]> git.bitcoin.ninja Git - rust-lightning/commitdiff
Remove block_connected de-duplication logic
authorJeffrey Czyz <jkczyz@gmail.com>
Fri, 5 Mar 2021 00:58:26 +0000 (16:58 -0800)
committerJeffrey Czyz <jkczyz@gmail.com>
Fri, 5 Mar 2021 00:58:26 +0000 (16:58 -0800)
Calling block_connected for the same block was necessary when clients
were expected to re-fetch filtered blocks with relevant transactions. At
the time, all listeners were notified of the connected block again for
re-scanning. Thus, de-duplication logic was put in place.

However, this requirement is no longer applicable for ChannelManager as
of commit bd39b20f642e042981e4fdd5f3600a357be51931, so remove this
logic.

lightning/src/ln/channel.rs

index 633652222d11352f64be2f1f13a75d543e07eca4..d9cab1720dcca12865e6a351a30b24123c8ad1f9 100644 (file)
@@ -368,8 +368,7 @@ pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
        /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
        funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
        short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
-       /// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks, also used to verify consistency during
-       /// ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super))
+       /// Used to verify consistency during ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super)).
        pub(super) last_block_connected: BlockHash,
        funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
 
@@ -3517,12 +3516,12 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
                                _ => true
                        }
                });
-               let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
-               if header.block_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
-                       if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
-                               self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
-                       }
+
+               if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
+                       self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
                }
+
+               let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
                if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
                        for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
                                let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
@@ -3568,46 +3567,45 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
                                }
                        }
                }
-               if header.block_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
-                       self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash();
-                       self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, header.time);
-                       if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
-                               if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
-                                       let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
-                                               self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
-                                               true
-                                       } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
-                                               self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
-                                               self.update_time_counter += 1;
-                                               true
-                                       } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
-                                               // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
-                                               // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
-                                               false
-                                       } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
-                                               panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
+
+               self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash();
+               self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, header.time);
+               if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
+                       if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
+                               let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+                                       self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
+                                       true
+                               } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
+                                       self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+                                       self.update_time_counter += 1;
+                                       true
+                               } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
+                                       // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
+                                       // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
+                                       false
+                               } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
+                                       panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
+                               } else {
+                                       // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
+                                       // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
+                                       false
+                               };
+                               self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(self.last_block_connected);
+
+                               //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
+                               //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
+                               //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
+                               //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
+                               if need_commitment_update {
+                                       if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
+                                               let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
+                                               return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
+                                                       channel_id: self.channel_id,
+                                                       next_per_commitment_point,
+                                               }), timed_out_htlcs));
                                        } else {
-                                               // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
-                                               // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
-                                               false
-                                       };
-                                       self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(self.last_block_connected);
-
-                                       //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
-                                       //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
-                                       //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
-                                       //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
-                                       if need_commitment_update {
-                                               if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
-                                                       let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
-                                                       return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
-                                                               channel_id: self.channel_id,
-                                                               next_per_commitment_point,
-                                                       }), timed_out_htlcs));
-                                               } else {
-                                                       self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
-                                                       return Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs));
-                                               }
+                                               self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
+                                               return Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs));
                                        }
                                }
                        }