}
}
- fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>)
- where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- L::Target: Logger,
- {
- let commit_txs = self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
- let mut txs = vec![];
- for tx in commit_txs.iter() {
- log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx));
- txs.push(tx);
- }
- broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&txs);
+ fn generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs(&mut self) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Vec<TransactionOutputs>) {
+ let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(
+ self.funding_redeemscript.clone(),
+ self.channel_value_satoshis,
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
+ );
+ let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
+ self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32,
+ PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp),
+ self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height()
+ );
+ let mut claimable_outpoints = vec![commitment_package];
self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(self.funding_info.0));
+ // Although we aren't signing the transaction directly here, the transaction will be signed
+ // in the claim that is queued to OnchainTxHandler. We set holder_tx_signed here to reject
+ // new channel updates.
+ self.holder_tx_signed = true;
+ let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
+ // We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is
+ // unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in
+ // `transactions_confirmed`.
+ if !self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
+ // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
+ // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
+ let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(
+ &self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height()
+ );
+ let unsigned_commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_unsigned_holder_commitment_tx();
+ let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(
+ &self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &unsigned_commitment_tx
+ );
+ if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
+ watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
+ }
+ claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
+ }
+ (claimable_outpoints, watch_outputs)
+ }
+
+ pub(crate) fn queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
+ )
+ where
+ B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+ {
+ let (claimable_outpoints, _) = self.generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs();
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(
+ claimable_outpoints, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster,
+ fee_estimator, logger
+ );
}
fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
log_trace!(logger, "Avoiding commitment broadcast, already detected confirmed spend onchain");
continue;
}
- self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
- // If the channel supports anchor outputs, we'll need to emit an external
- // event to be consumed such that a child transaction is broadcast with a
- // high enough feerate for the parent commitment transaction to confirm.
- if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
- let funding_output = HolderFundingOutput::build(
- self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
- self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone(),
- );
- let best_block_height = self.best_block.height();
- let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
- self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32,
- PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_output),
- best_block_height, best_block_height
- );
- self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(
- vec![commitment_package], best_block_height, best_block_height,
- broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger,
- );
- }
+ self.queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast(broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
} else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
log_error!(logger, "WARNING: You have a potentially-unsafe holder commitment transaction available to broadcast");
log_error!(logger, " in channel monitor for channel {}!", &self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id());
}
}
+ /// Cancels any existing pending claims for a commitment that previously confirmed and has now
+ /// been replaced by another.
+ pub fn cancel_prev_commitment_claims<L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, logger: &L, confirmed_commitment_txid: &Txid
+ ) where L::Target: Logger {
+ for (counterparty_commitment_txid, _) in &self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain {
+ // Cancel any pending claims for counterparty commitments we've seen confirm.
+ if counterparty_commitment_txid == confirmed_commitment_txid {
+ continue;
+ }
+ for (htlc, _) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(counterparty_commitment_txid).unwrap_or(&vec![]) {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously confirmed counterparty commitment {}",
+ counterparty_commitment_txid);
+ let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: *counterparty_commitment_txid, vout: 0 };
+ if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ outpoint.vout = vout;
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if self.holder_tx_signed {
+ // If we've signed, we may have broadcast either commitment (prev or current), and
+ // attempted to claim from it immediately without waiting for a confirmation.
+ if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid != *confirmed_commitment_txid {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously broadcast holder commitment {}",
+ self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid);
+ let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, vout: 0 };
+ for (htlc, _, _) in &self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
+ if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ outpoint.vout = vout;
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
+ if prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid != *confirmed_commitment_txid {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously broadcast holder commitment {}",
+ prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid);
+ let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid, vout: 0 };
+ for (htlc, _, _) in &prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
+ if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ outpoint.vout = vout;
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ // No previous claim.
+ }
+ }
+
fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(
&mut self, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
},
});
+ // Now that we've detected a confirmed commitment transaction, attempt to cancel
+ // pending claims for any commitments that were previously confirmed such that
+ // we don't continue claiming inputs that no longer exist.
+ self.cancel_prev_commitment_claims(&logger, &txid);
}
}
if tx.input.len() >= 1 {
let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
if should_broadcast {
- let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone());
- let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height());
- claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
- self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(self.funding_info.0));
- // Although we aren't signing the transaction directly here, the transaction will be signed
- // in the claim that is queued to OnchainTxHandler. We set holder_tx_signed here to reject
- // new channel updates.
- self.holder_tx_signed = true;
- // We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is
- // unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in
- // `transactions_confirmed`.
- if !self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
- // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
- // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
- // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
- let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
- let unsigned_commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_unsigned_holder_commitment_tx();
- let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &unsigned_commitment_tx);
- if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
- watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
- }
- claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
- }
+ let (mut new_outpoints, mut new_outputs) = self.generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs();
+ claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
+ watch_outputs.append(&mut new_outputs);
}
// Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
None
}
+ pub fn abandon_claim(&mut self, outpoint: &BitcoinOutPoint) {
+ let claim_id = self.claimable_outpoints.get(outpoint).map(|(claim_id, _)| *claim_id)
+ .or_else(|| {
+ self.pending_claim_requests.iter()
+ .find(|(_, claim)| claim.outpoints().iter().any(|claim_outpoint| *claim_outpoint == outpoint))
+ .map(|(claim_id, _)| *claim_id)
+ });
+ if let Some(claim_id) = claim_id {
+ if let Some(claim) = self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&claim_id) {
+ for outpoint in claim.outpoints() {
+ self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ self.locktimed_packages.values_mut().for_each(|claims|
+ claims.retain(|claim| !claim.outpoints().iter().any(|claim_outpoint| *claim_outpoint == outpoint)));
+ }
+ }
+
/// Upon channelmonitor.block_connected(..) or upon provision of a preimage on the forward link
/// for this channel, provide new relevant on-chain transactions and/or new claim requests.
/// Together with `update_claims_view_from_matched_txn` this used to be named
nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
{
let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
+ if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
+ let _ = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ }
+
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
- check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
// One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
// connect_style.
return;
}
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let funding_tx = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).3;
route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
- let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[1].txid());
+ let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], funding_tx);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
- let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]);
+ let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[0].clone()]);
connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
- let tx = {
+ let commitment_tx = {
let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
// Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
// have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
node_txn.remove(0)
};
- mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
// Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
.provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
}
- mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
- let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Must be an HTLC-Success
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx);
+ let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), if nodes[2].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 2 } else { 1 });
+ let htlc_tx = node_txn.pop().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, commitment_tx.txid());
+ assert_eq!(htlc_tx.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Must be an HTLC-Success
+ assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
+ check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx);
}
#[test]
watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
// Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
- let alice_state = {
+ {
let mut txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
- txn.remove(0)
+ check_spends!(txn[0], chan_1.3);
+ check_spends!(txn[1], txn[0]);
};
// Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
{
let htlc_txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
- assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
- // Alice doesn't clean up the old HTLC claim since it hasn't seen a conflicting spend for
- // it. However, she should, because it now has an invalid parent.
- check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], alice_state);
}
}
assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
} else {
- assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
+ if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
+ assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
+ assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].txid(), bob_txn[1].txid());
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
+ }
check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
}
}
// If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
// Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
// HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
- let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
+ let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
if broadcast_alice {
assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
} else {
- assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
- check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
- assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
+ assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
+ let htlc_tx = bob_txn.pop().unwrap();
+ check_spends!(htlc_tx, txn_to_broadcast[0]);
+ assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
}
}
}
// We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(spending_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[0].txid());
- check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
+ let htlc_tx = if spending_txn[0].txid() == node_txn[0].txid() {
+ &spending_txn[1]
+ } else {
+ &spending_txn[0]
+ };
+ check_spends!(htlc_tx, node_txn[0]);
// We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
// timelock is up).
let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
// should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
// additional block built on top of the current chain.
nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
- &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
+ &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, htlc_tx)], conf_height + 1);
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
commitment_tx
};
let commitment_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx));
- if anchors && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
+ if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid());
};
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
+ if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
+ let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid());
+ }
// Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
- let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = {
- let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
- assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
- assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
- if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
- check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
- check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3);
- (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone())
- } else {
- check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3);
- check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
- (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone())
- }
- };
// Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ let mut revoked_commitment_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64;
};
let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
+ if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
+ check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
+ } else {
+ check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
+ }
let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]);
check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
+
+ revoked_commitment_txs.push(commitment_tx.clone());
anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone());
};
for node in &nodes {
- mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_txs[1]]);
+ mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_txs[0], &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_txs[1], &anchor_txs[1]]);
}
check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
- let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() {
+ let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_txs[0].txid() {
(if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
} else {
(if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_txs[0]);
assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
+ check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
}
// Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
sig
};
htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_slice(&[fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
- check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
+ check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_txs[0], revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
htlc_tx
};
).unwrap();
if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(_) = &outputs[0] {
- check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_a, &revoked_commitment_b);
+ check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
} else {
check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
}
// If we update the best block to the new height before providing the confirmed transactions,
// we'll see another broadcast of the commitment transaction.
- if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
+ if !confirm_counterparty_commitment && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
let _ = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
}
let htlc_timeout_tx = {
let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
- let tx = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == commitment_tx.txid() {
- txn[0].clone()
- } else {
- txn[1].clone()
- };
+ let tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
tx
};
let nodes_0_deserialized;
let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
let (_, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
// Serialize the ChannelManager prior to sending payments
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_commitment_tx);
- let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
- assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_commitment_tx);
+ let bs_htlc_claim_txn = {
+ let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
+ check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
+ check_spends!(txn[1], as_commitment_tx);
+ txn.pop().unwrap()
+ };
if !confirm_before_reload {
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx);
+ let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), as_commitment_tx.txid());
}
- mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn);
expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_1, None, true, false);
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV*4 + 20);
let (first_htlc_timeout_tx, second_htlc_timeout_tx) = {
};
check_spends!(first_htlc_timeout_tx, as_commitment_tx);
check_spends!(second_htlc_timeout_tx, as_commitment_tx);
- if first_htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output == bs_htlc_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
+ if first_htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output == bs_htlc_claim_txn.input[0].previous_output {
confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &second_htlc_timeout_tx);
} else {
confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &first_htlc_timeout_tx);
// the HTLC-Timeout transaction beyond 1 conf). For dust HTLCs, the HTLC is considered resolved
// after the commitment transaction, so always connect the commitment transaction.
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
+ if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
+ let _ = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ }
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
if !use_dust {
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + (MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32));
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + (MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32));
let as_htlc_timeout = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
- check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout[0]);
- // nodes[0] may rebroadcast (or RBF-bump) its HTLC-Timeout, so wipe the announced set.
- nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout[0]);
}
+ if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
+ let _ = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ }
// Create a new channel on which to retry the payment before we fail the payment via the
// HTLC-Timeout transaction. This avoids ChannelManager timing out the payment due to us
// Connect blocks until the CLTV timeout is up so that we get an HTLC-Timeout transaction
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
- let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[1].txid());
- check_spends!(node_txn[1], funding_tx);
- check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
- let timeout_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
+ let (commitment_tx, htlc_timeout_tx) = {
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
+ check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
+ check_spends!(txn[1], txn[0]);
+ (txn.remove(0), txn.remove(0))
+ };
nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 10_000_000);
- connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[1].clone()]));
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
- let claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
- assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(claim_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
+ let htlc_success_tx = {
+ let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
+ txn.pop().unwrap()
+ };
- connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[1].clone()]));
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
if confirm_commitment_tx {
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
}
- let claim_block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, if payment_timeout { timeout_txn } else { vec![claim_txn[0].clone()] });
+ let claim_block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, if payment_timeout { vec![htlc_timeout_tx] } else { vec![htlc_success_tx] });
if payment_timeout {
assert!(confirm_commitment_tx); // Otherwise we're spending below our CSV!
confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &cs_commitment_tx[1]);
} else {
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_expiry - nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1);
- let bs_htlc_timeout_tx = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
- assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_tx.len(), 1);
- confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_tx[0]);
+ let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 2 } else { 1 });
+ let bs_htlc_timeout_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_tx);
}
} else {
confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx_b);
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx_b);
+ if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
+ let _ = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ }
// Provide the preimage now, such that we only claim from the holder commitment (since it's
// currently confirmed) and not the counterparty's.
// commitment (still unrevoked) is the currently confirmed closing transaction.
assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].witness.second_to_last().unwrap(), &payment_preimage.0[..]);
}
+
+fn do_test_retries_own_commitment_broadcast_after_reorg(anchors: bool, revoked_counterparty_commitment: bool) {
+ // Tests that a node will retry broadcasting its own commitment after seeing a confirmed
+ // counterparty commitment be reorged out.
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ if revoked_counterparty_commitment {
+ chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
+ }
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
+ if anchors {
+ config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
+ config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
+ }
+ let persister;
+ let new_chain_monitor;
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
+ let nodes_1_deserialized;
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
+ // Route a payment so we have an HTLC to claim as well.
+ let _ = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
+
+ if revoked_counterparty_commitment {
+ // Trigger a fee update such that we advance the state. We will have B broadcast its state
+ // without the fee update.
+ let serialized_node = nodes[1].node.encode();
+ let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
+
+ *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() += 1;
+ nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
+
+ reload_node!(
+ nodes[1], config, &serialized_node, &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, nodes_1_deserialized
+ );
+ }
+
+ // Connect blocks until the HTLC expiry is met, prompting a commitment broadcast by A.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
+ check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+ check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
+
+ {
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ if anchors {
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ let commitment_tx_a = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx_a, funding_tx);
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
+ let htlc_tx_a = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ let commitment_tx_a = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ check_spends!(commitment_tx_a, funding_tx);
+ check_spends!(htlc_tx_a, commitment_tx_a);
+ }
+ };
+
+ // B will also broadcast its own commitment.
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+ check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
+ check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
+
+ let commitment_b = {
+ let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ let tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
+ check_spends!(tx, funding_tx);
+ tx
+ };
+
+ // Confirm B's commitment, A should now broadcast an HTLC timeout for commitment B.
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_b);
+ {
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
+ if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
+ // `commitment_a` and `htlc_timeout_a` are rebroadcast because the best block was
+ // updated prior to seeing `commitment_b`.
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 3 });
+ check_spends!(txn.last().unwrap(), commitment_b);
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_b);
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Disconnect the block, allowing A to retry its own commitment. Note that we connect two
+ // blocks, one to get us back to the original height, and another to retry our pending claims.
+ disconnect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
+ {
+ let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
+ if anchors {
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
+ check_spends!(txn[0], txn[1]); // HTLC timeout A
+ check_spends!(txn[1], funding_tx); // Commitment A
+ assert_ne!(txn[1].txid(), commitment_b.txid());
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_retries_own_commitment_broadcast_after_reorg() {
+ do_test_retries_own_commitment_broadcast_after_reorg(false, false);
+ do_test_retries_own_commitment_broadcast_after_reorg(false, true);
+ do_test_retries_own_commitment_broadcast_after_reorg(true, false);
+ do_test_retries_own_commitment_broadcast_after_reorg(true, true);
+}
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff