use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
use lightning::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
use lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager;
+use lightning::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler};
+use lightning::ln::peer_handler::{PeerManager, SocketDescriptor};
use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
/// [`ChannelManager`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
/// [`ChannelManager::write`]: lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager#impl-Writeable
/// [`FilesystemPersister::persist_manager`]: lightning_persister::FilesystemPersister::persist_manager
- pub fn start<PM, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>(persist_manager: PM, manager: Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<K>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>>, logger: Arc<L>) -> Self
- where Signer: 'static + Sign,
- M: 'static + chain::Watch<Signer>,
- T: 'static + BroadcasterInterface,
- K: 'static + KeysInterface<Signer=Signer>,
- F: 'static + FeeEstimator,
- L: 'static + Logger,
- PM: 'static + Send + Fn(&ChannelManager<Signer, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<K>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>) -> Result<(), std::io::Error>,
+ pub fn start<PM, Signer, M, T, K, F, L, Descriptor: 'static + SocketDescriptor + Send, CM, RM>(
+ persist_channel_manager: PM,
+ channel_manager: Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<K>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>>,
+ peer_manager: Arc<PeerManager<Descriptor, Arc<CM>, Arc<RM>, Arc<L>>>, logger: Arc<L>,
+ ) -> Self
+ where
+ Signer: 'static + Sign,
+ M: 'static + chain::Watch<Signer>,
+ T: 'static + BroadcasterInterface,
+ K: 'static + KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
+ F: 'static + FeeEstimator,
+ L: 'static + Logger,
+ CM: 'static + ChannelMessageHandler,
+ RM: 'static + RoutingMessageHandler,
+ PM: 'static
+ + Send
+ + Fn(
+ &ChannelManager<Signer, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<K>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>,
+ ) -> Result<(), std::io::Error>,
{
let stop_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
let stop_thread_clone = stop_thread.clone();
let handle = thread::spawn(move || -> Result<(), std::io::Error> {
let mut current_time = Instant::now();
loop {
- let updates_available = manager.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100));
+ peer_manager.process_events();
+ let updates_available =
+ channel_manager.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100));
if updates_available {
- persist_manager(&*manager)?;
+ persist_channel_manager(&*channel_manager)?;
}
// Exit the loop if the background processor was requested to stop.
if stop_thread.load(Ordering::Acquire) == true {
log_trace!(logger, "Terminating background processor.");
- return Ok(())
+ return Ok(());
}
if current_time.elapsed().as_secs() > CHAN_FRESHNESS_TIMER {
log_trace!(logger, "Calling manager's timer_chan_freshness_every_min");
- manager.timer_chan_freshness_every_min();
+ channel_manager.timer_chan_freshness_every_min();
current_time = Instant::now();
}
}
});
- Self {
- stop_thread: stop_thread_clone,
- thread_handle: handle,
- }
+ Self { stop_thread: stop_thread_clone, thread_handle: handle }
}
/// Stop `BackgroundProcessor`'s thread.
use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, SimpleArcChannelManager};
use lightning::ln::features::InitFeatures;
use lightning::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
+ use lightning::ln::peer_handler::{PeerManager, MessageHandler, SocketDescriptor};
use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
use lightning::util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEventsProvider, MessageSendEvent};
use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
use std::time::Duration;
use super::BackgroundProcessor;
+ #[derive(Clone, Eq, Hash, PartialEq)]
+ struct TestDescriptor{}
+ impl SocketDescriptor for TestDescriptor {
+ fn send_data(&mut self, _data: &[u8], _resume_read: bool) -> usize {
+ 0
+ }
+
+ fn disconnect_socket(&mut self) {}
+ }
+
type ChainMonitor = chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>, Arc<test_utils::TestFeeEstimator>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>, Arc<FilesystemPersister>>;
struct Node {
node: Arc<SimpleArcChannelManager<ChainMonitor, test_utils::TestBroadcaster, test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, test_utils::TestLogger>>,
+ peer_manager: Arc<PeerManager<TestDescriptor, Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMessageHandler>, Arc<test_utils::TestRoutingMessageHandler>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>>,
persister: Arc<FilesystemPersister>,
logger: Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>,
}
latest_height: 0,
};
let manager = Arc::new(ChannelManager::new(fee_estimator.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster, logger.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), UserConfig::default(), params));
- let node = Node { node: manager, persister, logger };
+ let msg_handler = MessageHandler { chan_handler: Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMessageHandler::new()), route_handler: Arc::new(test_utils::TestRoutingMessageHandler::new() )};
+ let peer_manager = Arc::new(PeerManager::new(msg_handler, keys_manager.get_node_secret(), &seed, logger.clone()));
+ let node = Node { node: manager, peer_manager, persister, logger };
nodes.push(node);
}
nodes
$node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!($node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
let events = $node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = match events[0] {
+ let (temporary_channel_id, tx) = match events[0] {
Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, $channel_value);
assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
let tx = Transaction { version: 1 as i32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
}]};
- let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
- (*temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_outpoint)
+ (*temporary_channel_id, tx)
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
- $node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
+ $node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
$node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!($node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
$node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!($node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
tx
// Initiate the background processors to watch each node.
let data_dir = nodes[0].persister.get_data_dir();
let callback = move |node: &ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<ChainMonitor>, Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<test_utils::TestFeeEstimator>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>| FilesystemPersister::persist_manager(data_dir.clone(), node);
- let bg_processor = BackgroundProcessor::start(callback, nodes[0].node.clone(), nodes[0].logger.clone());
+ let bg_processor = BackgroundProcessor::start(callback, nodes[0].node.clone(), nodes[0].peer_manager.clone(), nodes[0].logger.clone());
// Go through the channel creation process until each node should have something persisted.
let tx = open_channel!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
let nodes = create_nodes(1, "test_chan_freshness_called".to_string());
let data_dir = nodes[0].persister.get_data_dir();
let callback = move |node: &ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<ChainMonitor>, Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<test_utils::TestFeeEstimator>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>| FilesystemPersister::persist_manager(data_dir.clone(), node);
- let bg_processor = BackgroundProcessor::start(callback, nodes[0].node.clone(), nodes[0].logger.clone());
+ let bg_processor = BackgroundProcessor::start(callback, nodes[0].node.clone(), nodes[0].peer_manager.clone(), nodes[0].logger.clone());
loop {
let log_entries = nodes[0].logger.lines.lock().unwrap();
let desired_log = "Calling manager's timer_chan_freshness_every_min".to_string();
}
let nodes = create_nodes(2, "test_persist_error".to_string());
- let bg_processor = BackgroundProcessor::start(persist_manager, nodes[0].node.clone(), nodes[0].logger.clone());
+ let bg_processor = BackgroundProcessor::start(persist_manager, nodes[0].node.clone(), nodes[0].peer_manager.clone(), nodes[0].logger.clone());
open_channel!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
let _ = bg_processor.thread_handle.join().unwrap().expect_err("Errored persisting manager: test");
_ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value") => {},
_ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds.") => {},
_ if err.starts_with("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees.") => {},
- _ => panic!(err),
+ _ => panic!("{}", err),
}
},
APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed => {
value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
}]};
funding_output = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
- $source.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
+ $source.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
channel_txn.push(tx);
} else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
}
};
$source.handle_funding_signed(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
- {
- let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- if let events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { .. } = events[0] {
- } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
- }
funding_output
} }
}
let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: chain_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
let txdata: Vec<_> = channel_txn.iter().enumerate().map(|(i, tx)| (i + 1, tx)).collect();
- $node.block_connected(&header, &txdata, 1);
- for i in 2..100 {
+ $node.transactions_confirmed(&header, 1, &txdata);
+ for _ in 2..100 {
header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- $node.block_connected(&header, &[], i);
}
+ $node.update_best_block(&header, 99);
} }
}
use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
use lightning::chain;
+use lightning::chain::Listen;
use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
use lightning::chain::chainmonitor;
use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use std::cell::RefCell;
use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
use std::cmp;
- use std::sync::Arc;
+ use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64,AtomicUsize,Ordering};
#[inline]
}
}
- struct TestBroadcaster {}
+ struct TestBroadcaster {
+ txn_broadcasted: Mutex<Vec<Transaction>>,
+ }
impl BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
- fn broadcast_transaction(&self, _tx: &Transaction) {}
+ fn broadcast_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) {
+ self.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().push(tx.clone());
+ }
}
#[derive(Clone)]
self.blocks_connected += 1;
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: self.header_hashes[self.height].0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: self.blocks_connected, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
self.height += 1;
- self.manager.block_connected(&header, &txdata, self.height as u32);
+ self.manager.transactions_confirmed(&header, self.height as u32, &txdata);
+ self.manager.update_best_block(&header, self.height as u32);
(*self.monitor).block_connected(&header, &txdata, self.height as u32);
if self.header_hashes.len() > self.height {
self.header_hashes[self.height] = (header.block_hash(), self.blocks_connected);
fn disconnect_block(&mut self) {
if self.height > 0 && (self.max_height < 6 || self.height >= self.max_height - 6) {
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: self.header_hashes[self.height - 1].0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: self.header_hashes[self.height].1, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- self.manager.block_disconnected(&header);
+ self.manager.block_disconnected(&header, self.height as u32);
self.monitor.block_disconnected(&header, self.height as u32);
self.height -= 1;
let removal_height = self.height;
Err(_) => return,
};
- let broadcast = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{});
+ let broadcast = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{ txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()) });
let monitor = Arc::new(chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::new(None, broadcast.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), fee_est.clone(), Arc::new(TestPersister{})));
let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_secret: our_network_key.clone(), counter: AtomicU64::new(0) });
let mut payments_sent = 0;
let mut pending_funding_generation: Vec<([u8; 32], u64, Script)> = Vec::new();
let mut pending_funding_signatures = HashMap::new();
- let mut pending_funding_relay = Vec::new();
loop {
match get_slice!(1)[0] {
continue 'outer_loop;
}
};
- channelmanager.funding_transaction_generated(&funding_generation.0, funding_output.clone());
+ channelmanager.funding_transaction_generated(&funding_generation.0, tx.clone()).unwrap();
pending_funding_signatures.insert(funding_output, tx);
}
},
11 => {
- if !pending_funding_relay.is_empty() {
- loss_detector.connect_block(&pending_funding_relay[..]);
+ let mut txn = broadcast.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ if !txn.is_empty() {
+ loss_detector.connect_block(&txn[..]);
for _ in 2..100 {
loss_detector.connect_block(&[]);
}
}
- for tx in pending_funding_relay.drain(..) {
+ for tx in txn.drain(..) {
loss_detector.funding_txn.push(tx);
}
},
Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script, .. } => {
pending_funding_generation.push((temporary_channel_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script));
},
- Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { funding_txo, .. } => {
- pending_funding_relay.push(pending_funding_signatures.remove(&funding_txo).unwrap());
- },
Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, payment_secret, amt } => {
//TODO: enhance by fetching random amounts from fuzz input?
payments_received.push((payment_hash, payment_secret, amt));
// ...and make sure we can force-close a frozen channel
nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
// TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
// PaymentFailed event
let (temporary_channel_id, funding_tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 43);
- nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
+ nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_tx.clone()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
*nodes[1].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Some(Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure));
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- match events[0] {
- Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
- assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 43);
- assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0)[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
if confirm_a_first {
confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &funding_tx);
// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
// licenses.
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
- /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
- /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
- /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
- /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
+ /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
+ funding_tx_confirmation_height: u64,
short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
- funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
#[cfg(test)]
counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
+ funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
-
counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
}
pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
-/// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
-/// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
-/// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
-const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
last_sent_closing_fee: None,
funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
+ funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
short_channel_id: None,
- funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
feerate_per_kw: feerate,
counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
counterparty_parameters: None,
funding_outpoint: None
},
- counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
+ funding_transaction: None,
+ counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
counterparty_node_id,
last_sent_closing_fee: None,
funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
+ funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
short_channel_id: None,
- funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
}),
funding_outpoint: None
},
- counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
+ funding_transaction: None,
+ counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
counterparty_node_id,
/// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
/// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
- pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, last_block_hash: BlockHash, logger: &L) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, last_block_hash: BlockHash, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
if !self.is_outbound() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
}
self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
- Ok(channel_monitor)
+ Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap()))
}
pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
/// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
/// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
/// to the remote side.
- pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, bool, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
+ pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<Transaction>, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
- let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound();
+ let funding_broadcastable = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound() {
+ self.funding_transaction.take()
+ } else { None };
- // Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in
- // MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when
- // they received the FundingBroadcastSafe event, we can only ever hit
- // monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound channel which failed to persist the
- // monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the
- // monitor was persisted.
+ // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
+ // we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
+ // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound
+ // channel which failed to persist the monitor on funding_created, and we got the funding
+ // transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted.
let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
- assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
+ assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
- return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked);
+ return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
}
let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
let order = self.resend_order.clone();
log_trace!(logger, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
- if needs_broadcast_safe { "a funding broadcast safe, " } else { "" },
+ if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
- (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked)
+ (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked)
}
pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked
}
- /// When we receive a new block, we (a) check whether the block contains the funding
- /// transaction (which would start us counting blocks until we send the funding_signed), and
- /// (b) check the height of the block against outbound holding cell HTLCs in case we need to
- /// give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything else (e.g. commitment
- /// transaction broadcasts, channel closure detection, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
+ fn check_get_funding_locked(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::FundingLocked> {
+ if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
+ return None;
+ }
+
+ let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
+ if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
+ self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
+ }
+
+ if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth as i64 {
+ return None;
+ }
+
+ let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+ let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
+ true
+ } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+ self.update_time_counter += 1;
+ true
+ } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
+ // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
+ false
+ } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
+ panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
+ } else {
+ // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
+ false
+ };
+
+ if need_commitment_update {
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
+ let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
+ return Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ next_per_commitment_point,
+ });
+ } else {
+ self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
+ }
+ }
+ None
+ }
+
+ /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
+ /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
+ /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
+ pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData, logger: &L)
+ -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
+ let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+ for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
+ if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
+ // If we haven't yet sent a funding_locked, but are in FundingSent (ignoring
+ // whether they've sent a funding_locked or not), check if we should send one.
+ if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
+ let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
+ if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
+ tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
+ // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
+ // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
+ // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
+ // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
+ // channel and move on.
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
+ }
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ self.update_time_counter += 1;
+ return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ data: "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index".to_owned()
+ });
+ } else {
+ if self.is_outbound() {
+ for input in tx.input.iter() {
+ if input.witness.is_empty() {
+ // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
+ // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height as u64;
+ self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
+ self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
+ Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
+ Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for funding_locked here and
+ // send it immediately instead of waiting for an update_best_block call (which
+ // may have already happened for this block).
+ if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
+ return Ok(Some(funding_locked));
+ }
+ }
+ for inp in tx.input.iter() {
+ if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ data: "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.".to_owned()
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(None)
+ }
+
+ /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
+ /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
+ /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
/// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
///
/// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
/// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
/// post-shutdown.
- /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
///
/// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
/// back.
- pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
+ pub fn update_best_block(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
+ let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
match htlc_update {
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
- if *cltv_expiry <= height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
+ if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
false
} else { true }
}
});
- if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
- self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
+ self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
+
+ if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
+ return Ok((Some(funding_locked), timed_out_htlcs));
}
let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
- if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
- let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
- if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
- let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
- if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
- tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
- if self.is_outbound() {
- // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
- // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
- // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
- // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
- // channel and move on.
- #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
- panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
- }
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
- return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
- });
- } else {
- if self.is_outbound() {
- for input in tx.input.iter() {
- if input.witness.is_empty() {
- // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
- // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
- #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
- panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
- }
- }
- }
- self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
- self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
- Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
- Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
- }
- }
- }
+ if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
+ (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 {
+ let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
+ if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
+ // Note that check_get_funding_locked may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
+ // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
+ // indicate we've already sent a funding_locked
+ funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
}
- }
- self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, header.time);
- if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
- if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
- let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
- true
- } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
- true
- } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
- // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
- // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
- false
- } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
- panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
- } else {
- // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
- // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
- false
- };
- self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.block_hash());
-
- //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
- //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
- //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
- //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
- if need_commitment_update {
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
- let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
- return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- next_per_commitment_point,
- }), timed_out_htlcs));
- } else {
- self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
- return Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs));
- }
- }
+ // If we've sent funding_locked (or have both sent and received funding_locked), and
+ // the funding transaction's confirmation count has dipped below minimum_depth / 2,
+ // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
+ // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
+ if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth as i64 / 2 {
+ return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ data: format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.", self.minimum_depth, funding_tx_confirmations),
+ });
}
}
- Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
- }
- /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
- /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
- /// unconfirmation/reorg.
- pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
- if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
- self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
- if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
- return true;
- }
- }
- if Some(header.block_hash()) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
- self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
- }
- false
+ Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
}
// Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
/// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
/// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
/// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
- pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
if !self.is_outbound() {
panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
}
self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
+ self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
temporary_channel_id,
}
self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
+ self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
- self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
}
self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
- self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
+ self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
+ self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
};
let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
};
let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
last_sent_closing_fee,
funding_tx_confirmed_in,
+ funding_tx_confirmation_height,
short_channel_id,
- funding_tx_confirmations,
counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
counterparty_forwarding_info,
channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
- counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
+ funding_transaction,
+ counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
counterparty_node_id,
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
use hex;
use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
- use ln::channel::{Channel,Sign,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
+ use ln::channel::{Channel,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
use ln::features::InitFeatures;
use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
use ln::chan_utils;
use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
- use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface};
+ use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface, BaseSign};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use util::config::UserConfig;
use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
}]};
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
- let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
+ let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, last_block_hash, &&logger).unwrap();
// Node B --> Node A: funding signed
//!
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
#[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
our_network_key: SecretKey,
+ our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
/// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
/// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(params.latest_height),
last_block_hash: RwLock::new(params.latest_hash),
- secp_ctx,
channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
by_id: HashMap::new(),
pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
}),
our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
+ our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
+ secp_ctx,
last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
/// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
///
- /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
- /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
- /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
- /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
+ /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
+ /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
+ /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
+ /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
+ /// otherwise ignored.
///
/// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
/// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
}
}
- fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
let mut chan = {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
- // Error or Ok here doesn't matter - the result is only exposed publicly
- // when peer_node_id is None anyway.
- return Ok(());
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
}
}
if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
});
}
- Ok(())
+ Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
}
/// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
/// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None)
+ match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
+ Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
+ self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
+ events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id,
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
+ },
+ }
+ );
+ Ok(())
+ },
+ Err(e) => Err(e)
+ }
}
/// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
/// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
///
- /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
- /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
+ /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
+ /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
///
/// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
///
- /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
- /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
- pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
+ /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
+ /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
+ /// keys per-channel).
+ ///
+ /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
+ /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
+ /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
+ ///
+ /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
+ /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
+ /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
+ pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
+ if inp.witness.is_empty() {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
+ err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
+ });
+ }
+ }
+
let (chan, msg) = {
let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
Some(mut chan) => {
- (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo, &self.logger)
+ let mut output_index = None;
+ let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
+ for (idx, outp) in funding_transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
+ if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
+ if output_index.is_some() {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
+ err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
+ });
+ }
+ if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
+ err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
+ });
+ }
+ output_index = Some(idx as u16);
+ }
+ }
+ if output_index.is_none() {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
+ err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
+ });
+ }
+ let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: funding_transaction.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
+
+ (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
.map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
} else { unreachable!(); })
, chan)
},
- None => return
+ None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
};
match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
Ok(funding_msg) => {
(chan, funding_msg)
},
- Err(_) => { return; }
+ Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
+ err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
+ }) },
}
};
e.insert(chan);
}
}
+ Ok(())
}
fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
/// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
- PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
+ self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
}
/// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
return;
}
- let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
+ let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), funding_txo.clone(), pending_forwards));
}
handle_cs!();
},
}
- if needs_broadcast_safe {
- pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
- funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
- user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
- });
+ if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
+ self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
}
if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
}
fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
+ let funding_tx = {
let last_block_hash = *self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap();
let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
}
- let monitor = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, last_block_hash, &self.logger) {
+ let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, last_block_hash, &self.logger) {
Ok(update) => update,
Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
};
if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
}
- (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
+ funding_tx
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
}
};
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
- funding_txo,
- user_channel_id: user_id,
- });
+ self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
Ok(())
}
msg: update
});
}
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
+ },
+ });
}
},
}
L::Target: Logger,
{
fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
+ assert_eq!(*self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
+ "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
+ assert_eq!(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, height as u64 - 1,
+ "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
- ChannelManager::block_connected(self, &block.header, &txdata, height);
+ self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, height, &txdata);
+ self.update_best_block(&block.header, height);
}
- fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _height: u32) {
- ChannelManager::block_disconnected(self, header);
+ fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
+ assert_eq!(*self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap(), header.block_hash(),
+ "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
+
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ let new_height = self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32 - 1;
+ assert_eq!(new_height, height - 1,
+ "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
+ *self.last_block_hash.write().unwrap() = header.prev_blockhash;
+
+ self.do_chain_event(new_height, |channel| channel.update_best_block(new_height, header.time));
}
}
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
- /// Updates channel state based on transactions seen in a connected block.
- pub fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
+ fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
+ (&self, height: u32, f: FN) {
// Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
// during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
// See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
- let block_hash = header.block_hash();
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Block {} at height {} connected", block_hash, height);
-
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
-
- assert_eq!(*self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap(), header.prev_blockhash,
- "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
- assert_eq!(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, height as u64 - 1,
- "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
- self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
- *self.last_block_hash.write().unwrap() = block_hash;
let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
- let res = channel.block_connected(header, txdata, height);
+ let res = f(channel);
if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
}
} else if let Err(e) = res {
+ if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
+ short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
+ }
+ // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
+ // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
+ failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
});
return false;
}
- if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
- for &(_, tx) in txdata.iter() {
- for inp in tx.input.iter() {
- if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
- if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
- short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
- // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. Close the channel.
- failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
- }
- return false;
- }
- }
- }
- }
true
});
for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
}
+ }
+
+ /// Updates channel state to take note of transactions which were confirmed in the given block
+ /// at the given height.
+ ///
+ /// Note that you must still call (or have called) [`update_best_block`] with the block
+ /// information which is included here.
+ ///
+ /// This method may be called before or after [`update_best_block`] for a given block's
+ /// transaction data and may be called multiple times with additional transaction data for a
+ /// given block.
+ ///
+ /// This method may be called for a previous block after an [`update_best_block`] call has
+ /// been made for a later block, however it must *not* be called with transaction data from a
+ /// block which is no longer in the best chain (ie where [`update_best_block`] has already
+ /// been informed about a blockchain reorganization which no longer includes the block which
+ /// corresponds to `header`).
+ ///
+ /// [`update_best_block`]: `Self::update_best_block`
+ pub fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData) {
+ // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
+ // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
+ // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
+
+ let block_hash = header.block_hash();
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
+
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ self.do_chain_event(height, |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
+ }
+
+ /// Updates channel state with the current best blockchain tip. You should attempt to call this
+ /// quickly after a new block becomes available, however if multiple new blocks become
+ /// available at the same time, only a single `update_best_block()` call needs to be made.
+ ///
+ /// This method should also be called immediately after any block disconnections, once at the
+ /// reorganization fork point, and once with the new chain tip. Calling this method at the
+ /// blockchain reorganization fork point ensures we learn when a funding transaction which was
+ /// previously confirmed is reorganized out of the blockchain, ensuring we do not continue to
+ /// accept payments which cannot be enforced on-chain.
+ ///
+ /// In both the block-connection and block-disconnection case, this method may be called either
+ /// once per block connected or disconnected, or simply at the fork point and new tip(s),
+ /// skipping any intermediary blocks.
+ pub fn update_best_block(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
+ // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
+ // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
+ // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
+
+ let block_hash = header.block_hash();
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
+
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+
+ self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
+ *self.last_block_hash.write().unwrap() = block_hash;
+
+ self.do_chain_event(height, |channel| channel.update_best_block(height, header.time));
loop {
// Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the
}
}
- /// Updates channel state based on a disconnected block.
- ///
- /// If necessary, the channel may be force-closed without letting the counterparty participate
- /// in the shutdown.
- pub fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
- // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
- // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
- // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
-
- assert_eq!(*self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap(), header.block_hash(),
- "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
- self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
- *self.last_block_hash.write().unwrap() = header.prev_blockhash;
-
- let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
- {
- let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
- let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
- let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
- channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
- if v.block_disconnected(header) {
- if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
- short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
- }
- failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown(true));
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
- }
- false
- } else {
- true
- }
- });
- }
-
- self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
- }
-
/// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
/// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
/// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
last_block_hash: RwLock::new(last_block_hash),
- secp_ctx,
channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
by_id,
pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
}),
our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
+ our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
+ secp_ctx,
last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
}
}
}
+
+#[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
+pub mod bench {
+ use chain::Listen;
+ use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
+ use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
+ use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
+ use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+ use ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
+ use ln::features::InitFeatures;
+ use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
+ use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
+ use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
+ use routing::router::get_route;
+ use util::test_utils;
+ use util::config::UserConfig;
+ use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
+
+ use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
+ use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+ use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
+
+ use std::sync::Mutex;
+
+ use test::Bencher;
+
+ struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
+ node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
+ &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
+ &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
+ &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
+ &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
+ &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
+ }
+
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ #[bench]
+ fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
+ bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
+ }
+
+ pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
+ // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
+ // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
+ // calls per node.
+ let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
+ let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
+
+ let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())};
+ let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
+
+ let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
+ config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
+
+ let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
+ let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
+ let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
+ let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
+ let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
+ network,
+ latest_hash: genesis_hash,
+ latest_height: 0,
+ });
+ let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
+
+ let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
+ let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
+ let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
+ let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
+ let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
+ network,
+ latest_hash: genesis_hash,
+ latest_height: 0,
+ });
+ let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
+
+ node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
+ node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
+ node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
+
+ let tx;
+ if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
+ tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
+ value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
+ }]};
+ let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+ node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_outpoint);
+ } else { panic!(); }
+
+ node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
+ node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
+
+ get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingBroadcastSafe);
+
+ let block = Block {
+ header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
+ txdata: vec![tx],
+ };
+ Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
+ Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
+
+ node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
+ node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
+
+ let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
+
+ macro_rules! send_payment {
+ ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
+ let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
+ let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), None, Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
+
+ let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
+ let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
+
+ $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap();
+ let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
+ $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
+ $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
+ let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
+ $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
+ $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
+ $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
+ expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
+ assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage, &None, 10_000));
+
+ match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
+ $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
+ $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
+ }
+
+ let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
+ $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
+ $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
+ $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
+
+ expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
+ }
+ }
+
+ bench.iter(|| {
+ send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
+ send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
+ });
+ }
+}
//! A bunch of useful utilities for building networks of nodes and exchanging messages between
//! nodes for functional tests.
-use chain::Watch;
+use chain::{Listen, Watch};
use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret, PaymentSendFailure};
/// Mine the given transaction at the given height, mining blocks as required to build to that
/// height
pub fn confirm_transaction_at<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, tx: &Transaction, conf_height: u32) {
- let starting_block = node.best_block_info();
+ let first_connect_height = node.best_block_info().1 + 1;
+ assert!(first_connect_height <= conf_height);
+ if conf_height - first_connect_height >= 1 {
+ connect_blocks(node, conf_height - first_connect_height);
+ }
let mut block = Block {
- header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
+ header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: node.best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
txdata: Vec::new(),
};
- let height = starting_block.1 + 1;
- assert!(height <= conf_height);
- for _ in height..conf_height {
- connect_block(node, &block);
- block = Block {
- header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: block.header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
- txdata: vec![],
- };
- }
-
for _ in 0..*node.network_chan_count.borrow() { // Make sure we don't end up with channels at the same short id by offsetting by chan_count
block.txdata.push(Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() });
}
connect_block(node, &block);
}
+/// The possible ways we may notify a ChannelManager of a new block
+pub enum ConnectStyle {
+ /// Calls update_best_block first, detecting transactions in the block only after receiving the
+ /// header and height information.
+ BestBlockFirst,
+ /// The same as BestBlockFirst, however when we have multiple blocks to connect, we only
+ /// make a single update_best_block call.
+ BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks,
+ /// Calls transactions_confirmed first, detecting transactions in the block before updating the
+ /// header and height information.
+ TransactionsFirst,
+ /// The same as TransactionsFirst, however when we have multiple blocks to connect, we only
+ /// make a single update_best_block call.
+ TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks,
+ /// Provides the full block via the chain::Listen interface. In the current code this is
+ /// equivalent to TransactionsFirst with some additional assertions.
+ FullBlockViaListen,
+}
+
pub fn connect_blocks<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, depth: u32) -> BlockHash {
+ let skip_intermediaries = match *node.connect_style.borrow() {
+ ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks|ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks => true,
+ _ => false,
+ };
+
let mut block = Block {
header: BlockHeader { version: 0x2000000, prev_blockhash: node.best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
txdata: vec![],
};
- connect_block(node, &block);
- for _ in 2..depth + 1 {
+ assert!(depth >= 1);
+ for _ in 0..depth - 1 {
+ do_connect_block(node, &block, skip_intermediaries);
block = Block {
header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: block.header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
txdata: vec![],
};
- connect_block(node, &block);
}
+ connect_block(node, &block);
block.header.block_hash()
}
pub fn connect_block<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, block: &Block) {
+ do_connect_block(node, block, false);
+}
+
+fn do_connect_block<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, block: &Block, skip_manager: bool) {
let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
let height = node.best_block_info().1 + 1;
node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block.header, &txdata, height);
- node.node.block_connected(&block.header, &txdata, height);
+ if !skip_manager {
+ match *node.connect_style.borrow() {
+ ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
+ node.node.update_best_block(&block.header, height);
+ node.node.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, height, &block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect::<Vec<_>>());
+ },
+ ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst|ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks => {
+ node.node.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, height, &block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect::<Vec<_>>());
+ node.node.update_best_block(&block.header, height);
+ },
+ ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen => {
+ Listen::block_connected(node.node, &block, height);
+ }
+ }
+ }
node.node.test_process_background_events();
node.blocks.borrow_mut().push((block.header, height));
}
pub fn disconnect_blocks<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, count: u32) {
- for _ in 0..count {
+ for i in 0..count {
let orig_header = node.blocks.borrow_mut().pop().unwrap();
assert!(orig_header.1 > 0); // Cannot disconnect genesis
+ let prev_header = node.blocks.borrow().last().unwrap().clone();
+
node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.block_disconnected(&orig_header.0, orig_header.1);
- node.node.block_disconnected(&orig_header.0);
+ match *node.connect_style.borrow() {
+ ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen => {
+ Listen::block_disconnected(node.node, &orig_header.0, orig_header.1);
+ },
+ ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks|ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks => {
+ if i == count - 1 {
+ node.node.update_best_block(&prev_header.0, prev_header.1);
+ }
+ },
+ _ => {
+ node.node.update_best_block(&prev_header.0, prev_header.1);
+ },
+ }
}
}
pub network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
pub logger: &'c test_utils::TestLogger,
pub blocks: RefCell<Vec<(BlockHeader, u32)>>,
+ pub connect_style: Rc<RefCell<ConnectStyle>>,
}
impl<'a, 'b, 'c> Node<'a, 'b, 'c> {
pub fn best_block_hash(&self) -> BlockHash {
}
}
+/// Get a specific event from the pending events queue.
+#[macro_export]
+macro_rules! get_event {
+ ($node: expr, $event_type: path) => {
+ {
+ let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let ev = events.pop().unwrap();
+ match ev {
+ $event_type { .. } => {
+ ev
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
#[cfg(test)]
macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
}
}
-#[cfg(test)]
+/// Returns any local commitment transactions for the channel.
+#[macro_export]
macro_rules! get_local_commitment_txn {
($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
{
let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(node_a, channel_value, 42);
- node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
+ node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
}
let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
- match events_4[0] {
- Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
- assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
- assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
+ assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
+
+ assert_eq!(node_a.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_a.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
+ node_a.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
tx
}
}}
}
-#[cfg(test)]
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "unstable"))]
macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
let mut nodes = Vec::new();
let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
+ let connect_style = Rc::new(RefCell::new(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen));
for i in 0..node_count {
let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(cfgs[i].chain_source.genesis_hash, None, cfgs[i].logger);
keys_manager: &cfgs[i].keys_manager, node: &chan_mgrs[i], net_graph_msg_handler,
node_seed: cfgs[i].node_seed, network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(), logger: cfgs[i].logger,
- blocks: RefCell::new(vec![(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header, 0)])
+ blocks: RefCell::new(vec![(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header, 0)]),
+ connect_style: Rc::clone(&connect_style),
})
}
pub fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events<'a, 'b, 'c>(nodes: &Vec<Node<'a, 'b, 'c>>, a: usize, b: usize) {
let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
let as_update = match events_1[0] {
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
msg.clone()
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
+ match events_1[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[b].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert_eq!(msg.data, "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
msg.clone()
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
+ match events_2[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[a].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert_eq!(msg.data, "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
for node in nodes {
node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
use chain::channelmonitor;
use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
+use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, BaseSign};
use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
}
-#[test]
-fn test_1_conf_open() {
+fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
// Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
// tests that we properly send one in that case.
let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
- let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+ *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
}
}
+#[test]
+fn test_1_conf_open() {
+ do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
+ do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
+ do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
+}
fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
// Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
- nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
+ nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
}
let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
- match events_4[0] {
- Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
- assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
- assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
+ assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
check_spends!(htlc_pair.1, remote_txn[0]);
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
for e in events {
match e {
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert_eq!(msg.data, "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
+ },
MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
// Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
{
let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
}
- get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
// Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
{
let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
}
- get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
// HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
let node2_commitment_txid;
{
let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
}
- get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
msg.clone()
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
+ match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
// Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
msg.clone()
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
+ match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
added_monitors.clear();
}
- assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
match events[0] {
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ match events[2] {
MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success)
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
// Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone()] });
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
{
// B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 });
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
+ match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
+ assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
+ assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
if deliver_bs_raa {
match events[0] {
MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
}
- match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
+ match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
// Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
// transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
let tx = {
let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
// Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
// Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the event message FundingBroadcastSafe
+ // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
let channel_value = 100000;
let push_msat = 10001;
let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
- node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
+ node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
added_monitors.clear();
}
- // Normally, this is where node_a would check for a FundingBroadcastSafe event, but the test de/serializes first instead
+ // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
nodes.push(node_a);
nodes.push(node_b);
assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
- // After deserializing, make sure the FundingBroadcastSafe event is still held by the channel manager
+ // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
- match events_4[0] {
- Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
- assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
- assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
+ assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
// Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage, 3_000_000);
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage, 3_000_000);
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
// A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
// B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
// B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
// A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
}
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
match msg_events[0] {
- MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
match msg_events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match msg_events[2] {
MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
}
check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let htlc_timeout_tx;
mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
}
connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
// Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let htlc_timeout = {
// Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let htlc_timeout = {
block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
}
test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
}
header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
}
test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
}
}
if !check_revoke_no_close {
test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
} else {
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
}
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
if local {
// We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
} else {
// We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
// B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
node_txn.clear();
}
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
}
assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let penalty_txn = {
let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
// Move the first channel through the funding flow...
- let (temporary_channel_id, _tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
+ let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
- nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
+ nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
// We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
// this test before #653 fix.
chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let htlc_timeout = {
let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
if broadcast_alice {
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
}
assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
// If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
if broadcast_alice {
- check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
}
let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
// Move the first channel through the funding flow...
let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
- nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
+ nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
- as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
+ as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
};
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
}
let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
- match events_4[0] {
- Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
- assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
- assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
+ assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff