
- Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: bogus_route.hops[1].short_channel_id, is_permanent:true}));
+ if let Err(msgs::LightningError{err, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..}}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs");
+ } else {
+ assert!(false);
+ }
- let amt_to_forward = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&channels[1].2).unwrap().get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() - 1;
- let mut bogus_route = route.clone();
- let route_len = bogus_route.hops.len();
- bogus_route.hops[route_len-1].fee_msat = amt_to_forward;
- run_onion_failure_test("amount_below_minimum", 0, &nodes, &bogus_route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|11), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+}
- //TODO: with new config API, we will be able to generate both valid and
- //invalid channel_update cases.
- run_onion_failure_test("fee_insufficient", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- msg.amount_msat -= 1;
- }, || {}, true, Some(UPDATE|12), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: channels[0].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
+#[test]
+fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
+ //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
+ let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
- run_onion_failure_test("incorrect_cltv_expiry", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- // need to violate: cltv_expiry - cltv_expiry_delta >= outgoing_cltv_value
- msg.cltv_expiry -= 1;
- }, || {}, true, Some(UPDATE|13), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: channels[0].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
+ if let Err(msgs::LightningError{err, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..}}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err,"Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value");
+ } else {
+ assert!(false);
+ }
- run_onion_failure_test("expiry_too_soon", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1;
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
- }, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|14), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+}
- run_onion_failure_test("unknown_payment_hash", 2, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
- nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0);
- }, false, Some(PERM|15), None);
+#[test]
+fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
+ //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 3999999, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
+ let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
- run_onion_failure_test("final_expiry_too_soon", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1;
- let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
- }, || {}, true, Some(17), None);
+ if let Err(msgs::LightningError{err, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..}}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
+ } else {
+ assert!(false);
+ }
- run_onion_failure_test("final_incorrect_cltv_expiry", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
- for (_, pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().borrow_parts().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
- match f {
- &mut HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref mut forward_info, .. } =>
- forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value += 1,
- _ => {},
- }
- }
- }
- }, true, Some(18), None);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+}
- run_onion_failure_test("final_incorrect_htlc_amount", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
- // violate amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat
- for (_, pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().borrow_parts().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
- match f {
- &mut HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref mut forward_info, .. } =>
- forward_info.amt_to_forward -= 1,
- _ => {},
- }
- }
- }
- }, true, Some(19), None);
+#[test]
+fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
+ //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
+ // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
+ // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- run_onion_failure_test("channel_disabled", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || {
- // disconnect event to the channel between nodes[1] ~ nodes[2]
- nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- }, true, Some(UPDATE|20), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ //Disconnect and Reconnect
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
+ assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
+ assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
+ handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
+ handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
- run_onion_failure_test("expiry_too_far", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap();
- let mut route = route.clone();
- let height = 1;
- route.hops[1].cltv_expiry_delta += CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY + route.hops[0].cltv_expiry_delta + 1;
- let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- let (onion_payloads, _, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, height).unwrap();
- let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
- msg.cltv_expiry = htlc_cltv;
- msg.onion_routing_packet = onion_packet;
- }, ||{}, true, Some(21), None);
+ //Resend HTLC
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
+ if let Err(msgs::LightningError{err, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..}}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Remote skipped HTLC ID");
+ } else {
+ assert!(false);
+ }
+
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
}
#[test]
-#[should_panic]
-fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
- let nodes = create_network(2);
- //Force duplicate channel ids
- for node in nodes.iter() {
- *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
- }
-
- // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
- let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
- let push_msat=10001;
- nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
- let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel).unwrap();
-
- //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
- assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42).is_err());
+fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
+ //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
+
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+
+ let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
+ channel_id: chan.2,
+ htlc_id: 0,
+ payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
+ };
+
+ let err = nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
+
+ if let Err(msgs::LightningError{err, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..}}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed");
+ } else {
+ assert!(false);
+ }
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
}
#[test]
-fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
- let nodes = create_network(2);
-
- // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
- let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
- let push_msat=10001;
- assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42).is_err());
-
- // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
- let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
- // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
- let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
- assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42).is_err());
-
- // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
- let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
- let push_msat=10001;
- assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
- let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
-
- // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
- // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
- assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
-
- // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
- assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
- assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
-
- // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
- let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash();
- assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
-
- // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
- assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
- assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
- assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
- assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
- assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
-}
+fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
+ //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
-// BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
-// BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
-//TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
-#[test]
-fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
- //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
- //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
- let mut route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- route.hops[0].fee_msat = 0;
+ let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
+ channel_id: chan.2,
+ htlc_id: 0,
+ reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
+ };
- let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash);
+ let err = nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
- if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err}) = err {
- assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value");
+ if let Err(msgs::LightningError{err, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..}}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed");
} else {
assert!(false);
}
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
}
#[test]
-fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
- //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
- //It is enforced when constructing a route.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 0);
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000000, 500000001).unwrap();
+fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
+ //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
+
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash);
+ let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
+ channel_id: chan.2,
+ htlc_id: 0,
+ sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
+ failure_code: 0x8000,
+ };
- if let Err(APIError::RouteError{err}) = err {
- assert_eq!(err, "Channel CLTV overflowed?!");
+ let err = nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
+
+ if let Err(msgs::LightningError{err, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..}}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed");
} else {
assert!(false);
}
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
}
#[test]
-fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
- //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
- //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
- //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
- let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().their_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
+fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
+ //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
- for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- let mut payment_event = {
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
- assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
- } else {
- assert!(false);
- }
- SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
- };
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
- commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
+ let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
- expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100000);
- }
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash);
+ nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage, 100_000);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err}) = err {
- assert_eq!(err, "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs");
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fee.is_none());
+ update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ };
+
+ update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
+
+ let err = nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
+ if let Err(msgs::LightningError{err, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..}}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
} else {
assert!(false);
}
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
}
#[test]
-fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
- //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- let channel_value = 100000;
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
- let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
+fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
+ //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], max_in_flight+1, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash);
+ let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
- if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err}) = err {
- assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight");
+ nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage, 100_000);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fee.is_none());
+ update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ };
+
+ update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
+
+ let err = nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
+ if let Err(msgs::LightningError{err, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..}}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Remote tried to fulfill HTLC with an incorrect preimage");
} else {
assert!(false);
}
- send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
}
-// BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
+
#[test]
-fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
- //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
- let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
- {
- let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
- htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat();
- }
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], htlc_minimum_msat, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
+ //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
+
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
- let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
- if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
- assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value");
+ updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+
+ let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fee.is_none());
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ };
+ update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
+ let err = nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
+ if let Err(msgs::LightningError{err, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..}}) = err {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
} else {
assert!(false);
}
- assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
+ //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
+ // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
+
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+
+ //First hop
+ let mut payment_event = {
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
+ };
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
+ assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
+
+ //Second Hop
+ payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
+ nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
+
+ let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
+ let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
+ match events_3[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fee.is_none());
+ (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ };
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0).unwrap();
+
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
+
+ //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
+ match events_4[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
+ assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(update_fee.is_none());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
+
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+}
+
+fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
+ // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
+ // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
+ // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
+
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis;
+
+ // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
+ let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
+ let (_, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+
+ // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
+ let as_prev_commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+
+ // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
+ let as_last_commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
+ // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ if announce_latest {
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&as_last_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+ } else {
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&as_prev_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+ }
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ // Only 2 PaymentFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ let mut first_failed = false;
+ for event in events {
+ match event {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
+ assert!(!first_failed);
+ first_failed = true;
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
+ }
+ }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
}
#[test]
-fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
- //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
+fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
+ do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
+ do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
+}
- let their_channel_reserve = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).channel_reserve_msat;
+#[test]
+fn test_no_failure_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
+ // Transaction filters for failing back dust htlc based on local commitment txn infos has been
+ // prone to error, we test here that a dummy transaction don't fail them.
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 5000000-their_channel_reserve, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 5000000-their_channel_reserve+1;
- let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
+ // Rebalance a bit
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
- if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
- assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value");
- } else {
- assert!(false);
- }
+ let as_dust_limit = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis;
- assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+ // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
+ let (preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
+ let (preimage_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], as_dust_limit*1000);
+
+ // Build a dummy invalid transaction trying to spend a commitment tx
+ let input = TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), vout: 0 },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ };
+
+ let outp = TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
+ value: 10000,
+ };
+
+ let dummy_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: vec![input],
+ output: vec![outp]
+ };
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.block_connected(&header, 1, &[&dummy_tx], &[1;1]);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
+ // We broadcast a few more block to check everything is all right
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, 20, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], preimage_1, bs_dust_limit*1000);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], preimage_2, as_dust_limit*1000);
}
-#[test]
-fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
- //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
- //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 3999999, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
+ // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
+ // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
+ // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
+ // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
+ // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
+ // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
- let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&{
- let mut session_key = [0; 32];
- rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
- session_key
- }).expect("RNG is bad!");
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
- let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
- let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
- let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
- let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
+ let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis;
- let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
- channel_id: chan.2,
- htlc_id: 0,
- amount_msat: 1000,
- payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
- cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
- onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
- };
+ let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
+ let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
- for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
- msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
+ let as_commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ let bs_commitment_tx = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+
+ // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
+ if revoked {
+ let (payment_preimage_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3, 1_000_000);
}
- msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
- let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
- if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
- assert_eq!(err, "Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs");
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
+ if local {
+ // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&as_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
+ let parent_hash = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 2, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
+ let header_2 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: parent_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header_2, 7, &[&timeout_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+ let header_3 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_2.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 8, true, header_3.bitcoin_hash());
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
} else {
- assert!(false);
+ // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&bs_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
+ let parent_hash = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 2, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+ let header_2 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: parent_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ if !revoked {
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header_2, 7, &[&timeout_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ let header_3 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_2.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 8, true, header_3.bitcoin_hash());
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ } else {
+ // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
+ // commitment tx
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ let first;
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
+ else { first = false; }
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
+ else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
}
+}
- assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+#[test]
+fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
+ do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
+ do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
+ do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
}
#[test]
-fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
- //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
- let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
+fn test_upfront_shutdown_script() {
+ // BOLT 2 : Option upfront shutdown script, if peer commit its closing_script at channel opening
+ // enforce it at shutdown message
+
+ let mut config = UserConfig::new();
+ config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+ config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
+ config.channel_options.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = false;
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, Some(config), None]);
+
+ // We test that in case of peer committing upfront to a script, if it changes at closing, we refuse to sign
+ let flags = LocalFeatures::new();
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 1000000, 1000000, flags.clone(), flags.clone());
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(chan.3.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
+ let mut node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ node_0_shutdown.scriptpubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script().to_p2sh();
+ // Test we enforce upfront_scriptpbukey if by providing a diffrent one at closing that we disconnect peer
+ if let Err(error) = nodes[2].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown) {
+ match error.action {
+ ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(msg.data,"Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey which did not match their previous scriptpubkey");
+ },
+ _ => { assert!(false); }
+ }
+ } else { assert!(false); }
+ let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
- if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
- assert_eq!(err,"Remote HTLC add would put them over their max HTLC value in flight");
- } else {
- assert!(false);
+ // We test that in case of peer committing upfront to a script, if it doesn't change at closing, we sign
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 1000000, 1000000, flags.clone(), flags.clone());
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(chan.3.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
+ let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // We test that in case of peer committing upfront to a script, if it oesn't change at closing, we sign
+ if let Ok(_) = nodes[2].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown) {}
+ else { assert!(false) }
+ let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id, .. } => { assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
-}
+ // We test that if case of peer non-signaling we don't enforce committed script at channel opening
+ let mut flags_no = LocalFeatures::new();
+ flags_no.unset_upfront_shutdown_script();
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, flags_no, flags.clone());
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(chan.3.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
+ let mut node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ node_1_shutdown.scriptpubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script().to_p2sh();
+ if let Ok(_) = nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown) {}
+ else { assert!(false) }
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id, .. } => { assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
-#[test]
-fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
- //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 3999999, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
- let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
+ // We test that if user opt-out, we provide a zero-length script at channel opening and we are able to close
+ // channel smoothly, opt-out is from channel initiator here
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 0, 1000000, 1000000, flags.clone(), flags.clone());
+ nodes[1].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(chan.3.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
+ let mut node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ node_0_shutdown.scriptpubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script().to_p2sh();
+ if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown) {}
+ else { assert!(false) }
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id, .. } => { assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
- if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
- assert_eq!(err,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
- } else {
- assert!(false);
+ //// We test that if user opt-out, we provide a zero-length script at channel opening and we are able to close
+ //// channel smoothly
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, flags.clone(), flags.clone());
+ nodes[1].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(chan.3.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
+ let mut node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ node_0_shutdown.scriptpubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script().to_p2sh();
+ if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown) {}
+ else { assert!(false) }
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id, .. } => { assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { node_id, .. } => { assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
+}
- assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+#[test]
+fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
+ // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
+
+ let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::new();
+ low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
+ let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::new();
+ high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None]);
+
+ // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
+ let keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface> = Arc::new(KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), 10, 20));
+ if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }, &keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), &low_our_to_self_config) {
+ match error {
+ APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert_eq!(err, "Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"); },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ } else { assert!(false) }
+
+ // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
+ nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42).unwrap();
+ let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
+ if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }, &keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &open_channel, 0, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), &low_our_to_self_config) {
+ match error {
+ ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert_eq!(err, "Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"); },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ } else { assert!(false); }
+
+ // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
+ let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
+ if let Err(error) = nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &accept_channel) {
+ match error.action {
+ ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(msg.data,"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period");
+ },
+ _ => { assert!(false); }
+ }
+ } else { assert!(false); }
+
+ // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
+ nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42).unwrap();
+ let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
+ if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }, &keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &open_channel, 0, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), &high_their_to_self_config) {
+ match error {
+ ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert_eq!(err, "They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"); },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ } else { assert!(false); }
}
#[test]
-fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
- //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
- // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
- // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
- let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+fn test_data_loss_protect() {
+ // We want to be sure that :
+ // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
+ // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
+ // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to remote my_current_per_commitment_point
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ // Cache node A state before any channel update
+ let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
+ let mut previous_chan_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
+ nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut previous_chan_monitor_state).unwrap();
+
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
- //Disconnect and Reconnect
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+
+ // Restore node A from previous state
+ let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0)));
+ let chan_monitor = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(previous_chan_monitor_state.0), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap().1;
+ let chain_monitor = Arc::new(ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
+ let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
+ let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
+ let monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone(), feeest.clone()));
+ let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
+ channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &chan_monitor);
+ let node_state_0 = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
+ keys_manager: Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger), 42, 21)),
+ fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
+ monitor: monitor.clone(),
+ chain_monitor: chain_monitor.clone(),
+ logger: Arc::clone(&logger),
+ tx_broadcaster,
+ default_config: UserConfig::new(),
+ channel_monitors: &channel_monitors
+ }).unwrap().1;
+ nodes[0].node = Arc::new(node_state_0);
+ monitor.add_update_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_monitor.clone()).is_ok();
+ nodes[0].chan_monitor = monitor;
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor = chain_monitor;
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
- assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
- assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
- nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
- handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
- nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
- handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
- //Resend HTLC
- nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
- nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
- let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
- if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
- assert_eq!(err, "Remote skipped HTLC ID");
- } else {
- assert!(false);
+ // Check we update monitor following learning of per_commitment_point from B
+ if let Err(err) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]) {
+ match err.action {
+ ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
+ }
+ } else { assert!(false); }
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ {
+ let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
}
- assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
+ let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
+ for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
+ if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
+ } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected event")
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
+ if let Err(err) = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]) {
+ match err.action {
+ ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(msg.data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction"); },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
+ }
+ } else { assert!(false); }
+
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()]}, 1);
+ let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff