# The proc-macro2 crate switched to Rust edition 2021 starting with v1.0.66, i.e., has MSRV of 1.56
[ "$RUSTC_MINOR_VERSION" -lt 56 ] && cargo update -p proc-macro2 --precise "1.0.65" --verbose
+# The memchr crate switched to an MSRV of 1.60 starting with v2.6.0
+[ "$RUSTC_MINOR_VERSION" -lt 60 ] && cargo update -p memchr --precise "2.5.0" --verbose
+
[ "$LDK_COVERAGE_BUILD" != "" ] && export RUSTFLAGS="-C link-dead-code"
export RUST_BACKTRACE=1
use lightning::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use lightning::offers::invoice::UnsignedBolt12Invoice;
use lightning::offers::invoice_request::UnsignedInvoiceRequest;
-use lightning::util::enforcing_trait_impls::{EnforcingSigner, EnforcementState};
+use lightning::util::test_channel_signer::{TestChannelSigner, EnforcementState};
use lightning::util::errors::APIError;
use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
pub logger: Arc<dyn Logger>,
pub keys: Arc<KeyProvider>,
pub persister: Arc<TestPersister>,
- pub chain_monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
+ pub chain_monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<TestChannelSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
// If we reload a node with an old copy of ChannelMonitors, the ChannelManager deserialization
// logic will automatically force-close our channels for us (as we don't have an up-to-date
// monitor implying we are not able to punish misbehaving counterparties). Because this test
}
}
}
-impl chain::Watch<EnforcingSigner> for TestChainMonitor {
- fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>) -> chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus {
+impl chain::Watch<TestChannelSigner> for TestChainMonitor {
+ fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>) -> chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus {
let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap();
if let Some(_) = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(funding_txo, (monitor.get_latest_update_id(), ser.0)) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => entry,
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => panic!("Didn't have monitor on update call"),
};
- let deserialized_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::
+ let deserialized_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::
read(&mut Cursor::new(&map_entry.get().1), (&*self.keys, &*self.keys)).unwrap().1;
deserialized_monitor.update_monitor(update, &&TestBroadcaster{}, &FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) }, &self.logger).unwrap();
let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
}
impl SignerProvider for KeyProvider {
- type Signer = EnforcingSigner;
+ type Signer = TestChannelSigner;
fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
let id = self.rand_bytes_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) as u8;
channel_keys_id,
);
let revoked_commitment = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(keys.commitment_seed);
- EnforcingSigner::new_with_revoked(keys, revoked_commitment, false)
+ TestChannelSigner::new_with_revoked(keys, revoked_commitment, false)
}
fn read_chan_signer(&self, buffer: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> {
let inner: InMemorySigner = ReadableArgs::read(&mut reader, self)?;
let state = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(inner.commitment_seed);
- Ok(EnforcingSigner {
+ Ok(TestChannelSigner {
inner,
state,
disable_revocation_policy_check: false,
let mut monitors = HashMap::new();
let mut old_monitors = $old_monitors.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
for (outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser)) in old_monitors.drain() {
- monitors.insert(outpoint, <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&monitor_ser), (&*$keys_manager, &*$keys_manager)).expect("Failed to read monitor").1);
+ monitors.insert(outpoint, <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&monitor_ser), (&*$keys_manager, &*$keys_manager)).expect("Failed to read monitor").1);
chain_monitor.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser));
}
let mut monitor_refs = HashMap::new();
use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
use lightning::chain::channelmonitor;
-use lightning::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
+use lightning::util::test_channel_signer::TestChannelSigner;
use lightning::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writer, Writeable};
use lightning::util::test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface;
#[inline]
pub fn do_test<Out: test_logger::Output>(data: &[u8], _out: Out) {
- if let Ok((latest_block_hash, monitor)) = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(data), (&OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}, &OnlyReadsKeysInterface {})) {
+ if let Ok((latest_block_hash, monitor)) = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(data), (&OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}, &OnlyReadsKeysInterface {})) {
let mut w = VecWriter(Vec::new());
monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
- let deserialized_copy = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&w.0), (&OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}, &OnlyReadsKeysInterface {})).unwrap();
+ let deserialized_copy = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&w.0), (&OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}, &OnlyReadsKeysInterface {})).unwrap();
assert!(latest_block_hash == deserialized_copy.0);
assert!(monitor == deserialized_copy.1);
}
use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use lightning::sign::{InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial, EntropySource, NodeSigner, SignerProvider};
use lightning::events::Event;
-use lightning::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
+use lightning::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelDetails, ChannelManager, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
use lightning::ln::peer_handler::{MessageHandler,PeerManager,SocketDescriptor,IgnoringMessageHandler};
use lightning::ln::msgs::{self, DecodeError};
use lightning::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
use lightning::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
use lightning::util::errors::APIError;
-use lightning::util::enforcing_trait_impls::{EnforcingSigner, EnforcementState};
+use lightning::util::test_channel_signer::{TestChannelSigner, EnforcementState};
use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
use lightning::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
}
type ChannelMan<'a> = ChannelManager<
- Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
+ Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<TestChannelSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, &'a FuzzRouter, Arc<dyn Logger>>;
type PeerMan<'a> = PeerManager<Peer<'a>, Arc<ChannelMan<'a>>, Arc<P2PGossipSync<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<dyn Logger>>>, Arc<dyn UtxoLookup>, Arc<dyn Logger>>>, IgnoringMessageHandler, Arc<dyn Logger>, IgnoringMessageHandler, Arc<KeyProvider>>;
struct MoneyLossDetector<'a> {
manager: Arc<ChannelMan<'a>>,
- monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
+ monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<TestChannelSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
handler: PeerMan<'a>,
peers: &'a RefCell<[bool; 256]>,
impl<'a> MoneyLossDetector<'a> {
pub fn new(peers: &'a RefCell<[bool; 256]>,
manager: Arc<ChannelMan<'a>>,
- monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
+ monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<TestChannelSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
handler: PeerMan<'a>) -> Self {
MoneyLossDetector {
manager,
}
impl SignerProvider for KeyProvider {
- type Signer = EnforcingSigner;
+ type Signer = TestChannelSigner;
fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
let ctr = self.counter.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed) as u8;
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
let ctr = channel_keys_id[0];
let (inbound, state) = self.signer_state.borrow().get(&ctr).unwrap().clone();
- EnforcingSigner::new_with_revoked(if inbound {
+ TestChannelSigner::new_with_revoked(if inbound {
InMemorySigner::new(
&secp_ctx,
SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, ctr]).unwrap(),
}, state, false)
}
- fn read_chan_signer(&self, mut data: &[u8]) -> Result<EnforcingSigner, DecodeError> {
+ fn read_chan_signer(&self, mut data: &[u8]) -> Result<TestChannelSigner, DecodeError> {
let inner: InMemorySigner = ReadableArgs::read(&mut data, self)?;
let state = Arc::new(Mutex::new(EnforcementState::new()));
- Ok(EnforcingSigner::new_with_revoked(
+ Ok(TestChannelSigner::new_with_revoked(
inner,
state,
false
let mut should_forward = false;
let mut payments_received: Vec<PaymentHash> = Vec::new();
let mut payments_sent = 0;
- let mut pending_funding_generation: Vec<([u8; 32], PublicKey, u64, Script)> = Vec::new();
+ let mut pending_funding_generation: Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, u64, Script)> = Vec::new();
let mut pending_funding_signatures = HashMap::new();
loop {
use lightning::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
use lightning::offers::invoice::UnsignedBolt12Invoice;
use lightning::offers::invoice_request::UnsignedInvoiceRequest;
-use lightning::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
+use lightning::util::test_channel_signer::TestChannelSigner;
use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
use lightning::util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer};
use lightning::onion_message::{CustomOnionMessageContents, CustomOnionMessageHandler, Destination, MessageRouter, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, OnionMessagePath, OnionMessenger};
}
impl SignerProvider for KeyProvider {
- type Signer = EnforcingSigner;
+ type Signer = TestChannelSigner;
fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] { unreachable!() }
unreachable!()
}
- fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<EnforcingSigner, DecodeError> { unreachable!() }
+ fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<TestChannelSigner, DecodeError> { unreachable!() }
fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> { unreachable!() }
use lightning::blinded_path::{BlindedHop, BlindedPath};
use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+use lightning::ln::ChannelId;
use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{self, ChannelDetails, ChannelCounterparty};
use lightning::ln::features::{BlindedHopFeatures, Bolt12InvoiceFeatures};
use lightning::ln::msgs;
let rnid = node_pks.iter().skip(u16::from_be_bytes(get_slice!(2).try_into().unwrap()) as usize % node_pks.len()).next().unwrap();
let capacity = u64::from_be_bytes(get_slice!(8).try_into().unwrap());
$first_hops_vec.push(ChannelDetails {
- channel_id: [0; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
node_id: *rnid,
features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()),
use lightning::chain::{chainmonitor, channelmonitor};
use lightning::chain::chainmonitor::MonitorUpdateId;
use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use lightning::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
+use lightning::util::test_channel_signer::TestChannelSigner;
use std::sync::Mutex;
pub struct TestPersister {
pub update_ret: Mutex<chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus>,
}
-impl chainmonitor::Persist<EnforcingSigner> for TestPersister {
- fn persist_new_channel(&self, _funding_txo: OutPoint, _data: &channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>, _update_id: MonitorUpdateId) -> chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus {
+impl chainmonitor::Persist<TestChannelSigner> for TestPersister {
+ fn persist_new_channel(&self, _funding_txo: OutPoint, _data: &channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>, _update_id: MonitorUpdateId) -> chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus {
self.update_ret.lock().unwrap().clone()
}
- fn update_persisted_channel(&self, _funding_txo: OutPoint, _update: Option<&channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdate>, _data: &channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>, _update_id: MonitorUpdateId) -> chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus {
+ fn update_persisted_channel(&self, _funding_txo: OutPoint, _update: Option<&channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdate>, _data: &channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>, _update_id: MonitorUpdateId) -> chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus {
self.update_ret.lock().unwrap().clone()
}
}
use lightning::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, P2PGossipSync};
use lightning::routing::utxo::UtxoLookup;
use lightning::routing::router::Router;
-use lightning::routing::scoring::{Score, WriteableScore};
+use lightning::routing::scoring::{ScoreUpdate, WriteableScore};
use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
use lightning::util::persist::Persister;
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
fn update_scorer<'a, S: 'static + Deref<Target = SC> + Send + Sync, SC: 'a + WriteableScore<'a>>(
scorer: &'a S, event: &Event
) -> bool {
- let mut score = scorer.lock();
match event {
Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref path, short_channel_id: Some(scid), .. } => {
+ let mut score = scorer.write_lock();
score.payment_path_failed(path, *scid);
},
Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref path, payment_failed_permanently: true, .. } => {
// Reached if the destination explicitly failed it back. We treat this as a successful probe
// because the payment made it all the way to the destination with sufficient liquidity.
+ let mut score = scorer.write_lock();
score.probe_successful(path);
},
Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { path, .. } => {
+ let mut score = scorer.write_lock();
score.payment_path_successful(path);
},
Event::ProbeSuccessful { path, .. } => {
+ let mut score = scorer.write_lock();
score.probe_successful(path);
},
Event::ProbeFailed { path, short_channel_id: Some(scid), .. } => {
+ let mut score = scorer.write_lock();
score.probe_failed(path, *scid);
},
_ => return false,
use lightning::ln::peer_handler::{PeerManager, MessageHandler, SocketDescriptor, IgnoringMessageHandler};
use lightning::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NodeId, P2PGossipSync};
use lightning::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, Path, RouteHop};
- use lightning::routing::scoring::{ChannelUsage, Score};
+ use lightning::routing::scoring::{ChannelUsage, ScoreUpdate, ScoreLookUp};
use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
use lightning::util::ser::Writeable;
use lightning::util::test_utils;
fn write<W: lightning::util::ser::Writer>(&self, _: &mut W) -> Result<(), lightning::io::Error> { Ok(()) }
}
- impl Score for TestScorer {
+ impl ScoreLookUp for TestScorer {
type ScoreParams = ();
fn channel_penalty_msat(
&self, _short_channel_id: u64, _source: &NodeId, _target: &NodeId, _usage: ChannelUsage, _score_params: &Self::ScoreParams
) -> u64 { unimplemented!(); }
+ }
+ impl ScoreUpdate for TestScorer {
fn payment_path_failed(&mut self, actual_path: &Path, actual_short_channel_id: u64) {
if let Some(expectations) = &mut self.event_expectations {
match expectations.pop_front().unwrap() {
use std::convert::From;
use std::convert::TryFrom;
use std::convert::TryInto;
+use std::str::FromStr;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
+impl TryInto<serde_json::Value> for JsonResponse {
+ type Error = std::io::Error;
+ fn try_into(self) -> Result<serde_json::Value, std::io::Error> { Ok(self.0) }
+}
+
/// Conversion from `std::io::Error` into `BlockSourceError`.
impl From<std::io::Error> for BlockSourceError {
fn from(e: std::io::Error) -> BlockSourceError {
}
}
+/// Parses binary data as a block hash.
+impl TryInto<BlockHash> for BinaryResponse {
+ type Error = std::io::Error;
+
+ fn try_into(self) -> std::io::Result<BlockHash> {
+ BlockHash::from_slice(&self.0).map_err(|_|
+ std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, "bad block hash length")
+ )
+ }
+}
+
/// Converts a JSON value into block header data. The JSON value may be an object representing a
/// block header or an array of such objects. In the latter case, the first object is converted.
impl TryInto<BlockHeaderData> for JsonResponse {
}
}
+impl TryInto<BlockHash> for JsonResponse {
+ type Error = std::io::Error;
+
+ fn try_into(self) -> std::io::Result<BlockHash> {
+ match self.0.as_str() {
+ None => Err(std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, "expected JSON string")),
+ Some(hex_data) if hex_data.len() != 64 =>
+ Err(std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, "invalid hash length")),
+ Some(hex_data) => BlockHash::from_str(hex_data)
+ .map_err(|_| std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, "invalid hex data")),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/// The REST `getutxos` endpoint retuns a whole pile of data we don't care about and one bit we do
+/// - whether the `hit bitmap` field had any entries. Thus we condense the result down into only
+/// that.
+pub(crate) struct GetUtxosResponse {
+ pub(crate) hit_bitmap_nonempty: bool
+}
+
+impl TryInto<GetUtxosResponse> for JsonResponse {
+ type Error = std::io::Error;
+
+ fn try_into(self) -> std::io::Result<GetUtxosResponse> {
+ let bitmap_str =
+ self.0.as_object().ok_or(std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, "expected an object"))?
+ .get("bitmap").ok_or(std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, "missing bitmap field"))?
+ .as_str().ok_or(std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, "bitmap should be an str"))?;
+ let mut hit_bitmap_nonempty = false;
+ for c in bitmap_str.chars() {
+ if c < '0' || c > '9' {
+ return Err(std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, "invalid byte"));
+ }
+ if c > '0' { hit_bitmap_nonempty = true; }
+ }
+ Ok(GetUtxosResponse { hit_bitmap_nonempty })
+ }
+}
+
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) mod tests {
use super::*;
--- /dev/null
+//! When fetching gossip from peers, lightning nodes need to validate that gossip against the
+//! current UTXO set. This module defines an implementation of the LDK API required to do so
+//! against a [`BlockSource`] which implements a few additional methods for accessing the UTXO set.
+
+use crate::{AsyncBlockSourceResult, BlockData, BlockSource, BlockSourceError};
+
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Block;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut, OutPoint};
+use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
+
+use lightning::sign::NodeSigner;
+
+use lightning::ln::peer_handler::{CustomMessageHandler, PeerManager, SocketDescriptor};
+use lightning::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, OnionMessageHandler};
+
+use lightning::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, P2PGossipSync};
+use lightning::routing::utxo::{UtxoFuture, UtxoLookup, UtxoResult, UtxoLookupError};
+
+use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
+
+use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+use std::collections::VecDeque;
+use std::future::Future;
+use std::ops::Deref;
+use std::pin::Pin;
+use std::task::Poll;
+
+/// A trait which extends [`BlockSource`] and can be queried to fetch the block at a given height
+/// as well as whether a given output is unspent (i.e. a member of the current UTXO set).
+///
+/// Note that while this is implementable for a [`BlockSource`] which returns filtered block data
+/// (i.e. [`BlockData::HeaderOnly`] for [`BlockSource::get_block`] requests), such an
+/// implementation will reject all gossip as it is not fully able to verify the UTXOs referenced.
+pub trait UtxoSource : BlockSource + 'static {
+ /// Fetches the block hash of the block at the given height.
+ ///
+ /// This will, in turn, be passed to to [`BlockSource::get_block`] to fetch the block needed
+ /// for gossip validation.
+ fn get_block_hash_by_height<'a>(&'a self, block_height: u32) -> AsyncBlockSourceResult<'a, BlockHash>;
+
+ /// Returns true if the given output has *not* been spent, i.e. is a member of the current UTXO
+ /// set.
+ fn is_output_unspent<'a>(&'a self, outpoint: OutPoint) -> AsyncBlockSourceResult<'a, bool>;
+}
+
+/// A generic trait which is able to spawn futures in the background.
+///
+/// If the `tokio` feature is enabled, this is implemented on `TokioSpawner` struct which
+/// delegates to `tokio::spawn()`.
+pub trait FutureSpawner : Send + Sync + 'static {
+ /// Spawns the given future as a background task.
+ ///
+ /// This method MUST NOT block on the given future immediately.
+ fn spawn<T: Future<Output = ()> + Send + 'static>(&self, future: T);
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "tokio")]
+/// A trivial [`FutureSpawner`] which delegates to `tokio::spawn`.
+pub struct TokioSpawner;
+#[cfg(feature = "tokio")]
+impl FutureSpawner for TokioSpawner {
+ fn spawn<T: Future<Output = ()> + Send + 'static>(&self, future: T) {
+ tokio::spawn(future);
+ }
+}
+
+/// A trivial future which joins two other futures and polls them at the same time, returning only
+/// once both complete.
+pub(crate) struct Joiner<
+ A: Future<Output=Result<(BlockHash, Option<u32>), BlockSourceError>> + Unpin,
+ B: Future<Output=Result<BlockHash, BlockSourceError>> + Unpin,
+> {
+ pub a: A,
+ pub b: B,
+ a_res: Option<(BlockHash, Option<u32>)>,
+ b_res: Option<BlockHash>,
+}
+
+impl<
+ A: Future<Output=Result<(BlockHash, Option<u32>), BlockSourceError>> + Unpin,
+ B: Future<Output=Result<BlockHash, BlockSourceError>> + Unpin,
+> Joiner<A, B> {
+ fn new(a: A, b: B) -> Self { Self { a, b, a_res: None, b_res: None } }
+}
+
+impl<
+ A: Future<Output=Result<(BlockHash, Option<u32>), BlockSourceError>> + Unpin,
+ B: Future<Output=Result<BlockHash, BlockSourceError>> + Unpin,
+> Future for Joiner<A, B> {
+ type Output = Result<((BlockHash, Option<u32>), BlockHash), BlockSourceError>;
+ fn poll(mut self: Pin<&mut Self>, ctx: &mut core::task::Context<'_>) -> Poll<Self::Output> {
+ if self.a_res.is_none() {
+ match Pin::new(&mut self.a).poll(ctx) {
+ Poll::Ready(res) => {
+ if let Ok(ok) = res {
+ self.a_res = Some(ok);
+ } else {
+ return Poll::Ready(Err(res.unwrap_err()));
+ }
+ },
+ Poll::Pending => {},
+ }
+ }
+ if self.b_res.is_none() {
+ match Pin::new(&mut self.b).poll(ctx) {
+ Poll::Ready(res) => {
+ if let Ok(ok) = res {
+ self.b_res = Some(ok);
+ } else {
+ return Poll::Ready(Err(res.unwrap_err()));
+ }
+
+ },
+ Poll::Pending => {},
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(b_res) = self.b_res {
+ if let Some(a_res) = self.a_res {
+ return Poll::Ready(Ok((a_res, b_res)))
+ }
+ }
+ Poll::Pending
+ }
+}
+
+/// A struct which wraps a [`UtxoSource`] and a few LDK objects and implements the LDK
+/// [`UtxoLookup`] trait.
+///
+/// Note that if you're using this against a Bitcoin Core REST or RPC server, you likely wish to
+/// increase the `rpcworkqueue` setting in Bitcoin Core as LDK attempts to parallelize requests (a
+/// value of 1024 should more than suffice), and ensure you have sufficient file descriptors
+/// available on both Bitcoin Core and your LDK application for each request to hold its own
+/// connection.
+pub struct GossipVerifier<S: FutureSpawner,
+ Blocks: Deref + Send + Sync + 'static + Clone,
+ L: Deref + Send + Sync + 'static,
+ Descriptor: SocketDescriptor + Send + Sync + 'static,
+ CM: Deref + Send + Sync + 'static,
+ OM: Deref + Send + Sync + 'static,
+ CMH: Deref + Send + Sync + 'static,
+ NS: Deref + Send + Sync + 'static,
+> where
+ Blocks::Target: UtxoSource,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+ CM::Target: ChannelMessageHandler,
+ OM::Target: OnionMessageHandler,
+ CMH::Target: CustomMessageHandler,
+ NS::Target: NodeSigner,
+{
+ source: Blocks,
+ peer_manager: Arc<PeerManager<Descriptor, CM, Arc<P2PGossipSync<Arc<NetworkGraph<L>>, Self, L>>, OM, L, CMH, NS>>,
+ gossiper: Arc<P2PGossipSync<Arc<NetworkGraph<L>>, Self, L>>,
+ spawn: S,
+ block_cache: Arc<Mutex<VecDeque<(u32, Block)>>>,
+}
+
+const BLOCK_CACHE_SIZE: usize = 5;
+
+impl<S: FutureSpawner,
+ Blocks: Deref + Send + Sync + Clone,
+ L: Deref + Send + Sync,
+ Descriptor: SocketDescriptor + Send + Sync,
+ CM: Deref + Send + Sync,
+ OM: Deref + Send + Sync,
+ CMH: Deref + Send + Sync,
+ NS: Deref + Send + Sync,
+> GossipVerifier<S, Blocks, L, Descriptor, CM, OM, CMH, NS> where
+ Blocks::Target: UtxoSource,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+ CM::Target: ChannelMessageHandler,
+ OM::Target: OnionMessageHandler,
+ CMH::Target: CustomMessageHandler,
+ NS::Target: NodeSigner,
+{
+ /// Constructs a new [`GossipVerifier`].
+ ///
+ /// This is expected to be given to a [`P2PGossipSync`] (initially constructed with `None` for
+ /// the UTXO lookup) via [`P2PGossipSync::add_utxo_lookup`].
+ pub fn new(source: Blocks, spawn: S, gossiper: Arc<P2PGossipSync<Arc<NetworkGraph<L>>, Self, L>>, peer_manager: Arc<PeerManager<Descriptor, CM, Arc<P2PGossipSync<Arc<NetworkGraph<L>>, Self, L>>, OM, L, CMH, NS>>) -> Self {
+ Self {
+ source, spawn, gossiper, peer_manager,
+ block_cache: Arc::new(Mutex::new(VecDeque::with_capacity(BLOCK_CACHE_SIZE))),
+ }
+ }
+
+ async fn retrieve_utxo(
+ source: Blocks, block_cache: Arc<Mutex<VecDeque<(u32, Block)>>>, short_channel_id: u64
+ ) -> Result<TxOut, UtxoLookupError> {
+ let block_height = (short_channel_id >> 5 * 8) as u32; // block height is most significant three bytes
+ let transaction_index = ((short_channel_id >> 2 * 8) & 0xffffff) as u32;
+ let output_index = (short_channel_id & 0xffff) as u16;
+
+ let (outpoint, output);
+
+ 'tx_found: loop { // Used as a simple goto
+ macro_rules! process_block {
+ ($block: expr) => { {
+ if transaction_index as usize >= $block.txdata.len() {
+ return Err(UtxoLookupError::UnknownTx);
+ }
+ let transaction = &$block.txdata[transaction_index as usize];
+ if output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() {
+ return Err(UtxoLookupError::UnknownTx);
+ }
+
+ outpoint = OutPoint::new(transaction.txid(), output_index.into());
+ output = transaction.output[output_index as usize].clone();
+ } }
+ }
+ {
+ let recent_blocks = block_cache.lock().unwrap();
+ for (height, block) in recent_blocks.iter() {
+ if *height == block_height {
+ process_block!(block);
+ break 'tx_found;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let ((_, tip_height_opt), block_hash) =
+ Joiner::new(source.get_best_block(), source.get_block_hash_by_height(block_height))
+ .await
+ .map_err(|_| UtxoLookupError::UnknownTx)?;
+ if let Some(tip_height) = tip_height_opt {
+ // If the block doesn't yet have five confirmations, error out.
+ //
+ // The BOLT spec requires nodes wait for six confirmations before announcing a
+ // channel, and we give them one block of headroom in case we're delayed seeing a
+ // block.
+ if block_height + 5 > tip_height {
+ return Err(UtxoLookupError::UnknownTx);
+ }
+ }
+ let block_data = source.get_block(&block_hash).await
+ .map_err(|_| UtxoLookupError::UnknownTx)?;
+ let block = match block_data {
+ BlockData::HeaderOnly(_) => return Err(UtxoLookupError::UnknownTx),
+ BlockData::FullBlock(block) => block,
+ };
+ process_block!(block);
+ {
+ let mut recent_blocks = block_cache.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut insert = true;
+ for (height, _) in recent_blocks.iter() {
+ if *height == block_height {
+ insert = false;
+ }
+ }
+ if insert {
+ if recent_blocks.len() >= BLOCK_CACHE_SIZE {
+ recent_blocks.pop_front();
+ }
+ recent_blocks.push_back((block_height, block));
+ }
+ }
+ break 'tx_found;
+ };
+ let outpoint_unspent =
+ source.is_output_unspent(outpoint).await.map_err(|_| UtxoLookupError::UnknownTx)?;
+ if outpoint_unspent {
+ Ok(output)
+ } else {
+ Err(UtxoLookupError::UnknownTx)
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl<S: FutureSpawner,
+ Blocks: Deref + Send + Sync + Clone,
+ L: Deref + Send + Sync,
+ Descriptor: SocketDescriptor + Send + Sync,
+ CM: Deref + Send + Sync,
+ OM: Deref + Send + Sync,
+ CMH: Deref + Send + Sync,
+ NS: Deref + Send + Sync,
+> Deref for GossipVerifier<S, Blocks, L, Descriptor, CM, OM, CMH, NS> where
+ Blocks::Target: UtxoSource,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+ CM::Target: ChannelMessageHandler,
+ OM::Target: OnionMessageHandler,
+ CMH::Target: CustomMessageHandler,
+ NS::Target: NodeSigner,
+{
+ type Target = Self;
+ fn deref(&self) -> &Self { self }
+}
+
+
+impl<S: FutureSpawner,
+ Blocks: Deref + Send + Sync + Clone,
+ L: Deref + Send + Sync,
+ Descriptor: SocketDescriptor + Send + Sync,
+ CM: Deref + Send + Sync,
+ OM: Deref + Send + Sync,
+ CMH: Deref + Send + Sync,
+ NS: Deref + Send + Sync,
+> UtxoLookup for GossipVerifier<S, Blocks, L, Descriptor, CM, OM, CMH, NS> where
+ Blocks::Target: UtxoSource,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+ CM::Target: ChannelMessageHandler,
+ OM::Target: OnionMessageHandler,
+ CMH::Target: CustomMessageHandler,
+ NS::Target: NodeSigner,
+{
+ fn get_utxo(&self, _genesis_hash: &BlockHash, short_channel_id: u64) -> UtxoResult {
+ let res = UtxoFuture::new();
+ let fut = res.clone();
+ let source = self.source.clone();
+ let gossiper = Arc::clone(&self.gossiper);
+ let block_cache = Arc::clone(&self.block_cache);
+ let pm = Arc::clone(&self.peer_manager);
+ self.spawn.spawn(async move {
+ let res = Self::retrieve_utxo(source, block_cache, short_channel_id).await;
+ fut.resolve(gossiper.network_graph(), &*gossiper, res);
+ pm.process_events();
+ });
+ UtxoResult::Async(res)
+ }
+}
pub mod init;
pub mod poll;
+pub mod gossip;
+
#[cfg(feature = "rest-client")]
pub mod rest;
use crate::{BlockData, BlockHeaderData, BlockSource, AsyncBlockSourceResult};
use crate::http::{BinaryResponse, HttpEndpoint, HttpClient, JsonResponse};
+use crate::gossip::UtxoSource;
+use crate::convert::GetUtxosResponse;
+use bitcoin::OutPoint;
use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
}
}
+impl UtxoSource for RestClient {
+ fn get_block_hash_by_height<'a>(&'a self, block_height: u32) -> AsyncBlockSourceResult<'a, BlockHash> {
+ Box::pin(async move {
+ let resource_path = format!("blockhashbyheight/{}.bin", block_height);
+ Ok(self.request_resource::<BinaryResponse, _>(&resource_path).await?)
+ })
+ }
+
+ fn is_output_unspent<'a>(&'a self, outpoint: OutPoint) -> AsyncBlockSourceResult<'a, bool> {
+ Box::pin(async move {
+ let resource_path = format!("getutxos/{}-{}.json", outpoint.txid.to_hex(), outpoint.vout);
+ let utxo_result =
+ self.request_resource::<JsonResponse, GetUtxosResponse>(&resource_path).await?;
+ Ok(utxo_result.hit_bitmap_nonempty)
+ })
+ }
+}
+
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::http::BinaryResponse;
use crate::http::client_tests::{HttpServer, MessageBody};
+ use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
/// Parses binary data as a string-encoded `u32`.
impl TryInto<u32> for BinaryResponse {
Ok(n) => assert_eq!(n, 42),
}
}
+
+ #[tokio::test]
+ async fn parses_negative_getutxos() {
+ let server = HttpServer::responding_with_ok(MessageBody::Content(
+ // A real response contains a few more fields, but we actually only look at the
+ // "bitmap" field, so this should suffice for testing
+ "{\"chainHeight\": 1, \"bitmap\":\"0\",\"utxos\":[]}"
+ ));
+ let client = RestClient::new(server.endpoint()).unwrap();
+
+ let outpoint = OutPoint::new(bitcoin::Txid::from_inner([0; 32]), 0);
+ let unspent_output = client.is_output_unspent(outpoint).await.unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(unspent_output, false);
+ }
+
+ #[tokio::test]
+ async fn parses_positive_getutxos() {
+ let server = HttpServer::responding_with_ok(MessageBody::Content(
+ // A real response contains lots more data, but we actually only look at the "bitmap"
+ // field, so this should suffice for testing
+ "{\"chainHeight\": 1, \"bitmap\":\"1\",\"utxos\":[]}"
+ ));
+ let client = RestClient::new(server.endpoint()).unwrap();
+
+ let outpoint = OutPoint::new(bitcoin::Txid::from_inner([0; 32]), 0);
+ let unspent_output = client.is_output_unspent(outpoint).await.unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(unspent_output, true);
+ }
}
use crate::{BlockData, BlockHeaderData, BlockSource, AsyncBlockSourceResult};
use crate::http::{HttpClient, HttpEndpoint, HttpError, JsonResponse};
+use crate::gossip::UtxoSource;
use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
+use bitcoin::OutPoint;
use std::sync::Mutex;
return Err(std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::Other, rpc_error));
}
- let result = &mut response["result"];
- if result.is_null() {
- return Err(std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, "expected JSON result"));
- }
+ let result = match response.get_mut("result") {
+ Some(result) => result.take(),
+ None =>
+ return Err(std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, "expected JSON result")),
+ };
- JsonResponse(result.take()).try_into()
+ JsonResponse(result).try_into()
}
}
}
}
+impl UtxoSource for RpcClient {
+ fn get_block_hash_by_height<'a>(&'a self, block_height: u32) -> AsyncBlockSourceResult<'a, BlockHash> {
+ Box::pin(async move {
+ let height_param = serde_json::json!(block_height);
+ Ok(self.call_method("getblockhash", &[height_param]).await?)
+ })
+ }
+
+ fn is_output_unspent<'a>(&'a self, outpoint: OutPoint) -> AsyncBlockSourceResult<'a, bool> {
+ Box::pin(async move {
+ let txid_param = serde_json::json!(outpoint.txid.to_hex());
+ let vout_param = serde_json::json!(outpoint.vout);
+ let include_mempool = serde_json::json!(false);
+ let utxo_opt: serde_json::Value = self.call_method(
+ "gettxout", &[txid_param, vout_param, include_mempool]).await?;
+ Ok(!utxo_opt.is_null())
+ })
+ }
+}
+
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::http::client_tests::{HttpServer, MessageBody};
+ use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
+
/// Credentials encoded in base64.
const CREDENTIALS: &'static str = "dXNlcjpwYXNzd29yZA==";
#[tokio::test]
async fn call_method_returning_missing_result() {
- let response = serde_json::json!({ "result": null });
+ let response = serde_json::json!({ });
let server = HttpServer::responding_with_ok(MessageBody::Content(response));
let client = RpcClient::new(CREDENTIALS, server.endpoint()).unwrap();
Ok(count) => assert_eq!(count, 654470),
}
}
+
+ #[tokio::test]
+ async fn fails_to_fetch_spent_utxo() {
+ let response = serde_json::json!({ "result": null });
+ let server = HttpServer::responding_with_ok(MessageBody::Content(response));
+ let client = RpcClient::new(CREDENTIALS, server.endpoint()).unwrap();
+ let outpoint = OutPoint::new(bitcoin::Txid::from_inner([0; 32]), 0);
+ let unspent_output = client.is_output_unspent(outpoint).await.unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(unspent_output, false);
+ }
+
+ #[tokio::test]
+ async fn fetches_utxo() {
+ let response = serde_json::json!({ "result": {"bestblock": 1, "confirmations": 42}});
+ let server = HttpServer::responding_with_ok(MessageBody::Content(response));
+ let client = RpcClient::new(CREDENTIALS, server.endpoint()).unwrap();
+ let outpoint = OutPoint::new(bitcoin::Txid::from_inner([0; 32]), 0);
+ let unspent_output = client.is_output_unspent(outpoint).await.unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(unspent_output, true);
+ }
}
log_trace!(logger, "Considering {} channels for invoice route hints", channels.len());
for channel in channels.into_iter().filter(|chan| chan.is_channel_ready) {
if channel.get_inbound_payment_scid().is_none() || channel.counterparty.forwarding_info.is_none() {
- log_trace!(logger, "Ignoring channel {} for invoice route hints", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id));
+ log_trace!(logger, "Ignoring channel {} for invoice route hints", &channel.channel_id);
continue;
}
// If any public channel exists, return no hints and let the sender
// look at the public channels instead.
log_trace!(logger, "Not including channels in invoice route hints on account of public channel {}",
- log_bytes!(channel.channel_id));
+ &channel.channel_id);
return vec![].into_iter().take(MAX_CHANNEL_HINTS).map(route_hint_from_channel);
}
}
log_trace!(logger,
"Preferring counterparty {} channel {} (SCID {:?}, {} msats) over {} (SCID {:?}, {} msats) for invoice route hints",
log_pubkey!(channel.counterparty.node_id),
- log_bytes!(channel.channel_id), channel.short_channel_id,
+ &channel.channel_id, channel.short_channel_id,
channel.inbound_capacity_msat,
- log_bytes!(entry.get().channel_id), entry.get().short_channel_id,
+ &entry.get().channel_id, entry.get().short_channel_id,
current_max_capacity);
entry.insert(channel);
} else {
log_trace!(logger,
"Preferring counterparty {} channel {} (SCID {:?}, {} msats) over {} (SCID {:?}, {} msats) for invoice route hints",
log_pubkey!(channel.counterparty.node_id),
- log_bytes!(entry.get().channel_id), entry.get().short_channel_id,
+ &entry.get().channel_id, entry.get().short_channel_id,
current_max_capacity,
- log_bytes!(channel.channel_id), channel.short_channel_id,
+ &channel.channel_id, channel.short_channel_id,
channel.inbound_capacity_msat);
}
}
if include_channel {
log_trace!(logger, "Including channel {} in invoice route hints",
- log_bytes!(channel.channel_id));
+ &channel.channel_id);
} else if !has_enough_capacity {
log_trace!(logger, "Ignoring channel {} without enough capacity for invoice route hints",
- log_bytes!(channel.channel_id));
+ &channel.channel_id);
} else {
debug_assert!(!channel.is_usable || (has_pub_unconf_chan && !channel.is_public));
log_trace!(logger, "Ignoring channel {} with disconnected peer",
- log_bytes!(channel.channel_id));
+ &channel.channel_id);
}
include_channel
[dependencies]
bitcoin = "0.29.0"
lightning = { version = "0.0.116", path = "../lightning" }
-tokio = { version = "1.0", features = [ "io-util", "rt", "sync", "net", "time" ] }
+tokio = { version = "1.0", features = [ "rt", "sync", "net", "time" ] }
[dev-dependencies]
-tokio = { version = "1.14", features = [ "io-util", "macros", "rt", "rt-multi-thread", "sync", "net", "time" ] }
+tokio = { version = "1.14", features = [ "macros", "rt", "rt-multi-thread", "sync", "net", "time" ] }
lightning = { version = "0.0.116", path = "../lightning", features = ["_test_utils"] }
use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
-use tokio::net::TcpStream;
+use tokio::net::{tcp, TcpStream};
use tokio::{io, time};
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
-use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWrite, AsyncWriteExt};
+use tokio::io::AsyncWrite;
use lightning::ln::peer_handler;
use lightning::ln::peer_handler::SocketDescriptor as LnSocketTrait;
// define a trivial two- and three- select macro with the specific types we need and just use that.
pub(crate) enum SelectorOutput {
- A(Option<()>), B(Option<()>), C(tokio::io::Result<usize>),
+ A(Option<()>), B(Option<()>), C(tokio::io::Result<()>),
}
pub(crate) struct TwoSelector<
}
pub(crate) struct ThreeSelector<
- A: Future<Output=Option<()>> + Unpin, B: Future<Output=Option<()>> + Unpin, C: Future<Output=tokio::io::Result<usize>> + Unpin
+ A: Future<Output=Option<()>> + Unpin, B: Future<Output=Option<()>> + Unpin, C: Future<Output=tokio::io::Result<()>> + Unpin
> {
pub a: A,
pub b: B,
}
impl<
- A: Future<Output=Option<()>> + Unpin, B: Future<Output=Option<()>> + Unpin, C: Future<Output=tokio::io::Result<usize>> + Unpin
+ A: Future<Output=Option<()>> + Unpin, B: Future<Output=Option<()>> + Unpin, C: Future<Output=tokio::io::Result<()>> + Unpin
> Future for ThreeSelector<A, B, C> {
type Output = SelectorOutput;
fn poll(mut self: Pin<&mut Self>, ctx: &mut task::Context<'_>) -> Poll<SelectorOutput> {
/// Connection object (in an Arc<Mutex<>>) in each SocketDescriptor we create as well as in the
/// read future (which is returned by schedule_read).
struct Connection {
- writer: Option<io::WriteHalf<TcpStream>>,
+ writer: Option<Arc<TcpStream>>,
// Because our PeerManager is templated by user-provided types, and we can't (as far as I can
// tell) have a const RawWakerVTable built out of templated functions, we need some indirection
// between being woken up with write-ready and calling PeerManager::write_buffer_space_avail.
async fn schedule_read<PM: Deref + 'static + Send + Sync + Clone>(
peer_manager: PM,
us: Arc<Mutex<Self>>,
- mut reader: io::ReadHalf<TcpStream>,
+ reader: Arc<TcpStream>,
mut read_wake_receiver: mpsc::Receiver<()>,
mut write_avail_receiver: mpsc::Receiver<()>,
) where PM::Target: APeerManager<Descriptor = SocketDescriptor> {
ThreeSelector {
a: Box::pin(write_avail_receiver.recv()),
b: Box::pin(read_wake_receiver.recv()),
- c: Box::pin(reader.read(&mut buf)),
+ c: Box::pin(reader.readable()),
}.await
};
match select_result {
}
},
SelectorOutput::B(_) => {},
- SelectorOutput::C(read) => {
- match read {
+ SelectorOutput::C(res) => {
+ if res.is_err() { break Disconnect::PeerDisconnected; }
+ match reader.try_read(&mut buf) {
Ok(0) => break Disconnect::PeerDisconnected,
Ok(len) => {
let read_res = peer_manager.as_ref().read_event(&mut our_descriptor, &buf[0..len]);
Err(_) => break Disconnect::CloseConnection,
}
},
- Err(_) => break Disconnect::PeerDisconnected,
+ Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock => {
+ // readable() is allowed to spuriously wake, so we have to handle
+ // WouldBlock here.
+ },
+ Err(e) => break Disconnect::PeerDisconnected,
}
},
}
// here.
let _ = tokio::task::yield_now().await;
};
- let writer_option = us.lock().unwrap().writer.take();
- if let Some(mut writer) = writer_option {
- // If the socket is already closed, shutdown() will fail, so just ignore it.
- let _ = writer.shutdown().await;
- }
+ us.lock().unwrap().writer.take();
if let Disconnect::PeerDisconnected = disconnect_type {
peer_manager.as_ref().socket_disconnected(&our_descriptor);
peer_manager.as_ref().process_events();
}
}
- fn new(stream: StdTcpStream) -> (io::ReadHalf<TcpStream>, mpsc::Receiver<()>, mpsc::Receiver<()>, Arc<Mutex<Self>>) {
+ fn new(stream: StdTcpStream) -> (Arc<TcpStream>, mpsc::Receiver<()>, mpsc::Receiver<()>, Arc<Mutex<Self>>) {
// We only ever need a channel of depth 1 here: if we returned a non-full write to the
// PeerManager, we will eventually get notified that there is room in the socket to write
// new bytes, which will generate an event. That event will be popped off the queue before
// false.
let (read_waker, read_receiver) = mpsc::channel(1);
stream.set_nonblocking(true).unwrap();
- let (reader, writer) = io::split(TcpStream::from_std(stream).unwrap());
+ let tokio_stream = Arc::new(TcpStream::from_std(stream).unwrap());
- (reader, write_receiver, read_receiver,
+ (Arc::clone(&tokio_stream), write_receiver, read_receiver,
Arc::new(Mutex::new(Self {
- writer: Some(writer), write_avail, read_waker, read_paused: false,
+ writer: Some(tokio_stream), write_avail, read_waker, read_paused: false,
rl_requested_disconnect: false,
id: ID_COUNTER.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel)
})))
}
impl peer_handler::SocketDescriptor for SocketDescriptor {
fn send_data(&mut self, data: &[u8], resume_read: bool) -> usize {
- // To send data, we take a lock on our Connection to access the WriteHalf of the TcpStream,
- // writing to it if there's room in the kernel buffer, or otherwise create a new Waker with
- // a SocketDescriptor in it which can wake up the write_avail Sender, waking up the
+ // To send data, we take a lock on our Connection to access the TcpStream, writing to it if
+ // there's room in the kernel buffer, or otherwise create a new Waker with a
+ // SocketDescriptor in it which can wake up the write_avail Sender, waking up the
// processing future which will call write_buffer_space_avail and we'll end up back here.
let mut us = self.conn.lock().unwrap();
if us.writer.is_none() {
let mut ctx = task::Context::from_waker(&waker);
let mut written_len = 0;
loop {
- match std::pin::Pin::new(us.writer.as_mut().unwrap()).poll_write(&mut ctx, &data[written_len..]) {
- task::Poll::Ready(Ok(res)) => {
- // The tokio docs *seem* to indicate this can't happen, and I certainly don't
- // know how to handle it if it does (cause it should be a Poll::Pending
- // instead):
- assert_ne!(res, 0);
- written_len += res;
- if written_len == data.len() { return written_len; }
- },
- task::Poll::Ready(Err(e)) => {
- // The tokio docs *seem* to indicate this can't happen, and I certainly don't
- // know how to handle it if it does (cause it should be a Poll::Pending
- // instead):
- assert_ne!(e.kind(), io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock);
- // Probably we've already been closed, just return what we have and let the
- // read thread handle closing logic.
- return written_len;
+ match us.writer.as_ref().unwrap().poll_write_ready(&mut ctx) {
+ task::Poll::Ready(Ok(())) => {
+ match us.writer.as_ref().unwrap().try_write(&data[written_len..]) {
+ Ok(res) => {
+ debug_assert_ne!(res, 0);
+ written_len += res;
+ if written_len == data.len() { return written_len; }
+ },
+ Err(e) => return written_len,
+ }
},
+ task::Poll::Ready(Err(e)) => return written_len,
task::Poll::Pending => {
// We're queued up for a write event now, but we need to make sure we also
// pause read given we're now waiting on the remote end to ACK (and in
use crate::prelude::*;
use crate::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, Mutex, MutexGuard};
+use core::iter::FromIterator;
use core::ops::Deref;
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
where
FN: Fn(&ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>, &TransactionData) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
{
+ let funding_outpoints: HashSet<OutPoint> = HashSet::from_iter(self.monitors.read().unwrap().keys().cloned());
+ for funding_outpoint in funding_outpoints.iter() {
+ let monitor_lock = self.monitors.read().unwrap();
+ if let Some(monitor_state) = monitor_lock.get(funding_outpoint) {
+ self.update_monitor_with_chain_data(header, best_height, txdata, &process, funding_outpoint, &monitor_state);
+ }
+ }
+
+ // do some followup cleanup if any funding outpoints were added in between iterations
let monitor_states = self.monitors.write().unwrap();
+ for (funding_outpoint, monitor_state) in monitor_states.iter() {
+ if !funding_outpoints.contains(funding_outpoint) {
+ self.update_monitor_with_chain_data(header, best_height, txdata, &process, funding_outpoint, &monitor_state);
+ }
+ }
+
if let Some(height) = best_height {
// If the best block height is being updated, update highest_chain_height under the
// monitors write lock.
self.highest_chain_height.store(new_height, Ordering::Release);
}
}
+ }
- for (funding_outpoint, monitor_state) in monitor_states.iter() {
- let monitor = &monitor_state.monitor;
- let mut txn_outputs;
- {
- txn_outputs = process(monitor, txdata);
- let update_id = MonitorUpdateId {
- contents: UpdateOrigin::ChainSync(self.sync_persistence_id.get_increment()),
- };
- let mut pending_monitor_updates = monitor_state.pending_monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
- if let Some(height) = best_height {
- if !monitor_state.has_pending_chainsync_updates(&pending_monitor_updates) {
- // If there are not ChainSync persists awaiting completion, go ahead and
- // set last_chain_persist_height here - we wouldn't want the first
- // InProgress to always immediately be considered "overly delayed".
- monitor_state.last_chain_persist_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
- }
+ fn update_monitor_with_chain_data<FN>(&self, header: &BlockHeader, best_height: Option<u32>, txdata: &TransactionData, process: FN, funding_outpoint: &OutPoint, monitor_state: &MonitorHolder<ChannelSigner>) where FN: Fn(&ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>, &TransactionData) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs> {
+ let monitor = &monitor_state.monitor;
+ let mut txn_outputs;
+ {
+ txn_outputs = process(monitor, txdata);
+ let update_id = MonitorUpdateId {
+ contents: UpdateOrigin::ChainSync(self.sync_persistence_id.get_increment()),
+ };
+ let mut pending_monitor_updates = monitor_state.pending_monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
+ if let Some(height) = best_height {
+ if !monitor_state.has_pending_chainsync_updates(&pending_monitor_updates) {
+ // If there are not ChainSync persists awaiting completion, go ahead and
+ // set last_chain_persist_height here - we wouldn't want the first
+ // InProgress to always immediately be considered "overly delayed".
+ monitor_state.last_chain_persist_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
}
+ }
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Syncing Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor));
- match self.persister.update_persisted_channel(*funding_outpoint, None, monitor, update_id) {
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed =>
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Finished syncing Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor)),
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
- monitor_state.channel_perm_failed.store(true, Ordering::Release);
- self.pending_monitor_events.lock().unwrap().push((*funding_outpoint, vec![MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(*funding_outpoint)], monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()));
- self.event_notifier.notify();
- },
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Channel Monitor sync for channel {} in progress, holding events until completion!", log_funding_info!(monitor));
- pending_monitor_updates.push(update_id);
- },
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Syncing Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor));
+ match self.persister.update_persisted_channel(*funding_outpoint, None, monitor, update_id) {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed =>
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Finished syncing Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor)),
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
+ monitor_state.channel_perm_failed.store(true, Ordering::Release);
+ self.pending_monitor_events.lock().unwrap().push((*funding_outpoint, vec![MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(*funding_outpoint)], monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()));
+ self.event_notifier.notify();
+ }
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Channel Monitor sync for channel {} in progress, holding events until completion!", log_funding_info!(monitor));
+ pending_monitor_updates.push(update_id);
}
}
+ }
- // Register any new outputs with the chain source for filtering, storing any dependent
- // transactions from within the block that previously had not been included in txdata.
- if let Some(ref chain_source) = self.chain_source {
- let block_hash = header.block_hash();
- for (txid, mut outputs) in txn_outputs.drain(..) {
- for (idx, output) in outputs.drain(..) {
- // Register any new outputs with the chain source for filtering
- let output = WatchedOutput {
- block_hash: Some(block_hash),
- outpoint: OutPoint { txid, index: idx as u16 },
- script_pubkey: output.script_pubkey,
- };
- chain_source.register_output(output)
- }
+ // Register any new outputs with the chain source for filtering, storing any dependent
+ // transactions from within the block that previously had not been included in txdata.
+ if let Some(ref chain_source) = self.chain_source {
+ let block_hash = header.block_hash();
+ for (txid, mut outputs) in txn_outputs.drain(..) {
+ for (idx, output) in outputs.drain(..) {
+ // Register any new outputs with the chain source for filtering
+ let output = WatchedOutput {
+ block_hash: Some(block_hash),
+ outpoint: OutPoint { txid, index: idx as u16 },
+ script_pubkey: output.script_pubkey,
+ };
+ chain_source.register_output(output)
}
}
}
assert!(err.contains("ChannelMonitor storage failure")));
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2); // After the failure we generate a close-channel monitor update
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() },
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() },
[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
// However, as the ChainMonitor is still waiting for the original persistence to complete,
}
} else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
log_error!(logger, "WARNING: You have a potentially-unsafe holder commitment transaction available to broadcast");
- log_error!(logger, " in channel monitor for channel {}!", log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()));
+ log_error!(logger, " in channel monitor for channel {}!", &self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id());
log_error!(logger, " Read the docs for ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn and take manual action!");
} else {
// If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed, the ChannelManager
if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
- log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), txid);
+ &self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id(), txid);
self.funding_spend_seen = true;
let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
//! Types describing on-chain transactions.
+use crate::ln::ChannelId;
use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
+use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
impl OutPoint {
/// Convert an `OutPoint` to a lightning channel id.
- pub fn to_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
- let mut res = [0; 32];
- res[..].copy_from_slice(&self.txid[..]);
- res[30] ^= ((self.index >> 8) & 0xff) as u8;
- res[31] ^= ((self.index >> 0) & 0xff) as u8;
- res
+ pub fn to_channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
+ ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&self.txid.as_inner(), self.index)
}
/// Converts this OutPoint into the OutPoint field as used by rust-bitcoin
assert_eq!(&OutPoint {
txid: tx.txid(),
index: 0
- }.to_channel_id(), &hex::decode("3e88dd7165faf7be58b3c5bb2c9c452aebef682807ea57080f62e6f6e113c25e").unwrap()[..]);
+ }.to_channel_id().0[..], &hex::decode("3e88dd7165faf7be58b3c5bb2c9c452aebef682807ea57080f62e6f6e113c25e").unwrap()[..]);
assert_eq!(&OutPoint {
txid: tx.txid(),
index: 1
- }.to_channel_id(), &hex::decode("3e88dd7165faf7be58b3c5bb2c9c452aebef682807ea57080f62e6f6e113c25f").unwrap()[..]);
+ }.to_channel_id().0[..], &hex::decode("3e88dd7165faf7be58b3c5bb2c9c452aebef682807ea57080f62e6f6e113c25f").unwrap()[..]);
}
}
use crate::ln::channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS;
use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
use crate::ln::msgs;
-use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
+use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkUpdate;
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable, Readable, RequiredWrapper, UpgradableRequired, WithoutLength};
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ClaimedHTLC {
/// The `channel_id` of the channel over which the HTLC was received.
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The `user_channel_id` of the channel over which the HTLC was received. This is the value
/// passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound channels, or to
/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
/// counterparty node information.
node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
/// The outgoing `channel_id` between us and the next node.
- channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId,
},
/// Scenario where we are unsure of the next node to forward the HTLC to.
UnknownNextHop {
/// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`].
///
/// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated
- temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ temporary_channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The counterparty's node_id, which you'll need to pass back into
/// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`].
///
/// payment is to pay an invoice or to send a spontaneous payment.
purpose: PaymentPurpose,
/// The `channel_id` indicating over which channel we received the payment.
- via_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>,
+ via_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
/// The `user_channel_id` indicating over which channel we received the payment.
via_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
/// The block height at which this payment will be failed back and will no longer be
/// The `channel_id` indicating which channel the spendable outputs belong to.
///
/// This will always be `Some` for events generated by LDK versions 0.0.117 and above.
- channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>,
+ channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
},
/// This event is generated when a payment has been successfully forwarded through us and a
/// forwarding fee earned.
PaymentForwarded {
/// The incoming channel between the previous node and us. This is only `None` for events
/// generated or serialized by versions prior to 0.0.107.
- prev_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>,
+ prev_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
/// The outgoing channel between the next node and us. This is only `None` for events
/// generated or serialized by versions prior to 0.0.107.
- next_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>,
+ next_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
/// The fee, in milli-satoshis, which was earned as a result of the payment.
///
/// Note that if we force-closed the channel over which we forwarded an HTLC while the HTLC
/// [`Event::ChannelReady`] event.
ChannelPending {
/// The `channel_id` of the channel that is pending confirmation.
- channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
/// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
/// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
/// The `temporary_channel_id` this channel used to be known by during channel establishment.
///
/// Will be `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
- former_temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>,
+ former_temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
/// The `node_id` of the channel counterparty.
counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
/// The outpoint of the channel's funding transaction.
/// establishment.
ChannelReady {
/// The `channel_id` of the channel that is ready.
- channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
/// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
/// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
ChannelClosed {
/// The `channel_id` of the channel which has been closed. Note that on-chain transactions
/// resolving the channel are likely still awaiting confirmation.
- channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
/// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
/// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
/// inputs for another purpose.
DiscardFunding {
/// The channel_id of the channel which has been closed.
- channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The full transaction received from the user
transaction: Transaction
},
///
/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
/// [`ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn
- temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ temporary_channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The node_id of the counterparty requesting to open the channel.
///
/// When responding to the request, the `counterparty_node_id` should be passed
/// requirements (i.e. insufficient fees paid, or a CLTV that is too soon).
HTLCHandlingFailed {
/// The channel over which the HTLC was received.
- prev_channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
/// Destination of the HTLC that failed to be processed.
failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination,
},
5u8 => {
let f = || {
let mut outputs = WithoutLength(Vec::new());
- let mut channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
+ let mut channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, outputs, required),
(1, channel_id, option),
},
9u8 => {
let f = || {
- let mut channel_id = [0; 32];
+ let mut channel_id = ChannelId::new_zero();
let mut reason = UpgradableRequired(None);
let mut user_channel_id_low_opt: Option<u64> = None;
let mut user_channel_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
},
11u8 => {
let f = || {
- let mut channel_id = [0; 32];
+ let mut channel_id = ChannelId::new_zero();
let mut transaction = Transaction{ version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, channel_id, required),
},
25u8 => {
let f = || {
- let mut prev_channel_id = [0; 32];
+ let mut prev_channel_id = ChannelId::new_zero();
let mut failed_next_destination_opt = UpgradableRequired(None);
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, prev_channel_id, required),
27u8 => Ok(None),
29u8 => {
let f = || {
- let mut channel_id = [0; 32];
+ let mut channel_id = ChannelId::new_zero();
let mut user_channel_id: u128 = 0;
let mut counterparty_node_id = RequiredWrapper(None);
let mut channel_type = RequiredWrapper(None);
},
31u8 => {
let f = || {
- let mut channel_id = [0; 32];
+ let mut channel_id = ChannelId::new_zero();
let mut user_channel_id: u128 = 0;
let mut former_temporary_channel_id = None;
let mut counterparty_node_id = RequiredWrapper(None);
use crate::ln::channel::AnnouncementSigsState;
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler};
-use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
+use crate::util::test_channel_signer::TestChannelSigner;
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
use crate::util::test_utils::TestBroadcaster;
let chain_mon = {
let new_monitor = {
let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
- let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
+ let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
&mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
new_monitor
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
-use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
/// channel's counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
- Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
+ Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>
);
/// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
user_id: u128,
- channel_id: [u8; 32],
- temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
+ /// The current channel ID.
+ channel_id: ChannelId,
+ /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
+ /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
+ temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
channel_state: u32,
// When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
// Public utilities:
- pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
+ pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
self.channel_id
}
// Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
//
// Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
- pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
+ pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
self.temporary_channel_id
}
log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
- log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
+ &self.channel_id,
+ if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
}
assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
- let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
-
// ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
// on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
// these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
- assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
+ debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()));
+ log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
+ htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
match htlc.state {
InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
} else {
- log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
}
return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
},
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
- log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
// TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
// rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
_ => {}
}
}
- log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
+ log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
});
debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
}
- log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
+ log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
}
_ => {}
}
}
- log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
err_packet,
return Ok(None);
}
- log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
{
let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
- log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
+ &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
- log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
- log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
}
if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
// Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
// the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
- log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
}
} else {
log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
- log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
}
let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
- encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
}
} else { None };
if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
- &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
+ &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
need_commitment = true;
}
for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
- &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
+ &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
// Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
}
log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
- log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
+ &self.context.channel_id);
return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
}
} else { false };
log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
- log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
+ &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
}
assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
- if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
Err(e) => {
match e {
ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
- log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
- &payment_hash, msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
// If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
// be failed backwards. Failing to send here
// indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
- log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
+ &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
}
- log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
- log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
}
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
- log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), release_state_str);
+ &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
- log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()),
+ &self.context.channel_id(),
update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
release_state_str);
return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
} else {
log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
- log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), release_state_str);
+ &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
- log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
}
/// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
- log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
+ &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
MonitorRestoreUpdates {
} else { None };
log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
- log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
+ &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
macro_rules! log_and_panic {
($err_msg: expr) => {
- log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
- panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
+ log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
+ panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
}
}
log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
if required_revoke.is_some() {
- log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
} else {
- log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
}
Ok(ReestablishResponses {
})
} else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
if required_revoke.is_some() {
- log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
} else {
- log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
}
if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
// send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
// may have already happened for this block).
if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
- log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
+ log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
}
}
for inp in tx.input.iter() {
if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
- log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
}
}
let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
} else { None };
- log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
+ log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
}
}
} else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
- log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
+ log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
// If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
return None;
}
- log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
Ok(a) => a,
Err(e) => {
let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
- log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
remote_last_secret
} else {
- log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
[0;32]
};
self.mark_awaiting_response();
}
let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
- log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
+ log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
+ payment_hash, amount_msat,
if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
else { "to peer" });
log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
&counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
- log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
- log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
}
}
Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
};
- let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ let temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source);
Ok(Self {
context: ChannelContext {
log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
- encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
}
let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
- log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
+ &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
match &self.context.holder_signer {
// TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
- log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
// Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
// `ChannelMonitor`.
let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
- let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
+ let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
--- /dev/null
+// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
+// history.
+//
+// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
+// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
+// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
+// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
+// licenses.
+
+//! ChannelId definition.
+
+use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
+use crate::sign::EntropySource;
+use crate::util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer};
+
+use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
+
+use crate::io;
+use crate::prelude::*;
+use core::fmt;
+use core::ops::Deref;
+
+/// A unique 32-byte identifier for a channel.
+/// Depending on how the ID is generated, several varieties are distinguished
+/// (but all are stored as 32 bytes):
+/// _v1_ and _temporary_.
+/// A _v1_ channel ID is generated based on funding tx outpoint (txid & index).
+/// A _temporary_ ID is generated randomly.
+/// (Later revocation-point-based _v2_ is a possibility.)
+/// The variety (context) is not stored, it is relevant only at creation.
+///
+/// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly.
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd)]
+pub struct ChannelId(pub [u8; 32]);
+
+impl ChannelId {
+ /// Create _v1_ channel ID based on a funding TX ID and output index
+ pub fn v1_from_funding_txid(txid: &[u8; 32], output_index: u16) -> Self {
+ let mut res = [0; 32];
+ res[..].copy_from_slice(&txid[..]);
+ res[30] ^= ((output_index >> 8) & 0xff) as u8;
+ res[31] ^= ((output_index >> 0) & 0xff) as u8;
+ Self(res)
+ }
+
+ /// Create a _temporary_ channel ID randomly, based on an entropy source.
+ pub fn temporary_from_entropy_source<ES: Deref>(entropy_source: &ES) -> Self
+ where ES::Target: EntropySource {
+ Self(entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes())
+ }
+
+ /// Generic constructor; create a new channel ID from the provided data.
+ /// Use a more specific `*_from_*` constructor when possible.
+ pub fn from_bytes(data: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
+ Self(data)
+ }
+
+ /// Create a channel ID consisting of all-zeros data (e.g. when uninitialized or a placeholder).
+ pub fn new_zero() -> Self {
+ Self([0; 32])
+ }
+
+ /// Check whether ID is consisting of all zeros (uninitialized)
+ pub fn is_zero(&self) -> bool {
+ self.0[..] == [0; 32]
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for ChannelId {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ self.0.write(w)
+ }
+}
+
+impl Readable for ChannelId {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
+ Ok(ChannelId(buf))
+ }
+}
+
+impl ToHex for ChannelId {
+ fn to_hex(&self) -> String {
+ self.0.to_hex()
+ }
+}
+
+impl fmt::Display for ChannelId {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
+ crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ use crate::ln::ChannelId;
+ use crate::util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
+ use crate::util::test_utils;
+ use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
+ use crate::prelude::*;
+ use crate::io;
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_channel_id_v1_from_funding_txid() {
+ let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[2; 32], 1);
+ assert_eq!(channel_id.to_hex(), "0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020203");
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_channel_id_new_from_data() {
+ let data: [u8; 32] = [2; 32];
+ let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(data.clone());
+ assert_eq!(channel_id.0, data);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_channel_id_equals() {
+ let channel_id11 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[2; 32], 2);
+ let channel_id12 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[2; 32], 2);
+ let channel_id21 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[2; 32], 42);
+ assert_eq!(channel_id11, channel_id12);
+ assert_ne!(channel_id11, channel_id21);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_channel_id_write_read() {
+ let data: [u8; 32] = [2; 32];
+ let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(data.clone());
+
+ let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
+ channel_id.write(&mut w).unwrap();
+
+ let channel_id_2 = ChannelId::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(channel_id_2, channel_id);
+ assert_eq!(channel_id_2.0, data);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_channel_id_display() {
+ let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[2; 32], 1);
+ assert_eq!(format!("{}", &channel_id), "0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020203");
+ }
+}
use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
// Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
// construct one themselves.
-use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
+use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
err: msgs::LightningError,
- chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
+ chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
}
impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
#[inline]
- fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
+ fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
Self {
err: LightningError {
err: err.clone(),
Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
}
#[inline]
- fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
+ fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
Self {
err: LightningError {
err: err.clone(),
}
}
#[inline]
- fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
+ fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
Self {
err: match err {
ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
/// on a channel.
MonitorUpdatesComplete {
counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
- channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId,
},
}
/// durably to disk.
ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
/// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
- channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
htlc_id: u64,
},
/// `channel_id` -> `Channel`.
///
/// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty.
- pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<SP>>,
+ pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, Channel<SP>>,
/// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
///
/// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
/// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
/// `channel_by_id`.
- pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], OutboundV1Channel<SP>>,
+ pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, OutboundV1Channel<SP>>,
/// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
///
/// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
/// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
/// `channel_by_id`.
- pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel<SP>>,
+ pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundV1Channel<SP>>,
/// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
///
/// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
/// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
/// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
/// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
- pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundChannelRequest>,
+ pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
/// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
latest_features: InitFeatures,
/// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
/// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
/// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
/// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
- monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
+ monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
/// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
/// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
/// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
/// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
- actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
+ actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
/// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
/// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
/// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
}
// Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
- fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
- self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
- self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
- self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
- self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
+ fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
+ self.channel_by_id.contains_key(&channel_id) ||
+ self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(&channel_id) ||
+ self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(&channel_id) ||
+ self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(&channel_id)
}
}
/// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
///
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
- id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
+ id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
/// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
///
///
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
#[cfg(test)]
- pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
+ pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
#[cfg(not(test))]
- short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
+ short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
/// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
/// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
/// lifetime of the channel.
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
/// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
(false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
},
ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
- log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
+ log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", &$channel_id, msg);
update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
(true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
// We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when unfunded channels error.
// In any case, just close the channel.
ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
- log_error!($self.logger, "Closing unfunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
+ log_error!($self.logger, "Closing unfunded channel {} due to an error: {}", &$channel_id, msg);
update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
(true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
match $update_res {
ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
- log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
+ &$chan.context.channel_id());
Ok(false)
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
- log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
+ &$chan.context.channel_id());
update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
"ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
/// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
/// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
/// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
- pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
+ pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
}
Ok(temporary_channel_id)
}
- fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
+ fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
// Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
// Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
// a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
}, None));
}
- fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
/// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
/// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
/// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
- pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
}
/// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
/// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
/// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
- pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
}
/// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
/// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
- fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
+ fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
-> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
};
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
- log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
} else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
- log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
// Unfunded channel has no update
(None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
} else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
- log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
// Unfunded channel has no update
(None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
} else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
- log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
// N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
// don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
// events anyway.
(None, *peer_node_id)
} else {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
}
};
if let Some(update) = update_opt {
Ok(counterparty_node_id)
}
- fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
/// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
/// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
/// channel.
- pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
+ pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
-> Result<(), APIError> {
self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
}
///
/// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
/// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
- pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
+ pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
-> Result<(), APIError> {
self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
}
if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
}
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
}
/// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
/// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
Some(id) => id,
}
fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
// The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
+ log_trace!(self.logger,
+ "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
+ payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
/// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
/// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
- &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
+ &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
+ let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&temporary_channel_id) {
Some(chan) => {
let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
err: format!(
"Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
- log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
+ temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
})
},
};
}
#[cfg(test)]
- pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
})
///
/// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
/// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
- pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
/// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
/// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
- &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
+ &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
) -> Result<(), APIError> {
if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
for channel_id in channel_ids {
if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
- err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
+ err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
});
};
}
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
err: format!(
"Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
- log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
+ channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
});
};
let mut config = context.config();
/// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
/// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
pub fn update_channel_config(
- &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
+ &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
) -> Result<(), APIError> {
return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
}
/// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
// TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
// `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
- pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let next_hop_scid = {
.ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&next_hop_channel_id) {
Some(chan) => {
if !chan.context.is_usable() {
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
- err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
+ err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
})
}
chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
},
None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
- log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
+ next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
})
}
};
let _ = self.process_background_events();
}
- fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
+ fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
// If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
- log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
+ &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
}
if !chan.context.is_live() {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
- log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
+ &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
}
log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
- log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
+ &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
NotifyOption::DoPersist
if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
- counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
+ counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
node_id: counterparty_node_id,
action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
});
let process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
- chan_id: &[u8; 32],
+ chan_id: &ChannelId,
chan_context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
unfunded_chan_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
if unfunded_chan_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
log_error!(self.logger,
"Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner",
- log_bytes!(&chan_id[..]));
+ &chan_id);
update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan_context);
self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
self.finish_force_close_channel(chan_context.force_shutdown(false));
for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
- log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", log_bytes!(&chan_id[..]));
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
node_id: counterparty_node_id,
// failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
// be surfaced to the user.
fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
- &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
) {
let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
- log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
+ &chan_id, action);
peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
}
if !during_init {
channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
-> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
- log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
+ &channel.context.channel_id(),
if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
///
/// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
/// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
- pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
}
///
/// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
/// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
- pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
}
- fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
let peers_without_funded_channels =
let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", &chan.get().context.channel_id());
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
msg: announcement_sigs,
// counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
// channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
// announcement_signatures.
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", &chan.get().context.channel_id());
if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
// TODO(dunxen): Fix this duplication when we switch to a single map with enums as per
// https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
- log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
return Ok(());
} else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
- log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
+ log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
} else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
+ &msg.channel_id,
if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
}
/// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
/// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
- actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
+ actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
) -> bool {
actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
} else {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", &chan_id);
try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
}
},
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
has_monitor_update = true;
- let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
+ let channel_id: ChannelId = *channel_id;
let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
// blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
// update(s) when those blockers complete.
log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
- log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
+ &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
break;
}
debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
- log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
+ &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
{
}
} else {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
- log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
+ &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
}
}
} else {
if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
if channel.context.is_usable() {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", &channel.context.channel_id());
if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
});
}
} else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", &channel.context.channel_id());
}
}
}
if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", &channel.context.channel_id());
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
msg: announcement_sigs,
// very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
// We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
// repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
- if msg.channel_id != [0; 32] {
+ if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
_ => {}
}
- if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
- let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
+ if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
+ let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
- let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
+ let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, Channel<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
- log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
+ &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
// backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
log_info!(args.logger,
"Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
- log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), &payment_hash);
+ &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
}
}
} else {
log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
- log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
+ &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
monitor.get_latest_update_id());
if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
}, None));
} else {
- log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
+ log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
- log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
+ &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
$chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
- update.update_id, $channel_info_log, log_bytes!($funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
+ update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
pending_background_events.push(
BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
// If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
- log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
+ &chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
} else {
log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
- log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
+ &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
- &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
+ &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
false
} else { true }
} else { true }
pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
- &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
+ &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
intercepted_id != ev_id
use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
+ use crate::ln::ChannelId;
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
- let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
+ let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
{
// Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
// funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
// as it has the funding transaction.
let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
}
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
{
let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
}
expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
// as it has the funding transaction.
let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
}
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
- nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
// party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
}
{
// kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
}
nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
// doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
- assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
+ assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
}
let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
// Dummy values
- let channel_id = [4; 32];
+ let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
}
- open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
}
// A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
- open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
- open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
}
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
- open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
}
// Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
- open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
}
// If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
// If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
// should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
- let bad_channel_id = [10; 32];
+ let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
assert!(
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
- use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+ use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
use criterion::Criterion;
let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
- let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
+ let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use crate::events::{ClaimedHTLC, ClosureReason, Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, PaymentFailureReason};
use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEventHandler, Wallet, WalletSource};
-use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
+use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, AChannelManager, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, PaymentId, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
use crate::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
use crate::routing::router::{self, PaymentParameters, Route};
use crate::ln::features::InitFeatures;
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
-use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
+use crate::util::test_channel_signer::TestChannelSigner;
use crate::util::scid_utils;
use crate::util::test_utils;
use crate::util::test_utils::{panicking, TestChainMonitor, TestScorer, TestKeysInterface};
use crate::prelude::*;
use core::cell::RefCell;
use alloc::rc::Rc;
-use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, LockTestExt};
+use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, LockTestExt, RwLock};
use core::mem;
use core::iter::repeat;
use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, TxMerkleNode};
pub persister: test_utils::TestPersister,
pub logger: test_utils::TestLogger,
pub keys_manager: test_utils::TestKeysInterface,
- pub scorer: Mutex<test_utils::TestScorer>,
+ pub scorer: RwLock<test_utils::TestScorer>,
}
pub struct NodeCfg<'a> {
for outpoint in self.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
self.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut w).unwrap();
- let (_, deserialized_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
+ let (_, deserialized_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), (self.keys_manager, self.keys_manager)).unwrap();
deserialized_monitors.push(deserialized_monitor);
}
channel_monitors.insert(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
}
- let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
+ let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
self.node.write(&mut w).unwrap();
<(BlockHash, ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestRouter, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(w.0), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
}
}
-pub fn create_chan_between_nodes<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node_a: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, node_b: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
+pub fn create_chan_between_nodes<'a, 'b, 'c: 'd, 'd>(node_a: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, node_b: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, ChannelId, Transaction) {
create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
}
-pub fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node_a: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, node_b: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
+pub fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value<'a, 'b, 'c: 'd, 'd>(node_a: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, node_b: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, ChannelId, Transaction) {
let (channel_ready, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &channel_ready);
(announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
for index in 0..2 {
if let Ok(mon) = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(
$crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint {
- txid: bitcoin::Txid::from_slice(&$channel_id[..]).unwrap(), index
+ txid: bitcoin::Txid::from_slice(&$channel_id.0[..]).unwrap(), index
})
{
monitor = Some(mon);
let mut monitors_read = Vec::with_capacity(monitors_encoded.len());
for encoded in monitors_encoded {
let mut monitor_read = &encoded[..];
- let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>
+ let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>
::read(&mut monitor_read, (node.keys_manager, node.keys_manager)).unwrap();
assert!(monitor_read.is_empty());
monitors_read.push(monitor);
};
}
-pub fn create_funding_transaction<'a, 'b, 'c>(node: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, expected_counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, expected_chan_value: u64, expected_user_chan_id: u128) -> ([u8; 32], Transaction, OutPoint) {
+pub fn create_funding_transaction<'a, 'b, 'c>(node: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, expected_counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, expected_chan_value: u64, expected_user_chan_id: u128) -> (ChannelId, Transaction, OutPoint) {
let chan_id = *node.network_chan_count.borrow();
let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
}
-pub fn sign_funding_transaction<'a, 'b, 'c>(node_a: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, node_b: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, channel_value: u64, expected_temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Transaction {
+pub fn sign_funding_transaction<'a, 'b, 'c>(node_a: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, node_b: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, channel_value: u64, expected_temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) -> Transaction {
let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(node_a, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, 42);
assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
}
// Receiver must have been initialized with manually_accept_inbound_channels set to true.
-pub fn open_zero_conf_channel<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(initiator: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, receiver: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, initiator_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> (bitcoin::Transaction, [u8; 32]) {
+pub fn open_zero_conf_channel<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(initiator: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, receiver: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, initiator_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> (bitcoin::Transaction, ChannelId) {
let initiator_channels = initiator.node.list_usable_channels().len();
let receiver_channels = receiver.node.list_usable_channels().len();
node_recv.node.handle_channel_ready(&node_conf.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_conf, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_recv.node.get_our_node_id()));
}
-pub fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second<'a, 'b, 'c>(node_recv: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, node_conf: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>) -> ((msgs::ChannelReady, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
+pub fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second<'a, 'b, 'c>(node_recv: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, node_conf: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>) -> ((msgs::ChannelReady, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), ChannelId) {
let channel_id;
let events_6 = node_conf.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 3);
}), channel_id)
}
-pub fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node_a: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, node_b: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::ChannelReady, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
+pub fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm<'a, 'b, 'c: 'd, 'd>(node_a: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, node_b: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::ChannelReady, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), ChannelId) {
let conf_height = core::cmp::max(node_a.best_block_info().1 + 1, node_b.best_block_info().1 + 1);
create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(node_a, node_b, tx, conf_height);
confirm_transaction_at(node_a, tx, conf_height);
create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(node_b, node_a)
}
-pub fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node_a: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, node_b: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::ChannelReady, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
+pub fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a<'a, 'b, 'c: 'd, 'd>(node_a: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, node_b: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::ChannelReady, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), ChannelId, Transaction) {
let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
(msgs, chan_id, tx)
((*announcement).clone(), as_update, bs_update)
}
-pub fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(nodes: &'a Vec<Node<'b, 'c, 'd>>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
+pub fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes<'a, 'b, 'c: 'd, 'd>(nodes: &'a Vec<Node<'b, 'c, 'd>>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, ChannelId, Transaction) {
create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
}
-pub fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(nodes: &'a Vec<Node<'b, 'c, 'd>>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
+pub fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value<'a, 'b, 'c: 'd, 'd>(nodes: &'a Vec<Node<'b, 'c, 'd>>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, ChannelId, Transaction) {
let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
update_nodes_with_chan_announce(nodes, a, b, &chan_announcement.0, &chan_announcement.1, &chan_announcement.2);
(chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
}
}
-pub fn close_channel<'a, 'b, 'c>(outbound_node: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, inbound_node: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Transaction) {
+pub fn close_channel<'a, 'b, 'c>(outbound_node: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, inbound_node: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, channel_id: &ChannelId, funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Transaction) {
let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
let (node_b, broadcaster_b, struct_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) };
let (tx_a, tx_b);
let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
let seed = [i as u8; 32];
let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
- let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
+ let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
chan_mon_cfgs.push(TestChanMonCfg { tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator, chain_source, logger, persister, keys_manager, scorer });
}
create_node_cfgs_with_persisters(node_count, chanmon_cfgs, chanmon_cfgs.iter().map(|c| &c.persister).collect())
}
-pub fn create_node_cfgs_with_persisters<'a>(node_count: usize, chanmon_cfgs: &'a Vec<TestChanMonCfg>, persisters: Vec<&'a impl Persist<EnforcingSigner>>) -> Vec<NodeCfg<'a>> {
+pub fn create_node_cfgs_with_persisters<'a>(node_count: usize, chanmon_cfgs: &'a Vec<TestChanMonCfg>, persisters: Vec<&'a impl Persist<TestChannelSigner>>) -> Vec<NodeCfg<'a>> {
let mut nodes = Vec::new();
for i in 0..node_count {
///
/// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
/// also fail.
-pub fn test_txn_broadcast<'a, 'b, 'c>(node: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
+pub fn test_txn_broadcast<'a, 'b, 'c>(node: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, ChannelId, Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
let mut txn_seen = HashSet::new();
node_txn.retain(|tx| txn_seen.insert(tx.txid()));
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
-use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
+use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
use crate::ln::channel::{DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS, ChannelError};
use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
-use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
+use crate::util::test_channel_signer::TestChannelSigner;
use crate::util::test_utils::{self, WatchtowerPersister};
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
use core::default::Default;
use core::iter::repeat;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
-use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
- // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
+ // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
// needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
- // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
+ // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
// needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
- format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
+ format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", raa_msg.channel_id), 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
}
let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
- let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
+ let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &scorer);
let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
// us to surface its failure to the user.
chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
+ nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
// Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
// to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
- nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
+ nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
// Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
// commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
// commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
// channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
- // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
+ // TestChannelSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
// check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
// we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
// implement that).
let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
- let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
+ let unknown_channel_id = ChannelId::new_zero();
let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
match api_res {
Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
let watchtower = {
let new_monitor = {
let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
- let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
+ let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
&mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
new_monitor
let watchtower_alice = {
let new_monitor = {
let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
- let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
+ let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
&mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
new_monitor
let watchtower_bob = {
let new_monitor = {
let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
- let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
+ let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
&mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
new_monitor
// A null channel ID should close all channels
let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
- nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
+ nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(), data: "ERR".to_owned() });
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 100000);
#[macro_use]
pub mod functional_test_utils;
+pub mod channel_id;
pub mod channelmanager;
pub mod inbound_payment;
pub mod msgs;
#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
pub(crate) mod channel;
+// Re-export ChannelId
+pub use self::channel_id::ChannelId;
+
pub(crate) mod onion_utils;
mod outbound_payment;
pub mod wire;
// Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
// the second level instead.
- let revoked_claims = {
+ let revoked_claim_transactions = {
let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
}
- txn
+ let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = HashMap::new();
+ for current_tx in txn.into_iter() {
+ revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx);
+ }
+ revoked_claim_transaction_map
};
for node in &nodes {
- mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claims.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>());
+ mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::<Vec<_>>());
}
let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
).unwrap();
- check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claims[idx]);
+
+ check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
} else {
panic!("unexpected event");
}
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
+use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use crate::ln::onion_utils;
use crate::onion_message;
use crate::util::logger;
use crate::util::ser::{LengthReadable, Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, WithoutLength, FixedLengthReader, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize, Hostname, TransactionU16LenLimited, BigSize};
-use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
-
use crate::routing::gossip::{NodeAlias, NodeId};
/// 21 million * 10^8 * 1000
///
/// All-0s indicates a general error unrelated to a specific channel, after which all channels
/// with the sending peer should be closed.
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// A possibly human-readable error description.
///
/// The string should be sanitized before it is used (e.g., emitted to logs or printed to
/// The channel ID involved in the warning.
///
/// All-0s indicates a warning unrelated to a specific channel.
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// A possibly human-readable warning description.
///
/// The string should be sanitized before it is used (e.g. emitted to logs or printed to
/// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
/// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
- pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub temporary_channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The channel value
pub funding_satoshis: u64,
/// The amount to push to the counterparty as part of the open, in milli-satoshi
/// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
/// A temporary channel ID derived using a zeroed out value for the channel acceptor's revocation basepoint
- pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub temporary_channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The feerate for the funding transaction set by the channel initiator
pub funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
/// The feerate for the commitment transaction set by the channel initiator
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct AcceptChannel {
/// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
- pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub temporary_channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by sender will be omitted
pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
/// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards sender, in milli-satoshi
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct AcceptChannelV2 {
/// The same `temporary_channel_id` received from the initiator's `open_channel2` message.
- pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub temporary_channel_id: ChannelId,
/// Part of the channel value contributed by the channel acceptor
pub funding_satoshis: u64,
/// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by the channel acceptor will be
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct FundingCreated {
/// A temporary channel ID, until the funding is established
- pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub temporary_channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The funding transaction ID
pub funding_txid: Txid,
/// The specific output index funding this channel
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct FundingSigned {
/// The channel ID
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The signature of the channel acceptor (fundee) on the initial commitment transaction
pub signature: Signature,
#[cfg(taproot)]
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ChannelReady {
/// The channel ID
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The per-commitment point of the second commitment transaction
pub next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
/// If set, provides a `short_channel_id` alias for this channel.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct TxAddInput {
/// The channel ID
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// A randomly chosen unique identifier for this input, which is even for initiators and odd for
/// non-initiators.
pub serial_id: u64,
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct TxAddOutput {
/// The channel ID
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// A randomly chosen unique identifier for this output, which is even for initiators and odd for
/// non-initiators.
pub serial_id: u64,
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct TxRemoveInput {
/// The channel ID
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The serial ID of the input to be removed
pub serial_id: u64,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct TxRemoveOutput {
/// The channel ID
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The serial ID of the output to be removed
pub serial_id: u64,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct TxComplete {
/// The channel ID
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
}
/// A tx_signatures message containing the sender's signatures for a transaction constructed with
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct TxSignatures {
/// The channel ID
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The TXID
pub tx_hash: Txid,
/// The list of witnesses
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct TxInitRbf {
/// The channel ID
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The locktime of the transaction
pub locktime: u32,
/// The feerate of the transaction
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct TxAckRbf {
/// The channel ID
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The number of satoshis the sender will contribute to or, if negative, remove from
/// (e.g. splice-out) the funding output of the transaction
pub funding_output_contribution: Option<i64>,
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct TxAbort {
/// The channel ID
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// Message data
pub data: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Shutdown {
/// The channel ID
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The destination of this peer's funds on closing.
///
/// Must be in one of these forms: P2PKH, P2SH, P2WPKH, P2WSH, P2TR.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ClosingSigned {
/// The channel ID
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The proposed total fee for the closing transaction
pub fee_satoshis: u64,
/// A signature on the closing transaction
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct UpdateAddHTLC {
/// The channel ID
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The HTLC ID
pub htlc_id: u64,
/// The HTLC value in milli-satoshi
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct UpdateFulfillHTLC {
/// The channel ID
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The HTLC ID
pub htlc_id: u64,
/// The pre-image of the payment hash, allowing HTLC redemption
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct UpdateFailHTLC {
/// The channel ID
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The HTLC ID
pub htlc_id: u64,
pub(crate) reason: OnionErrorPacket,
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
/// The channel ID
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The HTLC ID
pub htlc_id: u64,
pub(crate) sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct CommitmentSigned {
/// The channel ID
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// A signature on the commitment transaction
pub signature: Signature,
/// Signatures on the HTLC transactions
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct RevokeAndACK {
/// The channel ID
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The secret corresponding to the per-commitment point
pub per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
/// The next sender-broadcast commitment transaction's per-commitment point
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct UpdateFee {
/// The channel ID
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// Fee rate per 1000-weight of the transaction
pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ChannelReestablish {
/// The channel ID
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The next commitment number for the sender
pub next_local_commitment_number: u64,
/// The next commitment number for the recipient
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct AnnouncementSignatures {
/// The channel ID
- pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
/// The short channel ID
pub short_channel_id: u64,
/// A signature by the node key
use bitcoin::{Transaction, PackedLockTime, TxIn, Script, Sequence, Witness, TxOut};
use hex;
use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
+ use crate::ln::ChannelId;
use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use crate::ln::msgs::{self, FinalOnionHopData, OnionErrorPacket};
use crate::routing::gossip::{NodeAlias, NodeId};
};
let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
- channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]),
next_local_commitment_number: 3,
next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
your_last_per_commitment_secret: [9;32],
};
let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
- channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]),
next_local_commitment_number: 3,
next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
your_last_per_commitment_secret: [9;32],
let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("02020202020202020202020202020202"));
let announcement_signatures = msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
- channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]),
short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
node_signature: sig_1,
bitcoin_signature: sig_2,
let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
let open_channel = msgs::OpenChannel {
chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
- temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
+ temporary_channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
funding_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
push_msat: 2536655962884945560,
dust_limit_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
let (_, pubkey_7) = get_keys_from!("0707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707", secp_ctx);
let open_channelv2 = msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
- temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
+ temporary_channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: 821716,
commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: 821716,
funding_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
let accept_channel = msgs::AcceptChannel {
- temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
+ temporary_channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
dust_limit_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 2536655962884945560,
channel_reserve_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
let (_, pubkey_7) = get_keys_from!("0707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707", secp_ctx);
let accept_channelv2 = msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
- temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
+ temporary_channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
funding_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
dust_limit_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 2536655962884945560,
let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
let funding_created = msgs::FundingCreated {
- temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
+ temporary_channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
funding_txid: Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap(),
funding_output_index: 255,
signature: sig_1,
let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
let funding_signed = msgs::FundingSigned {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
signature: sig_1,
#[cfg(taproot)]
partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let (_, pubkey_1,) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
let channel_ready = msgs::ChannelReady {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
short_channel_id_alias: None,
};
#[test]
fn encoding_tx_add_input() {
let tx_add_input = msgs::TxAddInput {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
serial_id: 4886718345,
prevtx: TransactionU16LenLimited::new(Transaction {
version: 2,
#[test]
fn encoding_tx_add_output() {
let tx_add_output = msgs::TxAddOutput {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
serial_id: 4886718345,
sats: 4886718345,
script: Address::from_str("bc1qxmk834g5marzm227dgqvynd23y2nvt2ztwcw2z").unwrap().script_pubkey(),
#[test]
fn encoding_tx_remove_input() {
let tx_remove_input = msgs::TxRemoveInput {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
serial_id: 4886718345,
};
let encoded_value = tx_remove_input.encode();
#[test]
fn encoding_tx_remove_output() {
let tx_remove_output = msgs::TxRemoveOutput {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
serial_id: 4886718345,
};
let encoded_value = tx_remove_output.encode();
#[test]
fn encoding_tx_complete() {
let tx_complete = msgs::TxComplete {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
};
let encoded_value = tx_complete.encode();
let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap();
#[test]
fn encoding_tx_signatures() {
let tx_signatures = msgs::TxSignatures {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
tx_hash: Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap(),
witnesses: vec![
Witness::from_vec(vec![
fn do_encoding_tx_init_rbf(funding_value_with_hex_target: Option<(i64, &str)>) {
let tx_init_rbf = msgs::TxInitRbf {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
locktime: 305419896,
feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: 20190119,
funding_output_contribution: if let Some((value, _)) = funding_value_with_hex_target { Some(value) } else { None },
fn do_encoding_tx_ack_rbf(funding_value_with_hex_target: Option<(i64, &str)>) {
let tx_ack_rbf = msgs::TxAckRbf {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
funding_output_contribution: if let Some((value, _)) = funding_value_with_hex_target { Some(value) } else { None },
};
let encoded_value = tx_ack_rbf.encode();
#[test]
fn encoding_tx_abort() {
let tx_abort = msgs::TxAbort {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
data: hex::decode("54686520717569636B2062726F776E20666F78206A756D7073206F76657220746865206C617A7920646F672E").unwrap(),
};
let encoded_value = tx_abort.encode();
let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
let script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::OP_TRUE).into_script();
let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
scriptpubkey:
if script_type == 1 { Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() }
else if script_type == 2 { Address::p2sh(&script, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
let closing_signed = msgs::ClosingSigned {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
signature: sig_1,
fee_range: None,
assert_eq!(msgs::ClosingSigned::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value)).unwrap(), closing_signed);
let closing_signed_with_range = msgs::ClosingSigned {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
signature: sig_1,
fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
hmac: [2; 32]
};
let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
amount_msat: 3608586615801332854,
payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
#[test]
fn encoding_update_fulfill_htlc() {
let update_fulfill_htlc = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([1; 32]),
};
data: [1; 32].to_vec(),
};
let update_fail_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
reason
};
#[test]
fn encoding_update_fail_malformed_htlc() {
let update_fail_malformed_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
failure_code: 255
let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
let commitment_signed = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
signature: sig_1,
htlc_signatures: if htlcs { vec![sig_2, sig_3, sig_4] } else { Vec::new() },
#[cfg(taproot)]
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
let raa = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
per_commitment_secret: [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1],
next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
#[cfg(taproot)]
#[test]
fn encoding_update_fee() {
let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
feerate_per_kw: 20190119,
};
let encoded_value = update_fee.encode();
#[test]
fn encoding_error() {
let error = msgs::ErrorMessage {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
};
let encoded_value = error.encode();
#[test]
fn encoding_warning() {
let error = msgs::WarningMessage {
- channel_id: [2; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
};
let encoded_value = error.encode();
{
#[cfg(feature = "std")] {
if has_expired(&route_params) {
+ log_error!(logger, "Payment with id {} and hash {} had expired before we started paying",
+ payment_id, payment_hash);
return Err(RetryableSendFailure::PaymentExpired)
}
}
&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(), &route_params,
Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), inflight_htlcs(),
payment_hash, payment_id,
- ).map_err(|_| RetryableSendFailure::RouteNotFound)?;
+ ).map_err(|_| {
+ log_error!(logger, "Failed to find route for payment with id {} and hash {}",
+ payment_id, payment_hash);
+ RetryableSendFailure::RouteNotFound
+ })?;
let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
recipient_onion.clone(), payment_id, keysend_preimage, &route, Some(retry_strategy),
Some(route_params.payment_params.clone()), entropy_source, best_block_height)
- .map_err(|_| RetryableSendFailure::DuplicatePayment)?;
+ .map_err(|_| {
+ log_error!(logger, "Payment with id {} is already pending. New payment had payment hash {}",
+ payment_id, payment_hash);
+ RetryableSendFailure::DuplicatePayment
+ })?;
let res = self.pay_route_internal(&route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, None,
onion_session_privs, node_signer, best_block_height, &send_payment_along_path);
- log_info!(logger, "Result sending payment with id {}: {:?}", &payment_id, res);
+ log_info!(logger, "Sending payment with id {} and hash {} returned {:?}",
+ payment_id, payment_hash, res);
if let Err(e) = res {
self.handle_pay_route_err(e, payment_id, payment_hash, route, route_params, router, first_hops, &inflight_htlcs, entropy_source, node_signer, best_block_height, logger, pending_events, &send_payment_along_path);
}
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
+ log_info!(logger, "Payment with id {} and hash {} sent!", payment_id, payment_hash);
let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
pending_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentSent {
payment_id: Some(payment_id),
use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, Retry, RetryableSendFailure};
use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
use crate::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters};
- use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+ use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
use crate::util::test_utils;
let outbound_payments = OutboundPayments::new();
let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger));
- let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
+ let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph, &scorer);
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[0; 32], Network::Testnet);
let outbound_payments = OutboundPayments::new();
let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger));
- let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
+ let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph, &scorer);
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[0; 32], Network::Testnet);
let outbound_payments = OutboundPayments::new();
let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger));
- let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
+ let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph, &scorer);
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[0; 32], Network::Testnet);
use crate::ln::channel::EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS;
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS, RecentPaymentDetails, RecipientOnionFields, HTLCForwardInfo, PendingHTLCRouting, PendingAddHTLCInfo};
use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
-use crate::ln::{msgs, PaymentSecret, PaymentPreimage};
+use crate::ln::{msgs, ChannelId, PaymentSecret, PaymentPreimage};
use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
use crate::ln::outbound_payment::Retry;
use crate::routing::gossip::{EffectiveCapacity, RoutingFees};
};
// Check for unknown channel id error.
- let unknown_chan_id_err = nodes[1].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &[42; 32], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), expected_outbound_amount_msat).unwrap_err();
+ let unknown_chan_id_err = nodes[1].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &ChannelId::from_bytes([42; 32]), nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), expected_outbound_amount_msat).unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(unknown_chan_id_err , APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
log_bytes!([42; 32]), nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()) });
let unusable_chan_err = nodes[1].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &temp_chan_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), expected_outbound_amount_msat).unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(unusable_chan_err , APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
- log_bytes!(temp_chan_id), nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()) });
+ &temp_chan_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()) });
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
// Open the just-in-time channel so the payment can then be forwarded.
}, Ok(route.clone()));
{
- let scorer = chanmon_cfgs[0].scorer.lock().unwrap();
+ let scorer = chanmon_cfgs[0].scorer.read().unwrap();
// The initial send attempt, 2 paths
scorer.expect_usage(chans[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 10_000, inflight_htlc_msat: 0, effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Unknown });
scorer.expect_usage(chans[1].short_channel_id.unwrap(), ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 100_000_001, inflight_htlc_msat: 0, effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Unknown });
use crate::sign::{KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient};
use crate::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, OnionMessageProvider};
+use crate::ln::ChannelId;
use crate::ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, LightningError, NetAddress, OnionMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler};
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self { message_queue: Mutex::new(Vec::new()) }
}
- fn push_error(&self, node_id: &PublicKey, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
+ fn push_error(&self, node_id: &PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId) {
self.message_queue.lock().unwrap().push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "We do not support channel messages, sorry.".to_owned() },
}
(msgs::DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression, _) => {
log_gossip!(self.logger, "We don't support zlib-compressed message fields, sending a warning and ignoring message");
- self.enqueue_message(peer, &msgs::WarningMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "Unsupported message compression: zlib".to_owned() });
+ self.enqueue_message(peer, &msgs::WarningMessage { channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(), data: "Unsupported message compression: zlib".to_owned() });
continue;
}
(_, Some(ty)) if is_gossip_msg(ty) => {
log_gossip!(self.logger, "Got an invalid value while deserializing a gossip message");
self.enqueue_message(peer, &msgs::WarningMessage {
- channel_id: [0; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
data: format!("Unreadable/bogus gossip message of type {}", ty),
});
continue;
wire::Message::Error(msg) => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Got Err message from {}: {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), PrintableString(&msg.data));
self.message_handler.chan_handler.handle_error(&their_node_id, &msg);
- if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
+ if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
return Err(PeerHandleError { }.into());
}
},
MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendAcceptChannel event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.temporary_channel_id));
+ &msg.temporary_channel_id);
self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendAcceptChannelV2 event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.temporary_channel_id));
+ &msg.temporary_channel_id);
self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendOpenChannel event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.temporary_channel_id));
+ &msg.temporary_channel_id);
self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendOpenChannelV2 event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.temporary_channel_id));
+ &msg.temporary_channel_id);
self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendFundingCreated event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {} (which becomes {})",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.temporary_channel_id),
+ &msg.temporary_channel_id,
log_funding_channel_id!(msg.funding_txid, msg.funding_output_index));
// TODO: If the peer is gone we should generate a DiscardFunding event
// indicating to the wallet that they should just throw away this funding transaction
MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendFundingSigned event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ &msg.channel_id);
self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendChannelReady event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ &msg.channel_id);
self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendTxAddInput event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ &msg.channel_id);
self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendTxAddOutput event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ &msg.channel_id);
self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendTxRemoveInput event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ &msg.channel_id);
self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendTxRemoveOutput event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ &msg.channel_id);
self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendTxComplete event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ &msg.channel_id);
self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendTxSignatures event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ &msg.channel_id);
self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendTxInitRbf event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ &msg.channel_id);
self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendTxAckRbf event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ &msg.channel_id);
self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendTxAbort event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ &msg.channel_id);
self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendAnnouncementSignatures event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {})",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ &msg.channel_id);
self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
update_add_htlcs.len(),
update_fulfill_htlcs.len(),
update_fail_htlcs.len(),
- log_bytes!(commitment_signed.channel_id));
+ &commitment_signed.channel_id);
let mut peer = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id);
for msg in update_add_htlcs {
self.enqueue_message(&mut *peer, msg);
MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendRevokeAndACK event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ &msg.channel_id);
self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendClosingSigned event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ &msg.channel_id);
self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling Shutdown event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ &msg.channel_id);
self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling SendChannelReestablish event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
log_pubkey!(node_id),
- log_bytes!(msg.channel_id));
+ &msg.channel_id);
self.enqueue_message(&mut *get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id), msg);
},
MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
}
},
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg } => {
- log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling BroadcastChannelUpdate event in peer_handler for short channel id {}", msg.contents.short_channel_id);
+ log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling BroadcastChannelUpdate event in peer_handler for contents {:?}", msg.contents);
match self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_channel_update(&msg) {
Ok(_) | Err(LightningError { action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip, .. }) =>
self.forward_broadcast_msg(peers, &wire::Message::ChannelUpdate(msg), None),
use crate::sign::{NodeSigner, Recipient};
use crate::events;
use crate::io;
+ use crate::ln::ChannelId;
use crate::ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use crate::ln::peer_channel_encryptor::PeerChannelEncryptor;
use crate::ln::peer_handler::{CustomMessageHandler, PeerManager, MessageHandler, SocketDescriptor, IgnoringMessageHandler, filter_addresses};
.push(crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
node_id: peers[1].node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
msg: msgs::Shutdown {
- channel_id: [0; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
scriptpubkey: bitcoin::Script::new(),
},
});
.push(crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
node_id: peers[0].node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
msg: msgs::Shutdown {
- channel_id: [0; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
scriptpubkey: bitcoin::Script::new(),
},
});
let their_id = peers[1].node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap();
- let msg = msgs::Shutdown { channel_id: [42; 32], scriptpubkey: bitcoin::Script::new() };
+ let msg = msgs::Shutdown { channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([42; 32]), scriptpubkey: bitcoin::Script::new() };
a_chan_handler.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
node_id: their_id, msg: msg.clone()
});
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
-use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
+use crate::util::test_channel_signer::TestChannelSigner;
use crate::util::test_utils;
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
let mut read = &serialized[..];
- let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, (keys_manager, keys_manager)).unwrap();
+ let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(&mut read, (keys_manager, keys_manager)).unwrap();
assert!(read.is_empty());
node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
}
let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
let mut read = &serialized[..];
- let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, (keys_manager, keys_manager)).unwrap();
+ let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(&mut read, (keys_manager, keys_manager)).unwrap();
assert!(read.is_empty());
node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
}
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use crate::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
+use crate::ln::ChannelId;
use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures, InitFeatures};
use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, GossipTimestampFilter};
where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
{
network_graph: G,
- utxo_lookup: Option<U>,
+ utxo_lookup: RwLock<Option<U>>,
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
network_graph,
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
- utxo_lookup,
+ utxo_lookup: RwLock::new(utxo_lookup),
pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
logger,
}
/// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
/// existing announcements unless they are updated.
/// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
- pub fn add_utxo_lookup(&mut self, utxo_lookup: Option<U>) {
- self.utxo_lookup = utxo_lookup;
+ pub fn add_utxo_lookup(&self, utxo_lookup: Option<U>) {
+ *self.utxo_lookup.write().unwrap() = utxo_lookup;
}
/// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
- channel_id: [0; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
},
log_level: Level::Trace,
err: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
- channel_id: [0; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
data: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
},
log_level: Level::Trace
}
fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
- self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.utxo_lookup)?;
+ self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &*self.utxo_lookup.read().unwrap())?;
Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
}
use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice};
use crate::routing::gossip::{DirectedChannelInfo, EffectiveCapacity, ReadOnlyNetworkGraph, NetworkGraph, NodeId, RoutingFees};
-use crate::routing::scoring::{ChannelUsage, LockableScore, Score};
+use crate::routing::scoring::{ChannelUsage, LockableScore, ScoreLookUp};
use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, ReadableArgs, Writer};
use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
use crate::util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
use crate::io;
use crate::prelude::*;
-use crate::sync::{Mutex};
+use crate::sync::Mutex;
use alloc::collections::BinaryHeap;
use core::{cmp, fmt};
-use core::ops::{Deref, DerefMut};
+use core::ops::Deref;
/// A [`Router`] implemented using [`find_route`].
-pub struct DefaultRouter<G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph<L>>, L: Deref, S: Deref, SP: Sized, Sc: Score<ScoreParams = SP>> where
+pub struct DefaultRouter<G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph<L>>, L: Deref, S: Deref, SP: Sized, Sc: ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>> where
L::Target: Logger,
- S::Target: for <'a> LockableScore<'a, Score = Sc>,
+ S::Target: for <'a> LockableScore<'a, ScoreLookUp = Sc>,
{
network_graph: G,
logger: L,
score_params: SP
}
-impl<G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph<L>>, L: Deref, S: Deref, SP: Sized, Sc: Score<ScoreParams = SP>> DefaultRouter<G, L, S, SP, Sc> where
+impl<G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph<L>>, L: Deref, S: Deref, SP: Sized, Sc: ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>> DefaultRouter<G, L, S, SP, Sc> where
L::Target: Logger,
- S::Target: for <'a> LockableScore<'a, Score = Sc>,
+ S::Target: for <'a> LockableScore<'a, ScoreLookUp = Sc>,
{
/// Creates a new router.
pub fn new(network_graph: G, logger: L, random_seed_bytes: [u8; 32], scorer: S, score_params: SP) -> Self {
}
}
-impl< G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph<L>>, L: Deref, S: Deref, SP: Sized, Sc: Score<ScoreParams = SP>> Router for DefaultRouter<G, L, S, SP, Sc> where
+impl< G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph<L>>, L: Deref, S: Deref, SP: Sized, Sc: ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>> Router for DefaultRouter<G, L, S, SP, Sc> where
L::Target: Logger,
- S::Target: for <'a> LockableScore<'a, Score = Sc>,
+ S::Target: for <'a> LockableScore<'a, ScoreLookUp = Sc>,
{
fn find_route(
&self,
};
find_route(
payer, params, &self.network_graph, first_hops, &*self.logger,
- &ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs::new(self.scorer.lock().deref_mut(), &inflight_htlcs),
+ &ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs::new(self.scorer.read_lock(), &inflight_htlcs),
&self.score_params,
&random_seed_bytes
)
}
}
-/// [`Score`] implementation that factors in in-flight HTLC liquidity.
+/// [`ScoreLookUp`] implementation that factors in in-flight HTLC liquidity.
///
-/// Useful for custom [`Router`] implementations to wrap their [`Score`] on-the-fly when calling
+/// Useful for custom [`Router`] implementations to wrap their [`ScoreLookUp`] on-the-fly when calling
/// [`find_route`].
///
-/// [`Score`]: crate::routing::scoring::Score
-pub struct ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs<'a, S: Score<ScoreParams = SP>, SP: Sized> {
- scorer: &'a mut S,
+/// [`ScoreLookUp`]: crate::routing::scoring::ScoreLookUp
+pub struct ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs<'a, SP: Sized, Sc: 'a + ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>, S: Deref<Target = Sc>> {
+ scorer: S,
// Maps a channel's short channel id and its direction to the liquidity used up.
inflight_htlcs: &'a InFlightHtlcs,
}
-
-impl<'a, S: Score<ScoreParams = SP>, SP: Sized> ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs<'a, S, SP> {
+impl<'a, SP: Sized, Sc: ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>, S: Deref<Target = Sc>> ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs<'a, SP, Sc, S> {
/// Initialize a new `ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs`.
- pub fn new(scorer: &'a mut S, inflight_htlcs: &'a InFlightHtlcs) -> Self {
+ pub fn new(scorer: S, inflight_htlcs: &'a InFlightHtlcs) -> Self {
ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs {
scorer,
inflight_htlcs
}
#[cfg(c_bindings)]
-impl<'a, S: Score<ScoreParams = SP>, SP: Sized> Writeable for ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs<'a, S, SP> {
+impl<'a, SP: Sized, Sc: ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>, S: Deref<Target = Sc>> Writeable for ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs<'a, SP, Sc, S> {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> { self.scorer.write(writer) }
}
-impl<'a, S: Score<ScoreParams = SP>, SP: Sized> Score for ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs<'a, S, SP> {
- type ScoreParams = S::ScoreParams;
+impl<'a, SP: Sized, Sc: 'a + ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>, S: Deref<Target = Sc>> ScoreLookUp for ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs<'a, SP, Sc, S> {
+ type ScoreParams = Sc::ScoreParams;
fn channel_penalty_msat(&self, short_channel_id: u64, source: &NodeId, target: &NodeId, usage: ChannelUsage, score_params: &Self::ScoreParams) -> u64 {
if let Some(used_liquidity) = self.inflight_htlcs.used_liquidity_msat(
source, target, short_channel_id
self.scorer.channel_penalty_msat(short_channel_id, source, target, usage, score_params)
}
}
-
- fn payment_path_failed(&mut self, path: &Path, short_channel_id: u64) {
- self.scorer.payment_path_failed(path, short_channel_id)
- }
-
- fn payment_path_successful(&mut self, path: &Path) {
- self.scorer.payment_path_successful(path)
- }
-
- fn probe_failed(&mut self, path: &Path, short_channel_id: u64) {
- self.scorer.probe_failed(path, short_channel_id)
- }
-
- fn probe_successful(&mut self, path: &Path) {
- self.scorer.probe_successful(path)
- }
}
/// A data structure for tracking in-flight HTLCs. May be used during pathfinding to account for
/// [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
/// [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentPathFailed
/// [`NetworkGraph`]: crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph
-pub fn find_route<L: Deref, GL: Deref, S: Score>(
+pub fn find_route<L: Deref, GL: Deref, S: ScoreLookUp>(
our_node_pubkey: &PublicKey, route_params: &RouteParameters,
network_graph: &NetworkGraph<GL>, first_hops: Option<&[&ChannelDetails]>, logger: L,
scorer: &S, score_params: &S::ScoreParams, random_seed_bytes: &[u8; 32]
Ok(route)
}
-pub(crate) fn get_route<L: Deref, S: Score>(
+pub(crate) fn get_route<L: Deref, S: ScoreLookUp>(
our_node_pubkey: &PublicKey, payment_params: &PaymentParameters, network_graph: &ReadOnlyNetworkGraph,
first_hops: Option<&[&ChannelDetails]>, final_value_msat: u64, logger: L, scorer: &S, score_params: &S::ScoreParams,
_random_seed_bytes: &[u8; 32]
our_node_pubkey);
for details in first_channels {
let first_hop_candidate = CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details };
- add_entry!(first_hop_candidate, our_node_id, intro_node_id, 0, path_contribution_msat, 0,
- 0_u64, 0, 0);
+ let blinded_path_fee = match compute_fees(path_contribution_msat, candidate.fees()) {
+ Some(fee) => fee,
+ None => continue
+ };
+ add_entry!(first_hop_candidate, our_node_id, intro_node_id, blinded_path_fee,
+ path_contribution_msat, candidate.htlc_minimum_msat(), 0_u64,
+ candidate.cltv_expiry_delta(),
+ candidate.blinded_path().map_or(1, |bp| bp.blinded_hops.len() as u8));
}
}
}
hop_ids: [Option<NodeId>; MAX_PATH_LENGTH_ESTIMATE as usize],
}
- impl Score for HopScorer {
+ impl ScoreLookUp for HopScorer {
type ScoreParams = ();
fn channel_penalty_msat(&self, _short_channel_id: u64, source: &NodeId, target: &NodeId,
_usage: ChannelUsage, _score_params: &Self::ScoreParams) -> u64
}
u64::max_value()
}
-
- fn payment_path_failed(&mut self, _path: &Path, _short_channel_id: u64) {}
-
- fn payment_path_successful(&mut self, _path: &Path) {}
-
- fn probe_failed(&mut self, _path: &Path, _short_channel_id: u64) {}
-
- fn probe_successful(&mut self, _path: &Path) {}
}
impl<'a> Writeable for HopScorer {
use crate::routing::router::{get_route, build_route_from_hops_internal, add_random_cltv_offset, default_node_features,
BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteHop, RoutingFees,
DEFAULT_MAX_TOTAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_PATH_LENGTH_ESTIMATE};
- use crate::routing::scoring::{ChannelUsage, FixedPenaltyScorer, Score, ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters, ProbabilisticScoringDecayParameters};
+ use crate::routing::scoring::{ChannelUsage, FixedPenaltyScorer, ScoreLookUp, ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters, ProbabilisticScoringDecayParameters};
use crate::routing::test_utils::{add_channel, add_or_update_node, build_graph, build_line_graph, id_to_feature_flags, get_nodes, update_channel};
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use crate::sign::EntropySource;
+ use crate::ln::ChannelId;
use crate::ln::features::{BlindedHopFeatures, Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use crate::ln::msgs::{ErrorAction, LightningError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
use crate::ln::channelmanager;
fn get_channel_details(short_channel_id: Option<u64>, node_id: PublicKey,
features: InitFeatures, outbound_capacity_msat: u64) -> channelmanager::ChannelDetails {
channelmanager::ChannelDetails {
- channel_id: [0; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
counterparty: channelmanager::ChannelCounterparty {
features,
node_id,
fn available_amount_while_routing_test() {
// Tests whether we choose the correct available channel amount while routing.
- let (secp_ctx, network_graph, mut gossip_sync, chain_monitor, logger) = build_graph();
+ let (secp_ctx, network_graph, gossip_sync, chain_monitor, logger) = build_graph();
let (our_privkey, our_id, privkeys, nodes) = get_nodes(&secp_ctx);
let scorer = ln_test_utils::TestScorer::new();
let keys_manager = ln_test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[0u8; 32], Network::Testnet);
impl Writeable for BadChannelScorer {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, _w: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> { unimplemented!() }
}
- impl Score for BadChannelScorer {
+ impl ScoreLookUp for BadChannelScorer {
type ScoreParams = ();
fn channel_penalty_msat(&self, short_channel_id: u64, _: &NodeId, _: &NodeId, _: ChannelUsage, _score_params:&Self::ScoreParams) -> u64 {
if short_channel_id == self.short_channel_id { u64::max_value() } else { 0 }
}
-
- fn payment_path_failed(&mut self, _path: &Path, _short_channel_id: u64) {}
- fn payment_path_successful(&mut self, _path: &Path) {}
- fn probe_failed(&mut self, _path: &Path, _short_channel_id: u64) {}
- fn probe_successful(&mut self, _path: &Path) {}
}
struct BadNodeScorer {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, _w: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> { unimplemented!() }
}
- impl Score for BadNodeScorer {
+ impl ScoreLookUp for BadNodeScorer {
type ScoreParams = ();
fn channel_penalty_msat(&self, _: u64, _: &NodeId, target: &NodeId, _: ChannelUsage, _score_params:&Self::ScoreParams) -> u64 {
if *target == self.node_id { u64::max_value() } else { 0 }
}
-
- fn payment_path_failed(&mut self, _path: &Path, _short_channel_id: u64) {}
- fn payment_path_successful(&mut self, _path: &Path) {}
- fn probe_failed(&mut self, _path: &Path, _short_channel_id: u64) {}
- fn probe_successful(&mut self, _path: &Path) {}
}
#[test]
}
assert_eq!(total_amount_paid_msat, 100_000);
}
+
+ #[test]
+ fn direct_to_intro_node() {
+ // This previously caused a debug panic in the router when asserting
+ // `used_liquidity_msat <= hop_max_msat`, because when adding first_hop<>blinded_route_hint
+ // direct channels we failed to account for the fee charged for use of the blinded path.
+
+ // Build a graph:
+ // node0 -1(1)2 - node1
+ // such that there isn't enough liquidity to reach node1, but the router thinks there is if it
+ // doesn't account for the blinded path fee.
+
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let logger = Arc::new(ln_test_utils::TestLogger::new());
+ let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
+ let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(Arc::clone(&network_graph), None, Arc::clone(&logger));
+ let scorer = ln_test_utils::TestScorer::new();
+ let keys_manager = ln_test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[0u8; 32], Network::Testnet);
+ let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+
+ let amt_msat = 10_000_000;
+ let (_, _, privkeys, nodes) = get_nodes(&secp_ctx);
+ add_channel(&gossip_sync, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[0], &privkeys[1],
+ ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags(1)), 1);
+ update_channel(&gossip_sync, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[0], UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
+ short_channel_id: 1,
+ timestamp: 1,
+ flags: 0,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: 10_000_000,
+ fee_base_msat: 800,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ excess_data: Vec::new()
+ });
+ update_channel(&gossip_sync, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[1], UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
+ short_channel_id: 1,
+ timestamp: 1,
+ flags: 1,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: 10_000_000,
+ fee_base_msat: 800,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ excess_data: Vec::new()
+ });
+ let first_hops = vec![
+ get_channel_details(Some(1), nodes[1], InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0b11]), 10_000_000)];
+
+ let blinded_path = BlindedPath {
+ introduction_node_id: nodes[1],
+ blinding_point: ln_test_utils::pubkey(42),
+ blinded_hops: vec![
+ BlindedHop { blinded_node_id: ln_test_utils::pubkey(42 as u8), encrypted_payload: Vec::new() },
+ BlindedHop { blinded_node_id: ln_test_utils::pubkey(42 as u8), encrypted_payload: Vec::new() }
+ ],
+ };
+ let blinded_payinfo = BlindedPayInfo {
+ fee_base_msat: 1000,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 1000,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
+ features: BlindedHopFeatures::empty(),
+ };
+ let blinded_hints = vec![(blinded_payinfo.clone(), blinded_path)];
+
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::blinded(blinded_hints.clone());
+
+ let netgraph = network_graph.read_only();
+ if let Err(LightningError { err, .. }) = get_route(&nodes[0], &payment_params, &netgraph,
+ Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), amt_msat, Arc::clone(&logger), &scorer, &(),
+ &random_seed_bytes) {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Failed to find a path to the given destination");
+ } else { panic!("Expected error") }
+
+ // Sending an exact amount accounting for the blinded path fee works.
+ let amt_minus_blinded_path_fee = amt_msat - blinded_payinfo.fee_base_msat as u64;
+ let route = get_route(&nodes[0], &payment_params, &netgraph,
+ Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), amt_minus_blinded_path_fee,
+ Arc::clone(&logger), &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(route.get_total_fees(), blinded_payinfo.fee_base_msat as u64);
+ assert_eq!(route.get_total_amount(), amt_minus_blinded_path_fee);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn direct_to_matching_intro_nodes() {
+ // This previously caused us to enter `unreachable` code in the following situation:
+ // 1. We add a route candidate for intro_node contributing a high amount
+ // 2. We add a first_hop<>intro_node route candidate for the same high amount
+ // 3. We see a cheaper blinded route hint for the same intro node but a much lower contribution
+ // amount, and update our route candidate for intro_node for the lower amount
+ // 4. We then attempt to update the aforementioned first_hop<>intro_node route candidate for the
+ // lower contribution amount, but fail (this was previously caused by failure to account for
+ // blinded path fees when adding first_hop<>intro_node candidates)
+ // 5. We go to construct the path from these route candidates and our first_hop<>intro_node
+ // candidate still thinks its path is contributing the original higher amount. This caused us
+ // to hit an `unreachable` overflow when calculating the cheaper intro_node fees over the
+ // larger amount
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let logger = Arc::new(ln_test_utils::TestLogger::new());
+ let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
+ let scorer = ln_test_utils::TestScorer::new();
+ let keys_manager = ln_test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[0u8; 32], Network::Testnet);
+ let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ let config = UserConfig::default();
+
+ // Values are taken from the fuzz input that uncovered this panic.
+ let amt_msat = 21_7020_5185_1403_2640;
+ let (_, _, _, nodes) = get_nodes(&secp_ctx);
+ let first_hops = vec![
+ get_channel_details(Some(1), nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
+ 18446744073709551615)];
+
+ let blinded_path = BlindedPath {
+ introduction_node_id: nodes[1],
+ blinding_point: ln_test_utils::pubkey(42),
+ blinded_hops: vec![
+ BlindedHop { blinded_node_id: ln_test_utils::pubkey(42 as u8), encrypted_payload: Vec::new() },
+ BlindedHop { blinded_node_id: ln_test_utils::pubkey(42 as u8), encrypted_payload: Vec::new() }
+ ],
+ };
+ let blinded_payinfo = BlindedPayInfo {
+ fee_base_msat: 5046_2720,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 4503_5996_2737_0496,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: 45_0359_9627_3704_9600,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
+ features: BlindedHopFeatures::empty(),
+ };
+ let mut blinded_hints = vec![
+ (blinded_payinfo.clone(), blinded_path.clone()),
+ (blinded_payinfo.clone(), blinded_path.clone()),
+ ];
+ blinded_hints[1].0.fee_base_msat = 419_4304;
+ blinded_hints[1].0.fee_proportional_millionths = 257;
+ blinded_hints[1].0.htlc_minimum_msat = 280_8908_6115_8400;
+ blinded_hints[1].0.htlc_maximum_msat = 2_8089_0861_1584_0000;
+ blinded_hints[1].0.cltv_expiry_delta = 0;
+
+ let bolt12_features: Bolt12InvoiceFeatures = channelmanager::provided_invoice_features(&config).to_context();
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::blinded(blinded_hints.clone())
+ .with_bolt12_features(bolt12_features.clone()).unwrap();
+
+ let netgraph = network_graph.read_only();
+ let route = get_route(&nodes[0], &payment_params, &netgraph,
+ Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), amt_msat,
+ Arc::clone(&logger), &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(route.get_total_fees(), blinded_payinfo.fee_base_msat as u64);
+ assert_eq!(route.get_total_amount(), amt_msat);
+ }
}
#[cfg(all(any(test, ldk_bench), not(feature = "no-std")))]
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+ use crate::routing::scoring::ScoreUpdate;
use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager};
+ use crate::ln::ChannelId;
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, ChannelCounterparty, ChannelDetails};
use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
#[inline]
pub(crate) fn first_hop(node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelDetails {
ChannelDetails {
- channel_id: [0; 32],
+ channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()),
node_id,
}
}
- pub(crate) fn generate_test_routes<S: Score>(graph: &NetworkGraph<&TestLogger>, scorer: &mut S,
+ pub(crate) fn generate_test_routes<S: ScoreLookUp + ScoreUpdate>(graph: &NetworkGraph<&TestLogger>, scorer: &mut S,
score_params: &S::ScoreParams, features: Bolt11InvoiceFeatures, mut seed: u64,
starting_amount: u64, route_count: usize,
) -> Vec<(ChannelDetails, PaymentParameters, u64)> {
let amt = starting_amount + seed % 1_000_000;
let path_exists =
get_route(&payer, ¶ms, &graph.read_only(), Some(&[&first_hop]),
- amt, &TestLogger::new(), &scorer, score_params, &random_seed_bytes).is_ok();
+ amt, &TestLogger::new(), scorer, score_params, &random_seed_bytes).is_ok();
if path_exists {
// ...and seed the scorer with success and failure data...
seed = seed.overflowing_mul(6364136223846793005).0.overflowing_add(1).0;
.with_bolt11_features(mpp_features).unwrap();
let route_res = get_route(&payer, ¶ms, &graph.read_only(),
- Some(&[&first_hop]), score_amt, &TestLogger::new(), &scorer,
+ Some(&[&first_hop]), score_amt, &TestLogger::new(), scorer,
score_params, &random_seed_bytes);
if let Ok(route) = route_res {
for path in route.paths {
// requires a too-high CLTV delta.
route_endpoints.retain(|(first_hop, params, amt)| {
get_route(&payer, params, &graph.read_only(), Some(&[first_hop]), *amt,
- &TestLogger::new(), &scorer, score_params, &random_seed_bytes).is_ok()
+ &TestLogger::new(), scorer, score_params, &random_seed_bytes).is_ok()
});
route_endpoints.truncate(route_count);
assert_eq!(route_endpoints.len(), route_count);
#[cfg(ldk_bench)]
pub mod benches {
use super::*;
+ use crate::routing::scoring::{ScoreUpdate, ScoreLookUp};
use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager};
use crate::ln::channelmanager;
use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
"generate_large_mpp_routes_with_probabilistic_scorer");
}
- fn generate_routes<S: Score>(
+ fn generate_routes<S: ScoreLookUp + ScoreUpdate>(
bench: &mut Criterion, graph: &NetworkGraph<&TestLogger>, mut scorer: S,
score_params: &S::ScoreParams, features: Bolt11InvoiceFeatures, starting_amount: u64,
bench_name: &'static str,
//! Utilities for scoring payment channels.
//!
//! [`ProbabilisticScorer`] may be given to [`find_route`] to score payment channels during path
-//! finding when a custom [`Score`] implementation is not needed.
+//! finding when a custom [`ScoreLookUp`] implementation is not needed.
//!
//! # Example
//!
use crate::prelude::*;
use core::{cmp, fmt};
-use core::cell::{RefCell, RefMut};
+use core::cell::{RefCell, RefMut, Ref};
use core::convert::TryInto;
use core::ops::{Deref, DerefMut};
use core::time::Duration;
use crate::io::{self, Read};
-use crate::sync::{Mutex, MutexGuard};
+use crate::sync::{Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, RwLockWriteGuard};
/// We define Score ever-so-slightly differently based on whether we are being built for C bindings
/// or not. For users, `LockableScore` must somehow be writeable to disk. For Rust users, this is
macro_rules! define_score { ($($supertrait: path)*) => {
/// An interface used to score payment channels for path finding.
///
-/// Scoring is in terms of fees willing to be paid in order to avoid routing through a channel.
-pub trait Score $(: $supertrait)* {
+/// `ScoreLookUp` is used to determine the penalty for a given channel.
+///
+/// Scoring is in terms of fees willing to be paid in order to avoid routing through a channel.
+pub trait ScoreLookUp $(: $supertrait)* {
/// A configurable type which should contain various passed-in parameters for configuring the scorer,
/// on a per-routefinding-call basis through to the scorer methods,
/// which are used to determine the parameters for the suitability of channels for use.
fn channel_penalty_msat(
&self, short_channel_id: u64, source: &NodeId, target: &NodeId, usage: ChannelUsage, score_params: &Self::ScoreParams
) -> u64;
+}
+/// `ScoreUpdate` is used to update the scorer's internal state after a payment attempt.
+pub trait ScoreUpdate $(: $supertrait)* {
/// Handles updating channel penalties after failing to route through a channel.
fn payment_path_failed(&mut self, path: &Path, short_channel_id: u64);
fn probe_successful(&mut self, path: &Path);
}
-impl<S: Score, T: DerefMut<Target=S> $(+ $supertrait)*> Score for T {
- type ScoreParams = S::ScoreParams;
+impl<SP: Sized, S: ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>, T: Deref<Target=S> $(+ $supertrait)*> ScoreLookUp for T {
+ type ScoreParams = SP;
fn channel_penalty_msat(
&self, short_channel_id: u64, source: &NodeId, target: &NodeId, usage: ChannelUsage, score_params: &Self::ScoreParams
) -> u64 {
self.deref().channel_penalty_msat(short_channel_id, source, target, usage, score_params)
}
+}
+impl<S: ScoreUpdate, T: DerefMut<Target=S> $(+ $supertrait)*> ScoreUpdate for T {
fn payment_path_failed(&mut self, path: &Path, short_channel_id: u64) {
self.deref_mut().payment_path_failed(path, short_channel_id)
}
#[cfg(c_bindings)]
define_score!(Writeable);
+
#[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
define_score!();
/// A scorer that is accessed under a lock.
///
-/// Needed so that calls to [`Score::channel_penalty_msat`] in [`find_route`] can be made while
-/// having shared ownership of a scorer but without requiring internal locking in [`Score`]
+/// Needed so that calls to [`ScoreLookUp::channel_penalty_msat`] in [`find_route`] can be made while
+/// having shared ownership of a scorer but without requiring internal locking in [`ScoreUpdate`]
/// implementations. Internal locking would be detrimental to route finding performance and could
-/// result in [`Score::channel_penalty_msat`] returning a different value for the same channel.
+/// result in [`ScoreLookUp::channel_penalty_msat`] returning a different value for the same channel.
///
/// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
pub trait LockableScore<'a> {
- /// The [`Score`] type.
- type Score: 'a + Score;
+ /// The [`ScoreUpdate`] type.
+ type ScoreUpdate: 'a + ScoreUpdate;
+ /// The [`ScoreLookUp`] type.
+ type ScoreLookUp: 'a + ScoreLookUp;
+
+ /// The write locked [`ScoreUpdate`] type.
+ type WriteLocked: DerefMut<Target = Self::ScoreUpdate> + Sized;
- /// The locked [`Score`] type.
- type Locked: DerefMut<Target = Self::Score> + Sized;
+ /// The read locked [`ScoreLookUp`] type.
+ type ReadLocked: Deref<Target = Self::ScoreLookUp> + Sized;
- /// Returns the locked scorer.
- fn lock(&'a self) -> Self::Locked;
+ /// Returns read locked scorer.
+ fn read_lock(&'a self) -> Self::ReadLocked;
+
+ /// Returns write locked scorer.
+ fn write_lock(&'a self) -> Self::WriteLocked;
}
/// Refers to a scorer that is accessible under lock and also writeable to disk
#[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
impl<'a, T> WriteableScore<'a> for T where T: LockableScore<'a> + Writeable {}
#[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
-impl<'a, T: 'a + Score> LockableScore<'a> for Mutex<T> {
- type Score = T;
- type Locked = MutexGuard<'a, T>;
+impl<'a, T: 'a + ScoreLookUp + ScoreUpdate> LockableScore<'a> for Mutex<T> {
+ type ScoreUpdate = T;
+ type ScoreLookUp = T;
+
+ type WriteLocked = MutexGuard<'a, Self::ScoreUpdate>;
+ type ReadLocked = MutexGuard<'a, Self::ScoreLookUp>;
+
+ fn read_lock(&'a self) -> Self::ReadLocked {
+ Mutex::lock(self).unwrap()
+ }
- fn lock(&'a self) -> Self::Locked {
+ fn write_lock(&'a self) -> Self::WriteLocked {
Mutex::lock(self).unwrap()
}
}
#[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
-impl<'a, T: 'a + Score> LockableScore<'a> for RefCell<T> {
- type Score = T;
- type Locked = RefMut<'a, T>;
+impl<'a, T: 'a + ScoreUpdate + ScoreLookUp> LockableScore<'a> for RefCell<T> {
+ type ScoreUpdate = T;
+ type ScoreLookUp = T;
+
+ type WriteLocked = RefMut<'a, Self::ScoreUpdate>;
+ type ReadLocked = Ref<'a, Self::ScoreLookUp>;
- fn lock(&'a self) -> Self::Locked {
+ fn write_lock(&'a self) -> Self::WriteLocked {
self.borrow_mut()
}
+
+ fn read_lock(&'a self) -> Self::ReadLocked {
+ self.borrow()
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
+impl<'a, SP:Sized, T: 'a + ScoreUpdate + ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>> LockableScore<'a> for RwLock<T> {
+ type ScoreUpdate = T;
+ type ScoreLookUp = T;
+
+ type WriteLocked = RwLockWriteGuard<'a, Self::ScoreLookUp>;
+ type ReadLocked = RwLockReadGuard<'a, Self::ScoreUpdate>;
+
+ fn read_lock(&'a self) -> Self::ReadLocked {
+ RwLock::read(self).unwrap()
+ }
+
+ fn write_lock(&'a self) -> Self::WriteLocked {
+ RwLock::write(self).unwrap()
+ }
}
#[cfg(c_bindings)]
/// A concrete implementation of [`LockableScore`] which supports multi-threading.
-pub struct MultiThreadedLockableScore<T: Score> {
- score: Mutex<T>,
+pub struct MultiThreadedLockableScore<T: ScoreLookUp + ScoreUpdate> {
+ score: RwLock<T>,
}
#[cfg(c_bindings)]
-impl<'a, T: 'a + Score> LockableScore<'a> for MultiThreadedLockableScore<T> {
- type Score = T;
- type Locked = MultiThreadedScoreLock<'a, T>;
+impl<'a, SP:Sized, T: 'a + ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP> + ScoreUpdate> LockableScore<'a> for MultiThreadedLockableScore<T> {
+ type ScoreUpdate = T;
+ type ScoreLookUp = T;
+ type WriteLocked = MultiThreadedScoreLockWrite<'a, Self::ScoreUpdate>;
+ type ReadLocked = MultiThreadedScoreLockRead<'a, Self::ScoreLookUp>;
+
+ fn read_lock(&'a self) -> Self::ReadLocked {
+ MultiThreadedScoreLockRead(self.score.read().unwrap())
+ }
- fn lock(&'a self) -> Self::Locked {
- MultiThreadedScoreLock(Mutex::lock(&self.score).unwrap())
+ fn write_lock(&'a self) -> Self::WriteLocked {
+ MultiThreadedScoreLockWrite(self.score.write().unwrap())
}
}
#[cfg(c_bindings)]
-impl<T: Score> Writeable for MultiThreadedLockableScore<T> {
+impl<T: ScoreUpdate + ScoreLookUp> Writeable for MultiThreadedLockableScore<T> {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
- self.lock().write(writer)
+ self.score.read().unwrap().write(writer)
}
}
#[cfg(c_bindings)]
-impl<'a, T: 'a + Score> WriteableScore<'a> for MultiThreadedLockableScore<T> {}
+impl<'a, T: 'a + ScoreUpdate + ScoreLookUp> WriteableScore<'a> for MultiThreadedLockableScore<T> {}
#[cfg(c_bindings)]
-impl<T: Score> MultiThreadedLockableScore<T> {
+impl<T: ScoreLookUp + ScoreUpdate> MultiThreadedLockableScore<T> {
/// Creates a new [`MultiThreadedLockableScore`] given an underlying [`Score`].
pub fn new(score: T) -> Self {
- MultiThreadedLockableScore { score: Mutex::new(score) }
+ MultiThreadedLockableScore { score: RwLock::new(score) }
}
}
#[cfg(c_bindings)]
/// A locked `MultiThreadedLockableScore`.
-pub struct MultiThreadedScoreLock<'a, T: Score>(MutexGuard<'a, T>);
+pub struct MultiThreadedScoreLockRead<'a, T: ScoreLookUp>(RwLockReadGuard<'a, T>);
#[cfg(c_bindings)]
-impl<'a, T: 'a + Score> Writeable for MultiThreadedScoreLock<'a, T> {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
- self.0.write(writer)
+/// A locked `MultiThreadedLockableScore`.
+pub struct MultiThreadedScoreLockWrite<'a, T: ScoreUpdate>(RwLockWriteGuard<'a, T>);
+
+#[cfg(c_bindings)]
+impl<'a, T: 'a + ScoreLookUp> Deref for MultiThreadedScoreLockRead<'a, T> {
+ type Target = T;
+
+ fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
+ self.0.deref()
}
}
#[cfg(c_bindings)]
-impl<'a, T: 'a + Score> DerefMut for MultiThreadedScoreLock<'a, T> {
- fn deref_mut(&mut self) -> &mut Self::Target {
- self.0.deref_mut()
- }
+impl<'a, T: 'a + ScoreUpdate> Writeable for MultiThreadedScoreLockWrite<'a, T> {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ self.0.write(writer)
+ }
}
#[cfg(c_bindings)]
-impl<'a, T: 'a + Score> Deref for MultiThreadedScoreLock<'a, T> {
+impl<'a, T: 'a + ScoreUpdate> Deref for MultiThreadedScoreLockWrite<'a, T> {
type Target = T;
- fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
- self.0.deref()
- }
+ fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
+ self.0.deref()
+ }
}
+#[cfg(c_bindings)]
+impl<'a, T: 'a + ScoreUpdate> DerefMut for MultiThreadedScoreLockWrite<'a, T> {
+ fn deref_mut(&mut self) -> &mut Self::Target {
+ self.0.deref_mut()
+ }
+}
-/// Proposed use of a channel passed as a parameter to [`Score::channel_penalty_msat`].
+/// Proposed use of a channel passed as a parameter to [`ScoreLookUp::channel_penalty_msat`].
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub struct ChannelUsage {
/// The amount to send through the channel, denominated in millisatoshis.
}
#[derive(Clone)]
-/// [`Score`] implementation that uses a fixed penalty.
+/// [`ScoreLookUp`] implementation that uses a fixed penalty.
pub struct FixedPenaltyScorer {
penalty_msat: u64,
}
}
}
-impl Score for FixedPenaltyScorer {
+impl ScoreLookUp for FixedPenaltyScorer {
type ScoreParams = ();
fn channel_penalty_msat(&self, _: u64, _: &NodeId, _: &NodeId, _: ChannelUsage, _score_params: &Self::ScoreParams) -> u64 {
self.penalty_msat
}
+}
+impl ScoreUpdate for FixedPenaltyScorer {
fn payment_path_failed(&mut self, _path: &Path, _short_channel_id: u64) {}
fn payment_path_successful(&mut self, _path: &Path) {}
#[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
type ConfiguredTime = Eternity;
-/// [`Score`] implementation using channel success probability distributions.
+/// [`ScoreLookUp`] implementation using channel success probability distributions.
///
/// Channels are tracked with upper and lower liquidity bounds - when an HTLC fails at a channel,
/// we learn that the upper-bound on the available liquidity is lower than the amount of the HTLC.
/// [`historical_liquidity_penalty_amount_multiplier_msat`]: ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters::historical_liquidity_penalty_amount_multiplier_msat
pub type ProbabilisticScorer<G, L> = ProbabilisticScorerUsingTime::<G, L, ConfiguredTime>;
-/// Probabilistic [`Score`] implementation.
+/// Probabilistic [`ScoreLookUp`] implementation.
///
/// This is not exported to bindings users generally all users should use the [`ProbabilisticScorer`] type alias.
pub struct ProbabilisticScorerUsingTime<G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph<L>>, L: Deref, T: Time>
}
}
-/// Tracks the historical state of a distribution as a weighted average of how much time was spent
-/// in each of 8 buckets.
-#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
-struct HistoricalBucketRangeTracker {
- buckets: [u16; 8],
-}
-
-impl HistoricalBucketRangeTracker {
- fn new() -> Self { Self { buckets: [0; 8] } }
- fn track_datapoint(&mut self, liquidity_offset_msat: u64, capacity_msat: u64) {
- // We have 8 leaky buckets for min and max liquidity. Each bucket tracks the amount of time
- // we spend in each bucket as a 16-bit fixed-point number with a 5 bit fractional part.
- //
- // Each time we update our liquidity estimate, we add 32 (1.0 in our fixed-point system) to
- // the buckets for the current min and max liquidity offset positions.
- //
- // We then decay each bucket by multiplying by 2047/2048 (avoiding dividing by a
- // non-power-of-two). This ensures we can't actually overflow the u16 - when we get to
- // 63,457 adding 32 and decaying by 2047/2048 leaves us back at 63,457.
- //
- // In total, this allows us to track data for the last 8,000 or so payments across a given
- // channel.
- //
- // These constants are a balance - we try to fit in 2 bytes per bucket to reduce overhead,
- // and need to balance having more bits in the decimal part (to ensure decay isn't too
- // non-linear) with having too few bits in the mantissa, causing us to not store very many
- // datapoints.
- //
- // The constants were picked experimentally, selecting a decay amount that restricts us
- // from overflowing buckets without having to cap them manually.
-
- // Ensure the bucket index is in the range [0, 7], even if the liquidity offset is zero or
- // the channel's capacity, though the second should generally never happen.
- debug_assert!(liquidity_offset_msat <= capacity_msat);
- let bucket_idx: u8 = (liquidity_offset_msat * 8 / capacity_msat.saturating_add(1))
- .try_into().unwrap_or(32); // 32 is bogus for 8 buckets, and will be ignored
- debug_assert!(bucket_idx < 8);
- if bucket_idx < 8 {
- for e in self.buckets.iter_mut() {
- *e = ((*e as u32) * 2047 / 2048) as u16;
- }
- self.buckets[bucket_idx as usize] = self.buckets[bucket_idx as usize].saturating_add(32);
- }
- }
- /// Decay all buckets by the given number of half-lives. Used to more aggressively remove old
- /// datapoints as we receive newer information.
- fn time_decay_data(&mut self, half_lives: u32) {
- for e in self.buckets.iter_mut() {
- *e = e.checked_shr(half_lives).unwrap_or(0);
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HistoricalBucketRangeTracker, { (0, buckets, required) });
-
-struct HistoricalMinMaxBuckets<'a> {
- min_liquidity_offset_history: &'a HistoricalBucketRangeTracker,
- max_liquidity_offset_history: &'a HistoricalBucketRangeTracker,
-}
-
-impl HistoricalMinMaxBuckets<'_> {
- #[inline]
- fn get_decayed_buckets<T: Time>(&self, now: T, last_updated: T, half_life: Duration)
- -> ([u16; 8], [u16; 8], u32) {
- let required_decays = now.duration_since(last_updated).as_secs()
- .checked_div(half_life.as_secs())
- .map_or(u32::max_value(), |decays| cmp::min(decays, u32::max_value() as u64) as u32);
- let mut min_buckets = *self.min_liquidity_offset_history;
- min_buckets.time_decay_data(required_decays);
- let mut max_buckets = *self.max_liquidity_offset_history;
- max_buckets.time_decay_data(required_decays);
- (min_buckets.buckets, max_buckets.buckets, required_decays)
- }
-
- #[inline]
- fn calculate_success_probability_times_billion<T: Time>(
- &self, now: T, last_updated: T, half_life: Duration, payment_amt_64th_bucket: u8)
- -> Option<u64> {
- // If historical penalties are enabled, calculate the penalty by walking the set of
- // historical liquidity bucket (min, max) combinations (where min_idx < max_idx) and, for
- // each, calculate the probability of success given our payment amount, then total the
- // weighted average probability of success.
- //
- // We use a sliding scale to decide which point within a given bucket will be compared to
- // the amount being sent - for lower-bounds, the amount being sent is compared to the lower
- // edge of the first bucket (i.e. zero), but compared to the upper 7/8ths of the last
- // bucket (i.e. 9 times the index, or 63), with each bucket in between increasing the
- // comparison point by 1/64th. For upper-bounds, the same applies, however with an offset
- // of 1/64th (i.e. starting at one and ending at 64). This avoids failing to assign
- // penalties to channels at the edges.
- //
- // If we used the bottom edge of buckets, we'd end up never assigning any penalty at all to
- // such a channel when sending less than ~0.19% of the channel's capacity (e.g. ~200k sats
- // for a 1 BTC channel!).
- //
- // If we used the middle of each bucket we'd never assign any penalty at all when sending
- // less than 1/16th of a channel's capacity, or 1/8th if we used the top of the bucket.
- let mut total_valid_points_tracked = 0;
-
- // Check if all our buckets are zero, once decayed and treat it as if we had no data. We
- // don't actually use the decayed buckets, though, as that would lose precision.
- let (decayed_min_buckets, decayed_max_buckets, required_decays) =
- self.get_decayed_buckets(now, last_updated, half_life);
- if decayed_min_buckets.iter().all(|v| *v == 0) || decayed_max_buckets.iter().all(|v| *v == 0) {
- return None;
- }
-
- for (min_idx, min_bucket) in self.min_liquidity_offset_history.buckets.iter().enumerate() {
- for max_bucket in self.max_liquidity_offset_history.buckets.iter().take(8 - min_idx) {
- total_valid_points_tracked += (*min_bucket as u64) * (*max_bucket as u64);
- }
- }
- // If the total valid points is smaller than 1.0 (i.e. 32 in our fixed-point scheme), treat
- // it as if we were fully decayed.
- if total_valid_points_tracked.checked_shr(required_decays).unwrap_or(0) < 32*32 {
- return None;
- }
-
- let mut cumulative_success_prob_times_billion = 0;
- for (min_idx, min_bucket) in self.min_liquidity_offset_history.buckets.iter().enumerate() {
- for (max_idx, max_bucket) in self.max_liquidity_offset_history.buckets.iter().enumerate().take(8 - min_idx) {
- let bucket_prob_times_million = (*min_bucket as u64) * (*max_bucket as u64)
- * 1024 * 1024 / total_valid_points_tracked;
- let min_64th_bucket = min_idx as u8 * 9;
- let max_64th_bucket = (7 - max_idx as u8) * 9 + 1;
- if payment_amt_64th_bucket > max_64th_bucket {
- // Success probability 0, the payment amount is above the max liquidity
- } else if payment_amt_64th_bucket <= min_64th_bucket {
- cumulative_success_prob_times_billion += bucket_prob_times_million * 1024;
- } else {
- cumulative_success_prob_times_billion += bucket_prob_times_million *
- ((max_64th_bucket - payment_amt_64th_bucket) as u64) * 1024 /
- ((max_64th_bucket - min_64th_bucket) as u64);
- }
- }
- }
-
- Some(cumulative_success_prob_times_billion)
- }
-}
-
/// Accounting for channel liquidity balance uncertainty.
///
/// Direction is defined in terms of [`NodeId`] partial ordering, where the source node is the
struct DirectedChannelLiquidity<L: Deref<Target = u64>, BRT: Deref<Target = HistoricalBucketRangeTracker>, T: Time, U: Deref<Target = T>> {
min_liquidity_offset_msat: L,
max_liquidity_offset_msat: L,
- min_liquidity_offset_history: BRT,
- max_liquidity_offset_history: BRT,
+ liquidity_history: HistoricalMinMaxBuckets<BRT>,
inflight_htlc_msat: u64,
capacity_msat: u64,
last_updated: U,
let amt = directed_info.effective_capacity().as_msat();
let dir_liq = liq.as_directed(source, target, 0, amt, self.decay_params);
- let buckets = HistoricalMinMaxBuckets {
- min_liquidity_offset_history: &dir_liq.min_liquidity_offset_history,
- max_liquidity_offset_history: &dir_liq.max_liquidity_offset_history,
- };
- let (min_buckets, max_buckets, _) = buckets.get_decayed_buckets(now,
- *dir_liq.last_updated, self.decay_params.historical_no_updates_half_life);
+ let (min_buckets, max_buckets, _) = dir_liq.liquidity_history
+ .get_decayed_buckets(now, *dir_liq.last_updated,
+ self.decay_params.historical_no_updates_half_life);
log_debug!(self.logger, core::concat!(
"Liquidity from {} to {} via {} is in the range ({}, {}).\n",
///
/// Because the datapoints are decayed slowly over time, values will eventually return to
/// `Some(([0; 8], [0; 8]))`.
+ ///
+ /// In order to fetch a single success probability from the buckets provided here, as used in
+ /// the scoring model, see [`Self::historical_estimated_payment_success_probability`].
pub fn historical_estimated_channel_liquidity_probabilities(&self, scid: u64, target: &NodeId)
-> Option<([u16; 8], [u16; 8])> {
let graph = self.network_graph.read_only();
let amt = directed_info.effective_capacity().as_msat();
let dir_liq = liq.as_directed(source, target, 0, amt, self.decay_params);
- let buckets = HistoricalMinMaxBuckets {
- min_liquidity_offset_history: &dir_liq.min_liquidity_offset_history,
- max_liquidity_offset_history: &dir_liq.max_liquidity_offset_history,
- };
- let (min_buckets, mut max_buckets, _) = buckets.get_decayed_buckets(T::now(),
- *dir_liq.last_updated, self.decay_params.historical_no_updates_half_life);
+ let (min_buckets, mut max_buckets, _) = dir_liq.liquidity_history
+ .get_decayed_buckets(dir_liq.now, *dir_liq.last_updated,
+ self.decay_params.historical_no_updates_half_life);
// Note that the liquidity buckets are an offset from the edge, so we inverse
// the max order to get the probabilities from zero.
max_buckets.reverse();
}
None
}
+
+ /// Query the probability of payment success sending the given `amount_msat` over the channel
+ /// with `scid` towards the given `target` node, based on the historical estimated liquidity
+ /// bounds.
+ ///
+ /// These are the same bounds as returned by
+ /// [`Self::historical_estimated_channel_liquidity_probabilities`] (but not those returned by
+ /// [`Self::estimated_channel_liquidity_range`]).
+ pub fn historical_estimated_payment_success_probability(
+ &self, scid: u64, target: &NodeId, amount_msat: u64)
+ -> Option<f64> {
+ let graph = self.network_graph.read_only();
+
+ if let Some(chan) = graph.channels().get(&scid) {
+ if let Some(liq) = self.channel_liquidities.get(&scid) {
+ if let Some((directed_info, source)) = chan.as_directed_to(target) {
+ let capacity_msat = directed_info.effective_capacity().as_msat();
+ let dir_liq = liq.as_directed(source, target, 0, capacity_msat, self.decay_params);
+
+ return dir_liq.liquidity_history.calculate_success_probability_times_billion(
+ dir_liq.now, *dir_liq.last_updated,
+ self.decay_params.historical_no_updates_half_life, amount_msat, capacity_msat
+ ).map(|p| p as f64 / (1024 * 1024 * 1024) as f64);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ None
+ }
}
impl<T: Time> ChannelLiquidity<T> {
DirectedChannelLiquidity {
min_liquidity_offset_msat,
max_liquidity_offset_msat,
- min_liquidity_offset_history,
- max_liquidity_offset_history,
+ liquidity_history: HistoricalMinMaxBuckets {
+ min_liquidity_offset_history,
+ max_liquidity_offset_history,
+ },
inflight_htlc_msat,
capacity_msat,
last_updated: &self.last_updated,
DirectedChannelLiquidity {
min_liquidity_offset_msat,
max_liquidity_offset_msat,
- min_liquidity_offset_history,
- max_liquidity_offset_history,
+ liquidity_history: HistoricalMinMaxBuckets {
+ min_liquidity_offset_history,
+ max_liquidity_offset_history,
+ },
inflight_htlc_msat,
capacity_msat,
last_updated: &mut self.last_updated,
/// Returns a liquidity penalty for routing the given HTLC `amount_msat` through the channel in
/// this direction.
fn penalty_msat(&self, amount_msat: u64, score_params: &ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters) -> u64 {
+ let available_capacity = self.available_capacity();
let max_liquidity_msat = self.max_liquidity_msat();
let min_liquidity_msat = core::cmp::min(self.min_liquidity_msat(), max_liquidity_msat);
}
};
+ if amount_msat >= available_capacity {
+ // We're trying to send more than the capacity, use a max penalty.
+ res = res.saturating_add(Self::combined_penalty_msat(amount_msat,
+ NEGATIVE_LOG10_UPPER_BOUND * 2048,
+ score_params.historical_liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat,
+ score_params.historical_liquidity_penalty_amount_multiplier_msat));
+ return res;
+ }
+
if score_params.historical_liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat != 0 ||
score_params.historical_liquidity_penalty_amount_multiplier_msat != 0 {
- let payment_amt_64th_bucket = if amount_msat < u64::max_value() / 64 {
- amount_msat * 64 / self.capacity_msat.saturating_add(1)
- } else {
- // Only use 128-bit arithmetic when multiplication will overflow to avoid 128-bit
- // division. This branch should only be hit in fuzz testing since the amount would
- // need to be over 2.88 million BTC in practice.
- ((amount_msat as u128) * 64 / (self.capacity_msat as u128).saturating_add(1))
- .try_into().unwrap_or(65)
- };
- #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
- debug_assert!(payment_amt_64th_bucket <= 64);
- if payment_amt_64th_bucket > 64 { return res; }
-
- let buckets = HistoricalMinMaxBuckets {
- min_liquidity_offset_history: &self.min_liquidity_offset_history,
- max_liquidity_offset_history: &self.max_liquidity_offset_history,
- };
- if let Some(cumulative_success_prob_times_billion) = buckets
+ if let Some(cumulative_success_prob_times_billion) = self.liquidity_history
.calculate_success_probability_times_billion(self.now, *self.last_updated,
- self.decay_params.historical_no_updates_half_life, payment_amt_64th_bucket as u8)
+ self.decay_params.historical_no_updates_half_life, amount_msat, self.capacity_msat)
{
let historical_negative_log10_times_2048 = approx::negative_log10_times_2048(cumulative_success_prob_times_billion + 1, 1024 * 1024 * 1024);
res = res.saturating_add(Self::combined_penalty_msat(amount_msat,
/// Computes the liquidity penalty from the penalty multipliers.
#[inline(always)]
- fn combined_penalty_msat(amount_msat: u64, negative_log10_times_2048: u64,
+ fn combined_penalty_msat(amount_msat: u64, mut negative_log10_times_2048: u64,
liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat: u64, liquidity_penalty_amount_multiplier_msat: u64,
) -> u64 {
- let liquidity_penalty_msat = {
- // Upper bound the liquidity penalty to ensure some channel is selected.
- let multiplier_msat = liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat;
- let max_penalty_msat = multiplier_msat.saturating_mul(NEGATIVE_LOG10_UPPER_BOUND);
- (negative_log10_times_2048.saturating_mul(multiplier_msat) / 2048).min(max_penalty_msat)
- };
+ negative_log10_times_2048 =
+ negative_log10_times_2048.min(NEGATIVE_LOG10_UPPER_BOUND * 2048);
+
+ // Upper bound the liquidity penalty to ensure some channel is selected.
+ let liquidity_penalty_msat = negative_log10_times_2048
+ .saturating_mul(liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat) / 2048;
let amount_penalty_msat = negative_log10_times_2048
.saturating_mul(liquidity_penalty_amount_multiplier_msat)
.saturating_mul(amount_msat) / 2048 / AMOUNT_PENALTY_DIVISOR;
}
/// Returns the lower bound of the channel liquidity balance in this direction.
+ #[inline(always)]
fn min_liquidity_msat(&self) -> u64 {
self.decayed_offset_msat(*self.min_liquidity_offset_msat)
}
/// Returns the upper bound of the channel liquidity balance in this direction.
+ #[inline(always)]
fn max_liquidity_msat(&self) -> u64 {
self.available_capacity()
.saturating_sub(self.decayed_offset_msat(*self.max_liquidity_offset_msat))
}
/// Returns the capacity minus the in-flight HTLCs in this direction.
+ #[inline(always)]
fn available_capacity(&self) -> u64 {
self.capacity_msat.saturating_sub(self.inflight_htlc_msat)
}
let half_lives = self.now.duration_since(*self.last_updated).as_secs()
.checked_div(self.decay_params.historical_no_updates_half_life.as_secs())
.map(|v| v.try_into().unwrap_or(u32::max_value())).unwrap_or(u32::max_value());
- self.min_liquidity_offset_history.time_decay_data(half_lives);
- self.max_liquidity_offset_history.time_decay_data(half_lives);
+ self.liquidity_history.min_liquidity_offset_history.time_decay_data(half_lives);
+ self.liquidity_history.max_liquidity_offset_history.time_decay_data(half_lives);
let min_liquidity_offset_msat = self.decayed_offset_msat(*self.min_liquidity_offset_msat);
- self.min_liquidity_offset_history.track_datapoint(
+ self.liquidity_history.min_liquidity_offset_history.track_datapoint(
min_liquidity_offset_msat, self.capacity_msat
);
let max_liquidity_offset_msat = self.decayed_offset_msat(*self.max_liquidity_offset_msat);
- self.max_liquidity_offset_history.track_datapoint(
+ self.liquidity_history.max_liquidity_offset_history.track_datapoint(
max_liquidity_offset_msat, self.capacity_msat
);
}
}
}
-impl<G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph<L>>, L: Deref, T: Time> Score for ProbabilisticScorerUsingTime<G, L, T> where L::Target: Logger {
+impl<G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph<L>>, L: Deref, T: Time> ScoreLookUp for ProbabilisticScorerUsingTime<G, L, T> where L::Target: Logger {
type ScoreParams = ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters;
fn channel_penalty_msat(
&self, short_channel_id: u64, source: &NodeId, target: &NodeId, usage: ChannelUsage, score_params: &ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters
.saturating_add(anti_probing_penalty_msat)
.saturating_add(base_penalty_msat)
}
+}
+impl<G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph<L>>, L: Deref, T: Time> ScoreUpdate for ProbabilisticScorerUsingTime<G, L, T> where L::Target: Logger {
fn payment_path_failed(&mut self, path: &Path, short_channel_id: u64) {
let amount_msat = path.final_value_msat();
log_trace!(self.logger, "Scoring path through to SCID {} as having failed at {} msat", short_channel_id, amount_msat);
}
}
+mod bucketed_history {
+ use super::*;
+
+ /// Tracks the historical state of a distribution as a weighted average of how much time was spent
+ /// in each of 8 buckets.
+ #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
+ pub(super) struct HistoricalBucketRangeTracker {
+ buckets: [u16; 8],
+ }
+
+ impl HistoricalBucketRangeTracker {
+ pub(super) fn new() -> Self { Self { buckets: [0; 8] } }
+ pub(super) fn track_datapoint(&mut self, liquidity_offset_msat: u64, capacity_msat: u64) {
+ // We have 8 leaky buckets for min and max liquidity. Each bucket tracks the amount of time
+ // we spend in each bucket as a 16-bit fixed-point number with a 5 bit fractional part.
+ //
+ // Each time we update our liquidity estimate, we add 32 (1.0 in our fixed-point system) to
+ // the buckets for the current min and max liquidity offset positions.
+ //
+ // We then decay each bucket by multiplying by 2047/2048 (avoiding dividing by a
+ // non-power-of-two). This ensures we can't actually overflow the u16 - when we get to
+ // 63,457 adding 32 and decaying by 2047/2048 leaves us back at 63,457.
+ //
+ // In total, this allows us to track data for the last 8,000 or so payments across a given
+ // channel.
+ //
+ // These constants are a balance - we try to fit in 2 bytes per bucket to reduce overhead,
+ // and need to balance having more bits in the decimal part (to ensure decay isn't too
+ // non-linear) with having too few bits in the mantissa, causing us to not store very many
+ // datapoints.
+ //
+ // The constants were picked experimentally, selecting a decay amount that restricts us
+ // from overflowing buckets without having to cap them manually.
+
+ // Ensure the bucket index is in the range [0, 7], even if the liquidity offset is zero or
+ // the channel's capacity, though the second should generally never happen.
+ debug_assert!(liquidity_offset_msat <= capacity_msat);
+ let bucket_idx: u8 = (liquidity_offset_msat * 8 / capacity_msat.saturating_add(1))
+ .try_into().unwrap_or(32); // 32 is bogus for 8 buckets, and will be ignored
+ debug_assert!(bucket_idx < 8);
+ if bucket_idx < 8 {
+ for e in self.buckets.iter_mut() {
+ *e = ((*e as u32) * 2047 / 2048) as u16;
+ }
+ self.buckets[bucket_idx as usize] = self.buckets[bucket_idx as usize].saturating_add(32);
+ }
+ }
+ /// Decay all buckets by the given number of half-lives. Used to more aggressively remove old
+ /// datapoints as we receive newer information.
+ pub(super) fn time_decay_data(&mut self, half_lives: u32) {
+ for e in self.buckets.iter_mut() {
+ *e = e.checked_shr(half_lives).unwrap_or(0);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HistoricalBucketRangeTracker, { (0, buckets, required) });
+
+ pub(super) struct HistoricalMinMaxBuckets<D: Deref<Target = HistoricalBucketRangeTracker>> {
+ pub(super) min_liquidity_offset_history: D,
+ pub(super) max_liquidity_offset_history: D,
+ }
+
+ impl<D: Deref<Target = HistoricalBucketRangeTracker>> HistoricalMinMaxBuckets<D> {
+ #[inline]
+ pub(super) fn get_decayed_buckets<T: Time>(&self, now: T, last_updated: T, half_life: Duration)
+ -> ([u16; 8], [u16; 8], u32) {
+ let required_decays = now.duration_since(last_updated).as_secs()
+ .checked_div(half_life.as_secs())
+ .map_or(u32::max_value(), |decays| cmp::min(decays, u32::max_value() as u64) as u32);
+ let mut min_buckets = *self.min_liquidity_offset_history;
+ min_buckets.time_decay_data(required_decays);
+ let mut max_buckets = *self.max_liquidity_offset_history;
+ max_buckets.time_decay_data(required_decays);
+ (min_buckets.buckets, max_buckets.buckets, required_decays)
+ }
+
+ #[inline]
+ pub(super) fn calculate_success_probability_times_billion<T: Time>(
+ &self, now: T, last_updated: T, half_life: Duration, amount_msat: u64, capacity_msat: u64)
+ -> Option<u64> {
+ // If historical penalties are enabled, calculate the penalty by walking the set of
+ // historical liquidity bucket (min, max) combinations (where min_idx < max_idx) and, for
+ // each, calculate the probability of success given our payment amount, then total the
+ // weighted average probability of success.
+ //
+ // We use a sliding scale to decide which point within a given bucket will be compared to
+ // the amount being sent - for lower-bounds, the amount being sent is compared to the lower
+ // edge of the first bucket (i.e. zero), but compared to the upper 7/8ths of the last
+ // bucket (i.e. 9 times the index, or 63), with each bucket in between increasing the
+ // comparison point by 1/64th. For upper-bounds, the same applies, however with an offset
+ // of 1/64th (i.e. starting at one and ending at 64). This avoids failing to assign
+ // penalties to channels at the edges.
+ //
+ // If we used the bottom edge of buckets, we'd end up never assigning any penalty at all to
+ // such a channel when sending less than ~0.19% of the channel's capacity (e.g. ~200k sats
+ // for a 1 BTC channel!).
+ //
+ // If we used the middle of each bucket we'd never assign any penalty at all when sending
+ // less than 1/16th of a channel's capacity, or 1/8th if we used the top of the bucket.
+ let mut total_valid_points_tracked = 0;
+
+ let payment_amt_64th_bucket: u8 = if amount_msat < u64::max_value() / 64 {
+ (amount_msat * 64 / capacity_msat.saturating_add(1))
+ .try_into().unwrap_or(65)
+ } else {
+ // Only use 128-bit arithmetic when multiplication will overflow to avoid 128-bit
+ // division. This branch should only be hit in fuzz testing since the amount would
+ // need to be over 2.88 million BTC in practice.
+ ((amount_msat as u128) * 64 / (capacity_msat as u128).saturating_add(1))
+ .try_into().unwrap_or(65)
+ };
+ #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
+ debug_assert!(payment_amt_64th_bucket <= 64);
+ if payment_amt_64th_bucket >= 64 { return None; }
+
+ // Check if all our buckets are zero, once decayed and treat it as if we had no data. We
+ // don't actually use the decayed buckets, though, as that would lose precision.
+ let (decayed_min_buckets, decayed_max_buckets, required_decays) =
+ self.get_decayed_buckets(now, last_updated, half_life);
+ if decayed_min_buckets.iter().all(|v| *v == 0) || decayed_max_buckets.iter().all(|v| *v == 0) {
+ return None;
+ }
+
+ for (min_idx, min_bucket) in self.min_liquidity_offset_history.buckets.iter().enumerate() {
+ for max_bucket in self.max_liquidity_offset_history.buckets.iter().take(8 - min_idx) {
+ total_valid_points_tracked += (*min_bucket as u64) * (*max_bucket as u64);
+ }
+ }
+ // If the total valid points is smaller than 1.0 (i.e. 32 in our fixed-point scheme), treat
+ // it as if we were fully decayed.
+ if total_valid_points_tracked.checked_shr(required_decays).unwrap_or(0) < 32*32 {
+ return None;
+ }
+
+ let mut cumulative_success_prob_times_billion = 0;
+ for (min_idx, min_bucket) in self.min_liquidity_offset_history.buckets.iter().enumerate() {
+ for (max_idx, max_bucket) in self.max_liquidity_offset_history.buckets.iter().enumerate().take(8 - min_idx) {
+ let bucket_prob_times_million = (*min_bucket as u64) * (*max_bucket as u64)
+ * 1024 * 1024 / total_valid_points_tracked;
+ let min_64th_bucket = min_idx as u8 * 9;
+ let max_64th_bucket = (7 - max_idx as u8) * 9 + 1;
+ if payment_amt_64th_bucket > max_64th_bucket {
+ // Success probability 0, the payment amount is above the max liquidity
+ } else if payment_amt_64th_bucket <= min_64th_bucket {
+ cumulative_success_prob_times_billion += bucket_prob_times_million * 1024;
+ } else {
+ cumulative_success_prob_times_billion += bucket_prob_times_million *
+ ((max_64th_bucket - payment_amt_64th_bucket) as u64) * 1024 /
+ ((max_64th_bucket - min_64th_bucket) as u64);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ Some(cumulative_success_prob_times_billion)
+ }
+ }
+}
+use bucketed_history::{HistoricalBucketRangeTracker, HistoricalMinMaxBuckets};
+
impl<G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph<L>>, L: Deref, T: Time> Writeable for ProbabilisticScorerUsingTime<G, L, T> where L::Target: Logger {
#[inline]
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
use crate::routing::gossip::{EffectiveCapacity, NetworkGraph, NodeId};
use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, Path, RouteHop};
- use crate::routing::scoring::{ChannelUsage, Score};
+ use crate::routing::scoring::{ChannelUsage, ScoreLookUp, ScoreUpdate};
use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
use crate::util::test_utils::{self, TestLogger};
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage, ¶ms), 47);
assert_eq!(scorer.historical_estimated_channel_liquidity_probabilities(42, &target),
None);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.historical_estimated_payment_success_probability(42, &target, 42),
+ None);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&payment_path_for_amount(1), 42);
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage, ¶ms), 2048);
// octile.
assert_eq!(scorer.historical_estimated_channel_liquidity_probabilities(42, &target),
Some(([32, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], [32, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0])));
+ assert_eq!(scorer.historical_estimated_payment_success_probability(42, &target, 1),
+ Some(1.0));
+ assert_eq!(scorer.historical_estimated_payment_success_probability(42, &target, 500),
+ Some(0.0));
// Even after we tell the scorer we definitely have enough available liquidity, it will
// still remember that there was some failure in the past, and assign a non-0 penalty.
assert_eq!(scorer.historical_estimated_channel_liquidity_probabilities(42, &target),
Some(([31, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 32], [31, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 32])));
+ // The exact success probability is a bit complicated and involves integer rounding, so we
+ // simply check bounds here.
+ let five_hundred_prob =
+ scorer.historical_estimated_payment_success_probability(42, &target, 500).unwrap();
+ assert!(five_hundred_prob > 0.5);
+ assert!(five_hundred_prob < 0.52);
+ let one_prob =
+ scorer.historical_estimated_payment_success_probability(42, &target, 1).unwrap();
+ assert!(one_prob < 1.0);
+ assert!(one_prob > 0.99);
+
// Advance the time forward 16 half-lives (which the docs claim will ensure all data is
// gone), and check that we're back to where we started.
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10 * 16));
// data entirely instead.
assert_eq!(scorer.historical_estimated_channel_liquidity_probabilities(42, &target),
Some(([0; 8], [0; 8])));
+ assert_eq!(scorer.historical_estimated_payment_success_probability(42, &target, 1), None);
- let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ let mut usage = ChannelUsage {
amount_msat: 100,
inflight_htlc_msat: 1024,
effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_024, htlc_maximum_msat: 1_024 },
};
scorer.payment_path_failed(&payment_path_for_amount(1), 42);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage, ¶ms), 2048);
+ usage.inflight_htlc_msat = 0;
assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage, ¶ms), 409);
let usage = ChannelUsage {
+++ /dev/null
-// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
-// history.
-//
-// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
-// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
-// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
-// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
-// licenses.
-
-use crate::ln::channel::{ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS};
-use crate::ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, TrustedCommitmentTransaction, ClosingTransaction};
-use crate::ln::{chan_utils, msgs, PaymentPreimage};
-use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner};
-
-use crate::prelude::*;
-use core::cmp;
-use crate::sync::{Mutex, Arc};
-#[cfg(test)] use crate::sync::MutexGuard;
-
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
-use bitcoin::util::sighash;
-
-use bitcoin::secp256k1;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
-use crate::events::bump_transaction::HTLCDescriptor;
-use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Writer};
-use crate::io::Error;
-use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
-
-/// Initial value for revoked commitment downward counter
-pub const INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 1 << 48;
-
-/// An implementation of Sign that enforces some policy checks. The current checks
-/// are an incomplete set. They include:
-///
-/// - When signing, the holder transaction has not been revoked
-/// - When revoking, the holder transaction has not been signed
-/// - The holder commitment number is monotonic and without gaps
-/// - The revoked holder commitment number is monotonic and without gaps
-/// - There is at least one unrevoked holder transaction at all times
-/// - The counterparty commitment number is monotonic and without gaps
-/// - The pre-derived keys and pre-built transaction in CommitmentTransaction were correctly built
-///
-/// Eventually we will probably want to expose a variant of this which would essentially
-/// be what you'd want to run on a hardware wallet.
-///
-/// Note that counterparty signatures on the holder transaction are not checked, but it should
-/// be in a complete implementation.
-///
-/// Note that before we do so we should ensure its serialization format has backwards- and
-/// forwards-compatibility prefix/suffixes!
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub struct EnforcingSigner {
- pub inner: InMemorySigner,
- /// Channel state used for policy enforcement
- pub state: Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>>,
- pub disable_revocation_policy_check: bool,
-}
-
-impl PartialEq for EnforcingSigner {
- fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
- Arc::ptr_eq(&self.state, &o.state)
- }
-}
-
-impl EnforcingSigner {
- /// Construct an EnforcingSigner
- pub fn new(inner: InMemorySigner) -> Self {
- let state = Arc::new(Mutex::new(EnforcementState::new()));
- Self {
- inner,
- state,
- disable_revocation_policy_check: false
- }
- }
-
- /// Construct an EnforcingSigner with externally managed storage
- ///
- /// Since there are multiple copies of this struct for each channel, some coordination is needed
- /// so that all copies are aware of enforcement state. A pointer to this state is provided
- /// here, usually by an implementation of KeysInterface.
- pub fn new_with_revoked(inner: InMemorySigner, state: Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>>, disable_revocation_policy_check: bool) -> Self {
- Self {
- inner,
- state,
- disable_revocation_policy_check
- }
- }
-
- pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures { self.inner.channel_type_features() }
-
- #[cfg(test)]
- pub fn get_enforcement_state(&self) -> MutexGuard<EnforcementState> {
- self.state.lock().unwrap()
- }
-}
-
-impl ChannelSigner for EnforcingSigner {
- fn get_per_commitment_point(&self, idx: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> PublicKey {
- self.inner.get_per_commitment_point(idx, secp_ctx)
- }
-
- fn release_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
- {
- let mut state = self.state.lock().unwrap();
- assert!(idx == state.last_holder_revoked_commitment || idx == state.last_holder_revoked_commitment - 1, "can only revoke the current or next unrevoked commitment - trying {}, last revoked {}", idx, state.last_holder_revoked_commitment);
- assert!(idx > state.last_holder_commitment, "cannot revoke the last holder commitment - attempted to revoke {} last commitment {}", idx, state.last_holder_commitment);
- state.last_holder_revoked_commitment = idx;
- }
- self.inner.release_commitment_secret(idx)
- }
-
- fn validate_holder_commitment(&self, holder_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, _preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), ()> {
- let mut state = self.state.lock().unwrap();
- let idx = holder_tx.commitment_number();
- assert!(idx == state.last_holder_commitment || idx == state.last_holder_commitment - 1, "expecting to validate the current or next holder commitment - trying {}, current {}", idx, state.last_holder_commitment);
- state.last_holder_commitment = idx;
- Ok(())
- }
-
- fn pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { self.inner.pubkeys() }
-
- fn channel_keys_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] { self.inner.channel_keys_id() }
-
- fn provide_channel_parameters(&mut self, channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters) {
- self.inner.provide_channel_parameters(channel_parameters)
- }
-}
-
-impl EcdsaChannelSigner for EnforcingSigner {
- fn sign_counterparty_commitment(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
- self.verify_counterparty_commitment_tx(commitment_tx, secp_ctx);
-
- {
- let mut state = self.state.lock().unwrap();
- let actual_commitment_number = commitment_tx.commitment_number();
- let last_commitment_number = state.last_counterparty_commitment;
- // These commitment numbers are backwards counting. We expect either the same as the previously encountered,
- // or the next one.
- assert!(last_commitment_number == actual_commitment_number || last_commitment_number - 1 == actual_commitment_number, "{} doesn't come after {}", actual_commitment_number, last_commitment_number);
- // Ensure that the counterparty doesn't get more than two broadcastable commitments -
- // the last and the one we are trying to sign
- assert!(actual_commitment_number >= state.last_counterparty_revoked_commitment - 2, "cannot sign a commitment if second to last wasn't revoked - signing {} revoked {}", actual_commitment_number, state.last_counterparty_revoked_commitment);
- state.last_counterparty_commitment = cmp::min(last_commitment_number, actual_commitment_number)
- }
-
- Ok(self.inner.sign_counterparty_commitment(commitment_tx, preimages, secp_ctx).unwrap())
- }
-
- fn validate_counterparty_revocation(&self, idx: u64, _secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<(), ()> {
- let mut state = self.state.lock().unwrap();
- assert!(idx == state.last_counterparty_revoked_commitment || idx == state.last_counterparty_revoked_commitment - 1, "expecting to validate the current or next counterparty revocation - trying {}, current {}", idx, state.last_counterparty_revoked_commitment);
- state.last_counterparty_revoked_commitment = idx;
- Ok(())
- }
-
- fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
- let trusted_tx = self.verify_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx, secp_ctx);
- let commitment_txid = trusted_tx.txid();
- let holder_csv = self.inner.counterparty_selected_contest_delay();
-
- let state = self.state.lock().unwrap();
- let commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
- if state.last_holder_revoked_commitment - 1 != commitment_number && state.last_holder_revoked_commitment - 2 != commitment_number {
- if !self.disable_revocation_policy_check {
- panic!("can only sign the next two unrevoked commitment numbers, revoked={} vs requested={} for {}",
- state.last_holder_revoked_commitment, commitment_number, self.inner.commitment_seed[0])
- }
- }
-
- for (this_htlc, sig) in trusted_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs) {
- assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
- let keys = trusted_tx.keys();
- let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(), holder_csv, &this_htlc, self.channel_type_features(), &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
-
- let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&this_htlc, self.channel_type_features(), &keys);
-
- let sighash_type = if self.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
- EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay
- } else {
- EcdsaSighashType::All
- };
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(
- &sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
- 0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.amount_msat / 1000, sighash_type,
- ).unwrap()[..]
- );
- secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, sig, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
- }
-
- Ok(self.inner.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(commitment_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
- }
-
- #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
- fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
- Ok(self.inner.unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(commitment_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
- }
-
- fn sign_justice_revoked_output(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
- Ok(self.inner.sign_justice_revoked_output(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, secp_ctx).unwrap())
- }
-
- fn sign_justice_revoked_htlc(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
- Ok(self.inner.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, htlc, secp_ctx).unwrap())
- }
-
- fn sign_holder_htlc_transaction(
- &self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, htlc_descriptor: &HTLCDescriptor,
- secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>
- ) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
- assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[input], htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
- assert_eq!(htlc_tx.output[input], htlc_descriptor.tx_output(secp_ctx));
- Ok(self.inner.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, htlc_descriptor, secp_ctx).unwrap())
- }
-
- fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
- Ok(self.inner.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_point, htlc, secp_ctx).unwrap())
- }
-
- fn sign_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
- closing_tx.verify(self.inner.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint())
- .expect("derived different closing transaction");
- Ok(self.inner.sign_closing_transaction(closing_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
- }
-
- fn sign_holder_anchor_input(
- &self, anchor_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
- ) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
- debug_assert!(MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS > ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI);
- // As long as our minimum dust limit is enforced and is greater than our anchor output
- // value, an anchor output can only have an index within [0, 1].
- assert!(anchor_tx.input[input].previous_output.vout == 0 || anchor_tx.input[input].previous_output.vout == 1);
- self.inner.sign_holder_anchor_input(anchor_tx, input, secp_ctx)
- }
-
- fn sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(
- &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>
- ) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
- self.inner.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(msg, secp_ctx)
- }
-}
-
-impl WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner for EnforcingSigner {}
-
-impl Writeable for EnforcingSigner {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
- // EnforcingSigner has two fields - `inner` ([`InMemorySigner`]) and `state`
- // ([`EnforcementState`]). `inner` is serialized here and deserialized by
- // [`SignerProvider::read_chan_signer`]. `state` is managed by [`SignerProvider`]
- // and will be serialized as needed by the implementation of that trait.
- self.inner.write(writer)?;
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl EnforcingSigner {
- fn verify_counterparty_commitment_tx<'a, T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &'a CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
- commitment_tx.verify(&self.inner.get_channel_parameters().as_counterparty_broadcastable(),
- self.inner.counterparty_pubkeys(), self.inner.pubkeys(), secp_ctx)
- .expect("derived different per-tx keys or built transaction")
- }
-
- fn verify_holder_commitment_tx<'a, T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &'a CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
- commitment_tx.verify(&self.inner.get_channel_parameters().as_holder_broadcastable(),
- self.inner.pubkeys(), self.inner.counterparty_pubkeys(), secp_ctx)
- .expect("derived different per-tx keys or built transaction")
- }
-}
-
-/// The state used by [`EnforcingSigner`] in order to enforce policy checks
-///
-/// This structure is maintained by KeysInterface since we may have multiple copies of
-/// the signer and they must coordinate their state.
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub struct EnforcementState {
- /// The last counterparty commitment number we signed, backwards counting
- pub last_counterparty_commitment: u64,
- /// The last counterparty commitment they revoked, backwards counting
- pub last_counterparty_revoked_commitment: u64,
- /// The last holder commitment number we revoked, backwards counting
- pub last_holder_revoked_commitment: u64,
- /// The last validated holder commitment number, backwards counting
- pub last_holder_commitment: u64,
-}
-
-impl EnforcementState {
- /// Enforcement state for a new channel
- pub fn new() -> Self {
- EnforcementState {
- last_counterparty_commitment: INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
- last_counterparty_revoked_commitment: INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
- last_holder_revoked_commitment: INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
- last_holder_commitment: INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
- }
- }
-}
use crate::routing::router::Route;
use crate::ln::chan_utils::HTLCClaim;
-use crate::util::logger::DebugBytes;
macro_rules! log_iter {
($obj: expr) => {
pub(crate) struct DebugFundingChannelId<'a>(pub &'a Txid, pub u16);
impl<'a> core::fmt::Display for DebugFundingChannelId<'a> {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), core::fmt::Error> {
- for i in (OutPoint { txid: self.0.clone(), index: self.1 }).to_channel_id().iter() {
- write!(f, "{:02x}", i)?;
- }
- Ok(())
+ (OutPoint { txid: self.0.clone(), index: self.1 }).to_channel_id().fmt(f)
}
}
macro_rules! log_funding_channel_id {
pub(crate) struct DebugFundingInfo<'a, T: 'a>(pub &'a (OutPoint, T));
impl<'a, T> core::fmt::Display for DebugFundingInfo<'a, T> {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), core::fmt::Error> {
- DebugBytes(&(self.0).0.to_channel_id()[..]).fmt(f)
+ (self.0).0.to_channel_id().fmt(f)
}
}
macro_rules! log_funding_info {
/// impls of traits that add exra enforcement on the way they're called. Useful for detecting state
/// machine errors and used in fuzz targets and tests.
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
-pub mod enforcing_trait_impls;
+pub mod test_channel_signer;
--- /dev/null
+// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
+// history.
+//
+// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
+// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
+// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
+// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
+// licenses.
+
+use crate::ln::channel::{ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS};
+use crate::ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, TrustedCommitmentTransaction, ClosingTransaction};
+use crate::ln::{chan_utils, msgs, PaymentPreimage};
+use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner};
+
+use crate::prelude::*;
+use core::cmp;
+use crate::sync::{Mutex, Arc};
+#[cfg(test)] use crate::sync::MutexGuard;
+
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
+use bitcoin::util::sighash;
+
+use bitcoin::secp256k1;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
+use crate::events::bump_transaction::HTLCDescriptor;
+use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Writer};
+use crate::io::Error;
+use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
+
+/// Initial value for revoked commitment downward counter
+pub const INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 1 << 48;
+
+/// An implementation of Sign that enforces some policy checks. The current checks
+/// are an incomplete set. They include:
+///
+/// - When signing, the holder transaction has not been revoked
+/// - When revoking, the holder transaction has not been signed
+/// - The holder commitment number is monotonic and without gaps
+/// - The revoked holder commitment number is monotonic and without gaps
+/// - There is at least one unrevoked holder transaction at all times
+/// - The counterparty commitment number is monotonic and without gaps
+/// - The pre-derived keys and pre-built transaction in CommitmentTransaction were correctly built
+///
+/// Eventually we will probably want to expose a variant of this which would essentially
+/// be what you'd want to run on a hardware wallet.
+///
+/// Note that counterparty signatures on the holder transaction are not checked, but it should
+/// be in a complete implementation.
+///
+/// Note that before we do so we should ensure its serialization format has backwards- and
+/// forwards-compatibility prefix/suffixes!
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct TestChannelSigner {
+ pub inner: InMemorySigner,
+ /// Channel state used for policy enforcement
+ pub state: Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>>,
+ pub disable_revocation_policy_check: bool,
+}
+
+impl PartialEq for TestChannelSigner {
+ fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
+ Arc::ptr_eq(&self.state, &o.state)
+ }
+}
+
+impl TestChannelSigner {
+ /// Construct an TestChannelSigner
+ pub fn new(inner: InMemorySigner) -> Self {
+ let state = Arc::new(Mutex::new(EnforcementState::new()));
+ Self {
+ inner,
+ state,
+ disable_revocation_policy_check: false
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Construct an TestChannelSigner with externally managed storage
+ ///
+ /// Since there are multiple copies of this struct for each channel, some coordination is needed
+ /// so that all copies are aware of enforcement state. A pointer to this state is provided
+ /// here, usually by an implementation of KeysInterface.
+ pub fn new_with_revoked(inner: InMemorySigner, state: Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>>, disable_revocation_policy_check: bool) -> Self {
+ Self {
+ inner,
+ state,
+ disable_revocation_policy_check
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures { self.inner.channel_type_features() }
+
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub fn get_enforcement_state(&self) -> MutexGuard<EnforcementState> {
+ self.state.lock().unwrap()
+ }
+}
+
+impl ChannelSigner for TestChannelSigner {
+ fn get_per_commitment_point(&self, idx: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> PublicKey {
+ self.inner.get_per_commitment_point(idx, secp_ctx)
+ }
+
+ fn release_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
+ {
+ let mut state = self.state.lock().unwrap();
+ assert!(idx == state.last_holder_revoked_commitment || idx == state.last_holder_revoked_commitment - 1, "can only revoke the current or next unrevoked commitment - trying {}, last revoked {}", idx, state.last_holder_revoked_commitment);
+ assert!(idx > state.last_holder_commitment, "cannot revoke the last holder commitment - attempted to revoke {} last commitment {}", idx, state.last_holder_commitment);
+ state.last_holder_revoked_commitment = idx;
+ }
+ self.inner.release_commitment_secret(idx)
+ }
+
+ fn validate_holder_commitment(&self, holder_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, _preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), ()> {
+ let mut state = self.state.lock().unwrap();
+ let idx = holder_tx.commitment_number();
+ assert!(idx == state.last_holder_commitment || idx == state.last_holder_commitment - 1, "expecting to validate the current or next holder commitment - trying {}, current {}", idx, state.last_holder_commitment);
+ state.last_holder_commitment = idx;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { self.inner.pubkeys() }
+
+ fn channel_keys_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] { self.inner.channel_keys_id() }
+
+ fn provide_channel_parameters(&mut self, channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters) {
+ self.inner.provide_channel_parameters(channel_parameters)
+ }
+}
+
+impl EcdsaChannelSigner for TestChannelSigner {
+ fn sign_counterparty_commitment(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
+ self.verify_counterparty_commitment_tx(commitment_tx, secp_ctx);
+
+ {
+ let mut state = self.state.lock().unwrap();
+ let actual_commitment_number = commitment_tx.commitment_number();
+ let last_commitment_number = state.last_counterparty_commitment;
+ // These commitment numbers are backwards counting. We expect either the same as the previously encountered,
+ // or the next one.
+ assert!(last_commitment_number == actual_commitment_number || last_commitment_number - 1 == actual_commitment_number, "{} doesn't come after {}", actual_commitment_number, last_commitment_number);
+ // Ensure that the counterparty doesn't get more than two broadcastable commitments -
+ // the last and the one we are trying to sign
+ assert!(actual_commitment_number >= state.last_counterparty_revoked_commitment - 2, "cannot sign a commitment if second to last wasn't revoked - signing {} revoked {}", actual_commitment_number, state.last_counterparty_revoked_commitment);
+ state.last_counterparty_commitment = cmp::min(last_commitment_number, actual_commitment_number)
+ }
+
+ Ok(self.inner.sign_counterparty_commitment(commitment_tx, preimages, secp_ctx).unwrap())
+ }
+
+ fn validate_counterparty_revocation(&self, idx: u64, _secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<(), ()> {
+ let mut state = self.state.lock().unwrap();
+ assert!(idx == state.last_counterparty_revoked_commitment || idx == state.last_counterparty_revoked_commitment - 1, "expecting to validate the current or next counterparty revocation - trying {}, current {}", idx, state.last_counterparty_revoked_commitment);
+ state.last_counterparty_revoked_commitment = idx;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
+ let trusted_tx = self.verify_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx, secp_ctx);
+ let commitment_txid = trusted_tx.txid();
+ let holder_csv = self.inner.counterparty_selected_contest_delay();
+
+ let state = self.state.lock().unwrap();
+ let commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
+ if state.last_holder_revoked_commitment - 1 != commitment_number && state.last_holder_revoked_commitment - 2 != commitment_number {
+ if !self.disable_revocation_policy_check {
+ panic!("can only sign the next two unrevoked commitment numbers, revoked={} vs requested={} for {}",
+ state.last_holder_revoked_commitment, commitment_number, self.inner.commitment_seed[0])
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (this_htlc, sig) in trusted_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs) {
+ assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
+ let keys = trusted_tx.keys();
+ let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(), holder_csv, &this_htlc, self.channel_type_features(), &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
+
+ let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&this_htlc, self.channel_type_features(), &keys);
+
+ let sighash_type = if self.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay
+ } else {
+ EcdsaSighashType::All
+ };
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(
+ &sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
+ 0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.amount_msat / 1000, sighash_type,
+ ).unwrap()[..]
+ );
+ secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, sig, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
+ }
+
+ Ok(self.inner.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(commitment_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
+ }
+
+ #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
+ fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
+ Ok(self.inner.unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(commitment_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
+ }
+
+ fn sign_justice_revoked_output(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ Ok(self.inner.sign_justice_revoked_output(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, secp_ctx).unwrap())
+ }
+
+ fn sign_justice_revoked_htlc(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ Ok(self.inner.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, htlc, secp_ctx).unwrap())
+ }
+
+ fn sign_holder_htlc_transaction(
+ &self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, htlc_descriptor: &HTLCDescriptor,
+ secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>
+ ) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[input], htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
+ assert_eq!(htlc_tx.output[input], htlc_descriptor.tx_output(secp_ctx));
+ Ok(self.inner.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, htlc_descriptor, secp_ctx).unwrap())
+ }
+
+ fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ Ok(self.inner.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_point, htlc, secp_ctx).unwrap())
+ }
+
+ fn sign_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ closing_tx.verify(self.inner.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint())
+ .expect("derived different closing transaction");
+ Ok(self.inner.sign_closing_transaction(closing_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
+ }
+
+ fn sign_holder_anchor_input(
+ &self, anchor_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
+ ) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ debug_assert!(MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS > ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI);
+ // As long as our minimum dust limit is enforced and is greater than our anchor output
+ // value, an anchor output can only have an index within [0, 1].
+ assert!(anchor_tx.input[input].previous_output.vout == 0 || anchor_tx.input[input].previous_output.vout == 1);
+ self.inner.sign_holder_anchor_input(anchor_tx, input, secp_ctx)
+ }
+
+ fn sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(
+ &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>
+ ) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
+ self.inner.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(msg, secp_ctx)
+ }
+}
+
+impl WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner for TestChannelSigner {}
+
+impl Writeable for TestChannelSigner {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
+ // TestChannelSigner has two fields - `inner` ([`InMemorySigner`]) and `state`
+ // ([`EnforcementState`]). `inner` is serialized here and deserialized by
+ // [`SignerProvider::read_chan_signer`]. `state` is managed by [`SignerProvider`]
+ // and will be serialized as needed by the implementation of that trait.
+ self.inner.write(writer)?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl TestChannelSigner {
+ fn verify_counterparty_commitment_tx<'a, T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &'a CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
+ commitment_tx.verify(&self.inner.get_channel_parameters().as_counterparty_broadcastable(),
+ self.inner.counterparty_pubkeys(), self.inner.pubkeys(), secp_ctx)
+ .expect("derived different per-tx keys or built transaction")
+ }
+
+ fn verify_holder_commitment_tx<'a, T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &'a CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
+ commitment_tx.verify(&self.inner.get_channel_parameters().as_holder_broadcastable(),
+ self.inner.pubkeys(), self.inner.counterparty_pubkeys(), secp_ctx)
+ .expect("derived different per-tx keys or built transaction")
+ }
+}
+
+/// The state used by [`TestChannelSigner`] in order to enforce policy checks
+///
+/// This structure is maintained by KeysInterface since we may have multiple copies of
+/// the signer and they must coordinate their state.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct EnforcementState {
+ /// The last counterparty commitment number we signed, backwards counting
+ pub last_counterparty_commitment: u64,
+ /// The last counterparty commitment they revoked, backwards counting
+ pub last_counterparty_revoked_commitment: u64,
+ /// The last holder commitment number we revoked, backwards counting
+ pub last_holder_revoked_commitment: u64,
+ /// The last validated holder commitment number, backwards counting
+ pub last_holder_commitment: u64,
+}
+
+impl EnforcementState {
+ /// Enforcement state for a new channel
+ pub fn new() -> Self {
+ EnforcementState {
+ last_counterparty_commitment: INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+ last_counterparty_revoked_commitment: INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+ last_holder_revoked_commitment: INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+ last_holder_commitment: INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+ }
+ }
+}
use crate::sign;
use crate::events;
use crate::events::bump_transaction::{WalletSource, Utxo};
+use crate::ln::ChannelId;
use crate::ln::channelmanager;
use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use crate::routing::gossip::{EffectiveCapacity, NetworkGraph, NodeId};
use crate::routing::utxo::{UtxoLookup, UtxoLookupError, UtxoResult};
use crate::routing::router::{find_route, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Route, RouteParameters, Router, ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs};
-use crate::routing::scoring::{ChannelUsage, Score};
+use crate::routing::scoring::{ChannelUsage, ScoreUpdate, ScoreLookUp};
+use crate::sync::RwLock;
use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
-use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::{EnforcingSigner, EnforcementState};
+use crate::util::test_channel_signer::{TestChannelSigner, EnforcementState};
use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Level, Record};
use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writer, Writeable};
use crate::io;
use crate::prelude::*;
use core::cell::RefCell;
-use core::ops::DerefMut;
+use core::ops::Deref;
use core::time::Duration;
use crate::sync::{Mutex, Arc};
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicUsize, Ordering};
pub struct TestRouter<'a> {
pub network_graph: Arc<NetworkGraph<&'a TestLogger>>,
pub next_routes: Mutex<VecDeque<(RouteParameters, Result<Route, LightningError>)>>,
- pub scorer: &'a Mutex<TestScorer>,
+ pub scorer: &'a RwLock<TestScorer>,
}
impl<'a> TestRouter<'a> {
- pub fn new(network_graph: Arc<NetworkGraph<&'a TestLogger>>, scorer: &'a Mutex<TestScorer>) -> Self {
+ pub fn new(network_graph: Arc<NetworkGraph<&'a TestLogger>>, scorer: &'a RwLock<TestScorer>) -> Self {
Self { network_graph, next_routes: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()), scorer }
}
if let Some((find_route_query, find_route_res)) = self.next_routes.lock().unwrap().pop_front() {
assert_eq!(find_route_query, *params);
if let Ok(ref route) = find_route_res {
- let mut binding = self.scorer.lock().unwrap();
- let scorer = ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs::new(binding.deref_mut(), &inflight_htlcs);
+ let scorer = self.scorer.read().unwrap();
+ let scorer = ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs::new(scorer, &inflight_htlcs);
for path in &route.paths {
let mut aggregate_msat = 0u64;
for (idx, hop) in path.hops.iter().rev().enumerate() {
let logger = TestLogger::new();
find_route(
payer, params, &self.network_graph, first_hops, &logger,
- &ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs::new(self.scorer.lock().unwrap().deref_mut(), &inflight_htlcs), &(),
+ &ScorerAccountingForInFlightHtlcs::new(self.scorer.read().unwrap(), &inflight_htlcs), &(),
&[42; 32]
)
}
fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }}
impl SignerProvider for OnlyReadsKeysInterface {
- type Signer = EnforcingSigner;
+ type Signer = TestChannelSigner;
fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] { unreachable!(); }
let inner: InMemorySigner = ReadableArgs::read(&mut reader, self)?;
let state = Arc::new(Mutex::new(EnforcementState::new()));
- Ok(EnforcingSigner::new_with_revoked(
+ Ok(TestChannelSigner::new_with_revoked(
inner,
state,
false
}
pub struct TestChainMonitor<'a> {
- pub added_monitors: Mutex<Vec<(OutPoint, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>>,
- pub monitor_updates: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdate>>>,
- pub latest_monitor_update_id: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], (OutPoint, u64, MonitorUpdateId)>>,
- pub chain_monitor: chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingSigner, &'a TestChainSource, &'a chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface, &'a TestFeeEstimator, &'a TestLogger, &'a chainmonitor::Persist<EnforcingSigner>>,
+ pub added_monitors: Mutex<Vec<(OutPoint, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>>,
+ pub monitor_updates: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, Vec<channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdate>>>,
+ pub latest_monitor_update_id: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, (OutPoint, u64, MonitorUpdateId)>>,
+ pub chain_monitor: chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<TestChannelSigner, &'a TestChainSource, &'a chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface, &'a TestFeeEstimator, &'a TestLogger, &'a chainmonitor::Persist<TestChannelSigner>>,
pub keys_manager: &'a TestKeysInterface,
/// If this is set to Some(), the next update_channel call (not watch_channel) must be a
/// ChannelForceClosed event for the given channel_id with should_broadcast set to the given
/// boolean.
- pub expect_channel_force_closed: Mutex<Option<([u8; 32], bool)>>,
+ pub expect_channel_force_closed: Mutex<Option<(ChannelId, bool)>>,
}
impl<'a> TestChainMonitor<'a> {
- pub fn new(chain_source: Option<&'a TestChainSource>, broadcaster: &'a chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface, logger: &'a TestLogger, fee_estimator: &'a TestFeeEstimator, persister: &'a chainmonitor::Persist<EnforcingSigner>, keys_manager: &'a TestKeysInterface) -> Self {
+ pub fn new(chain_source: Option<&'a TestChainSource>, broadcaster: &'a chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface, logger: &'a TestLogger, fee_estimator: &'a TestFeeEstimator, persister: &'a chainmonitor::Persist<TestChannelSigner>, keys_manager: &'a TestKeysInterface) -> Self {
Self {
added_monitors: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
monitor_updates: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
}
}
- pub fn complete_sole_pending_chan_update(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
+ pub fn complete_sole_pending_chan_update(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) {
let (outpoint, _, latest_update) = self.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(channel_id).unwrap().clone();
self.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(outpoint, latest_update).unwrap();
}
}
-impl<'a> chain::Watch<EnforcingSigner> for TestChainMonitor<'a> {
- fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>) -> chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus {
+impl<'a> chain::Watch<TestChannelSigner> for TestChainMonitor<'a> {
+ fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>) -> chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus {
// At every point where we get a monitor update, we should be able to send a useful monitor
// to a watchtower and disk...
let mut w = TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
- let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
+ let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), (self.keys_manager, self.keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
assert!(new_monitor == monitor);
self.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().insert(funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
let monitor = self.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_txo).unwrap();
w.0.clear();
monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
- let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
+ let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), (self.keys_manager, self.keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
self.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().push((funding_txo, new_monitor));
}
impl SignerProvider for TestKeysInterface {
- type Signer = EnforcingSigner;
+ type Signer = TestChannelSigner;
fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64, user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
self.backing.generate_channel_keys_id(inbound, channel_value_satoshis, user_channel_id)
}
- fn derive_channel_signer(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> EnforcingSigner {
+ fn derive_channel_signer(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> TestChannelSigner {
let keys = self.backing.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
let state = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(keys.commitment_seed);
- EnforcingSigner::new_with_revoked(keys, state, self.disable_revocation_policy_check)
+ TestChannelSigner::new_with_revoked(keys, state, self.disable_revocation_policy_check)
}
fn read_chan_signer(&self, buffer: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, msgs::DecodeError> {
let inner: InMemorySigner = ReadableArgs::read(&mut reader, self)?;
let state = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(inner.commitment_seed);
- Ok(EnforcingSigner::new_with_revoked(
+ Ok(TestChannelSigner::new_with_revoked(
inner,
state,
self.disable_revocation_policy_check
self
}
- pub fn derive_channel_keys(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, id: &[u8; 32]) -> EnforcingSigner {
+ pub fn derive_channel_keys(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, id: &[u8; 32]) -> TestChannelSigner {
let keys = self.backing.derive_channel_keys(channel_value_satoshis, id);
let state = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(keys.commitment_seed);
- EnforcingSigner::new_with_revoked(keys, state, self.disable_revocation_policy_check)
+ TestChannelSigner::new_with_revoked(keys, state, self.disable_revocation_policy_check)
}
fn make_enforcement_state_cell(&self, commitment_seed: [u8; 32]) -> Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>> {
fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, _: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> { unreachable!(); }
}
-impl Score for TestScorer {
+impl ScoreLookUp for TestScorer {
type ScoreParams = ();
fn channel_penalty_msat(
&self, short_channel_id: u64, _source: &NodeId, _target: &NodeId, usage: ChannelUsage, _score_params: &Self::ScoreParams
}
0
}
+}
+impl ScoreUpdate for TestScorer {
fn payment_path_failed(&mut self, _actual_path: &Path, _actual_short_channel_id: u64) {}
fn payment_path_successful(&mut self, _actual_path: &Path) {}
--- /dev/null
+* In several APIs, `channel_id` parameters have been changed from type `[u8; 32]` to newly introduced `ChannelId` type, from `ln` namespace (`lightning::ln::ChannelId`) (PR #2485)
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff