cargo test --verbose --color always --features esplora-async
- name: Test backtrace-debug builds on Rust ${{ matrix.toolchain }}
if: "matrix.toolchain == 'stable'"
+ shell: bash # Default on Winblows is powershell
run: |
- cd lightning && cargo test --verbose --color always --features backtrace
+ cd lightning && RUST_BACKTRACE=1 cargo test --verbose --color always --features backtrace
- name: Test on Rust ${{ matrix.toolchain }} with net-tokio
if: "matrix.build-net-tokio && !matrix.coverage"
run: cargo test --verbose --color always
let params = RouteParameters {
payment_params,
final_value_msat,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
};
let random_seed_bytes: [u8; 32] = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
let route = match find_route(&our_id, ¶ms, &network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger), &scorer, &random_seed_bytes) {
let params = RouteParameters {
payment_params,
final_value_msat,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
};
let random_seed_bytes: [u8; 32] = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
let mut route = match find_route(&our_id, ¶ms, &network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger), &scorer, &random_seed_bytes) {
fn do_test<Out: test_logger::Output>(data: &[u8], out: Out) {
let logger = test_logger::TestLogger::new("".to_owned(), out);
let network_graph = lightning::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph::new(bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin, &logger);
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
let _ = rapid_sync.update_network_graph(data);
}
payment_params: PaymentParameters::from_node_id(*target, final_cltv_expiry_delta)
.with_route_hints(last_hops.clone()),
final_value_msat,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta,
};
let _ = find_route(&our_pubkey, &route_params, &net_graph,
first_hops.map(|c| c.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()).as_ref().map(|a| a.as_slice()),
let params = ChainParameters { network, best_block };
let manager = Arc::new(ChannelManager::new(fee_estimator.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), router.clone(), logger.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), UserConfig::default(), params));
let p2p_gossip_sync = Arc::new(P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph.clone(), Some(chain_source.clone()), logger.clone()));
- let rapid_gossip_sync = Arc::new(RapidGossipSync::new(network_graph.clone()));
+ let rapid_gossip_sync = Arc::new(RapidGossipSync::new(network_graph.clone(), logger.clone()));
let msg_handler = MessageHandler { chan_handler: Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMessageHandler::new()), route_handler: Arc::new(test_utils::TestRoutingMessageHandler::new()), onion_message_handler: IgnoringMessageHandler{}};
let peer_manager = Arc::new(PeerManager::new(msg_handler, 0, &seed, logger.clone(), IgnoringMessageHandler{}, keys_manager.clone()));
let node = Node { node: manager, p2p_gossip_sync, rapid_gossip_sync, peer_manager, chain_monitor, persister, tx_broadcaster, network_graph, logger, best_block, scorer };
use std::convert::TryFrom;
use std::convert::TryInto;
+use std::error::Error;
+use std::fmt;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
+/// An error returned by the RPC server.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct RpcError {
+ /// The error code.
+ pub code: i64,
+ /// The error message.
+ pub message: String,
+}
+
+impl fmt::Display for RpcError {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+ write!(f, "RPC error {}: {}", self.code, self.message)
+ }
+}
+
+impl Error for RpcError {}
+
/// A simple RPC client for calling methods using HTTP `POST`.
pub struct RpcClient {
basic_auth: String,
let error = &response["error"];
if !error.is_null() {
// TODO: Examine error code for a more precise std::io::ErrorKind.
- let message = error["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown error");
- return Err(std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::Other, message));
+ let rpc_error = RpcError {
+ code: error["code"].as_i64().unwrap_or(-1),
+ message: error["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown error").to_string()
+ };
+ return Err(std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::Other, rpc_error));
}
let result = &mut response["result"];
match client.call_method::<u64>("getblock", &[invalid_block_hash]).await {
Err(e) => {
assert_eq!(e.kind(), std::io::ErrorKind::Other);
- assert_eq!(e.get_ref().unwrap().to_string(), "invalid parameter");
+ let rpc_error: Box<RpcError> = e.into_inner().unwrap().downcast().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(rpc_error.code, -8);
+ assert_eq!(rpc_error.message, "invalid parameter");
},
Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
}
let route_params = RouteParameters {
payment_params,
final_value_msat: amount_msats,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: invoice.min_final_cltv_expiry_delta() as u32,
};
payer.send_payment(payment_hash, &payment_secret, payment_id, route_params, retry_strategy)
let route_params = RouteParameters {
payment_params,
final_value_msat: invoice.amount_milli_satoshis().unwrap(),
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: invoice.min_final_cltv_expiry_delta() as u32,
};
let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
let network_graph = &node_cfgs[0].network_graph;
let params = RouteParameters {
payment_params,
final_value_msat: invoice.amount_milli_satoshis().unwrap(),
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: invoice.min_final_cltv_expiry_delta() as u32,
};
let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
let network_graph = &node_cfgs[0].network_graph;
//! # let logger = FakeLogger {};
//!
//! let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Bitcoin, &logger);
-//! let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+//! let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
//! let snapshot_contents: &[u8] = &[0; 0];
//! let new_last_sync_timestamp_result = rapid_sync.update_network_graph(snapshot_contents);
//! ```
pub struct RapidGossipSync<NG: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, L: Deref>
where L::Target: Logger {
network_graph: NG,
+ logger: L,
is_initial_sync_complete: AtomicBool
}
impl<NG: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, L: Deref> RapidGossipSync<NG, L> where L::Target: Logger {
/// Instantiate a new [`RapidGossipSync`] instance.
- pub fn new(network_graph: NG) -> Self {
+ pub fn new(network_graph: NG, logger: L) -> Self {
Self {
network_graph,
+ logger,
is_initial_sync_complete: AtomicBool::new(false)
}
}
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
let sync_result = rapid_sync.sync_network_graph_with_file_path(&graph_sync_test_file);
if sync_result.is_err() {
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
let start = std::time::Instant::now();
let sync_result = rapid_sync
.sync_network_graph_with_file_path("./res/full_graph.lngossip");
let logger = TestLogger::new();
b.iter(|| {
let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Bitcoin, &logger);
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
let sync_result = rapid_sync.sync_network_graph_with_file_path("./res/full_graph.lngossip");
if let Err(crate::error::GraphSyncError::DecodeError(DecodeError::Io(io_error))) = &sync_result {
let error_string = format!("Input file lightning-rapid-gossip-sync/res/full_graph.lngossip is missing! Download it from https://bitcoin.ninja/ldk-compressed_graph-bc08df7542-2022-05-05.bin\n\n{:?}", io_error);
};
use lightning::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
+use lightning::{log_warn, log_trace, log_given_level};
use lightning::util::ser::{BigSize, Readable};
use lightning::io;
if let ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip = lightning_error.action {
// everything is fine, just a duplicate channel announcement
} else {
+ log_warn!(self.logger, "Failed to process channel announcement: {:?}", lightning_error);
return Err(lightning_error.into());
}
}
if (channel_flags & 0b_1000_0000) != 0 {
// incremental update, field flags will indicate mutated values
let read_only_network_graph = network_graph.read_only();
- if let Some(channel) = read_only_network_graph
- .channels()
- .get(&short_channel_id) {
-
- let directional_info = channel
- .get_directional_info(channel_flags)
- .ok_or(LightningError {
- err: "Couldn't find previous directional data for update".to_owned(),
- action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
- })?;
-
+ if let Some(directional_info) =
+ read_only_network_graph.channels().get(&short_channel_id)
+ .and_then(|channel| channel.get_directional_info(channel_flags))
+ {
synthetic_update.cltv_expiry_delta = directional_info.cltv_expiry_delta;
synthetic_update.htlc_minimum_msat = directional_info.htlc_minimum_msat;
synthetic_update.htlc_maximum_msat = directional_info.htlc_maximum_msat;
synthetic_update.fee_base_msat = directional_info.fees.base_msat;
synthetic_update.fee_proportional_millionths = directional_info.fees.proportional_millionths;
-
} else {
+ log_trace!(self.logger,
+ "Skipping application of channel update for chan {} with flags {} as original data is missing.",
+ short_channel_id, channel_flags);
skip_update_for_unknown_channel = true;
}
};
match network_graph.update_channel_unsigned(&synthetic_update) {
Ok(_) => {},
Err(LightningError { action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip, .. }) => {},
- Err(LightningError { action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(_), .. }) => {},
+ Err(LightningError { action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(level), err }) => {
+ log_given_level!(self.logger, level, "Failed to apply channel update: {:?}", err);
+ },
Err(LightningError { action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError, .. }) => {},
Err(e) => return Err(e.into()),
}
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 58, 85, 116, 216, 255, 2, 68, 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 24, 0,
0, 3, 232, 0, 0, 0,
];
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
let update_result = rapid_sync.update_network_graph(&example_input[..]);
assert!(update_result.is_err());
if let Err(GraphSyncError::DecodeError(DecodeError::ShortRead)) = update_result {
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
let update_result = rapid_sync.update_network_graph(&incremental_update_input[..]);
assert!(update_result.is_ok());
}
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
- let update_result = rapid_sync.update_network_graph(&announced_update_input[..]);
- assert!(update_result.is_err());
- if let Err(GraphSyncError::LightningError(lightning_error)) = update_result {
- assert_eq!(
- lightning_error.err,
- "Couldn't find previous directional data for update"
- );
- } else {
- panic!("Unexpected update result: {:?}", update_result)
- }
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
+ rapid_sync.update_network_graph(&announced_update_input[..]).unwrap();
}
#[test]
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
let initialization_result = rapid_sync.update_network_graph(&initialization_input[..]);
if initialization_result.is_err() {
panic!(
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 136, 0, 0, 0, 221, 255, 2,
68, 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 128,
];
- let update_result = rapid_sync.update_network_graph(&opposite_direction_incremental_update_input[..]);
- assert!(update_result.is_err());
- if let Err(GraphSyncError::LightningError(lightning_error)) = update_result {
- assert_eq!(
- lightning_error.err,
- "Couldn't find previous directional data for update"
- );
- } else {
- panic!("Unexpected update result: {:?}", update_result)
- }
+ rapid_sync.update_network_graph(&opposite_direction_incremental_update_input[..]).unwrap();
}
#[test]
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
let initialization_result = rapid_sync.update_network_graph(&initialization_input[..]);
assert!(initialization_result.is_ok());
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
let initialization_result = rapid_sync.update_network_graph(&initialization_input[..]);
assert!(initialization_result.is_ok());
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
let update_result = rapid_sync.update_network_graph(&VALID_RGS_BINARY);
if update_result.is_err() {
panic!("Unexpected update result: {:?}", update_result)
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
// this is mostly for checking uint underflow issues before the fuzzer does
let update_result = rapid_sync.update_network_graph_no_std(&VALID_RGS_BINARY, Some(0));
assert!(update_result.is_ok());
let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Bitcoin, &logger);
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
let update_result = rapid_sync.update_network_graph_no_std(&VALID_RGS_BINARY, Some(latest_succeeding_time));
assert!(update_result.is_ok());
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 2);
let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Bitcoin, &logger);
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
let update_result = rapid_sync.update_network_graph_no_std(&VALID_RGS_BINARY, Some(earliest_failing_time));
assert!(update_result.is_err());
if let Err(GraphSyncError::LightningError(lightning_error)) = update_result {
let logger = TestLogger::new();
let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Bitcoin, &logger);
- let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph);
+ let rapid_sync = RapidGossipSync::new(&network_graph, &logger);
let update_result = rapid_sync.update_network_graph(&unknown_version_input[..]);
assert!(update_result.is_err());
use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use crate::ln::chan_utils;
use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCClaim, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
-use crate::ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
+use crate::ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, SentHTLCId};
use crate::chain;
use crate::chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
use crate::io::{self, Error};
use core::convert::TryInto;
use core::ops::Deref;
-use crate::sync::Mutex;
+use crate::sync::{Mutex, LockTestExt};
/// An update generated by the underlying channel itself which contains some new information the
/// [`ChannelMonitor`] should be made aware of.
LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
+ claimed_htlcs: Vec<(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)>,
},
LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
commitment_txid: Txid,
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
(0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
(0, commitment_tx, required),
+ (1, claimed_htlcs, vec_type),
(2, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
},
(1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
/// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
+ counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: HashMap<SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage>,
+
// We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
// some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
// various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> where Signer: PartialEq {
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
- let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
- let other = other.inner.lock().unwrap();
- inner.eq(&other)
+ // We need some kind of total lockorder. Absent a better idea, we sort by position in
+ // memory and take locks in that order (assuming that we can't move within memory while a
+ // lock is held).
+ let ord = ((self as *const _) as usize) < ((other as *const _) as usize);
+ let a = if ord { self.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() } else { other.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() };
+ let b = if ord { other.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() } else { self.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() };
+ a.eq(&b)
}
}
(9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
(11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
(13, self.spendable_txids_confirmed, vec_type),
+ (15, self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, required),
});
Ok(())
counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
+ counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
&self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
) -> Result<(), ()> {
- self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs).map_err(|_| ())
+ self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, &Vec::new()).map_err(|_| ())
}
/// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
/// `ChannelMonitor`. This is used to determine if an HTLC was removed from the channel prior
/// to the `ChannelManager` having been persisted.
///
- /// This is similar to [`Self::get_pending_outbound_htlcs`] except it includes HTLCs which were
- /// resolved by this `ChannelMonitor`.
- pub(crate) fn get_all_current_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
+ /// This is similar to [`Self::get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs`] except it includes
+ /// HTLCs which were resolved on-chain (i.e. where the final HTLC resolution was done by an
+ /// event from this `ChannelMonitor`).
+ pub(crate) fn get_all_current_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, (HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<PaymentPreimage>)> {
let mut res = HashMap::new();
// Just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs on
// `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
- res.insert((**source).clone(), htlc.clone());
+ res.insert((**source).clone(), (htlc.clone(),
+ us.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).cloned()));
}
}
}
res
}
- /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel.
+ /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel or which were
+ /// resolved with a preimage from our counterparty.
+ ///
/// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
- pub(crate) fn get_pending_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
+ ///
+ /// Currently, the preimage is unused, however if it is present in the relevant internal state
+ /// an HTLC is always included even if it has been resolved.
+ pub(crate) fn get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, (HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<PaymentPreimage>)> {
let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
// We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
// actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
} else { false }
});
- if !htlc_update_confd {
- res.insert(source.clone(), htlc.clone());
+ let counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt =
+ us.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).cloned();
+ if !htlc_update_confd || counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt.is_some() {
+ res.insert(source.clone(), (htlc.clone(), counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt));
}
}
}
}
}
if matched_htlc { continue; }
+ if $self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).is_some() {
+ continue;
+ }
$self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
match entry.event {
// Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
// events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
- for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
- *source = None;
+ if self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap() != txid {
+ let cur_claimables = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(
+ &self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ for (_, ref source_opt) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
+ if let Some(source) = source_opt {
+ if !cur_claimables.iter()
+ .any(|(_, cur_source_opt)| cur_source_opt == source_opt)
+ {
+ self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.remove(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ for &mut (_, ref mut source_opt) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
+ *source_opt = None;
+ }
+ } else {
+ assert!(cfg!(fuzzing), "Commitment txids are unique outside of fuzzing, where hashes can collide");
}
}
/// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
/// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
/// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
- fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
- // block for Rust 1.34 compat
- let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = {
- let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
- let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
- let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
- self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
- HolderSignedTx {
- txid,
- revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
- a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
- b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
- delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
- per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
- htlc_outputs,
- to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
- feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
- }
+ fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>, claimed_htlcs: &[(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
+ let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
+ let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
+ let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
+ self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
+ let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
+ txid,
+ revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
+ a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
+ b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
+ delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
+ per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
+ htlc_outputs,
+ to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
+ feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
};
self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
+ for (claimed_htlc_id, claimed_preimage) in claimed_htlcs {
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
+ let cur_counterparty_htlcs = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(
+ &self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap()).unwrap();
+ assert!(cur_counterparty_htlcs.iter().any(|(_, source_opt)| {
+ if let Some(source) = source_opt {
+ SentHTLCId::from_source(source) == *claimed_htlc_id
+ } else { false }
+ }));
+ }
+ self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.insert(*claimed_htlc_id, *claimed_preimage);
+ }
if self.holder_tx_signed {
return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
}
let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
for update in updates.updates.iter() {
match update {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, claimed_htlcs } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
- if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone()) {
+ if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone(), &claimed_htlcs) {
log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
ret = Err(());
let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None;
let mut spendable_txids_confirmed = Some(Vec::new());
+ let mut counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs = Some(HashMap::new());
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
(3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
(9, counterparty_node_id, option),
(11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
(13, spendable_txids_confirmed, vec_type),
+ (15, counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, option),
});
Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
+ counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.unwrap(),
prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
current_holder_commitment_tx,
fn test_prune_preimages() {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
- let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))});
+ let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster {
+ txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
+ blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))
+ });
let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
- let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
let mut preimages = Vec::new();
{
HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block, dummy_key);
monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
- let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
- monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
- monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
- monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
- monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
+ monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"1").into_inner()),
+ preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
+ monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"2").into_inner()),
+ preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
+ monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"3").into_inner()),
+ preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
+
// Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
+ monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"4").into_inner()),
+ preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
+
// Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
// previous commitment tx's preimages too
monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(vec![(genesis_block(Network::Testnet), 200); 200])),
};
let chain_mon = {
- let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
- let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
- monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
- let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
- &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
- assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
+ let new_monitor = {
+ let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
+ let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
+ &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
+ assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
+ new_monitor
+ };
let chain_mon = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
assert_eq!(chain_mon.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
chain_mon
{
let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
+ get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, channel_id).announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
+ }
+ {
let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
- get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, channel_id).announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
get_channel_ref!(nodes[1], nodes[0], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, channel_id).announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
}
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
-use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
+use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
use crate::ln::chan_utils;
use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
#[derive(Clone)]
enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
+ /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
Failure(HTLCFailReason),
}
}
}
- self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
- let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
- updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
- commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
- htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
- }]
- };
-
for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
Some(forward_info.clone())
need_commitment = true;
}
}
+ let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
// Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
+ if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
+ // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
+ // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
+ // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
+ // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
+ // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
+ // claim anyway.
+ claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
+ }
htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
need_commitment = true;
}
}
+ self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
+ let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
+ commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
+ htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
+ claimed_htlcs,
+ }]
+ };
+
self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
// Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
// build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
Ok(InterceptId(buf))
}
}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
+/// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
+pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
+ PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
+ OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
+}
+impl SentHTLCId {
+ pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
+ match source {
+ HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
+ short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
+ htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
+ },
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
+ Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
+ }
+ }
+}
+impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
+ (0, PreviousHopData) => {
+ (0, short_channel_id, required),
+ (2, htlc_id, required),
+ },
+ (2, OutboundRoute) => {
+ (0, session_priv, required),
+ };
+);
+
+
/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
#[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
}
macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
- ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
+ ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
&$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
$self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
+ core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
$self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
}
macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
- ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
+ ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
// update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
// any case so that it won't deadlock.
debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
.update_id == $update_id) &&
$chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
{
- handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $chan);
+ handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
}
Ok(())
},
}
} };
- ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
- handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
+ ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
+ handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
}
}
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
- break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, chan_entry);
+ break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
}
if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
})
}
- // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
- pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
+ self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
+ }
+
+ fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
+ debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
+
log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
}
let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
-
let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
Some(monitor_update) => {
let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
- if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, chan) {
+ if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
break Err(e);
}
if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
self.pending_outbound_payments
.send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
|path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
/// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
self.pending_outbound_payments
.send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
&self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
#[cfg(test)]
fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
|path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
/// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
best_block_height,
/// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
|| self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
/// us to easily discern them from real payments.
pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+ let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
|path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
/// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
/// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, &FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
}
/// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
/// reason for the failure.
///
/// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
- pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: &FailureCode) {
+ pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
}
/// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
- fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: &FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
+ fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
match failure_code {
- FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
- FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
+ FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
+ FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
- HTLCFailReason::reason(*failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
+ HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
}
}
}
)
).unwrap_or(None);
- if let Some(mut peer_state_lock) = peer_state_opt.take() {
+ if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
- peer_state, chan);
+ peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
if let Err(e) = res {
// TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
// of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
}
fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
- let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
+ debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
return;
}
- handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, channel.get_mut());
+ handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
}
/// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
let chan = e.insert(chan);
- let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
+ let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
+ per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
// Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
// channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
- let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, chan);
+ let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
// We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
// it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
- break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, chan_entry);
+ break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
}
break Ok(());
},
let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
- peer_state, chan)
+ peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
}
fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
- let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
+ let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
.ok_or_else(|| {
debug_assert!(false);
MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
- })?;
- let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
- let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
- peer_state, chan);
+ let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
+ peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
(htlcs_to_fail, res)
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
/// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
+ debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
+
let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
/// update events as a separate process method here.
#[cfg(fuzzing)]
pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
- self.process_pending_monitor_events();
+ PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
+ if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
+ NotifyOption::DoPersist
+ } else {
+ NotifyOption::SkipPersist
+ }
+ });
}
/// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
let mut has_monitor_update = false;
let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
- let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
-
- for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
- 'chan_loop: loop {
- let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
- let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
- let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
- let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
- let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
- chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
- if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
- failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
- }
- if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
- has_monitor_update = true;
- let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
- funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
- let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
- let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
- let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
- peer_state_lock, peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
- peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
- if res.is_err() {
- handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
+ // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
+ // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
+ // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
+ // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
+ 'peer_loop: loop {
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
+ 'chan_loop: loop {
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
+ let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
+ let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
+ let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
+ chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
+ if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
+ failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
+ }
+ if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
+ has_monitor_update = true;
+
+ let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
+ funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
+ let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
+ let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
+ peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
+ peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
+ if res.is_err() {
+ handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
+ }
+ continue 'peer_loop;
}
- continue 'chan_loop;
}
+ break 'chan_loop;
}
- break 'chan_loop;
}
+ break 'peer_loop;
}
let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
0 => {
let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
- let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
+ let mut path: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
let mut payment_id = None;
let mut payment_secret = None;
- let mut payment_params = None;
+ let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, session_priv, required),
(1, payment_id, option),
(2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
(3, payment_secret, option),
(4, path, vec_type),
- (5, payment_params, option),
+ (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
});
if payment_id.is_none() {
// For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
// instead.
payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
}
+ if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+ let path = path.unwrap();
+ if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
+ if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
+ params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta;
+ }
+ }
Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
first_hop_htlc_msat,
- path: path.unwrap(),
+ path,
payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
payment_secret,
payment_params,
let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
- peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap());
+ // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
+ // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
+ // per_peer_state lock at all.
+ peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
}
(serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
}
+ if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
+ pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
+ }
+
if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
} else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
}
pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
- } else {
+ }
+ let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
+ pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
+ retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
+ };
+
+ {
// If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
// ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
// (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
// 0.0.102+
for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
- for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
+ for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
if path.is_empty() {
log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
+
let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
- match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
+ match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
}
}
}
- for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
- if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
- let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
- info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
- info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
- };
- // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
- // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
- // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
- // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
- // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
- forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
- forwards.retain(|forward| {
- if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
- if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
- log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
- log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
- false
+ for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
+ match htlc_source {
+ HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
+ let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
+ info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
+ info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
+ };
+ // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
+ // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
+ // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
+ // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
+ // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
+ forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
+ forwards.retain(|forward| {
+ if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
+ if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
+ log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
+ log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
+ false
+ } else { true }
} else { true }
+ });
+ !forwards.is_empty()
+ });
+ pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
+ if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
+ log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
+ log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
+ pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
+ if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
+ intercepted_id != ev_id
+ } else { true }
+ });
+ false
} else { true }
});
- !forwards.is_empty()
- });
- pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
- if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
- log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
- log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
- pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
- if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
- intercepted_id != ev_id
- } else { true }
- });
- false
- } else { true }
- });
+ },
+ HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
+ if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
+ let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
+ // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
+ // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
+ // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
+ // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
+ // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
+ // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
+ // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
+ // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
+ pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
+ pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
+ }
+ },
}
}
}
}
}
- let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments { pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()), retry_lock: Mutex::new(()) };
if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
// If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
// `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
- if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
- pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
- }
-
let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
Ok(key) => key,
Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
// indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
// Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
- nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
let route_params = RouteParameters {
payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
final_value_msat: 100_000,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
};
let route = find_route(
&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
let route_params = RouteParameters {
payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
final_value_msat: 10_000,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
};
let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
let route_params = RouteParameters {
payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
final_value_msat: 10_000,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
};
let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
-
- assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
}
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
+
let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+ }
+ {
// Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
// as it has the funding transaction.
let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+ }
+ {
// At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
// `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
// from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
use crate::prelude::*;
use core::cell::RefCell;
use alloc::rc::Rc;
-use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, LockTestExt};
use core::mem;
use core::iter::repeat;
use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, TxMerkleNode};
panic!();
}
}
- assert_eq!(*chain_source.watched_txn.lock().unwrap(), *self.chain_source.watched_txn.lock().unwrap());
- assert_eq!(*chain_source.watched_outputs.lock().unwrap(), *self.chain_source.watched_outputs.lock().unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(*chain_source.watched_txn.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(), *self.chain_source.watched_txn.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
+ assert_eq!(*chain_source.watched_outputs.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(), *self.chain_source.watched_outputs.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
}
}
}
assert!(err.contains("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept")));
}
-pub fn send_payment<'a, 'b, 'c>(origin: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, expected_route: &[&Node<'a, 'b, 'c>], recv_value: u64) {
- let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
- claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
+pub fn send_payment<'a, 'b, 'c>(origin: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, expected_route: &[&Node<'a, 'b, 'c>], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
+ let res = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value);
+ claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, res.0);
+ res
}
pub fn fail_payment_along_route<'a, 'b, 'c>(origin_node: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, expected_paths: &[&[&Node<'a, 'b, 'c>]], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) {
let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
- nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
let watchtower = {
- let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
- let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
- monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
- let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
- &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
- assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
+ let new_monitor = {
+ let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
+ let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
+ &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
+ assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
+ new_monitor
+ };
let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
watchtower
let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
let watchtower_alice = {
- let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
- let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
- monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
- let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
- &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
- assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
+ let new_monitor = {
+ let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
+ let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
+ &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
+ assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
+ new_monitor
+ };
let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
watchtower
let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
let watchtower_bob = {
- let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
- let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
- monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
- let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
- &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
- assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
+ let new_monitor = {
+ let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
+ let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
+ &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
+ assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
+ new_monitor
+ };
let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
watchtower
dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
};
- {
- nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ {
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
}
assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
- {
- nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ {
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
- nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
let route_params = RouteParameters {
payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
final_value_msat: 10000,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
};
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
let route_params = RouteParameters {
payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
final_value_msat: 10000,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
};
let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_amount);
- nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&payment_hash, &failure_code);
+ nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&payment_hash, failure_code);
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash }]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient};
use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{ChannelDetails, HTLCSource, IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS, PaymentId};
-use crate::ln::channelmanager::MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as LDK_DEFAULT_MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA;
use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
use crate::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
use crate::util::time::Time;
#[cfg(all(not(feature = "no-std"), test))]
use crate::util::time::tests::SinceEpoch;
+use crate::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
use core::cmp;
use core::fmt::{self, Display, Formatter};
if pending_amt_msat < total_msat {
retry_id_route_params = Some((*pmt_id, RouteParameters {
final_value_msat: *total_msat - *pending_amt_msat,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta:
- if let Some(delta) = params.final_cltv_expiry_delta { delta }
- else {
- debug_assert!(false, "We always set the final_cltv_expiry_delta when a path fails");
- LDK_DEFAULT_MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA.into()
- },
payment_params: params.clone(),
}));
break
Some(RouteParameters {
payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta:
- if let Some(delta) = payment_params.final_cltv_expiry_delta { delta }
- else { max_unsent_cltv_delta },
})
} else { None }
} else { None },
// `payment_params`) back to the user.
let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
if let Some(params) = payment.get_mut().payment_parameters() {
- if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta.is_none() {
- // This should be rare, but a user could provide None for the payment data, and
- // we need it when we go to retry the payment, so fill it in.
- params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = Some(path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta);
- }
retry = Some(RouteParameters {
payment_params: params.clone(),
final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: params.final_cltv_expiry_delta.unwrap(),
});
} else if let Some(params) = payment_params {
retry = Some(RouteParameters {
payment_params: params.clone(),
final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta:
- if let Some(delta) = params.final_cltv_expiry_delta { delta }
- else { path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta },
});
}
(0, session_privs, required),
(1, pending_fee_msat, option),
(2, payment_hash, required),
- (3, payment_params, option),
+ // Note that while we "default" payment_param's final CLTV expiry delta to 0 we should
+ // never see it - `payment_params` was added here after the field was added/required.
+ (3, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
(4, payment_secret, option),
(5, keysend_preimage, option),
(6, total_msat, required),
let expired_route_params = RouteParameters {
payment_params,
final_value_msat: 0,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
};
let pending_events = Mutex::new(Vec::new());
if on_retry {
let route_params = RouteParameters {
payment_params,
final_value_msat: 0,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
};
router.expect_find_route(route_params.clone(),
Err(LightningError { err: String::new(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError }));
let route_params = RouteParameters {
payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
final_value_msat: 0,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
};
let failed_scid = 42;
let route = Route {
let mut route_params = RouteParameters {
payment_params: route.payment_params.clone().unwrap(),
final_value_msat: amt_msat,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
};
nodes[0].router.expect_find_route(route_params.clone(), Ok(route.clone()));
let route_params = RouteParameters {
payment_params: route.payment_params.clone().unwrap(),
final_value_msat: amt_msat,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
};
nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_retry(payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), route_params, Retry::Attempts(1)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let (_, _, chan_2_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
// Send and claim the payment. Inflight HTLCs should be empty.
- let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 500000);
- nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
- check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..]], 500000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
- claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], payment_preimage);
+ let payment_hash = send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 500000).1;
+ let inflight_htlcs = node_chanmgrs[0].compute_inflight_htlcs();
{
- let inflight_htlcs = node_chanmgrs[0].compute_inflight_htlcs();
-
let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
- let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
- let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
let channel_1 = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1_id);
- let channel_2 = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[2], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, chan_2_id);
let chan_1_used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat(
&NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) ,
&NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
channel_1.get_short_channel_id().unwrap()
);
+ assert_eq!(chan_1_used_liquidity, None);
+ }
+ {
+ let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
+ let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
+ let channel_2 = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[2], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, chan_2_id);
+
let chan_2_used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat(
&NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) ,
&NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()),
channel_2.get_short_channel_id().unwrap()
);
- assert_eq!(chan_1_used_liquidity, None);
assert_eq!(chan_2_used_liquidity, None);
}
let pending_payments = nodes[0].node.list_recent_payments();
}
// Send the payment, but do not claim it. Our inflight HTLCs should contain the pending payment.
- let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 500000);
+ let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 500000);
+ let inflight_htlcs = node_chanmgrs[0].compute_inflight_htlcs();
{
- let inflight_htlcs = node_chanmgrs[0].compute_inflight_htlcs();
-
let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
- let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
- let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
let channel_1 = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1_id);
- let channel_2 = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[2], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, chan_2_id);
let chan_1_used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat(
&NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) ,
&NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
channel_1.get_short_channel_id().unwrap()
);
+ // First hop accounts for expected 1000 msat fee
+ assert_eq!(chan_1_used_liquidity, Some(501000));
+ }
+ {
+ let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
+ let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
+ let channel_2 = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[2], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, chan_2_id);
+
let chan_2_used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat(
&NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) ,
&NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()),
channel_2.get_short_channel_id().unwrap()
);
- // First hop accounts for expected 1000 msat fee
- assert_eq!(chan_1_used_liquidity, Some(501000));
assert_eq!(chan_2_used_liquidity, Some(500000));
}
let pending_payments = nodes[0].node.list_recent_payments();
nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
}
+ let inflight_htlcs = node_chanmgrs[0].compute_inflight_htlcs();
{
- let inflight_htlcs = node_chanmgrs[0].compute_inflight_htlcs();
-
let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
- let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
- let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
let channel_1 = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1_id);
- let channel_2 = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[2], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, chan_2_id);
let chan_1_used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat(
&NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) ,
&NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
channel_1.get_short_channel_id().unwrap()
);
+ assert_eq!(chan_1_used_liquidity, None);
+ }
+ {
+ let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
+ let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
+ let channel_2 = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[2], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, chan_2_id);
+
let chan_2_used_liquidity = inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat(
&NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) ,
&NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()),
channel_2.get_short_channel_id().unwrap()
);
-
- assert_eq!(chan_1_used_liquidity, None);
assert_eq!(chan_2_used_liquidity, None);
}
let route_params = RouteParameters {
payment_params,
final_value_msat: amt_msat,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
};
let route = get_route(
&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params.payment_params,
&nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, route_params.final_value_msat,
- route_params.final_cltv_expiry_delta, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
+ route_params.payment_params.final_cltv_expiry_delta, nodes[0].logger, &scorer,
+ &random_seed_bytes,
).unwrap();
let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[2].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(amt_msat), 60 * 60, None).unwrap();
let route_params = RouteParameters {
payment_params,
final_value_msat: amt_msat,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
};
let (_, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat);
let route_params = RouteParameters {
payment_params,
final_value_msat: amt_msat,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
};
// Ensure the first monitor update (for the initial send path1 over chan_1) succeeds, but the
let mut payment_params = route_params.payment_params.clone();
payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(chan_2_id);
nodes[0].router.expect_find_route(RouteParameters {
- payment_params, final_value_msat: amt_msat / 2, final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV
+ payment_params, final_value_msat: amt_msat / 2,
}, Ok(retry_1_route));
let mut payment_params = route_params.payment_params.clone();
payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(chan_3_id);
nodes[0].router.expect_find_route(RouteParameters {
- payment_params, final_value_msat: amt_msat / 4, final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV
+ payment_params, final_value_msat: amt_msat / 4,
}, Ok(retry_2_route));
// Send a payment that will partially fail on send, then partially fail on retry, then succeed.
let route_params = RouteParameters {
payment_params,
final_value_msat: amt_msat,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
};
chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
let route_params = RouteParameters {
payment_params,
final_value_msat: amt_msat,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
};
nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_retry(payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), route_params, Retry::Attempts(1)).unwrap();
let route_params = RouteParameters {
payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
final_value_msat: amt_msat,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
};
let chans = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
payment_params: pay_params,
// Note that the second request here requests the amount we originally failed to send,
// not the amount remaining on the full payment, which should be changed.
- final_value_msat: 100_000_001, final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV
+ final_value_msat: 100_000_001,
}, Ok(route.clone()));
{
let route_params = RouteParameters {
payment_params,
final_value_msat: amt_msat,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
};
let chans = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
pay_params.previously_failed_channels.push(chans[0].short_channel_id.unwrap());
nodes[0].router.expect_find_route(RouteParameters {
payment_params: pay_params, final_value_msat: amt_msat,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV
}, Ok(route.clone()));
nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_retry(payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), route_params, Retry::Attempts(1)).unwrap();
let route_params = RouteParameters {
payment_params,
final_value_msat: amt_msat,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
};
let mut route = Route {
route.paths[0][1].fee_msat = amt_msat;
nodes[0].router.expect_find_route(RouteParameters {
payment_params: second_payment_params,
- final_value_msat: amt_msat, final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
+ final_value_msat: amt_msat,
}, Ok(route.clone()));
nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_retry(payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), route_params, Retry::Attempts(1)).unwrap();
let route_params = RouteParameters {
payment_params,
final_value_msat: amt_msat,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
};
let mut route = Route {
route.paths.remove(0);
nodes[0].router.expect_find_route(RouteParameters {
payment_params: second_payment_params,
- final_value_msat: amt_msat / 2, final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
+ final_value_msat: amt_msat / 2,
}, Ok(route.clone()));
nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_retry(payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), route_params, Retry::Attempts(1)).unwrap();
let mut route_params = RouteParameters {
payment_params,
final_value_msat: amt_msat,
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
};
let mut route = Route {
}
}
}
+
+fn do_no_missing_sent_on_midpoint_reload(persist_manager_with_payment: bool) {
+ // Test that if we reload in the middle of an HTLC claim commitment signed dance we'll still
+ // receive the PaymentSent event even if the ChannelManager had no idea about the payment when
+ // it was last persisted.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let (persister_a, persister_b, persister_c);
+ let (chain_monitor_a, chain_monitor_b, chain_monitor_c);
+ let (nodes_0_deserialized, nodes_0_deserialized_b, nodes_0_deserialized_c);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
+
+ let mut nodes_0_serialized = Vec::new();
+ if !persist_manager_with_payment {
+ nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
+ }
+
+ let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
+
+ if persist_manager_with_payment {
+ nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
+ }
+
+ nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 1_000_000);
+
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ // The ChannelMonitor should always be the latest version, as we're required to persist it
+ // during the commitment signed handling.
+ let chan_0_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).encode();
+ reload_node!(nodes[0], test_default_channel_config(), &nodes_0_serialized, &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized], persister_a, chain_monitor_a, nodes_0_deserialized);
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
+ if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[1] { assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage); } else { panic!(); }
+ // Note that we don't get a PaymentPathSuccessful here as we leave the HTLC pending to avoid
+ // the double-claim that would otherwise appear at the end of this test.
+ let as_broadcasted_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(as_broadcasted_txn.len(), 1);
+
+ // Ensure that, even after some time, if we restart we still include *something* in the current
+ // `ChannelManager` which prevents a `PaymentFailed` when we restart even if pending resolved
+ // payments have since been timed out thanks to `IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS`.
+ // A naive implementation of the fix here would wipe the pending payments set, causing a
+ // failure event when we restart.
+ for _ in 0..(IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS * 2) { nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); }
+
+ let chan_0_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).encode();
+ reload_node!(nodes[0], test_default_channel_config(), &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized], persister_b, chain_monitor_b, nodes_0_deserialized_b);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert!(events.is_empty());
+
+ // Ensure that we don't generate any further events even after the channel-closing commitment
+ // transaction is confirmed on-chain.
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_broadcasted_txn[0]);
+ for _ in 0..(IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS * 2) { nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); }
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert!(events.is_empty());
+
+ let chan_0_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).encode();
+ reload_node!(nodes[0], test_default_channel_config(), &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized], persister_c, chain_monitor_c, nodes_0_deserialized_c);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert!(events.is_empty());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn no_missing_sent_on_midpoint_reload() {
+ do_no_missing_sent_on_midpoint_reload(false);
+ do_no_missing_sent_on_midpoint_reload(true);
+}
let pending_read_buffer = [0; 50].to_vec(); // Noise act two is 50 bytes
let mut peers = self.peers.write().unwrap();
- if peers.insert(descriptor, Mutex::new(Peer {
- channel_encryptor: peer_encryptor,
- their_node_id: None,
- their_features: None,
- their_net_address: remote_network_address,
-
- pending_outbound_buffer: LinkedList::new(),
- pending_outbound_buffer_first_msg_offset: 0,
- gossip_broadcast_buffer: LinkedList::new(),
- awaiting_write_event: false,
-
- pending_read_buffer,
- pending_read_buffer_pos: 0,
- pending_read_is_header: false,
-
- sync_status: InitSyncTracker::NoSyncRequested,
-
- msgs_sent_since_pong: 0,
- awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals: 0,
- received_message_since_timer_tick: false,
- sent_gossip_timestamp_filter: false,
-
- received_channel_announce_since_backlogged: false,
- inbound_connection: false,
- })).is_some() {
- panic!("PeerManager driver duplicated descriptors!");
- };
- Ok(res)
+ match peers.entry(descriptor) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
+ debug_assert!(false, "PeerManager driver duplicated descriptors!");
+ Err(PeerHandleError {})
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
+ e.insert(Mutex::new(Peer {
+ channel_encryptor: peer_encryptor,
+ their_node_id: None,
+ their_features: None,
+ their_net_address: remote_network_address,
+
+ pending_outbound_buffer: LinkedList::new(),
+ pending_outbound_buffer_first_msg_offset: 0,
+ gossip_broadcast_buffer: LinkedList::new(),
+ awaiting_write_event: false,
+
+ pending_read_buffer,
+ pending_read_buffer_pos: 0,
+ pending_read_is_header: false,
+
+ sync_status: InitSyncTracker::NoSyncRequested,
+
+ msgs_sent_since_pong: 0,
+ awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals: 0,
+ received_message_since_timer_tick: false,
+ sent_gossip_timestamp_filter: false,
+
+ received_channel_announce_since_backlogged: false,
+ inbound_connection: false,
+ }));
+ Ok(res)
+ }
+ }
}
/// Indicates a new inbound connection has been established to a node with an optional remote
let pending_read_buffer = [0; 50].to_vec(); // Noise act one is 50 bytes
let mut peers = self.peers.write().unwrap();
- if peers.insert(descriptor, Mutex::new(Peer {
- channel_encryptor: peer_encryptor,
- their_node_id: None,
- their_features: None,
- their_net_address: remote_network_address,
-
- pending_outbound_buffer: LinkedList::new(),
- pending_outbound_buffer_first_msg_offset: 0,
- gossip_broadcast_buffer: LinkedList::new(),
- awaiting_write_event: false,
-
- pending_read_buffer,
- pending_read_buffer_pos: 0,
- pending_read_is_header: false,
-
- sync_status: InitSyncTracker::NoSyncRequested,
-
- msgs_sent_since_pong: 0,
- awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals: 0,
- received_message_since_timer_tick: false,
- sent_gossip_timestamp_filter: false,
-
- received_channel_announce_since_backlogged: false,
- inbound_connection: true,
- })).is_some() {
- panic!("PeerManager driver duplicated descriptors!");
- };
- Ok(())
+ match peers.entry(descriptor) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
+ debug_assert!(false, "PeerManager driver duplicated descriptors!");
+ Err(PeerHandleError {})
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
+ e.insert(Mutex::new(Peer {
+ channel_encryptor: peer_encryptor,
+ their_node_id: None,
+ their_features: None,
+ their_net_address: remote_network_address,
+
+ pending_outbound_buffer: LinkedList::new(),
+ pending_outbound_buffer_first_msg_offset: 0,
+ gossip_broadcast_buffer: LinkedList::new(),
+ awaiting_write_event: false,
+
+ pending_read_buffer,
+ pending_read_buffer_pos: 0,
+ pending_read_is_header: false,
+
+ sync_status: InitSyncTracker::NoSyncRequested,
+
+ msgs_sent_since_pong: 0,
+ awaiting_pong_timer_tick_intervals: 0,
+ received_message_since_timer_tick: false,
+ sent_gossip_timestamp_filter: false,
+
+ received_channel_announce_since_backlogged: false,
+ inbound_connection: true,
+ }));
+ Ok(())
+ }
+ }
}
fn peer_should_read(&self, peer: &mut Peer) -> bool {
macro_rules! insert_node_id {
() => {
match self.node_id_to_descriptor.lock().unwrap().entry(peer.their_node_id.unwrap().0) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Got second connection with {}, closing", log_pubkey!(peer.their_node_id.unwrap().0));
peer.their_node_id = None; // Unset so that we don't generate a peer_disconnected event
+ // Check that the peers map is consistent with the
+ // node_id_to_descriptor map, as this has been broken
+ // before.
+ debug_assert!(peers.get(e.get()).is_some());
return Err(PeerHandleError { })
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
self.do_attempt_write_data(&mut descriptor, &mut *peer, false);
}
self.do_disconnect(descriptor, &*peer, "DisconnectPeer HandleError");
- }
+ } else { debug_assert!(false, "Missing connection for peer"); }
}
}
}
},
Some(peer_lock) => {
let peer = peer_lock.lock().unwrap();
- if !peer.handshake_complete() { return; }
- debug_assert!(peer.their_node_id.is_some());
if let Some((node_id, _)) = peer.their_node_id {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling disconnection of peer {}", log_pubkey!(node_id));
- self.node_id_to_descriptor.lock().unwrap().remove(&node_id);
+ let removed = self.node_id_to_descriptor.lock().unwrap().remove(&node_id);
+ debug_assert!(removed.is_some(), "descriptor maps should be consistent");
+ if !peer.handshake_complete() { return; }
self.message_handler.chan_handler.peer_disconnected(&node_id);
self.message_handler.onion_message_handler.peer_disconnected(&node_id);
}
use crate::prelude::*;
use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
- use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
+ use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
#[derive(Clone)]
struct FileDescriptor {
fd: u16,
outbound_data: Arc<Mutex<Vec<u8>>>,
+ disconnect: Arc<AtomicBool>,
}
impl PartialEq for FileDescriptor {
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
data.len()
}
- fn disconnect_socket(&mut self) {}
+ fn disconnect_socket(&mut self) { self.disconnect.store(true, Ordering::Release); }
}
struct PeerManagerCfg {
fn establish_connection<'a>(peer_a: &PeerManager<FileDescriptor, &'a test_utils::TestChannelMessageHandler, &'a test_utils::TestRoutingMessageHandler, IgnoringMessageHandler, &'a test_utils::TestLogger, IgnoringMessageHandler, &'a test_utils::TestNodeSigner>, peer_b: &PeerManager<FileDescriptor, &'a test_utils::TestChannelMessageHandler, &'a test_utils::TestRoutingMessageHandler, IgnoringMessageHandler, &'a test_utils::TestLogger, IgnoringMessageHandler, &'a test_utils::TestNodeSigner>) -> (FileDescriptor, FileDescriptor) {
let id_a = peer_a.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap();
- let mut fd_a = FileDescriptor { fd: 1, outbound_data: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
+ let mut fd_a = FileDescriptor {
+ fd: 1, outbound_data: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())),
+ disconnect: Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)),
+ };
let addr_a = NetAddress::IPv4{addr: [127, 0, 0, 1], port: 1000};
let id_b = peer_b.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap();
- let mut fd_b = FileDescriptor { fd: 1, outbound_data: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
+ let mut fd_b = FileDescriptor {
+ fd: 1, outbound_data: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())),
+ disconnect: Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)),
+ };
let addr_b = NetAddress::IPv4{addr: [127, 0, 0, 1], port: 1001};
let initial_data = peer_b.new_outbound_connection(id_a, fd_b.clone(), Some(addr_a.clone())).unwrap();
peer_a.new_inbound_connection(fd_a.clone(), Some(addr_b.clone())).unwrap();
(fd_a.clone(), fd_b.clone())
}
+ #[test]
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")]
+ fn fuzz_threaded_connections() {
+ // Spawn two threads which repeatedly connect two peers together, leading to "got second
+ // connection with peer" disconnections and rapid reconnect. This previously found an issue
+ // with our internal map consistency, and is a generally good smoke test of disconnection.
+ let cfgs = Arc::new(create_peermgr_cfgs(2));
+ // Until we have std::thread::scoped we have to unsafe { turn off the borrow checker }.
+ let peers = Arc::new(create_network(2, unsafe { &*(&*cfgs as *const _) as &'static _ }));
+
+ let start_time = std::time::Instant::now();
+ macro_rules! spawn_thread { ($id: expr) => { {
+ let peers = Arc::clone(&peers);
+ let cfgs = Arc::clone(&cfgs);
+ std::thread::spawn(move || {
+ let mut ctr = 0;
+ while start_time.elapsed() < std::time::Duration::from_secs(1) {
+ let id_a = peers[0].node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap();
+ let mut fd_a = FileDescriptor {
+ fd: $id + ctr * 3, outbound_data: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())),
+ disconnect: Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)),
+ };
+ let addr_a = NetAddress::IPv4{addr: [127, 0, 0, 1], port: 1000};
+ let mut fd_b = FileDescriptor {
+ fd: $id + ctr * 3, outbound_data: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())),
+ disconnect: Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)),
+ };
+ let addr_b = NetAddress::IPv4{addr: [127, 0, 0, 1], port: 1001};
+ let initial_data = peers[1].new_outbound_connection(id_a, fd_b.clone(), Some(addr_a.clone())).unwrap();
+ peers[0].new_inbound_connection(fd_a.clone(), Some(addr_b.clone())).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(peers[0].read_event(&mut fd_a, &initial_data).unwrap(), false);
+
+ while start_time.elapsed() < std::time::Duration::from_secs(1) {
+ peers[0].process_events();
+ if fd_a.disconnect.load(Ordering::Acquire) { break; }
+ let a_data = fd_a.outbound_data.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ if peers[1].read_event(&mut fd_b, &a_data).is_err() { break; }
+
+ peers[1].process_events();
+ if fd_b.disconnect.load(Ordering::Acquire) { break; }
+ let b_data = fd_b.outbound_data.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ if peers[0].read_event(&mut fd_a, &b_data).is_err() { break; }
+
+ cfgs[0].chan_handler.pending_events.lock().unwrap()
+ .push(crate::util::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
+ node_id: peers[1].node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
+ msg: msgs::Shutdown {
+ channel_id: [0; 32],
+ scriptpubkey: bitcoin::Script::new(),
+ },
+ });
+ cfgs[1].chan_handler.pending_events.lock().unwrap()
+ .push(crate::util::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
+ node_id: peers[0].node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
+ msg: msgs::Shutdown {
+ channel_id: [0; 32],
+ scriptpubkey: bitcoin::Script::new(),
+ },
+ });
+
+ peers[0].timer_tick_occurred();
+ peers[1].timer_tick_occurred();
+ }
+
+ peers[0].socket_disconnected(&fd_a);
+ peers[1].socket_disconnected(&fd_b);
+ ctr += 1;
+ std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_micros(1));
+ }
+ })
+ } } }
+ let thrd_a = spawn_thread!(1);
+ let thrd_b = spawn_thread!(2);
+
+ thrd_a.join().unwrap();
+ thrd_b.join().unwrap();
+ }
+
#[test]
fn test_disconnect_peer() {
// Simple test which builds a network of PeerManager, connects and brings them to NoiseState::Finished and
let cfgs = create_peermgr_cfgs(2);
let peers = create_network(2, &cfgs);
- let mut fd_dup = FileDescriptor { fd: 3, outbound_data: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
+ let mut fd_dup = FileDescriptor {
+ fd: 3, outbound_data: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())),
+ disconnect: Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)),
+ };
let addr_dup = NetAddress::IPv4{addr: [127, 0, 0, 1], port: 1003};
let id_a = cfgs[0].node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap();
peers[0].new_inbound_connection(fd_dup.clone(), Some(addr_dup.clone())).unwrap();
let peers = create_network(2, &cfgs);
let a_id = peers[0].node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap();
- let mut fd_a = FileDescriptor { fd: 1, outbound_data: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
- let mut fd_b = FileDescriptor { fd: 1, outbound_data: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
+ let mut fd_a = FileDescriptor {
+ fd: 1, outbound_data: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())),
+ disconnect: Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)),
+ };
+ let mut fd_b = FileDescriptor {
+ fd: 1, outbound_data: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())),
+ disconnect: Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)),
+ };
let initial_data = peers[1].new_outbound_connection(a_id, fd_b.clone(), None).unwrap();
peers[0].new_inbound_connection(fd_a.clone(), None).unwrap();
use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
use crate::routing::gossip::{DirectedChannelInfo, EffectiveCapacity, ReadOnlyNetworkGraph, NetworkGraph, NodeId, RoutingFees};
use crate::routing::scoring::{ChannelUsage, LockableScore, Score};
-use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Writer};
+use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, ReadableArgs, Writer};
use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
use crate::util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Route, DecodeError> {
let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
let path_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ if path_count == 0 { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
let mut paths = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(path_count, 128) as usize);
+ let mut min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = u32::max_value();
for _ in 0..path_count {
let hop_count: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(hop_count as usize);
+ let mut hops: Vec<RouteHop> = Vec::with_capacity(hop_count as usize);
for _ in 0..hop_count {
hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
}
+ if hops.is_empty() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
+ min_final_cltv_expiry_delta =
+ cmp::min(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta, hops.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
paths.push(hops);
}
let mut payment_params = None;
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
- (1, payment_params, option),
+ (1, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)),
});
Ok(Route { paths, payment_params })
}
/// The amount in msats sent on the failed payment path.
pub final_value_msat: u64,
+}
- /// The CLTV on the final hop of the failed payment path.
- ///
- /// This field is deprecated, [`PaymentParameters::final_cltv_expiry_delta`] should be used
- /// instead, if available.
- pub final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
+impl Writeable for RouteParameters {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
+ (0, self.payment_params, required),
+ (2, self.final_value_msat, required),
+ // LDK versions prior to 0.0.114 had the `final_cltv_expiry_delta` parameter in
+ // `RouteParameters` directly. For compatibility, we write it here.
+ (4, self.payment_params.final_cltv_expiry_delta, required),
+ });
+ Ok(())
+ }
}
-impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RouteParameters, {
- (0, payment_params, required),
- (2, final_value_msat, required),
- (4, final_cltv_expiry_delta, required),
-});
+impl Readable for RouteParameters {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ (0, payment_params, (required: ReadableArgs, 0)),
+ (2, final_value_msat, required),
+ (4, final_cltv_expiry_delta, required),
+ });
+ let mut payment_params: PaymentParameters = payment_params.0.unwrap();
+ if payment_params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
+ payment_params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = final_cltv_expiry_delta.0.unwrap();
+ }
+ Ok(Self {
+ payment_params,
+ final_value_msat: final_value_msat.0.unwrap(),
+ })
+ }
+}
/// Maximum total CTLV difference we allow for a full payment path.
pub const DEFAULT_MAX_TOTAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u32 = 1008;
/// these SCIDs.
pub previously_failed_channels: Vec<u64>,
- /// The minimum CLTV delta at the end of the route.
- ///
- /// This field should always be set to `Some` and may be required in a future release.
- pub final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u32>,
+ /// The minimum CLTV delta at the end of the route. This value must not be zero.
+ pub final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
+}
+
+impl Writeable for PaymentParameters {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
+ (0, self.payee_pubkey, required),
+ (1, self.max_total_cltv_expiry_delta, required),
+ (2, self.features, option),
+ (3, self.max_path_count, required),
+ (4, self.route_hints, vec_type),
+ (5, self.max_channel_saturation_power_of_half, required),
+ (6, self.expiry_time, option),
+ (7, self.previously_failed_channels, vec_type),
+ (9, self.final_cltv_expiry_delta, required),
+ });
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl ReadableArgs<u32> for PaymentParameters {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, default_final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ (0, payee_pubkey, required),
+ (1, max_total_cltv_expiry_delta, (default_value, DEFAULT_MAX_TOTAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)),
+ (2, features, option),
+ (3, max_path_count, (default_value, DEFAULT_MAX_PATH_COUNT)),
+ (4, route_hints, vec_type),
+ (5, max_channel_saturation_power_of_half, (default_value, 2)),
+ (6, expiry_time, option),
+ (7, previously_failed_channels, vec_type),
+ (9, final_cltv_expiry_delta, (default_value, default_final_cltv_expiry_delta)),
+ });
+ Ok(Self {
+ payee_pubkey: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(payee_pubkey, required),
+ max_total_cltv_expiry_delta: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(max_total_cltv_expiry_delta, (default_value, unused)),
+ features,
+ max_path_count: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(max_path_count, (default_value, unused)),
+ route_hints: route_hints.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
+ max_channel_saturation_power_of_half: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(max_channel_saturation_power_of_half, (default_value, unused)),
+ expiry_time,
+ previously_failed_channels: previously_failed_channels.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
+ final_cltv_expiry_delta: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(final_cltv_expiry_delta, (default_value, unused)),
+ })
+ }
}
-impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PaymentParameters, {
- (0, payee_pubkey, required),
- (1, max_total_cltv_expiry_delta, (default_value, DEFAULT_MAX_TOTAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)),
- (2, features, option),
- (3, max_path_count, (default_value, DEFAULT_MAX_PATH_COUNT)),
- (4, route_hints, vec_type),
- (5, max_channel_saturation_power_of_half, (default_value, 2)),
- (6, expiry_time, option),
- (7, previously_failed_channels, vec_type),
- (9, final_cltv_expiry_delta, option),
-});
impl PaymentParameters {
/// Creates a payee with the node id of the given `pubkey`.
max_path_count: DEFAULT_MAX_PATH_COUNT,
max_channel_saturation_power_of_half: 2,
previously_failed_channels: Vec::new(),
- final_cltv_expiry_delta: Some(final_cltv_expiry_delta),
+ final_cltv_expiry_delta,
}
}
) -> Result<Route, LightningError>
where L::Target: Logger, GL::Target: Logger {
let graph_lock = network_graph.read_only();
- let final_cltv_expiry_delta =
- if let Some(delta) = route_params.payment_params.final_cltv_expiry_delta { delta }
- else { route_params.final_cltv_expiry_delta };
+ let final_cltv_expiry_delta = route_params.payment_params.final_cltv_expiry_delta;
let mut route = get_route(our_node_pubkey, &route_params.payment_params, &graph_lock, first_hops,
route_params.final_value_msat, final_cltv_expiry_delta, logger, scorer,
random_seed_bytes)?;
if payment_params.max_total_cltv_expiry_delta <= final_cltv_expiry_delta {
return Err(LightningError{err: "Can't find a route where the maximum total CLTV expiry delta is below the final CLTV expiry.".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
}
- if let Some(delta) = payment_params.final_cltv_expiry_delta {
- debug_assert_eq!(delta, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
- }
+
+ // TODO: Remove the explicit final_cltv_expiry_delta parameter
+ debug_assert_eq!(final_cltv_expiry_delta, payment_params.final_cltv_expiry_delta);
// The general routing idea is the following:
// 1. Fill first/last hops communicated by the caller.
let graph_lock = network_graph.read_only();
let mut route = build_route_from_hops_internal(
our_node_pubkey, hops, &route_params.payment_params, &graph_lock,
- route_params.final_value_msat, route_params.final_cltv_expiry_delta, logger, random_seed_bytes)?;
+ route_params.final_value_msat, route_params.payment_params.final_cltv_expiry_delta,
+ logger, random_seed_bytes)?;
add_random_cltv_offset(&mut route, &route_params.payment_params, &graph_lock, random_seed_bytes);
Ok(route)
}
use crate::prelude::*;
use alloc::sync::{Arc, Weak};
-use crate::sync::Mutex;
+use crate::sync::{Mutex, LockTestExt};
use core::ops::Deref;
/// An error when accessing the chain via [`UtxoLookup`].
// lookup if we haven't gotten that far yet).
match Weak::upgrade(&e.get()) {
Some(pending_msgs) => {
- let pending_matches = match &pending_msgs.lock().unwrap().channel_announce {
+ // This may be called with the mutex held on a different UtxoMessages
+ // struct, however in that case we have a global lockorder of new messages
+ // -> old messages, which makes this safe.
+ let pending_matches = match &pending_msgs.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self().channel_announce {
Some(ChannelAnnouncement::Full(pending_msg)) => Some(pending_msg) == full_msg,
Some(ChannelAnnouncement::Unsigned(pending_msg)) => pending_msg == msg,
None => {
Ok(TxOut { value: 1_000_000, script_pubkey: good_script }));
assert_eq!(chan_update_a.contents.timestamp, chan_update_b.contents.timestamp);
- assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels()
+ let graph_lock = network_graph.read_only();
+ assert!(graph_lock.channels()
.get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id).as_ref().unwrap()
.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update !=
- network_graph.read_only().channels()
+ graph_lock.channels()
.get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id).as_ref().unwrap()
.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update);
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "backtrace")]
-fn get_construction_location(backtrace: &Backtrace) -> String {
+fn get_construction_location(backtrace: &Backtrace) -> (String, Option<u32>) {
// Find the first frame that is after `debug_sync` (or that is in our tests) and use
// that as the mutex construction site. Note that the first few frames may be in
// the `backtrace` crate, so we have to ignore those.
let symbol_name = symbol.name().unwrap().as_str().unwrap();
if !sync_mutex_constr_regex.is_match(symbol_name) {
if found_debug_sync {
- if let Some(col) = symbol.colno() {
- return format!("{}:{}:{}", symbol.filename().unwrap().display(), symbol.lineno().unwrap(), col);
- } else {
- // Windows debug symbols don't support column numbers, so fall back to
- // line numbers only if no `colno` is available
- return format!("{}:{}", symbol.filename().unwrap().display(), symbol.lineno().unwrap());
- }
+ return (format!("{}:{}", symbol.filename().unwrap().display(), symbol.lineno().unwrap()), symbol.colno());
}
} else { found_debug_sync = true; }
}
#[cfg(feature = "backtrace")]
{
- let lock_constr_location = get_construction_location(&res._lock_construction_bt);
+ let (lock_constr_location, lock_constr_colno) =
+ get_construction_location(&res._lock_construction_bt);
LOCKS_INIT.call_once(|| { unsafe { LOCKS = Some(StdMutex::new(HashMap::new())); } });
let mut locks = unsafe { LOCKS.as_ref() }.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
match locks.entry(lock_constr_location) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => return Arc::clone(e.get()),
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
+ assert_eq!(lock_constr_colno,
+ get_construction_location(&e.get()._lock_construction_bt).1,
+ "Because Windows doesn't support column number results in backtraces, we cannot construct two mutexes on the same line or we risk lockorder detection false positives.");
+ return Arc::clone(e.get())
+ },
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(Arc::clone(&res)); },
}
}
res
}
- // Returns whether we were a recursive lock (only relevant for read)
- fn _pre_lock(this: &Arc<LockMetadata>, read: bool) -> bool {
- let mut inserted = false;
+ fn pre_lock(this: &Arc<LockMetadata>, _double_lock_self_allowed: bool) {
LOCKS_HELD.with(|held| {
// For each lock which is currently locked, check that no lock's locked-before
// set includes the lock we're about to lock, which would imply a lockorder
// inversion.
- for (locked_idx, _locked) in held.borrow().iter() {
- if read && *locked_idx == this.lock_idx {
- // Recursive read locks are explicitly allowed
- return;
+ for (locked_idx, locked) in held.borrow().iter() {
+ if *locked_idx == this.lock_idx {
+ // Note that with `feature = "backtrace"` set, we may be looking at different
+ // instances of the same lock. Still, doing so is quite risky, a total order
+ // must be maintained, and doing so across a set of otherwise-identical mutexes
+ // is fraught with issues.
+ #[cfg(feature = "backtrace")]
+ debug_assert!(_double_lock_self_allowed,
+ "Tried to acquire a lock while it was held!\nLock constructed at {}",
+ get_construction_location(&this._lock_construction_bt).0);
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "backtrace"))]
+ panic!("Tried to acquire a lock while it was held!");
}
}
for (locked_idx, locked) in held.borrow().iter() {
- if !read && *locked_idx == this.lock_idx {
- // With `feature = "backtrace"` set, we may be looking at different instances
- // of the same lock.
- debug_assert!(cfg!(feature = "backtrace"), "Tried to acquire a lock while it was held!");
- }
for (locked_dep_idx, _locked_dep) in locked.locked_before.lock().unwrap().iter() {
if *locked_dep_idx == this.lock_idx && *locked_dep_idx != locked.lock_idx {
#[cfg(feature = "backtrace")]
panic!("Tried to violate existing lockorder.\nMutex that should be locked after the current lock was created at the following backtrace.\nNote that to get a backtrace for the lockorder violation, you should set RUST_BACKTRACE=1\nLock being taken constructed at: {} ({}):\n{:?}\nLock constructed at: {} ({})\n{:?}\n\nLock dep created at:\n{:?}\n\n",
- get_construction_location(&this._lock_construction_bt), this.lock_idx, this._lock_construction_bt,
- get_construction_location(&locked._lock_construction_bt), locked.lock_idx, locked._lock_construction_bt,
+ get_construction_location(&this._lock_construction_bt).0,
+ this.lock_idx, this._lock_construction_bt,
+ get_construction_location(&locked._lock_construction_bt).0,
+ locked.lock_idx, locked._lock_construction_bt,
_locked_dep._lockdep_trace);
#[cfg(not(feature = "backtrace"))]
panic!("Tried to violate existing lockorder. Build with the backtrace feature for more info.");
}
}
held.borrow_mut().insert(this.lock_idx, Arc::clone(this));
- inserted = true;
});
- inserted
}
- fn pre_lock(this: &Arc<LockMetadata>) { Self::_pre_lock(this, false); }
- fn pre_read_lock(this: &Arc<LockMetadata>) -> bool { Self::_pre_lock(this, true) }
-
fn held_by_thread(this: &Arc<LockMetadata>) -> LockHeldState {
let mut res = LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread;
LOCKS_HELD.with(|held| {
inner: StdMutex<T>,
deps: Arc<LockMetadata>,
}
+impl<T: Sized> Mutex<T> {
+ pub(crate) fn into_inner(self) -> LockResult<T> {
+ self.inner.into_inner().map_err(|_| ())
+ }
+}
#[must_use = "if unused the Mutex will immediately unlock"]
pub struct MutexGuard<'a, T: Sized + 'a> {
}
pub fn lock<'a>(&'a self) -> LockResult<MutexGuard<'a, T>> {
- LockMetadata::pre_lock(&self.deps);
+ LockMetadata::pre_lock(&self.deps, false);
self.inner.lock().map(|lock| MutexGuard { mutex: self, lock }).map_err(|_| ())
}
}
}
-impl <T> LockTestExt for Mutex<T> {
+impl<'a, T: 'a> LockTestExt<'a> for Mutex<T> {
#[inline]
fn held_by_thread(&self) -> LockHeldState {
LockMetadata::held_by_thread(&self.deps)
}
+ type ExclLock = MutexGuard<'a, T>;
+ #[inline]
+ fn unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(&'a self) -> MutexGuard<T> {
+ LockMetadata::pre_lock(&self.deps, true);
+ self.inner.lock().map(|lock| MutexGuard { mutex: self, lock }).unwrap()
+ }
}
pub struct RwLock<T: Sized> {
pub struct RwLockReadGuard<'a, T: Sized + 'a> {
lock: &'a RwLock<T>,
- first_lock: bool,
guard: StdRwLockReadGuard<'a, T>,
}
impl<T: Sized> Drop for RwLockReadGuard<'_, T> {
fn drop(&mut self) {
- if !self.first_lock {
- // Note that its not strictly true that the first taken read lock will get unlocked
- // last, but in practice our locks are always taken as RAII, so it should basically
- // always be true.
- return;
- }
LOCKS_HELD.with(|held| {
held.borrow_mut().remove(&self.lock.deps.lock_idx);
});
}
pub fn read<'a>(&'a self) -> LockResult<RwLockReadGuard<'a, T>> {
- let first_lock = LockMetadata::pre_read_lock(&self.deps);
- self.inner.read().map(|guard| RwLockReadGuard { lock: self, guard, first_lock }).map_err(|_| ())
+ // Note that while we could be taking a recursive read lock here, Rust's `RwLock` may
+ // deadlock trying to take a second read lock if another thread is waiting on the write
+ // lock. This behavior is platform dependent, but our in-tree `FairRwLock` guarantees
+ // such a deadlock.
+ LockMetadata::pre_lock(&self.deps, false);
+ self.inner.read().map(|guard| RwLockReadGuard { lock: self, guard }).map_err(|_| ())
}
pub fn write<'a>(&'a self) -> LockResult<RwLockWriteGuard<'a, T>> {
- LockMetadata::pre_lock(&self.deps);
+ LockMetadata::pre_lock(&self.deps, false);
self.inner.write().map(|guard| RwLockWriteGuard { lock: self, guard }).map_err(|_| ())
}
}
}
-impl <T> LockTestExt for RwLock<T> {
+impl<'a, T: 'a> LockTestExt<'a> for RwLock<T> {
#[inline]
fn held_by_thread(&self) -> LockHeldState {
LockMetadata::held_by_thread(&self.deps)
}
+ type ExclLock = RwLockWriteGuard<'a, T>;
+ #[inline]
+ fn unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(&'a self) -> RwLockWriteGuard<'a, T> {
+ LockMetadata::pre_lock(&self.deps, true);
+ self.inner.write().map(|guard| RwLockWriteGuard { lock: self, guard }).unwrap()
+ }
}
pub type FairRwLock<T> = RwLock<T>;
}
}
-impl<T> LockTestExt for FairRwLock<T> {
+impl<'a, T: 'a> LockTestExt<'a> for FairRwLock<T> {
#[inline]
fn held_by_thread(&self) -> LockHeldState {
// fairrwlock is only built in non-test modes, so we should never support tests.
LockHeldState::Unsupported
}
+ type ExclLock = RwLockWriteGuard<'a, T>;
+ #[inline]
+ fn unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(&'a self) -> RwLockWriteGuard<'a, T> {
+ self.write().unwrap()
+ }
}
Unsupported,
}
-pub(crate) trait LockTestExt {
+pub(crate) trait LockTestExt<'a> {
fn held_by_thread(&self) -> LockHeldState;
+ type ExclLock;
+ /// If two instances of the same mutex are being taken at the same time, it's very easy to have
+ /// a lockorder inversion and risk deadlock. Thus, we default to disabling such locks.
+ ///
+ /// However, sometimes they cannot be avoided. In such cases, this method exists to take a
+ /// mutex while avoiding a test failure. It is deliberately verbose and includes the term
+ /// "unsafe" to indicate that special care needs to be taken to ensure no deadlocks are
+ /// possible.
+ fn unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(&'a self) -> Self::ExclLock;
}
#[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(feature = "_bench_unstable"), test))]
#[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(feature = "_bench_unstable", not(test))))]
mod ext_impl {
use super::*;
- impl<T> LockTestExt for Mutex<T> {
+ impl<'a, T: 'a> LockTestExt<'a> for Mutex<T> {
#[inline]
fn held_by_thread(&self) -> LockHeldState { LockHeldState::Unsupported }
+ type ExclLock = MutexGuard<'a, T>;
+ #[inline]
+ fn unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(&'a self) -> MutexGuard<T> { self.lock().unwrap() }
}
- impl<T> LockTestExt for RwLock<T> {
+ impl<'a, T: 'a> LockTestExt<'a> for RwLock<T> {
#[inline]
fn held_by_thread(&self) -> LockHeldState { LockHeldState::Unsupported }
+ type ExclLock = RwLockWriteGuard<'a, T>;
+ #[inline]
+ fn unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(&'a self) -> RwLockWriteGuard<T> { self.write().unwrap() }
}
}
pub fn try_lock<'a>(&'a self) -> LockResult<MutexGuard<'a, T>> {
Ok(MutexGuard { lock: self.inner.borrow_mut() })
}
+
+ pub fn into_inner(self) -> LockResult<T> {
+ Ok(self.inner.into_inner())
+ }
}
-impl<T> LockTestExt for Mutex<T> {
+impl<'a, T: 'a> LockTestExt<'a> for Mutex<T> {
#[inline]
fn held_by_thread(&self) -> LockHeldState {
if self.lock().is_err() { return LockHeldState::HeldByThread; }
else { return LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread; }
}
+ type ExclLock = MutexGuard<'a, T>;
+ #[inline]
+ fn unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(&'a self) -> MutexGuard<T> { self.lock().unwrap() }
}
pub struct RwLock<T: ?Sized> {
}
}
-impl<T> LockTestExt for RwLock<T> {
+impl<'a, T: 'a> LockTestExt<'a> for RwLock<T> {
#[inline]
fn held_by_thread(&self) -> LockHeldState {
if self.write().is_err() { return LockHeldState::HeldByThread; }
else { return LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread; }
}
+ type ExclLock = RwLockWriteGuard<'a, T>;
+ #[inline]
+ fn unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(&'a self) -> RwLockWriteGuard<T> { self.write().unwrap() }
}
pub type FairRwLock<T> = RwLock<T>;
}
#[test]
+#[should_panic]
+#[cfg(not(feature = "backtrace"))]
fn recursive_read() {
let lock = RwLock::new(());
let _a = lock.read().unwrap();
}
}
-#[test]
-fn read_recursive_no_lockorder() {
- // Like the above, but note that no lockorder is implied when we recursively read-lock a
- // RwLock, causing this to pass just fine.
- let a = RwLock::new(());
- let b = RwLock::new(());
- let _outer = a.read().unwrap();
- {
- let _a = a.read().unwrap();
- let _b = b.read().unwrap();
- }
- {
- let _b = b.read().unwrap();
- let _a = a.read().unwrap();
- }
-}
-
#[test]
#[should_panic]
fn read_write_lockorder_fail() {
/// actually backed by a [`HashMap`], with some additional tracking to ensure we can iterate over
/// keys in the order defined by [`Ord`].
///
+/// (C-not exported) as bindings provide alternate accessors rather than exposing maps directly.
+///
/// [`BTreeMap`]: alloc::collections::BTreeMap
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq)]
pub struct IndexedMap<K: Hash + Ord, V> {
}
/// An iterator over a range of values in an [`IndexedMap`]
+///
+/// (C-not exported) as bindings provide alternate accessors rather than exposing maps directly.
pub struct Range<'a, K: Hash + Ord, V> {
inner_range: Iter<'a, K>,
map: &'a HashMap<K, V>,
}
/// An [`Entry`] for a key which currently has no value
+///
+/// (C-not exported) as bindings provide alternate accessors rather than exposing maps directly.
pub struct VacantEntry<'a, K: Hash + Ord, V> {
#[cfg(feature = "hashbrown")]
underlying_entry: hash_map::VacantEntry<'a, K, V, hash_map::DefaultHashBuilder>,
}
/// An [`Entry`] for an existing key-value pair
+///
+/// (C-not exported) as bindings provide alternate accessors rather than exposing maps directly.
pub struct OccupiedEntry<'a, K: Hash + Ord, V> {
#[cfg(feature = "hashbrown")]
underlying_entry: hash_map::OccupiedEntry<'a, K, V, hash_map::DefaultHashBuilder>,
/// A mutable reference to a position in the map. This can be used to reference, add, or update the
/// value at a fixed key.
+///
+/// (C-not exported) as bindings provide alternate accessors rather than exposing maps directly.
pub enum Entry<'a, K: Hash + Ord, V> {
/// A mutable reference to a position within the map where there is no value.
Vacant(VacantEntry<'a, K, V>),
($logger: expr, $lvl:expr, $($arg:tt)+) => (
match $lvl {
#[cfg(not(any(feature = "max_level_off")))]
- $crate::util::logger::Level::Error => log_internal!($logger, $lvl, $($arg)*),
+ $crate::util::logger::Level::Error => $crate::log_internal!($logger, $lvl, $($arg)*),
#[cfg(not(any(feature = "max_level_off", feature = "max_level_error")))]
- $crate::util::logger::Level::Warn => log_internal!($logger, $lvl, $($arg)*),
+ $crate::util::logger::Level::Warn => $crate::log_internal!($logger, $lvl, $($arg)*),
#[cfg(not(any(feature = "max_level_off", feature = "max_level_error", feature = "max_level_warn")))]
- $crate::util::logger::Level::Info => log_internal!($logger, $lvl, $($arg)*),
+ $crate::util::logger::Level::Info => $crate::log_internal!($logger, $lvl, $($arg)*),
#[cfg(not(any(feature = "max_level_off", feature = "max_level_error", feature = "max_level_warn", feature = "max_level_info")))]
- $crate::util::logger::Level::Debug => log_internal!($logger, $lvl, $($arg)*),
+ $crate::util::logger::Level::Debug => $crate::log_internal!($logger, $lvl, $($arg)*),
#[cfg(not(any(feature = "max_level_off", feature = "max_level_error", feature = "max_level_warn", feature = "max_level_info", feature = "max_level_debug")))]
- $crate::util::logger::Level::Trace => log_internal!($logger, $lvl, $($arg)*),
+ $crate::util::logger::Level::Trace => $crate::log_internal!($logger, $lvl, $($arg)*),
#[cfg(not(any(feature = "max_level_off", feature = "max_level_error", feature = "max_level_warn", feature = "max_level_info", feature = "max_level_debug", feature = "max_level_trace")))]
- $crate::util::logger::Level::Gossip => log_internal!($logger, $lvl, $($arg)*),
+ $crate::util::logger::Level::Gossip => $crate::log_internal!($logger, $lvl, $($arg)*),
#[cfg(any(feature = "max_level_off", feature = "max_level_error", feature = "max_level_warn", feature = "max_level_info", feature = "max_level_debug", feature = "max_level_trace"))]
_ => {
#[macro_export]
macro_rules! log_error {
($logger: expr, $($arg:tt)*) => (
- log_given_level!($logger, $crate::util::logger::Level::Error, $($arg)*);
+ $crate::log_given_level!($logger, $crate::util::logger::Level::Error, $($arg)*);
)
}
#[macro_export]
macro_rules! log_warn {
($logger: expr, $($arg:tt)*) => (
- log_given_level!($logger, $crate::util::logger::Level::Warn, $($arg)*);
+ $crate::log_given_level!($logger, $crate::util::logger::Level::Warn, $($arg)*);
)
}
#[macro_export]
macro_rules! log_info {
($logger: expr, $($arg:tt)*) => (
- log_given_level!($logger, $crate::util::logger::Level::Info, $($arg)*);
+ $crate::log_given_level!($logger, $crate::util::logger::Level::Info, $($arg)*);
)
}
#[macro_export]
macro_rules! log_debug {
($logger: expr, $($arg:tt)*) => (
- log_given_level!($logger, $crate::util::logger::Level::Debug, $($arg)*);
+ $crate::log_given_level!($logger, $crate::util::logger::Level::Debug, $($arg)*);
)
}
#[macro_export]
macro_rules! log_trace {
($logger: expr, $($arg:tt)*) => (
- log_given_level!($logger, $crate::util::logger::Level::Trace, $($arg)*)
+ $crate::log_given_level!($logger, $crate::util::logger::Level::Trace, $($arg)*)
)
}
#[macro_export]
macro_rules! log_gossip {
($logger: expr, $($arg:tt)*) => (
- log_given_level!($logger, $crate::util::logger::Level::Gossip, $($arg)*);
+ $crate::log_given_level!($logger, $crate::util::logger::Level::Gossip, $($arg)*);
)
}
/// Writer that only tracks the amount of data written - useful if you need to calculate the length
/// of some data when serialized but don't yet need the full data.
+///
+/// (C-not exported) as manual TLV building is not currently supported in bindings
pub struct LengthCalculatingWriter(pub usize);
impl Writer for LengthCalculatingWriter {
#[inline]
/// Essentially [`std::io::Take`] but a bit simpler and with a method to walk the underlying stream
/// forward to ensure we always consume exactly the fixed length specified.
+///
+/// (C-not exported) as manual TLV building is not currently supported in bindings
pub struct FixedLengthReader<R: Read> {
read: R,
bytes_read: u64,
/// A [`Read`] implementation which tracks whether any bytes have been read at all. This allows us to distinguish
/// between "EOF reached before we started" and "EOF reached mid-read".
+///
+/// (C-not exported) as manual TLV building is not currently supported in bindings
pub struct ReadTrackingReader<R: Read> {
read: R,
/// Returns whether we have read from this reader or not yet.
}
/// Wrapper to read a required (non-optional) TLV record.
-pub struct RequiredWrapper<T: Readable>(pub Option<T>);
+///
+/// (C-not exported) as manual TLV building is not currently supported in bindings
+pub struct RequiredWrapper<T>(pub Option<T>);
impl<T: Readable> Readable for RequiredWrapper<T> {
#[inline]
fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
Ok(Self(Some(Readable::read(reader)?)))
}
}
+impl<A, T: ReadableArgs<A>> ReadableArgs<A> for RequiredWrapper<T> {
+ #[inline]
+ fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R, args: A) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ Ok(Self(Some(ReadableArgs::read(reader, args)?)))
+ }
+}
/// When handling `default_values`, we want to map the default-value T directly
/// to a `RequiredWrapper<T>` in a way that works for `field: T = t;` as
/// well. Thus, we assume `Into<T> for T` does nothing and use that.
-impl<T: Readable> From<T> for RequiredWrapper<T> {
+impl<T> From<T> for RequiredWrapper<T> {
fn from(t: T) -> RequiredWrapper<T> { RequiredWrapper(Some(t)) }
}
/// Wrapper to read a required (non-optional) TLV record that may have been upgraded without
/// backwards compat.
+///
+/// (C-not exported) as manual TLV building is not currently supported in bindings
pub struct UpgradableRequired<T: MaybeReadable>(pub Option<T>);
impl<T: MaybeReadable> MaybeReadable for UpgradableRequired<T> {
#[inline]
/// A type for variable-length values within TLV record where the length is encoded as part of the record.
/// Used to prevent encoding the length twice.
+///
+/// (C-not exported) as manual TLV building is not currently supported in bindings
pub struct WithoutLength<T>(pub T);
impl Writeable for WithoutLength<&String> {
($stream: expr, $type: expr, $field: expr, (option, encoding: $fieldty: ty)) => {
$crate::_encode_tlv!($stream, $type, $field, option);
};
+ ($stream: expr, $type: expr, $field: expr, (option: $trait: ident $(, $read_arg: expr)?)) => {
+ // Just a read-mapped type
+ $crate::_encode_tlv!($stream, $type, $field, option);
+ };
}
/// Panics if the last seen TLV type is not numerically less than the TLV type currently being checked.
$len.0 += field_len;
}
};
+ ($len: expr, $type: expr, $field: expr, (option: $trait: ident $(, $read_arg: expr)?)) => {
+ $crate::_get_varint_length_prefixed_tlv_length!($len, $type, $field, option);
+ };
($len: expr, $type: expr, $field: expr, upgradable_required) => {
$crate::_get_varint_length_prefixed_tlv_length!($len, $type, $field, required);
};
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}};
+ ($last_seen_type: expr, $typ: expr, $type: expr, $field: ident, (required: $trait: ident $(, $read_arg: expr)?)) => {{
+ $crate::_check_decoded_tlv_order!($last_seen_type, $typ, $type, $field, required);
+ }};
($last_seen_type: expr, $typ: expr, $type: expr, $field: ident, option) => {{
// no-op
}};
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}};
+ ($last_seen_type: expr, $type: expr, $field: ident, (required: $trait: ident $(, $read_arg: expr)?)) => {{
+ $crate::_check_missing_tlv!($last_seen_type, $type, $field, required);
+ }};
($last_seen_type: expr, $type: expr, $field: ident, vec_type) => {{
// no-op
}};
($reader: expr, $field: ident, required) => {{
$field = $crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut $reader)?;
}};
+ ($reader: expr, $field: ident, (required: $trait: ident $(, $read_arg: expr)?)) => {{
+ $field = $trait::read(&mut $reader $(, $read_arg)*)?;
+ }};
($reader: expr, $field: ident, vec_type) => {{
let f: $crate::util::ser::WithoutLength<Vec<_>> = $crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut $reader)?;
$field = Some(f.0);
($field: ident, option) => {
$field
};
+ ($field: ident, (option: $trait: ident $(, $read_arg: expr)?)) => {
+ $crate::_init_tlv_based_struct_field!($field, option)
+ };
($field: ident, upgradable_required) => {
$field.0.unwrap()
};
($field: ident, required) => {
let mut $field = $crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
};
+ ($field: ident, (required: $trait: ident $(, $read_arg: expr)?)) => {
+ $crate::_init_tlv_field_var!($field, required);
+ };
($field: ident, vec_type) => {
let mut $field = Some(Vec::new());
};
($field: ident, option) => {
let mut $field = None;
};
+ ($field: ident, (option: $trait: ident $(, $read_arg: expr)?)) => {
+ $crate::_init_tlv_field_var!($field, option);
+ };
($field: ident, upgradable_required) => {
let mut $field = $crate::util::ser::UpgradableRequired(None);
};
pub(crate) fn notify(&self) {
let mut lock = self.notify_pending.lock().unwrap();
if let Some(future_state) = &lock.1 {
- future_state.lock().unwrap().complete();
+ if future_state.lock().unwrap().complete() {
+ lock.1 = None;
+ return;
+ }
}
lock.0 = true;
mem::drop(lock);
}
impl FutureState {
- fn complete(&mut self) {
+ fn complete(&mut self) -> bool {
for (counts_as_call, callback) in self.callbacks.drain(..) {
callback.call();
self.callbacks_made |= counts_as_call;
}
self.complete = true;
+ self.callbacks_made
}
}
assert_eq!(Pin::new(&mut future).poll(&mut Context::from_waker(&waker)), Poll::Ready(()));
assert!(!notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
}
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_poll_post_notify_completes() {
+ // Tests that if we have a future state that has completed, and we haven't yet requested a
+ // new future, if we get a notify prior to requesting that second future it is generated
+ // pre-completed.
+ let notifier = Notifier::new();
+
+ notifier.notify();
+ let mut future = notifier.get_future();
+ let (woken, waker) = create_waker();
+ assert_eq!(Pin::new(&mut future).poll(&mut Context::from_waker(&waker)), Poll::Ready(()));
+ assert!(!woken.load(Ordering::SeqCst));
+
+ notifier.notify();
+ let mut future = notifier.get_future();
+ let (woken, waker) = create_waker();
+ assert_eq!(Pin::new(&mut future).poll(&mut Context::from_waker(&waker)), Poll::Ready(()));
+ assert!(!woken.load(Ordering::SeqCst));
+
+ let mut future = notifier.get_future();
+ let (woken, waker) = create_waker();
+ assert_eq!(Pin::new(&mut future).poll(&mut Context::from_waker(&waker)), Poll::Pending);
+ assert!(!woken.load(Ordering::SeqCst));
+
+ notifier.notify();
+ assert!(woken.load(Ordering::SeqCst));
+ assert_eq!(Pin::new(&mut future).poll(&mut Context::from_waker(&waker)), Poll::Ready(()));
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_poll_post_notify_completes_initial_notified() {
+ // Identical to the previous test, but the first future completes via a wake rather than an
+ // immediate `Poll::Ready`.
+ let notifier = Notifier::new();
+
+ let mut future = notifier.get_future();
+ let (woken, waker) = create_waker();
+ assert_eq!(Pin::new(&mut future).poll(&mut Context::from_waker(&waker)), Poll::Pending);
+
+ notifier.notify();
+ assert!(woken.load(Ordering::SeqCst));
+ assert_eq!(Pin::new(&mut future).poll(&mut Context::from_waker(&waker)), Poll::Ready(()));
+
+ notifier.notify();
+ let mut future = notifier.get_future();
+ let (woken, waker) = create_waker();
+ assert_eq!(Pin::new(&mut future).poll(&mut Context::from_waker(&waker)), Poll::Ready(()));
+ assert!(!woken.load(Ordering::SeqCst));
+
+ let mut future = notifier.get_future();
+ let (woken, waker) = create_waker();
+ assert_eq!(Pin::new(&mut future).poll(&mut Context::from_waker(&waker)), Poll::Pending);
+ assert!(!woken.load(Ordering::SeqCst));
+
+ notifier.notify();
+ assert!(woken.load(Ordering::SeqCst));
+ assert_eq!(Pin::new(&mut future).poll(&mut Context::from_waker(&waker)), Poll::Ready(()));
+ }
}