use lightning::events;
use lightning::events::MessageSendEventsProvider;
use lightning::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
-use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelDetails, ChannelManager, PaymentSendFailure, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
+use lightning::ln::channel_state::ChannelDetails;
+use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters,ChannelManager, PaymentSendFailure, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
use lightning::ln::channel::FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
use lightning::ln::msgs::{self, CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, UpdateAddHTLC, Init};
use lightning::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
use lightning::sign::{InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial, EntropySource, NodeSigner, SignerProvider};
use lightning::events::Event;
use lightning::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
-use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelDetails, ChannelManager, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry, InterceptId};
+use lightning::ln::channel_state::ChannelDetails;
+use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry, InterceptId};
use lightning::ln::peer_handler::{MessageHandler,PeerManager,SocketDescriptor,IgnoringMessageHandler};
use lightning::ln::msgs::{self, DecodeError};
use lightning::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
GEN_TEST lightning::ln::msgs::WarningMessage test_msg_hole ", 32, 2"
GEN_TEST lightning::ln::msgs::ChannelUpdate test_msg_hole ", 108, 1"
-GEN_TEST lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelDetails test_msg_simple ""
+GEN_TEST lightning::ln::channel_state::ChannelDetails test_msg_simple ""
GEN_TEST lightning::ln::msgs::OpenChannelV2 test_msg_simple ""
GEN_TEST lightning::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2 test_msg_simple ""
#[inline]
pub fn msg_channel_details_test<Out: test_logger::Output>(data: &[u8], _out: Out) {
- test_msg_simple!(lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelDetails, data);
+ test_msg_simple!(lightning::ln::channel_state::ChannelDetails, data);
}
#[no_mangle]
pub extern "C" fn msg_channel_details_run(data: *const u8, datalen: usize) {
let data = unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) };
- test_msg_simple!(lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelDetails, data);
+ test_msg_simple!(lightning::ln::channel_state::ChannelDetails, data);
}
use lightning::blinded_path::{BlindedHop, BlindedPath, IntroductionNode};
use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use lightning::ln::ChannelId;
-use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{self, ChannelDetails, ChannelCounterparty};
+use lightning::ln::channel_state::{ChannelDetails, ChannelCounterparty, ChannelShutdownState};
+use lightning::ln::channelmanager;
use lightning::ln::features::{BlindedHopFeatures, Bolt12InvoiceFeatures};
use lightning::ln::msgs;
use lightning::offers::invoice::BlindedPayInfo;
inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: None,
config: None,
feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: None,
- channel_shutdown_state: Some(channelmanager::ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown),
+ channel_shutdown_state: Some(ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown),
pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
});
use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
use lightning::sign::{Recipient, NodeSigner, SignerProvider, EntropySource};
use lightning::ln::types::{PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
-use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChannelDetails, ChannelManager, MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
+use lightning::ln::channel_state::ChannelDetails;
+use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{PhantomRouteHints, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
use lightning::ln::inbound_payment::{create, create_from_hash, ExpandedKey};
use lightning::routing::gossip::RoutingFees;
use crate::blinded_path::utils;
use crate::io;
use crate::ln::types::PaymentSecret;
-use crate::ln::channelmanager::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
+use crate::ln::channel_state::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
use crate::ln::features::BlindedHopFeatures;
use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use crate::offers::invoice::BlindedPayInfo;
use crate::util::logger::{Logger, WithContext};
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
-use crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelDetails;
+use crate::ln::channel_state::ChannelDetails;
use crate::prelude::*;
use crate::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, Mutex, MutexGuard};
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
-use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
+use crate::ln::channel_state::{ChannelShutdownState, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
+use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
use crate::ln::chan_utils;
use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
}
-/// Exposes the state of pending inbound HTLCs.
-///
-/// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
-/// through the following states in the state machine:
-/// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
-/// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
-/// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
-/// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
-/// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
-/// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
-/// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
-///
-/// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
-pub enum InboundHTLCStateDetails {
- /// We have added this HTLC in our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
- /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
- /// before this HTLC is included on the remote commitment transaction.
- AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
- /// This HTLC has been included in the commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages on both sides
- /// and is included in both commitment transactions.
- ///
- /// This HTLC is now safe to either forward or be claimed as a payment by us. The HTLC will
- /// remain in this state until the forwarded upstream HTLC has been resolved and we resolve this
- /// HTLC correspondingly, or until we claim it as a payment. If it is part of a multipart
- /// payment, it will only be claimed together with other required parts.
- Committed,
- /// We have received the preimage for this HTLC and it is being removed by fulfilling it with
- /// update_fulfill_htlc. This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting
- /// the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote
- /// commitment transaction after update_fulfill_htlc.
- AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
- /// The HTLC is being removed by failing it with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
- /// This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting the appropriate
- /// revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote commitment
- /// transaction.
- AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
-}
-
impl From<&InboundHTLCState> for Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
fn from(state: &InboundHTLCState) -> Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
match state {
}
}
-impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(InboundHTLCStateDetails,
- (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
- (2, Committed) => {},
- (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill) => {},
- (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail) => {};
-);
-
struct InboundHTLCOutput {
htlc_id: u64,
amount_msat: u64,
state: InboundHTLCState,
}
-/// Exposes details around pending inbound HTLCs.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
-pub struct InboundHTLCDetails {
- /// The HTLC ID.
- /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
- /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
- /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
- pub htlc_id: u64,
- /// The amount in msat.
- pub amount_msat: u64,
- /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
- pub cltv_expiry: u32,
- /// The payment hash.
- pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
- /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
- ///
- /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
- /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
- ///
- /// See [`InboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
- ///
- /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
- /// states may result in `None` here.
- pub state: Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails>,
- /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
- /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
- /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
- /// transactions as well.
- ///
- /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
- /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
- /// fee.
- ///
- /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
- /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
- pub is_dust: bool,
-}
-
-impl_writeable_tlv_based!(InboundHTLCDetails, {
- (0, htlc_id, required),
- (2, amount_msat, required),
- (4, cltv_expiry, required),
- (6, payment_hash, required),
- (7, state, upgradable_option),
- (8, is_dust, required),
-});
-
#[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
enum OutboundHTLCState {
/// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
}
-/// Exposes the state of pending outbound HTLCs.
-///
-/// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
-/// through the following states in the state machine:
-/// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
-/// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
-/// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
-/// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
-/// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
-/// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
-/// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
-///
-/// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
-pub enum OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
- /// We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before the HTLC is added
- /// on the remote's commitment transaction after update_add_htlc.
- AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
- /// The HTLC has been added to the remote's commitment transaction by sending commitment_signed
- /// and receiving revoke_and_ack in return.
- ///
- /// The HTLC will remain in this state until the remote node resolves the HTLC, or until we
- /// unilaterally close the channel due to a timeout with an uncooperative remote node.
- Committed,
- /// The HTLC has been fulfilled successfully by the remote with a preimage in update_fulfill_htlc,
- /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
- /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
- /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
- AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
- /// The HTLC has been failed by the remote with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc,
- /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
- /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
- /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
- AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
-}
-
impl From<&OutboundHTLCState> for OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
fn from(state: &OutboundHTLCState) -> OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
match state {
}
}
-impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OutboundHTLCStateDetails,
- (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
- (2, Committed) => {},
- (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess) => {},
- (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure) => {};
-);
-
#[derive(Clone)]
#[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
}
-/// Exposes details around pending outbound HTLCs.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
-pub struct OutboundHTLCDetails {
- /// The HTLC ID.
- /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
- /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
- /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
- ///
- /// Not present when we are awaiting a remote revocation and the HTLC is not added yet.
- pub htlc_id: Option<u64>,
- /// The amount in msat.
- pub amount_msat: u64,
- /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
- pub cltv_expiry: u32,
- /// The payment hash.
- pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
- /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
- ///
- /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
- /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
- ///
- /// See [`OutboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
- ///
- /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
- /// states may result in `None` here.
- pub state: Option<OutboundHTLCStateDetails>,
- /// The extra fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
- pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
- /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
- /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
- /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
- /// transactions as well.
- ///
- /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
- /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
- /// fee.
- ///
- /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
- /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
- pub is_dust: bool,
-}
-
-impl_writeable_tlv_based!(OutboundHTLCDetails, {
- (0, htlc_id, required),
- (2, amount_msat, required),
- (4, cltv_expiry, required),
- (6, payment_hash, required),
- (7, state, upgradable_option),
- (8, skimmed_fee_msat, required),
- (10, is_dust, required),
-});
-
/// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
#[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
--- /dev/null
+// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
+// history.
+//
+// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
+// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
+// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
+// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
+// licenses.
+
+//! Information about the state of a channel.
+
+use alloc::vec::Vec;
+
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
+
+use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
+use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+use crate::ln::channel::ChannelContext;
+use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
+use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentHash};
+use crate::sign::SignerProvider;
+use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
+
+use core::ops::Deref;
+
+/// Exposes the state of pending inbound HTLCs.
+///
+/// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
+/// through the following states in the state machine:
+/// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
+/// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
+/// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
+/// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
+/// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
+/// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
+/// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
+///
+/// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+pub enum InboundHTLCStateDetails {
+ /// We have added this HTLC in our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
+ /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
+ /// before this HTLC is included on the remote commitment transaction.
+ AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
+ /// This HTLC has been included in the commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages on both sides
+ /// and is included in both commitment transactions.
+ ///
+ /// This HTLC is now safe to either forward or be claimed as a payment by us. The HTLC will
+ /// remain in this state until the forwarded upstream HTLC has been resolved and we resolve this
+ /// HTLC correspondingly, or until we claim it as a payment. If it is part of a multipart
+ /// payment, it will only be claimed together with other required parts.
+ Committed,
+ /// We have received the preimage for this HTLC and it is being removed by fulfilling it with
+ /// update_fulfill_htlc. This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting
+ /// the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote
+ /// commitment transaction after update_fulfill_htlc.
+ AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
+ /// The HTLC is being removed by failing it with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
+ /// This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting the appropriate
+ /// revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote commitment
+ /// transaction.
+ AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
+}
+
+impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(InboundHTLCStateDetails,
+ (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
+ (2, Committed) => {},
+ (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill) => {},
+ (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail) => {};
+);
+
+/// Exposes details around pending inbound HTLCs.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+pub struct InboundHTLCDetails {
+ /// The HTLC ID.
+ /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
+ /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
+ /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
+ pub htlc_id: u64,
+ /// The amount in msat.
+ pub amount_msat: u64,
+ /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
+ pub cltv_expiry: u32,
+ /// The payment hash.
+ pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
+ ///
+ /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
+ /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
+ ///
+ /// See [`InboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
+ ///
+ /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
+ /// states may result in `None` here.
+ pub state: Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails>,
+ /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
+ /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
+ /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
+ /// transactions as well.
+ ///
+ /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
+ /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
+ /// fee.
+ ///
+ /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
+ /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
+ pub is_dust: bool,
+}
+
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(InboundHTLCDetails, {
+ (0, htlc_id, required),
+ (2, amount_msat, required),
+ (4, cltv_expiry, required),
+ (6, payment_hash, required),
+ (7, state, upgradable_option),
+ (8, is_dust, required),
+});
+
+/// Exposes the state of pending outbound HTLCs.
+///
+/// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
+/// through the following states in the state machine:
+/// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
+/// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
+/// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
+/// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
+/// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
+/// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
+/// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
+///
+/// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+pub enum OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
+ /// We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before the HTLC is added
+ /// on the remote's commitment transaction after update_add_htlc.
+ AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
+ /// The HTLC has been added to the remote's commitment transaction by sending commitment_signed
+ /// and receiving revoke_and_ack in return.
+ ///
+ /// The HTLC will remain in this state until the remote node resolves the HTLC, or until we
+ /// unilaterally close the channel due to a timeout with an uncooperative remote node.
+ Committed,
+ /// The HTLC has been fulfilled successfully by the remote with a preimage in update_fulfill_htlc,
+ /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
+ /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
+ /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
+ AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
+ /// The HTLC has been failed by the remote with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc,
+ /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
+ /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
+ /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
+ AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
+}
+
+impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OutboundHTLCStateDetails,
+ (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
+ (2, Committed) => {},
+ (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess) => {},
+ (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure) => {};
+);
+
+/// Exposes details around pending outbound HTLCs.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+pub struct OutboundHTLCDetails {
+ /// The HTLC ID.
+ /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
+ /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
+ /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
+ ///
+ /// Not present when we are awaiting a remote revocation and the HTLC is not added yet.
+ pub htlc_id: Option<u64>,
+ /// The amount in msat.
+ pub amount_msat: u64,
+ /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
+ pub cltv_expiry: u32,
+ /// The payment hash.
+ pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
+ ///
+ /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
+ /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
+ ///
+ /// See [`OutboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
+ ///
+ /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
+ /// states may result in `None` here.
+ pub state: Option<OutboundHTLCStateDetails>,
+ /// The extra fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
+ pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
+ /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
+ /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
+ /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
+ /// transactions as well.
+ ///
+ /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
+ /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
+ /// fee.
+ ///
+ /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
+ /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
+ pub is_dust: bool,
+}
+
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(OutboundHTLCDetails, {
+ (0, htlc_id, required),
+ (2, amount_msat, required),
+ (4, cltv_expiry, required),
+ (6, payment_hash, required),
+ (7, state, upgradable_option),
+ (8, skimmed_fee_msat, required),
+ (10, is_dust, required),
+});
+
+/// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
+ /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
+ pub fee_base_msat: u32,
+ /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
+ pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
+ /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
+ /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
+ /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
+ pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
+}
+
+/// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
+/// to better separate parameters.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
+ /// The node_id of our counterparty
+ pub node_id: PublicKey,
+ /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
+ /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
+ /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
+ pub features: InitFeatures,
+ /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
+ /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
+ /// claiming at least this value on chain.
+ ///
+ /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
+ ///
+ /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
+ pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
+ /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
+ /// payments to us through this channel.
+ pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
+ /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
+ /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
+ /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
+ pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
+ /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
+ pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
+}
+
+/// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
+///
+/// [`ChannelManager::list_channels`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::list_channels
+/// [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+pub struct ChannelDetails {
+ /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
+ /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
+ /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
+ /// lifetime of the channel.
+ pub channel_id: ChannelId,
+ /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
+ pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
+ /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
+ /// our counterparty already.
+ pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
+ /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
+ ///
+ /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
+ pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
+ /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
+ /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
+ ///
+ /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
+ /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
+ ///
+ /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
+ /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
+ ///
+ /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
+ /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
+ /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
+ /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
+ /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
+ pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
+ /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
+ /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
+ /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
+ /// `Some(0)`).
+ ///
+ /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
+ ///
+ /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
+ /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
+ pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
+ /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
+ /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
+ /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
+ /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
+ ///
+ /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
+ /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
+ ///
+ /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
+ pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
+ /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
+ pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
+ /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
+ /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
+ /// this value on chain.
+ ///
+ /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
+ ///
+ /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
+ ///
+ /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
+ pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
+ /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
+ /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
+ /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
+ /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
+ /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
+ /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
+ /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
+ pub user_channel_id: u128,
+ /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
+ /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
+ ///
+ /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
+ pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
+ /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
+ /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
+ /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
+ ///
+ /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
+ /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
+ /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
+ /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
+ ///
+ /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
+ pub balance_msat: u64,
+ /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
+ /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
+ /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
+ /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
+ ///
+ /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
+ ///
+ /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
+ /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
+ /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
+ pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
+ /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
+ /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
+ /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
+ /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
+ ///
+ /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
+ /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
+ pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
+ /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
+ /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
+ /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
+ /// route which is valid.
+ pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
+ /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
+ /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
+ /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
+ /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
+ /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
+ ///
+ /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
+ /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
+ /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
+ pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
+ /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
+ /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
+ /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
+ /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
+ /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
+ ///
+ /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
+ ///
+ /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
+ /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
+ /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
+ pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
+ /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
+ ///
+ /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
+ pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
+ /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
+ /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
+ /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
+ /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
+ /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
+ ///
+ /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
+ pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
+ /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
+ pub is_outbound: bool,
+ /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
+ /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
+ /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
+ /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
+ /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
+ ///
+ /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
+ pub is_channel_ready: bool,
+ /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
+ /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
+ pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
+ /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
+ /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
+ ///
+ /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
+ pub is_usable: bool,
+ /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
+ pub is_public: bool,
+ /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
+ /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
+ pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
+ /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
+ pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
+ /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
+ ///
+ /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
+ pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
+ /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
+ ///
+ /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
+ pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
+ /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
+ ///
+ /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
+ pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
+}
+
+impl ChannelDetails {
+ /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
+ /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
+ /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
+ ///
+ /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
+ /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
+ pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
+ self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
+ }
+
+ /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
+ /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
+ /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
+ ///
+ /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
+ /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
+ ///
+ /// [`Route`]: crate::routing::router::Route
+ pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
+ self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
+ }
+
+ pub(super) fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
+ context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
+ ) -> Self
+ where
+ SP::Target: SignerProvider,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ {
+ let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
+ let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
+ context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
+ ChannelDetails {
+ channel_id: context.channel_id(),
+ counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
+ node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ features: latest_features,
+ unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
+ forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
+ // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
+ // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
+ // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
+ // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
+ // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
+ outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
+ Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat())
+ } else {
+ None
+ },
+ outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
+ },
+ funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
+ // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
+ // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
+ channel_type: if context.have_received_message() {
+ Some(context.get_channel_type().clone())
+ } else {
+ None
+ },
+ short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
+ outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() {
+ Some(context.outbound_scid_alias())
+ } else {
+ None
+ },
+ inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
+ channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
+ feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
+ unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
+ balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
+ inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
+ outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
+ next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
+ next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
+ confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
+ confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
+ force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
+ is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
+ is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
+ is_usable: context.is_live(),
+ is_public: context.should_announce(),
+ inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
+ inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
+ config: Some(context.config()),
+ channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
+ pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
+ pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+/// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
+/// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
+/// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
+/// the channel will be removed shortly.
+/// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
+/// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
+pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
+ /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
+ NotShuttingDown,
+ /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
+ ShutdownInitiated,
+ /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
+ /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
+ ResolvingHTLCs,
+ /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
+ NegotiatingClosingFee,
+ /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
+ /// to drop the channel.
+ ShutdownComplete,
+}
use crate::ln::inbound_payment;
use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
-pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
+use crate::ln::channel_state::{ChannelCounterparty, ChannelDetails, ChannelShutdownState, CounterpartyForwardingInfo};
use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
/// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
-/// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
-pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
- /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
- pub fee_base_msat: u32,
- /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
- pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
- /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
- /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
- /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
- pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
-}
-
-/// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
-/// to better separate parameters.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
-pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
- /// The node_id of our counterparty
- pub node_id: PublicKey,
- /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
- /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
- /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
- pub features: InitFeatures,
- /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
- /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
- /// claiming at least this value on chain.
- ///
- /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
- ///
- /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
- pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
- /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
- /// payments to us through this channel.
- pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
- /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
- /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
- /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
- pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
- /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
- pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
-}
-
-/// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
-pub struct ChannelDetails {
- /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
- /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
- /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
- /// lifetime of the channel.
- pub channel_id: ChannelId,
- /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
- pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
- /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
- /// our counterparty already.
- pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
- /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
- ///
- /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
- pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
- /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
- /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
- ///
- /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
- /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
- ///
- /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
- /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
- ///
- /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
- /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
- /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
- /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
- /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
- pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
- /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
- /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
- /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
- /// `Some(0)`).
- ///
- /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
- ///
- /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
- /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
- pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
- /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
- /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
- /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
- /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
- ///
- /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
- /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
- ///
- /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
- pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
- /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
- pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
- /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
- /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
- /// this value on chain.
- ///
- /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
- ///
- /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
- ///
- /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
- pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
- /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
- /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
- /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
- /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
- /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
- ///
- /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
- /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
- /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
- pub user_channel_id: u128,
- /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
- /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
- ///
- /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
- pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
- /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
- /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
- /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
- ///
- /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
- /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
- /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
- /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
- ///
- /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
- pub balance_msat: u64,
- /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
- /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
- /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
- /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
- ///
- /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
- ///
- /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
- /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
- /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
- pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
- /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
- /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
- /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
- /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
- ///
- /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
- /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
- pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
- /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
- /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
- /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
- /// route which is valid.
- pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
- /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
- /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
- /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
- /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
- /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
- ///
- /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
- /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
- /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
- pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
- /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
- /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
- /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
- /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
- /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
- ///
- /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
- ///
- /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
- /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
- /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
- pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
- /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
- ///
- /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
- pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
- /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
- /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
- /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
- /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
- /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
- ///
- /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
- pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
- /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
- pub is_outbound: bool,
- /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
- /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
- /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
- /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
- /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
- ///
- /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
- pub is_channel_ready: bool,
- /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
- /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
- pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
- /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
- /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
- ///
- /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
- pub is_usable: bool,
- /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
- pub is_public: bool,
- /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
- /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
- pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
- /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
- pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
- /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
- ///
- /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
- pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
- /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
- ///
- /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
- pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
- /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
- ///
- /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
- pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
-}
-
-impl ChannelDetails {
- /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
- /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
- /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
- ///
- /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
- /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
- pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
- self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
- }
-
- /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
- /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
- /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
- ///
- /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
- /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
- pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
- self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
- }
-
- fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
- context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
- fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
- ) -> Self
- where
- SP::Target: SignerProvider,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator
- {
- let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
- let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
- context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
- ChannelDetails {
- channel_id: context.channel_id(),
- counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
- node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- features: latest_features,
- unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
- forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
- // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
- // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
- // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
- // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
- // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
- outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
- Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
- outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
- },
- funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
- // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
- // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
- channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
- short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
- outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
- inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
- channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
- feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
- unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
- balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
- inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
- outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
- next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
- next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
- user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
- confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
- confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
- force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
- is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
- is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
- is_usable: context.is_live(),
- is_public: context.should_announce(),
- inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
- inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
- config: Some(context.config()),
- channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
- pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
- pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
- }
- }
-}
-
-#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
-/// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
-/// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
-/// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
-/// the channel will be removed shortly.
-/// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
-/// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
-pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
- /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
- NotShuttingDown,
- /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
- ShutdownInitiated,
- /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
- /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
- ResolvingHTLCs,
- /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
- NegotiatingClosingFee,
- /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
- /// to drop the channel.
- ShutdownComplete,
-}
-
/// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
/// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
pub mod onion_payment;
pub mod channelmanager;
pub mod channel_keys;
+pub mod channel_state;
pub mod inbound_payment;
pub mod msgs;
pub mod peer_handler;
use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient};
use crate::events::{self, PaymentFailureReason};
use crate::ln::types::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
-use crate::ln::channelmanager::{ChannelDetails, EventCompletionAction, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
+use crate::ln::channel_state::ChannelDetails;
+use crate::ln::channelmanager::{EventCompletionAction, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
use crate::ln::onion_utils;
use crate::ln::onion_utils::{DecodedOnionFailure, HTLCFailReason};
use crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice;
use crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus;
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
-use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentSendFailure, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry, ChannelShutdownState, ChannelDetails};
+use crate::ln::channel_state::{ChannelDetails, ChannelShutdownState};
+use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentSendFailure, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route, RouteParameters};
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::types::ChannelId;
use crate::blinded_path::message;
use crate::blinded_path::payment::{ForwardTlvs, PaymentConstraints, PaymentRelay, ReceiveTlvs, self};
use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
-use crate::ln::channelmanager::{ChannelDetails, PaymentId, MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, RecipientOnionFields};
+use crate::ln::channel_state::ChannelDetails;
+use crate::ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, RecipientOnionFields};
use crate::ln::features::{BlindedHopFeatures, Bolt11InvoiceFeatures, Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
use crate::ln::onion_utils;
use crate::routing::test_utils::{add_channel, add_or_update_node, build_graph, build_line_graph, id_to_feature_flags, get_nodes, update_channel};
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use crate::sign::EntropySource;
+ use crate::ln::channel_state::{ChannelCounterparty, ChannelDetails, ChannelShutdownState};
use crate::ln::types::ChannelId;
use crate::ln::features::{BlindedHopFeatures, ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use crate::ln::msgs::{ErrorAction, LightningError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
use crate::sync::Arc;
fn get_channel_details(short_channel_id: Option<u64>, node_id: PublicKey,
- features: InitFeatures, outbound_capacity_msat: u64) -> channelmanager::ChannelDetails {
- channelmanager::ChannelDetails {
+ features: InitFeatures, outbound_capacity_msat: u64) -> ChannelDetails {
+ ChannelDetails {
channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
- counterparty: channelmanager::ChannelCounterparty {
+ counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
features,
node_id,
unspendable_punishment_reserve: 0,
inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: None,
config: None,
feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: None,
- channel_shutdown_state: Some(channelmanager::ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown),
+ channel_shutdown_state: Some(ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown),
pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
}
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use crate::routing::scoring::ScoreUpdate;
use crate::sign::KeysManager;
+ use crate::ln::channel_state::{ChannelCounterparty, ChannelShutdownState};
+ use crate::ln::channelmanager;
use crate::ln::types::ChannelId;
- use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, ChannelCounterparty};
use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
use crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger;
inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: None,
config: None,
feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: None,
- channel_shutdown_state: Some(channelmanager::ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown),
+ channel_shutdown_state: Some(ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown),
pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
}
use crate::events;
use crate::events::bump_transaction::{WalletSource, Utxo};
use crate::ln::types::ChannelId;
-use crate::ln::channelmanager::{ChannelDetails, self};
+use crate::ln::channel_state::ChannelDetails;
+use crate::ln::channelmanager;
#[cfg(test)]
use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff