Addressed PR comments
[rust-lightning] / src / ln / functional_tests.rs
index ca394fcdf98fda96379630cb2d6c9024e4739f05..2e6f2d79290b1c26267bef9423db2bc486b41df7 100644 (file)
@@ -6084,10 +6084,107 @@ fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
 }
 
+fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
+       let mut nodes = create_network(2);
+       let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
+       let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+       let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+       nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash).unwrap();
+       check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+       let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+       // As far as A is concerened, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
+       // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
+       // to "time out" the HTLC.
+
+       let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+       for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 {
+               nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new());
+               header.prev_blockhash = header.bitcoin_hash();
+       }
+       test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
+       check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
+}
+
+fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
+       let nodes = create_network(3);
+       let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
+       // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
+       // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
+       // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
+       // actually revoked.
+       let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
+       let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
+       assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, htlc_value));
+       expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+       check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+       let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+       nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+       nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+       check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+       let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+       nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0).unwrap();
+       check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+       nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1).unwrap();
+       check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+       let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+       if check_revoke_no_close {
+               nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+               check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+       }
+
+       let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+       for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 {
+               nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new());
+               header.prev_blockhash = header.bitcoin_hash();
+       }
+       if !check_revoke_no_close {
+               test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
+               check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
+       } else {
+               let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+               assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+               match events[0] {
+                       Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
+                               assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
+                               assert!(rejected_by_dest);
+                       },
+                       _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+               }
+       }
+}
+
+// Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
+// There are only a few cases to test here:
+//  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
+//    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
+//  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
+//  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
+// We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
+// non-dust HTLCs.
+// Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
+// assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
+// tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
 #[test]
-fn htlc_claim_local_commitment_only() {
+fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
        do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
        do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
+
+       do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
+       do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
+       do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
+       do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
+       do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
+       do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
 }
 
 fn run_onion_failure_test<F1,F2>(_name: &str, test_case: u8, nodes: &Vec<Node>, route: &Route, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, callback_msg: F1, callback_node: F2, expected_retryable: bool, expected_error_code: Option<u16>, expected_channel_update: Option<HTLCFailChannelUpdate>)
@@ -6505,3 +6602,364 @@ fn test_onion_failure() {
                msg.onion_routing_packet = onion_packet;
        }, ||{}, true, Some(21), None);
 }
+
+#[test]
+fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender() {
+       use util::rng;
+       use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
+       use super::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
+       use super::channel::ChannelError;
+
+       let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+
+       // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
+
+       // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
+       //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
+
+       // BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
+       // BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
+       let mut nodes = create_network(2);
+       let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
+       let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+       let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+
+       let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
+               let mut session_key = [0; 32];
+               rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
+               session_key
+       }).expect("RNG is bad!");
+
+       let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
+       let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+       let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
+       let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
+
+       let err = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan.2).unwrap().send_htlc(0, our_payment_hash, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
+               route: route.clone(),
+               session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
+               first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
+       }, onion_packet);
+
+       if let Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) = err {
+               assert_eq!(msg, "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value");
+       } else {
+               assert!(false);
+       }
+
+       //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
+       //TODO: This is not currently explicitly checked when sending an HTLC and exists as TODO in the channel::send_htlc(...) function
+       //It is enforced when constructing a route.
+
+       // BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
+       let mut nodes = create_network(2);
+       let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 0);
+       let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+       let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+
+       let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
+               let mut session_key = [0; 32];
+               rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
+               session_key
+       }).expect("RNG is bad!");
+
+       let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
+       let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+       let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
+       let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
+
+       let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().their_max_accepted_htlcs;
+
+       for _i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
+               let _ = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan.2).unwrap().send_htlc(10000, our_payment_hash, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
+                       route: route.clone(),
+                       session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
+                       first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
+               }, onion_packet.clone());
+       }
+
+       let err = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan.2).unwrap().send_htlc(10000, our_payment_hash, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
+               route: route.clone(),
+               session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
+               first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
+       }, onion_packet);
+
+       if let Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) = err {
+               assert_eq!(msg, "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs");
+       } else {
+               assert!(false);
+       }
+
+       // BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
+       let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 0);
+       let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+       let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+
+       let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
+               let mut session_key = [0; 32];
+               rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
+               session_key
+       }).expect("RNG is bad!");
+
+       let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
+       let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+       let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
+       let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
+
+       let err = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan.2).unwrap().send_htlc(10000001, our_payment_hash, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
+               route: route.clone(),
+               session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
+               first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
+       }, onion_packet);
+
+       if let Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) = err {
+               assert_eq!(msg, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight");
+       } else {
+               assert!(false);
+       }
+
+       // BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
+       // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
+       let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 0);
+       let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+       let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+
+       let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
+               let mut session_key = [0; 32];
+               rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
+               session_key
+       }).expect("RNG is bad!");
+
+       let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
+       let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+       let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
+       let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
+
+       for expected_id in 0..2 {
+               let res = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan.2).unwrap().send_htlc(100000, our_payment_hash, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
+                       route: route.clone(),
+                       session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
+                       first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
+               }, onion_packet.clone());
+
+               if let Ok(Some(msg)) = res {
+                       assert_eq!(msg.htlc_id, expected_id);
+               } else {
+                       assert!(false);
+               }
+       }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
+       use super::msgs::HandleError;
+
+       //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
+       let mut nodes = create_network(2);
+       let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
+       let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
+       {
+               let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+               let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
+               htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat();
+       }
+       let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], htlc_minimum_msat+1, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+       let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+       nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+       check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+       let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+       updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
+       let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
+
+       if let Err(HandleError{err, action: _}) = err {
+               assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value");
+       } else {
+               assert!(false);
+       }
+
+       //Confirm the channel was closed
+       {
+               assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.len(), 0);
+       }
+       //Clear unhandled msg events.
+       let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
+       use super::msgs::HandleError;
+
+       //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
+       let mut nodes = create_network(2);
+       let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
+       let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 3999999, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+       let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+       nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+       check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+       let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+       updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 4000001;
+       let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
+
+       if let Err(HandleError{err, action: _}) = err {
+               assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value");
+       } else {
+               assert!(false);
+       }
+
+       //Confirm the channel was closed
+       {
+               assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.len(), 0);
+       }
+       //Clear unhandled msg events.
+       let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
+       use util::rng;
+       let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+       use super::msgs::HandleError;
+
+       //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
+       //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
+       let mut nodes = create_network(2);
+       let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
+       let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 3999999, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+       let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+
+       let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
+               let mut session_key = [0; 32];
+               rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
+               session_key
+       }).expect("RNG is bad!");
+
+       let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
+       let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
+       let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
+       let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
+
+       let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
+               channel_id: chan.2,
+               htlc_id: 0,
+               amount_msat: 1000,
+               payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
+               cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
+               onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
+       };
+
+       for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
+               msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
+               nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
+       }
+       msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS + 1) as u64;
+       let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
+
+       if let Err(HandleError{err, action: _}) = err {
+               assert_eq!(err, "Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs");
+       } else {
+               assert!(false);
+       }
+
+       //Confirm the channel was closed
+       {
+               assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.len(), 0);
+       }
+       //Clear unhandled msg events.
+       let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
+       use super::msgs::HandleError;
+
+       //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
+       let mut nodes = create_network(2);
+       let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
+       let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+       let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+    nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+       check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+       let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+       updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
+       let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
+
+       if let Err(HandleError{err, action: _}) = err {
+               assert_eq!(err,"Remote HTLC add would put them over their max HTLC value in flight");
+       } else {
+               assert!(false);
+       }
+
+       //Confirm the channel was closed
+       {
+               assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.len(), 0);
+       }
+       //Clear unhandled msg events.
+       let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
+       use super::msgs::HandleError;
+
+       //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
+       let mut nodes = create_network(2);
+       let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
+       let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 3999999, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+       let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+       nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+       check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+       let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+       updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
+       let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
+
+       if let Err(HandleError{err, action: _}) = err {
+               assert_eq!(err,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
+       } else {
+               assert!(false);
+       }
+
+       //Confirm the channel was closed
+       {
+               assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.len(), 0);
+       }
+       //Clear unhandled msg events.
+       let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
+       use super::msgs::HandleError;
+
+       //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
+       let mut nodes = create_network(2);
+       let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
+       let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 3999999, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+       let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+       nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
+       check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+       let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+       let _ = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
+       assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().next_remote_htlc_id, 1);
+
+       //Disconnect and Reconnect
+       nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+       nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+       nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+       let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
+       assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
+       nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+       let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
+       assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
+       nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
+       let _ = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
+       nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
+       let _ = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
+       let _ = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
+       //Confirm the HTLC was ignored
+       assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().next_remote_htlc_id, 1);
+
+       //Clear unhandled msg events
+       let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+}
\ No newline at end of file