[*]
indent_style = tab
insert_final_newline = true
+trim_trailing_whitespace = true
run: |
cargo test --verbose --color always -p lightning
cargo test --verbose --color always -p lightning-invoice
+ cargo test --verbose --color always -p lightning-rapid-gossip-sync
cargo build --verbose --color always -p lightning-persister
cargo build --verbose --color always -p lightning-background-processor
- name: Test C Bindings Modifications on Rust ${{ matrix.toolchain }}
- name: Fetch routing graph snapshot
if: steps.cache-graph.outputs.cache-hit != 'true'
run: |
- wget -O lightning/net_graph-2021-05-31.bin https://bitcoin.ninja/ldk-net_graph-v0.0.15-2021-05-31.bin
- if [ "$(sha256sum lightning/net_graph-2021-05-31.bin | awk '{ print $1 }')" != "05a5361278f68ee2afd086cc04a1f927a63924be451f3221d380533acfacc303" ]; then
+ curl --verbose -L -o lightning/net_graph-2021-05-31.bin https://bitcoin.ninja/ldk-net_graph-v0.0.15-2021-05-31.bin
+ echo "Sha sum: $(sha256sum lightning/net_graph-2021-05-31.bin | awk '{ print $1 }')"
+ if [ "$(sha256sum lightning/net_graph-2021-05-31.bin | awk '{ print $1 }')" != "${EXPECTED_ROUTING_GRAPH_SNAPSHOT_SHASUM}" ]; then
echo "Bad hash"
exit 1
fi
+ env:
+ EXPECTED_ROUTING_GRAPH_SNAPSHOT_SHASUM: 05a5361278f68ee2afd086cc04a1f927a63924be451f3221d380533acfacc303
+ - name: Fetch rapid graph sync reference input
+ run: |
+ curl --verbose -L -o lightning-rapid-gossip-sync/res/full_graph.lngossip https://bitcoin.ninja/ldk-compressed_graph-bc08df7542-2022-05-05.bin
+ echo "Sha sum: $(sha256sum lightning-rapid-gossip-sync/res/full_graph.lngossip | awk '{ print $1 }')"
+ if [ "$(sha256sum lightning-rapid-gossip-sync/res/full_graph.lngossip | awk '{ print $1 }')" != "${EXPECTED_RAPID_GOSSIP_SHASUM}" ]; then
+ echo "Bad hash"
+ exit 1
+ fi
+ env:
+ EXPECTED_RAPID_GOSSIP_SHASUM: 9637b91cea9d64320cf48fc0787c70fe69fc062f90d3512e207044110cadfd7b
- name: Test with Network Graph on Rust ${{ matrix.toolchain }}
run: |
cd lightning
"lightning-net-tokio",
"lightning-persister",
"lightning-background-processor",
+ "lightning-rapid-gossip-sync"
]
exclude = [
[dependencies]
afl = { version = "0.4", optional = true }
lightning = { path = "../lightning", features = ["regex"] }
+lightning-rapid-gossip-sync = { path = "../lightning-rapid-gossip-sync" }
bitcoin = { version = "0.28.1", features = ["secp-lowmemory"] }
hex = "0.3"
honggfuzz = { version = "0.5", optional = true }
GEN_TEST chanmon_consistency
GEN_TEST full_stack
GEN_TEST peer_crypt
+GEN_TEST process_network_graph
GEN_TEST router
GEN_TEST zbase32
--- /dev/null
+// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
+// history.
+//
+// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
+// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
+// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
+// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
+// licenses.
+
+// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on target_template.txt
+// To modify it, modify target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
+
+#![cfg_attr(feature = "libfuzzer_fuzz", no_main)]
+
+#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
+compile_error!("Fuzz targets need cfg=fuzzing");
+
+extern crate lightning_fuzz;
+use lightning_fuzz::process_network_graph::*;
+
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate afl;
+#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
+fn main() {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ process_network_graph_run(data.as_ptr(), data.len());
+ });
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
+#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ loop {
+ fuzz!(|data| {
+ process_network_graph_run(data.as_ptr(), data.len());
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "libfuzzer_fuzz")]
+#[macro_use] extern crate libfuzzer_sys;
+#[cfg(feature = "libfuzzer_fuzz")]
+fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
+ process_network_graph_run(data.as_ptr(), data.len());
+});
+
+#[cfg(feature = "stdin_fuzz")]
+fn main() {
+ use std::io::Read;
+
+ let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(8192);
+ std::io::stdin().read_to_end(&mut data).unwrap();
+ process_network_graph_run(data.as_ptr(), data.len());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn run_test_cases() {
+ use std::fs;
+ use std::io::Read;
+ use lightning_fuzz::utils::test_logger::StringBuffer;
+
+ use std::sync::{atomic, Arc};
+ {
+ let data: Vec<u8> = vec![0];
+ process_network_graph_run(data.as_ptr(), data.len());
+ }
+ let mut threads = Vec::new();
+ let threads_running = Arc::new(atomic::AtomicUsize::new(0));
+ if let Ok(tests) = fs::read_dir("test_cases/process_network_graph") {
+ for test in tests {
+ let mut data: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
+ let path = test.unwrap().path();
+ fs::File::open(&path).unwrap().read_to_end(&mut data).unwrap();
+ threads_running.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel);
+
+ let thread_count_ref = Arc::clone(&threads_running);
+ let main_thread_ref = std::thread::current();
+ threads.push((path.file_name().unwrap().to_str().unwrap().to_string(),
+ std::thread::spawn(move || {
+ let string_logger = StringBuffer::new();
+
+ let panic_logger = string_logger.clone();
+ let res = if ::std::panic::catch_unwind(move || {
+ process_network_graph_test(&data, panic_logger);
+ }).is_err() {
+ Some(string_logger.into_string())
+ } else { None };
+ thread_count_ref.fetch_sub(1, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel);
+ main_thread_ref.unpark();
+ res
+ })
+ ));
+ while threads_running.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) > 32 {
+ std::thread::park();
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ let mut failed_outputs = Vec::new();
+ for (test, thread) in threads.drain(..) {
+ if let Some(output) = thread.join().unwrap() {
+ println!("\nOutput of {}:\n{}\n", test, output);
+ failed_outputs.push(test);
+ }
+ }
+ if !failed_outputs.is_empty() {
+ println!("Test cases which failed: ");
+ for case in failed_outputs {
+ println!("{}", case);
+ }
+ panic!();
+ }
+}
self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update)
}
- fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
+ fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<(OutPoint, Vec<MonitorEvent>)> {
return self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
}
}
value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
}]};
funding_output = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
- $source.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
+ $source.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &$dest.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
channel_txn.push(tx);
} else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
}
let mut should_forward = false;
let mut payments_received: Vec<PaymentHash> = Vec::new();
let mut payments_sent = 0;
- let mut pending_funding_generation: Vec<([u8; 32], u64, Script)> = Vec::new();
+ let mut pending_funding_generation: Vec<([u8; 32], PublicKey, u64, Script)> = Vec::new();
let mut pending_funding_signatures = HashMap::new();
loop {
let channel_id = get_slice!(1)[0] as usize;
if channel_id >= channels.len() { return; }
channels.sort_by(|a, b| { a.channel_id.cmp(&b.channel_id) });
- if channelmanager.close_channel(&channels[channel_id].channel_id).is_err() { return; }
+ if channelmanager.close_channel(&channels[channel_id].channel_id, &channels[channel_id].counterparty.node_id).is_err() { return; }
},
7 => {
if should_forward {
10 => {
'outer_loop: for funding_generation in pending_funding_generation.drain(..) {
let mut tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
- value: funding_generation.1, script_pubkey: funding_generation.2,
+ value: funding_generation.2, script_pubkey: funding_generation.3,
}] };
let funding_output = 'search_loop: loop {
let funding_txid = tx.txid();
continue 'outer_loop;
}
};
- if let Err(e) = channelmanager.funding_transaction_generated(&funding_generation.0, tx.clone()) {
+ if let Err(e) = channelmanager.funding_transaction_generated(&funding_generation.0, &funding_generation.1, tx.clone()) {
// It's possible the channel has been closed in the mean time, but any other
// failure may be a bug.
if let APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err } = e {
let channel_id = get_slice!(1)[0] as usize;
if channel_id >= channels.len() { return; }
channels.sort_by(|a, b| { a.channel_id.cmp(&b.channel_id) });
- channelmanager.force_close_channel(&channels[channel_id].channel_id).unwrap();
+ channelmanager.force_close_channel(&channels[channel_id].channel_id, &channels[channel_id].counterparty.node_id).unwrap();
},
// 15 is above
_ => return,
loss_detector.handler.process_events();
for event in loss_detector.manager.get_and_clear_pending_events() {
match event {
- Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script, .. } => {
- pending_funding_generation.push((temporary_channel_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script));
+ Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script, .. } => {
+ pending_funding_generation.push((temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script));
},
Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => {
//TODO: enhance by fetching random amounts from fuzz input?
extern crate bitcoin;
extern crate lightning;
+extern crate lightning_rapid_gossip_sync;
extern crate hex;
pub mod utils;
pub mod chanmon_consistency;
pub mod full_stack;
pub mod peer_crypt;
+pub mod process_network_graph;
pub mod router;
pub mod zbase32;
use lightning::ln::peer_channel_encryptor::PeerChannelEncryptor;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, PublicKey, SecretKey};
use utils::test_logger;
}
}
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
+
let our_network_key = match SecretKey::from_slice(get_slice!(32)) {
Ok(key) => key,
Err(_) => return,
Err(_) => return,
};
let mut crypter = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_outbound(their_pubkey, ephemeral_key);
- crypter.get_act_one();
- match crypter.process_act_two(get_slice!(50), &our_network_key) {
+ crypter.get_act_one(&secp_ctx);
+ match crypter.process_act_two(get_slice!(50), &our_network_key, &secp_ctx) {
Ok(_) => {},
Err(_) => return,
}
assert!(crypter.is_ready_for_encryption());
crypter
} else {
- let mut crypter = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_network_key);
- match crypter.process_act_one_with_keys(get_slice!(50), &our_network_key, ephemeral_key) {
+ let mut crypter = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_network_key, &secp_ctx);
+ match crypter.process_act_one_with_keys(get_slice!(50), &our_network_key, ephemeral_key, &secp_ctx) {
Ok(_) => {},
Err(_) => return,
}
--- /dev/null
+// Import that needs to be added manually
+use utils::test_logger;
+
+/// Actual fuzz test, method signature and name are fixed
+fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
+ let block_hash = bitcoin::BlockHash::default();
+ let network_graph = lightning::routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph::new(block_hash);
+ lightning_rapid_gossip_sync::processing::update_network_graph(&network_graph, data);
+}
+
+/// Method that needs to be added manually, {name}_test
+pub fn process_network_graph_test<Out: test_logger::Output>(data: &[u8], _out: Out) {
+ do_test(data);
+}
+
+/// Method that needs to be added manually, {name}_run
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn process_network_graph_run(data: *const u8, datalen: usize) {
+ do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) });
+}
void chanmon_consistency_run(const unsigned char* data, size_t data_len);
void full_stack_run(const unsigned char* data, size_t data_len);
void peer_crypt_run(const unsigned char* data, size_t data_len);
+void process_network_graph_run(const unsigned char* data, size_t data_len);
void router_run(const unsigned char* data, size_t data_len);
void zbase32_run(const unsigned char* data, size_t data_len);
void msg_accept_channel_run(const unsigned char* data, size_t data_len);
use lightning::util::ser::Writeable;
use lightning::util::test_utils;
use lightning::util::persist::KVStorePersister;
- use lightning_invoice::payment::{InvoicePayer, RetryAttempts};
+ use lightning_invoice::payment::{InvoicePayer, Retry};
use lightning_invoice::utils::DefaultRouter;
use lightning_persister::FilesystemPersister;
use std::fs;
macro_rules! handle_funding_generation_ready {
($event: expr, $channel_value: expr) => {{
match $event {
- &Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
+ &Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id, .. } => {
assert_eq!(channel_value_satoshis, $channel_value);
assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
macro_rules! end_open_channel {
($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $temporary_channel_id: expr, $tx: expr) => {{
- $node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&$temporary_channel_id, $tx.clone()).unwrap();
+ $node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&$temporary_channel_id, &$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), $tx.clone()).unwrap();
$node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!($node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
$node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!($node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
}}
}
// Force-close the channel.
- nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id(), &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
// Check that the force-close updates are persisted.
check_persisted_data!(nodes[0].node, filepath.clone());
let bg_processor = BackgroundProcessor::start(persister, event_handler, nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].node.clone(), nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.clone(), nodes[0].peer_manager.clone(), nodes[0].logger.clone(), Some(nodes[0].scorer.clone()));
// Force close the channel and check that the SpendableOutputs event was handled.
- nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
let commitment_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().pop().unwrap();
confirm_transaction_depth(&mut nodes[0], &commitment_tx, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
let event = receiver
let data_dir = nodes[0].persister.get_data_dir();
let persister = Arc::new(Persister::new(data_dir));
let router = DefaultRouter::new(Arc::clone(&nodes[0].network_graph), Arc::clone(&nodes[0].logger), random_seed_bytes);
- let invoice_payer = Arc::new(InvoicePayer::new(Arc::clone(&nodes[0].node), router, Arc::clone(&nodes[0].scorer), Arc::clone(&nodes[0].logger), |_: &_| {}, RetryAttempts(2)));
+ let invoice_payer = Arc::new(InvoicePayer::new(Arc::clone(&nodes[0].node), router, Arc::clone(&nodes[0].scorer), Arc::clone(&nodes[0].logger), |_: &_| {}, Retry::Attempts(2)));
let event_handler = Arc::clone(&invoice_payer);
let bg_processor = BackgroundProcessor::start(persister, event_handler, nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].node.clone(), nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.clone(), nodes[0].peer_manager.clone(), nodes[0].logger.clone(), Some(nodes[0].scorer.clone()));
assert!(bg_processor.stop().is_ok());
#![cfg_attr(all(not(feature = "std"), not(test)), no_std)]
//! This crate provides data structures to represent
-//! [lightning BOLT11](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/11-payment-encoding.md)
+//! [lightning BOLT11](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/11-payment-encoding.md)
//! invoices and functions to create, encode and decode these. If you just want to use the standard
//! en-/decoding functionality this should get you started:
//!
pub mod payment;
pub mod utils;
+pub(crate) mod time_utils;
+
extern crate bech32;
extern crate bitcoin_hashes;
#[macro_use] extern crate lightning;
/// variant. If no element was found `None` gets returned.
///
/// The following example would extract the first B.
-/// ```
-/// use Enum::*
///
/// enum Enum {
/// A(u8),
/// B(u16)
/// }
///
-/// let elements = vec![A(1), A(2), B(3), A(4)]
+/// let elements = vec![Enum::A(1), Enum::A(2), Enum::B(3), Enum::A(4)];
///
-/// assert_eq!(find_extract!(elements.iter(), Enum::B(ref x), x), Some(3u16))
-/// ```
+/// assert_eq!(find_extract!(elements.iter(), Enum::B(x), x), Some(3u16));
macro_rules! find_extract {
($iter:expr, $enm:pat, $enm_var:ident) => {
find_all_extract!($iter, $enm, $enm_var).next()
/// variant through an iterator.
///
/// The following example would extract all A.
-/// ```
-/// use Enum::*
///
/// enum Enum {
/// A(u8),
/// B(u16)
/// }
///
-/// let elements = vec![A(1), A(2), B(3), A(4)]
+/// let elements = vec![Enum::A(1), Enum::A(2), Enum::B(3), Enum::A(4)];
///
/// assert_eq!(
-/// find_all_extract!(elements.iter(), Enum::A(ref x), x).collect::<Vec<u8>>(),
-/// vec![1u8, 2u8, 4u8])
-/// ```
+/// find_all_extract!(elements.iter(), Enum::A(x), x).collect::<Vec<u8>>(),
+/// vec![1u8, 2u8, 4u8]
+/// );
macro_rules! find_all_extract {
($iter:expr, $enm:pat, $enm_var:ident) => {
$iter.filter_map(|tf| match *tf {
//! # use lightning::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
//! # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChannelDetails, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
//! # use lightning::ln::msgs::LightningError;
-//! # use lightning::routing::scoring::Score;
//! # use lightning::routing::network_graph::NodeId;
//! # use lightning::routing::router::{Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters};
+//! # use lightning::routing::scoring::{ChannelUsage, Score};
//! # use lightning::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider};
//! # use lightning::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
//! # use lightning::util::ser::{Writeable, Writer};
//! # use lightning_invoice::Invoice;
-//! # use lightning_invoice::payment::{InvoicePayer, Payer, RetryAttempts, Router};
+//! # use lightning_invoice::payment::{InvoicePayer, Payer, Retry, Router};
//! # use secp256k1::PublicKey;
//! # use std::cell::RefCell;
//! # use std::ops::Deref;
//! # }
//! # impl Score for FakeScorer {
//! # fn channel_penalty_msat(
-//! # &self, _short_channel_id: u64, _send_amt: u64, _chan_amt: u64, _source: &NodeId, _target: &NodeId
+//! # &self, _short_channel_id: u64, _source: &NodeId, _target: &NodeId, _usage: ChannelUsage
//! # ) -> u64 { 0 }
//! # fn payment_path_failed(&mut self, _path: &[&RouteHop], _short_channel_id: u64) {}
//! # fn payment_path_successful(&mut self, _path: &[&RouteHop]) {}
//! # let router = FakeRouter {};
//! # let scorer = RefCell::new(FakeScorer {});
//! # let logger = FakeLogger {};
-//! let invoice_payer = InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, RetryAttempts(2));
+//! let invoice_payer = InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, Retry::Attempts(2));
//!
//! let invoice = "...";
//! if let Ok(invoice) = invoice.parse::<Invoice>() {
use lightning::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters};
use lightning::util::events::{Event, EventHandler};
use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
+use time_utils::Time;
use crate::sync::Mutex;
use secp256k1::PublicKey;
+use core::fmt;
+use core::fmt::{Debug, Display, Formatter};
use core::ops::Deref;
use core::time::Duration;
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
/// See [module-level documentation] for details.
///
/// [module-level documentation]: crate::payment
-pub struct InvoicePayer<P: Deref, R, S: Deref, L: Deref, E: EventHandler>
+pub type InvoicePayer<P, R, S, L, E> = InvoicePayerUsingTime::<P, R, S, L, E, ConfiguredTime>;
+
+#[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
+type ConfiguredTime = std::time::Instant;
+#[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
+use time_utils;
+#[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
+type ConfiguredTime = time_utils::Eternity;
+
+/// (C-not exported) generally all users should use the [`InvoicePayer`] type alias.
+pub struct InvoicePayerUsingTime<P: Deref, R, S: Deref, L: Deref, E: EventHandler, T: Time>
where
P::Target: Payer,
R: for <'a> Router<<<S as Deref>::Target as LockableScore<'a>>::Locked>,
logger: L,
event_handler: E,
/// Caches the overall attempts at making a payment, which is updated prior to retrying.
- payment_cache: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, usize>>,
- retry_attempts: RetryAttempts,
+ payment_cache: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentAttempts<T>>>,
+ retry: Retry,
+}
+
+/// Storing minimal payment attempts information required for determining if a outbound payment can
+/// be retried.
+#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
+struct PaymentAttempts<T: Time> {
+ /// This count will be incremented only after the result of the attempt is known. When it's 0,
+ /// it means the result of the first attempt is now known yet.
+ count: usize,
+ /// This field is only used when retry is [`Retry::Timeout`] which is only build with feature std
+ first_attempted_at: T
+}
+
+impl<T: Time> PaymentAttempts<T> {
+ fn new() -> Self {
+ PaymentAttempts {
+ count: 0,
+ first_attempted_at: T::now()
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl<T: Time> Display for PaymentAttempts<T> {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
+ #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
+ return write!( f, "attempts: {}", self.count);
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
+ return write!(
+ f,
+ "attempts: {}, duration: {}s",
+ self.count,
+ T::now().duration_since(self.first_attempted_at).as_secs()
+ );
+ }
}
/// A trait defining behavior of an [`Invoice`] payer.
) -> Result<Route, LightningError>;
}
-/// Number of attempts to retry payment path failures for an [`Invoice`].
+/// Strategies available to retry payment path failures for an [`Invoice`].
///
-/// Note that this is the number of *path* failures, not full payment retries. For multi-path
-/// payments, if this is less than the total number of paths, we will never even retry all of the
-/// payment's paths.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, Hash, PartialEq)]
-pub struct RetryAttempts(pub usize);
+pub enum Retry {
+ /// Max number of attempts to retry payment.
+ ///
+ /// Note that this is the number of *path* failures, not full payment retries. For multi-path
+ /// payments, if this is less than the total number of paths, we will never even retry all of the
+ /// payment's paths.
+ Attempts(usize),
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")]
+ /// Time elapsed before abandoning retries for a payment.
+ Timeout(Duration),
+}
+
+impl Retry {
+ fn is_retryable_now<T: Time>(&self, attempts: &PaymentAttempts<T>) -> bool {
+ match (self, attempts) {
+ (Retry::Attempts(max_retry_count), PaymentAttempts { count, .. }) => {
+ max_retry_count >= &count
+ },
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")]
+ (Retry::Timeout(max_duration), PaymentAttempts { first_attempted_at, .. } ) =>
+ *max_duration >= T::now().duration_since(*first_attempted_at),
+ }
+ }
+}
/// An error that may occur when making a payment.
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
Sending(PaymentSendFailure),
}
-impl<P: Deref, R, S: Deref, L: Deref, E: EventHandler> InvoicePayer<P, R, S, L, E>
+impl<P: Deref, R, S: Deref, L: Deref, E: EventHandler, T: Time> InvoicePayerUsingTime<P, R, S, L, E, T>
where
P::Target: Payer,
R: for <'a> Router<<<S as Deref>::Target as LockableScore<'a>>::Locked>,
/// Creates an invoice payer that retries failed payment paths.
///
/// Will forward any [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`] events to the decorated `event_handler` once
- /// `retry_attempts` has been exceeded for a given [`Invoice`].
+ /// `retry` has been exceeded for a given [`Invoice`].
pub fn new(
- payer: P, router: R, scorer: S, logger: L, event_handler: E, retry_attempts: RetryAttempts
+ payer: P, router: R, scorer: S, logger: L, event_handler: E, retry: Retry
) -> Self {
Self {
payer,
logger,
event_handler,
payment_cache: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
- retry_attempts,
+ retry,
}
}
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(invoice.payment_hash().clone().into_inner());
match self.payment_cache.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_hash) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(PaymentError::Invoice("payment pending")),
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => entry.insert(0),
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => entry.insert(PaymentAttempts::new()),
};
let payment_secret = Some(invoice.payment_secret().clone());
let send_payment = |route: &Route| {
self.payer.send_payment(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret)
};
+
self.pay_internal(&route_params, payment_hash, send_payment)
.map_err(|e| { self.payment_cache.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_hash); e })
}
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
match self.payment_cache.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_hash) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(PaymentError::Invoice("payment pending")),
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => entry.insert(0),
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => entry.insert(PaymentAttempts::new()),
};
let route_params = RouteParameters {
PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(_) => Err(e),
PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(_) => {
let mut payment_cache = self.payment_cache.lock().unwrap();
- let retry_count = payment_cache.get_mut(&payment_hash).unwrap();
- if *retry_count >= self.retry_attempts.0 {
- Err(e)
- } else {
- *retry_count += 1;
+ let payment_attempts = payment_cache.get_mut(&payment_hash).unwrap();
+ payment_attempts.count += 1;
+ if self.retry.is_retryable_now(payment_attempts) {
core::mem::drop(payment_cache);
Ok(self.pay_internal(params, payment_hash, send_payment)?)
+ } else {
+ Err(e)
}
},
PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure { failed_paths_retry, payment_id, .. } => {
fn retry_payment(
&self, payment_id: PaymentId, payment_hash: PaymentHash, params: &RouteParameters
) -> Result<(), ()> {
- let max_payment_attempts = self.retry_attempts.0 + 1;
- let attempts = *self.payment_cache.lock().unwrap()
- .entry(payment_hash)
- .and_modify(|attempts| *attempts += 1)
- .or_insert(1);
-
- if attempts >= max_payment_attempts {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Payment {} exceeded maximum attempts; not retrying (attempts: {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), attempts);
+ let attempts =
+ *self.payment_cache.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_hash)
+ .and_modify(|attempts| attempts.count += 1)
+ .or_insert(PaymentAttempts {
+ count: 1,
+ first_attempted_at: T::now()
+ });
+
+ if !self.retry.is_retryable_now(&attempts) {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Payment {} exceeded maximum attempts; not retrying ({})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), attempts);
return Err(());
}
#[cfg(feature = "std")] {
if has_expired(params) {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Invoice expired for payment {}; not retrying (attempts: {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), attempts);
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Invoice expired for payment {}; not retrying ({:})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), attempts);
return Err(());
}
}
&self.scorer.lock()
);
if route.is_err() {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to find a route for payment {}; not retrying (attempts: {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), attempts);
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to find a route for payment {}; not retrying ({:})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), attempts);
return Err(());
}
} else { false }
}
-impl<P: Deref, R, S: Deref, L: Deref, E: EventHandler> EventHandler for InvoicePayer<P, R, S, L, E>
+impl<P: Deref, R, S: Deref, L: Deref, E: EventHandler, T: Time> EventHandler for InvoicePayerUsingTime<P, R, S, L, E, T>
where
P::Target: Payer,
R: for <'a> Router<<<S as Deref>::Target as LockableScore<'a>>::Locked>,
let mut payment_cache = self.payment_cache.lock().unwrap();
let attempts = payment_cache
.remove(payment_hash)
- .map_or(1, |attempts| attempts + 1);
+ .map_or(1, |attempts| attempts.count + 1);
log_trace!(self.logger, "Payment {} succeeded (attempts: {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), attempts);
},
_ => {},
use lightning::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, ErrorAction, LightningError};
use lightning::routing::network_graph::NodeId;
use lightning::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop};
+ use lightning::routing::scoring::ChannelUsage;
use lightning::util::test_utils::TestLogger;
use lightning::util::errors::APIError;
use lightning::util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
use std::cell::RefCell;
use std::collections::VecDeque;
use std::time::{SystemTime, Duration};
+ use time_utils::tests::SinceEpoch;
use DEFAULT_EXPIRY_TIME;
fn invoice(payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Invoice {
let scorer = RefCell::new(TestScorer::new());
let logger = TestLogger::new();
let invoice_payer =
- InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, RetryAttempts(0));
+ InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, Retry::Attempts(0));
let payment_id = Some(invoice_payer.pay_invoice(&invoice).unwrap());
assert_eq!(*payer.attempts.borrow(), 1);
let scorer = RefCell::new(TestScorer::new());
let logger = TestLogger::new();
let invoice_payer =
- InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, RetryAttempts(2));
+ InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, Retry::Attempts(2));
let payment_id = Some(invoice_payer.pay_invoice(&invoice).unwrap());
assert_eq!(*payer.attempts.borrow(), 1);
let scorer = RefCell::new(TestScorer::new());
let logger = TestLogger::new();
let invoice_payer =
- InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, RetryAttempts(2));
+ InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, Retry::Attempts(2));
assert!(invoice_payer.pay_invoice(&invoice).is_ok());
}
let scorer = RefCell::new(TestScorer::new());
let logger = TestLogger::new();
let invoice_payer =
- InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, RetryAttempts(2));
+ InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, Retry::Attempts(2));
let payment_id = Some(PaymentId([1; 32]));
let event = Event::PaymentPathFailed {
}
#[test]
- fn fails_paying_invoice_after_max_retries() {
+ fn fails_paying_invoice_after_max_retry_counts() {
let event_handled = core::cell::RefCell::new(false);
let event_handler = |_: &_| { *event_handled.borrow_mut() = true; };
let scorer = RefCell::new(TestScorer::new());
let logger = TestLogger::new();
let invoice_payer =
- InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, RetryAttempts(2));
+ InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, Retry::Attempts(2));
let payment_id = Some(invoice_payer.pay_invoice(&invoice).unwrap());
assert_eq!(*payer.attempts.borrow(), 1);
assert_eq!(*payer.attempts.borrow(), 3);
}
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")]
+ #[test]
+ fn fails_paying_invoice_after_max_retry_timeout() {
+ let event_handled = core::cell::RefCell::new(false);
+ let event_handler = |_: &_| { *event_handled.borrow_mut() = true; };
+
+ let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
+ let invoice = invoice(payment_preimage);
+ let final_value_msat = invoice.amount_milli_satoshis().unwrap();
+
+ let payer = TestPayer::new()
+ .expect_send(Amount::ForInvoice(final_value_msat))
+ .expect_send(Amount::OnRetry(final_value_msat / 2));
+
+ let router = TestRouter {};
+ let scorer = RefCell::new(TestScorer::new());
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
+ type InvoicePayerUsingSinceEpoch <P, R, S, L, E> = InvoicePayerUsingTime::<P, R, S, L, E, SinceEpoch>;
+
+ let invoice_payer =
+ InvoicePayerUsingSinceEpoch::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, Retry::Timeout(Duration::from_secs(120)));
+
+ let payment_id = Some(invoice_payer.pay_invoice(&invoice).unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(*payer.attempts.borrow(), 1);
+
+ let event = Event::PaymentPathFailed {
+ payment_id,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash(invoice.payment_hash().clone().into_inner()),
+ network_update: None,
+ rejected_by_dest: false,
+ all_paths_failed: true,
+ path: TestRouter::path_for_value(final_value_msat),
+ short_channel_id: None,
+ retry: Some(TestRouter::retry_for_invoice(&invoice)),
+ };
+ invoice_payer.handle_event(&event);
+ assert_eq!(*event_handled.borrow(), false);
+ assert_eq!(*payer.attempts.borrow(), 2);
+
+ SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(121));
+
+ invoice_payer.handle_event(&event);
+ assert_eq!(*event_handled.borrow(), true);
+ assert_eq!(*payer.attempts.borrow(), 2);
+ }
+
#[test]
fn fails_paying_invoice_with_missing_retry_params() {
let event_handled = core::cell::RefCell::new(false);
let scorer = RefCell::new(TestScorer::new());
let logger = TestLogger::new();
let invoice_payer =
- InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, RetryAttempts(2));
+ InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, Retry::Attempts(2));
let payment_id = Some(invoice_payer.pay_invoice(&invoice).unwrap());
assert_eq!(*payer.attempts.borrow(), 1);
let scorer = RefCell::new(TestScorer::new());
let logger = TestLogger::new();
let invoice_payer =
- InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, RetryAttempts(2));
+ InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, Retry::Attempts(2));
let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
let invoice = expired_invoice(payment_preimage);
let scorer = RefCell::new(TestScorer::new());
let logger = TestLogger::new();
let invoice_payer =
- InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, RetryAttempts(2));
+ InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, Retry::Attempts(2));
let payment_id = Some(invoice_payer.pay_invoice(&invoice).unwrap());
assert_eq!(*payer.attempts.borrow(), 1);
let scorer = RefCell::new(TestScorer::new());
let logger = TestLogger::new();
let invoice_payer =
- InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, RetryAttempts(2));
+ InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, Retry::Attempts(2));
let payment_id = Some(invoice_payer.pay_invoice(&invoice).unwrap());
assert_eq!(*payer.attempts.borrow(), 1);
let scorer = RefCell::new(TestScorer::new());
let logger = TestLogger::new();
let invoice_payer =
- InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, RetryAttempts(2));
+ InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, Retry::Attempts(2));
let payment_id = Some(invoice_payer.pay_invoice(&invoice).unwrap());
assert_eq!(*payer.attempts.borrow(), 1);
let scorer = RefCell::new(TestScorer::new());
let logger = TestLogger::new();
let invoice_payer =
- InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, RetryAttempts(0));
+ InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, Retry::Attempts(0));
let payment_id = Some(invoice_payer.pay_invoice(&invoice).unwrap());
let scorer = RefCell::new(TestScorer::new());
let logger = TestLogger::new();
let invoice_payer =
- InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, |_: &_| {}, RetryAttempts(0));
+ InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, |_: &_| {}, Retry::Attempts(0));
let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
let invoice = invoice(payment_preimage);
let scorer = RefCell::new(TestScorer::new());
let logger = TestLogger::new();
let invoice_payer =
- InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, |_: &_| {}, RetryAttempts(0));
+ InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, |_: &_| {}, Retry::Attempts(0));
match invoice_payer.pay_invoice(&invoice) {
Err(PaymentError::Sending(_)) => {},
let scorer = RefCell::new(TestScorer::new());
let logger = TestLogger::new();
let invoice_payer =
- InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, RetryAttempts(0));
+ InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, Retry::Attempts(0));
let payment_id =
Some(invoice_payer.pay_zero_value_invoice(&invoice, final_value_msat).unwrap());
let scorer = RefCell::new(TestScorer::new());
let logger = TestLogger::new();
let invoice_payer =
- InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, RetryAttempts(0));
+ InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, Retry::Attempts(0));
let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
let invoice = invoice(payment_preimage);
let scorer = RefCell::new(TestScorer::new());
let logger = TestLogger::new();
let invoice_payer =
- InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, RetryAttempts(2));
+ InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, Retry::Attempts(2));
let payment_id = Some(invoice_payer.pay_pubkey(
pubkey, payment_preimage, final_value_msat, final_cltv_expiry_delta
}));
let logger = TestLogger::new();
let invoice_payer =
- InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, RetryAttempts(2));
+ InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, Retry::Attempts(2));
let payment_id = Some(invoice_payer.pay_invoice(&invoice).unwrap());
let event = Event::PaymentPathFailed {
);
let logger = TestLogger::new();
let invoice_payer =
- InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, RetryAttempts(2));
+ InvoicePayer::new(&payer, router, &scorer, &logger, event_handler, Retry::Attempts(2));
let payment_id = invoice_payer.pay_invoice(&invoice).unwrap();
let event = Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
impl Score for TestScorer {
fn channel_penalty_msat(
- &self, _short_channel_id: u64, _send_amt: u64, _chan_amt: u64, _source: &NodeId, _target: &NodeId
+ &self, _short_channel_id: u64, _source: &NodeId, _target: &NodeId, _usage: ChannelUsage
) -> u64 { 0 }
fn payment_path_failed(&mut self, actual_path: &[&RouteHop], actual_short_channel_id: u64) {
let event_handler = |_: &_| { panic!(); };
let scorer = RefCell::new(TestScorer::new());
- let invoice_payer = InvoicePayer::new(nodes[0].node, router, &scorer, nodes[0].logger, event_handler, RetryAttempts(1));
+ let invoice_payer = InvoicePayer::new(nodes[0].node, router, &scorer, nodes[0].logger, event_handler, Retry::Attempts(1));
assert!(invoice_payer.pay_invoice(&create_invoice_from_channelmanager_and_duration_since_epoch(
&nodes[1].node, nodes[1].keys_manager, Currency::Bitcoin, Some(100_010_000), "Invoice".to_string(),
let event_handler = |_: &_| { panic!(); };
let scorer = RefCell::new(TestScorer::new());
- let invoice_payer = InvoicePayer::new(nodes[0].node, router, &scorer, nodes[0].logger, event_handler, RetryAttempts(1));
+ let invoice_payer = InvoicePayer::new(nodes[0].node, router, &scorer, nodes[0].logger, event_handler, Retry::Attempts(1));
assert!(invoice_payer.pay_invoice(&create_invoice_from_channelmanager_and_duration_since_epoch(
&nodes[1].node, nodes[1].keys_manager, Currency::Bitcoin, Some(100_010_000), "Invoice".to_string(),
event_checker(event);
};
let scorer = RefCell::new(TestScorer::new());
- let invoice_payer = InvoicePayer::new(nodes[0].node, router, &scorer, nodes[0].logger, event_handler, RetryAttempts(1));
+ let invoice_payer = InvoicePayer::new(nodes[0].node, router, &scorer, nodes[0].logger, event_handler, Retry::Attempts(1));
assert!(invoice_payer.pay_invoice(&create_invoice_from_channelmanager_and_duration_since_epoch(
&nodes[1].node, nodes[1].keys_manager, Currency::Bitcoin, Some(100_010_000), "Invoice".to_string(),
--- /dev/null
+../../lightning/src/util/time.rs
\ No newline at end of file
// Force close because cooperative close doesn't result in any persisted
// updates.
- nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
- nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
let update_map = nodes[1].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap();
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
- nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
let update_map = nodes[1].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap();
--- /dev/null
+[package]
+name = "lightning-rapid-gossip-sync"
+version = "0.0.106"
+authors = ["Arik Sosman <git@arik.io>"]
+license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
+repository = "https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning"
+edition = "2018"
+description = """
+Utility to process gossip routing data from Rapid Gossip Sync Server.
+"""
+
+[features]
+_bench_unstable = []
+
+[dependencies]
+lightning = { version = "0.0.106", path = "../lightning" }
+bitcoin = { version = "0.28.1", default-features = false }
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+lightning = { version = "0.0.106", path = "../lightning", features = ["_test_utils"] }
--- /dev/null
+# lightning-rapid-gossip-sync
+
+This crate exposes functionality for rapid gossip graph syncing, aimed primarily at mobile clients.
+Its server counterpart is the
+[rapid-gossip-sync-server](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rapid-gossip-sync-server) repository.
+
+## Mechanism
+
+The (presumed) server sends a compressed gossip response containing gossip data. The gossip data is
+formatted compactly, omitting signatures and opportunistically incremental where previous channel
+updates are known.
+
+Essentially, the serialization structure is as follows:
+
+1. Fixed prefix bytes `76, 68, 75, 1` (the first three bytes are ASCII for `LDK`)
+ - The purpose of this prefix is to identify the serialization format, should other rapid gossip
+ sync formats arise in the future
+ - The fourth byte is the protocol version in case our format gets updated
+2. Chain hash (32 bytes)
+3. Latest seen timestamp (`u32`)
+4. An unsigned int indicating the number of node IDs to follow
+5. An array of compressed node ID pubkeys (all pubkeys are presumed to be standard
+ compressed 33-byte-serializations)
+6. An unsigned int indicating the number of channel announcement messages to follow
+7. An array of significantly stripped down customized channel announcements
+8. An unsigned int indicating the number of channel update messages to follow
+9. A series of default values used for non-incremental channel updates
+ - The values are defined as follows:
+ 1. `default_cltv_expiry_delta`
+ 2. `default_htlc_minimum_msat`
+ 3. `default_fee_base_msat`
+ 4. `default_fee_proportional_millionths`
+ 5. `default_htlc_maximum_msat` (`u64`, and if the default is no maximum, `u64::MAX`)
+ - The defaults are calculated by the server based on the frequency among non-incremental
+ updates within a given delta set
+10. An array of customized channel updates
+
+You will also notice that `NodeAnnouncement` messages are omitted altogether as the node IDs are
+implicitly extracted from the channel announcements and updates.
+
+The data is then applied to the current network graph, artificially dated to the timestamp of the
+latest seen message less one week, be it an announcement or an update, from the server's
+perspective. The network graph should not be pruned until the graph sync completes.
+
+### Custom Channel Announcement
+
+To achieve compactness and avoid data repetition, we're sending a significantly stripped down
+version of the channel announcement message, which contains only the following data:
+
+1. `channel_features`: `u16` + `n`, where `n` is the number of bytes indicated by the first `u16`
+2. `short_channel_id`: `CompactSize` (incremental `CompactSize` deltas starting from 0)
+3. `node_id_1_index`: `CompactSize` (index of node id within the previously sent sequence)
+4. `node_id_2_index`: `CompactSize` (index of node id within the previously sent sequence)
+
+### Custom Channel Update
+
+For the purpose of rapid syncing, we have deviated from the channel update format specified in
+BOLT 7 significantly. Our custom channel updates are structured as follows:
+
+1. `short_channel_id`: `CompactSize` (incremental `CompactSize` deltas starting at 0)
+2. `custom_channel_flags`: `u8`
+3. `update_data`
+
+Specifically, our custom channel flags break down like this:
+
+| 128 | 64 | 32 | 16 | 8 | 4 | 2 | 1 |
+|---------------------|----|----|----|---|---|------------------|-----------|
+| Incremental update? | | | | | | Disable channel? | Direction |
+
+If the most significant bit is set to `1`, indicating an incremental update, the intermediate bit
+flags assume the following meaning:
+
+| 64 | 32 | 16 | 8 | 4 |
+|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
+| `cltv_expiry_delta` has changed | `htlc_minimum_msat` has changed | `fee_base_msat` has changed | `fee_proportional_millionths` has changed | `htlc_maximum_msat` has changed |
+
+If the most significant bit is set to `0`, the meaning is almost identical, except instead of a
+change, the flags now represent a deviation from the defaults sent at the beginning of the update
+sequence.
+
+In both cases, `update_data` only contains the fields that are indicated by the channel flags to be
+non-default or to have mutated.
+
+## Delta Calculation
+
+The way a server is meant to calculate this rapid gossip sync data is by taking the latest time
+any change, be it either an announcement or an update, was seen. That timestamp is included in each
+rapid sync message, so all the client needs to do is cache one variable.
+
+If a particular channel update had never occurred before, the full update is sent. If a channel has
+had updates prior to the provided timestamp, the latest update prior to the timestamp is taken as a
+reference, and the delta is calculated against it.
+
+Depending on whether the rapid sync message is calculated on the fly or a snapshotted version is
+returned, intermediate changes between the latest update seen by the client and the latest update
+broadcast on the network may be taken into account when calculating the delta.
+
+## Performance
+
+Given the primary purpose of this utility is a faster graph sync, we thought it might be helpful to
+provide some examples of various delta sets. These examples were calculated as of May 19th 2022
+with a network graph comprised of 80,000 channel announcements and 160,000 directed channel updates.
+
+| Full sync | |
+|-----------------------------|--------|
+| Message Length | 4.7 MB |
+| Gzipped Message Length | 2.0 MB |
+| Client-side Processing Time | 1.4 s |
+
+| Week-old sync | |
+|-----------------------------|--------|
+| Message Length | 2.7 MB |
+| Gzipped Message Length | 862 kB |
+| Client-side Processing Time | 907 ms |
+
+| Day-old sync | |
+|-----------------------------|---------|
+| Message Length | 191 kB |
+| Gzipped Message Length | 92.8 kB |
+| Client-side Processing Time | 196 ms |
--- /dev/null
+*
+!.gitignore
--- /dev/null
+use core::fmt::Debug;
+use std::fmt::Formatter;
+use lightning::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, LightningError};
+
+/// All-encompassing standard error type that processing can return
+pub enum GraphSyncError {
+ /// Error trying to read the update data, typically due to an erroneous data length indication
+ /// that is greater than the actual amount of data provided
+ DecodeError(DecodeError),
+ /// Error applying the patch to the network graph, usually the result of updates that are too
+ /// old or missing prerequisite data to the application of updates out of order
+ LightningError(LightningError),
+}
+
+impl From<std::io::Error> for GraphSyncError {
+ fn from(error: std::io::Error) -> Self {
+ Self::DecodeError(DecodeError::Io(error.kind()))
+ }
+}
+
+impl From<DecodeError> for GraphSyncError {
+ fn from(error: DecodeError) -> Self {
+ Self::DecodeError(error)
+ }
+}
+
+impl From<LightningError> for GraphSyncError {
+ fn from(error: LightningError) -> Self {
+ Self::LightningError(error)
+ }
+}
+
+impl Debug for GraphSyncError {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+ match self {
+ GraphSyncError::DecodeError(e) => f.write_fmt(format_args!("DecodeError: {:?}", e)),
+ GraphSyncError::LightningError(e) => f.write_fmt(format_args!("LightningError: {:?}", e))
+ }
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+#![deny(missing_docs)]
+#![deny(unsafe_code)]
+#![deny(broken_intra_doc_links)]
+#![deny(non_upper_case_globals)]
+#![deny(non_camel_case_types)]
+#![deny(non_snake_case)]
+#![deny(unused_mut)]
+#![deny(unused_variables)]
+#![deny(unused_imports)]
+//! This crate exposes functionality to rapidly sync gossip data, aimed primarily at mobile
+//! devices.
+//!
+//! The server sends a compressed response containing differential gossip data. The gossip data is
+//! formatted compactly, omitting signatures and opportunistically incremental where previous
+//! channel updates are known (a mechanism that is enabled when the timestamp of the last known
+//! channel update is communicated). A reference server implementation can be found
+//! [here](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rapid-gossip-sync-server).
+//!
+//! An example server request could look as simple as the following. Note that the first ever rapid
+//! sync should use `0` for `last_sync_timestamp`:
+//!
+//! ```shell
+//! curl -o rapid_sync.lngossip https://rapidsync.lightningdevkit.org/snapshot/<last_sync_timestamp>
+//! ```
+//!
+//! Then, call the network processing function. In this example, we process the update by reading
+//! its contents from disk, which we do by calling the `sync_network_graph_with_file_path` method:
+//!
+//! ```
+//! use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
+//! use bitcoin::Network;
+//! use lightning::routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
+//!
+//! let block_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash();
+//! let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(block_hash);
+//! let new_last_sync_timestamp_result = lightning_rapid_gossip_sync::sync_network_graph_with_file_path(&network_graph, "./rapid_sync.lngossip");
+//! ```
+//!
+//! The primary benefit this syncing mechanism provides is that given a trusted server, a
+//! low-powered client can offload the validation of gossip signatures. This enables a client to
+//! privately calculate routes for payments, and do so much faster and earlier than requiring a full
+//! peer-to-peer gossip sync to complete.
+//!
+//! The reason the rapid sync server requires trust is that it could provide bogus data, though at
+//! worst, all that would result in is a fake network topology, which wouldn't enable the server to
+//! steal or siphon off funds. It could, however, reduce the client's privacy by forcing all
+//! payments to be routed via channels the server controls.
+//!
+//! The way a server is meant to calculate this rapid gossip sync data is by using a `latest_seen`
+//! timestamp provided by the client. It's not included in either channel announcement or update,
+//! (not least due to announcements not including any timestamps at all, but only a block height)
+//! but rather, it's a timestamp of when the server saw a particular message.
+
+// Allow and import test features for benching
+#![cfg_attr(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"), feature(test))]
+#[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
+extern crate test;
+
+use std::fs::File;
+
+use lightning::routing::network_graph;
+
+use crate::error::GraphSyncError;
+
+/// Error types that these functions can return
+pub mod error;
+
+/// Core functionality of this crate
+pub mod processing;
+
+/// Sync gossip data from a file
+/// Returns the last sync timestamp to be used the next time rapid sync data is queried.
+///
+/// `network_graph`: The network graph to apply the updates to
+///
+/// `sync_path`: Path to the file where the gossip update data is located
+///
+pub fn sync_network_graph_with_file_path(
+ network_graph: &network_graph::NetworkGraph,
+ sync_path: &str,
+) -> Result<u32, GraphSyncError> {
+ let mut file = File::open(sync_path)?;
+ processing::update_network_graph_from_byte_stream(&network_graph, &mut file)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ use std::fs;
+
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
+ use bitcoin::Network;
+
+ use lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
+ use lightning::routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
+
+ use crate::sync_network_graph_with_file_path;
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_sync_from_file() {
+ struct FileSyncTest {
+ directory: String,
+ }
+
+ impl FileSyncTest {
+ fn new(tmp_directory: &str, valid_response: &[u8]) -> FileSyncTest {
+ let test = FileSyncTest { directory: tmp_directory.to_owned() };
+
+ let graph_sync_test_directory = test.get_test_directory();
+ fs::create_dir_all(graph_sync_test_directory).unwrap();
+
+ let graph_sync_test_file = test.get_test_file_path();
+ fs::write(&graph_sync_test_file, valid_response).unwrap();
+
+ test
+ }
+ fn get_test_directory(&self) -> String {
+ let graph_sync_test_directory = self.directory.clone() + "/graph-sync-tests";
+ graph_sync_test_directory
+ }
+ fn get_test_file_path(&self) -> String {
+ let graph_sync_test_directory = self.get_test_directory();
+ let graph_sync_test_file = graph_sync_test_directory.to_owned() + "/test_data.lngossip";
+ graph_sync_test_file
+ }
+ }
+
+ impl Drop for FileSyncTest {
+ fn drop(&mut self) {
+ fs::remove_dir_all(self.directory.clone()).unwrap();
+ }
+ }
+
+ // same as incremental_only_update_fails_without_prior_same_direction_updates
+ let valid_response = vec![
+ 76, 68, 75, 1, 111, 226, 140, 10, 182, 241, 179, 114, 193, 166, 162, 70, 174, 99, 247,
+ 79, 147, 30, 131, 101, 225, 90, 8, 156, 104, 214, 25, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 97, 227, 98, 218,
+ 0, 0, 0, 4, 2, 22, 7, 207, 206, 25, 164, 197, 231, 230, 231, 56, 102, 61, 250, 251,
+ 187, 172, 38, 46, 79, 247, 108, 44, 155, 48, 219, 238, 252, 53, 192, 6, 67, 2, 36, 125,
+ 157, 176, 223, 175, 234, 116, 94, 248, 201, 225, 97, 235, 50, 47, 115, 172, 63, 136,
+ 88, 216, 115, 11, 111, 217, 114, 84, 116, 124, 231, 107, 2, 158, 1, 242, 121, 152, 106,
+ 204, 131, 186, 35, 93, 70, 216, 10, 237, 224, 183, 89, 95, 65, 3, 83, 185, 58, 138,
+ 181, 64, 187, 103, 127, 68, 50, 2, 201, 19, 17, 138, 136, 149, 185, 226, 156, 137, 175,
+ 110, 32, 237, 0, 217, 90, 31, 100, 228, 149, 46, 219, 175, 168, 77, 4, 143, 38, 128,
+ 76, 97, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 255, 2, 68,
+ 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 2, 3, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 40, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 232, 0, 0, 3, 232,
+ 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 58, 85, 116, 216, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 25, 0, 0,
+ 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 125, 255, 2, 68, 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 29, 129, 25, 192,
+ ];
+
+ let tmp_directory = "./rapid-gossip-sync-tests-tmp";
+ let sync_test = FileSyncTest::new(tmp_directory, &valid_response);
+ let graph_sync_test_file = sync_test.get_test_file_path();
+
+ let block_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
+ let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(block_hash);
+
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
+
+ let sync_result = sync_network_graph_with_file_path(&network_graph, &graph_sync_test_file);
+
+ if sync_result.is_err() {
+ panic!("Unexpected sync result: {:?}", sync_result)
+ }
+
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 2);
+ let after = network_graph.to_string();
+ assert!(
+ after.contains("021607cfce19a4c5e7e6e738663dfafbbbac262e4ff76c2c9b30dbeefc35c00643")
+ );
+ assert!(
+ after.contains("02247d9db0dfafea745ef8c9e161eb322f73ac3f8858d8730b6fd97254747ce76b")
+ );
+ assert!(
+ after.contains("029e01f279986acc83ba235d46d80aede0b7595f410353b93a8ab540bb677f4432")
+ );
+ assert!(
+ after.contains("02c913118a8895b9e29c89af6e20ed00d95a1f64e4952edbafa84d048f26804c61")
+ );
+ assert!(after.contains("619737530008010752"));
+ assert!(after.contains("783241506229452801"));
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn measure_native_read_from_file() {
+ let block_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
+ let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(block_hash);
+
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
+
+ let start = std::time::Instant::now();
+ let sync_result =
+ sync_network_graph_with_file_path(&network_graph, "./res/full_graph.lngossip");
+ if let Err(crate::error::GraphSyncError::DecodeError(DecodeError::Io(io_error))) = &sync_result {
+ let error_string = format!("Input file lightning-graph-sync/res/full_graph.lngossip is missing! Download it from https://bitcoin.ninja/ldk-compressed_graph-bc08df7542-2022-05-05.bin\n\n{:?}", io_error);
+ #[cfg(not(require_route_graph_test))]
+ {
+ println!("{}", error_string);
+ return;
+ }
+ #[cfg(require_route_graph_test)]
+ panic!("{}", error_string);
+ }
+ let elapsed = start.elapsed();
+ println!("initialization duration: {:?}", elapsed);
+ if sync_result.is_err() {
+ panic!("Unexpected sync result: {:?}", sync_result)
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
+pub mod bench {
+ use test::Bencher;
+
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
+ use bitcoin::Network;
+
+ use lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
+ use lightning::routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
+
+ use crate::sync_network_graph_with_file_path;
+
+ #[bench]
+ fn bench_reading_full_graph_from_file(b: &mut Bencher) {
+ let block_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
+ b.iter(|| {
+ let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(block_hash);
+ let sync_result = sync_network_graph_with_file_path(
+ &network_graph,
+ "./res/full_graph.lngossip",
+ );
+ if let Err(crate::error::GraphSyncError::DecodeError(DecodeError::Io(io_error))) = &sync_result {
+ let error_string = format!("Input file lightning-graph-sync/res/full_graph.lngossip is missing! Download it from https://bitcoin.ninja/ldk-compressed_graph-bc08df7542-2022-05-05.bin\n\n{:?}", io_error);
+ #[cfg(not(require_route_graph_test))]
+ {
+ println!("{}", error_string);
+ return;
+ }
+ panic!("{}", error_string);
+ }
+ assert!(sync_result.is_ok())
+ });
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+use std::cmp::max;
+use std::io;
+use std::io::Read;
+
+use bitcoin::BlockHash;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
+
+use lightning::ln::msgs::{
+ DecodeError, ErrorAction, LightningError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate,
+};
+use lightning::routing::network_graph;
+use lightning::util::ser::{BigSize, Readable};
+
+use crate::error::GraphSyncError;
+
+/// The purpose of this prefix is to identify the serialization format, should other rapid gossip
+/// sync formats arise in the future.
+///
+/// The fourth byte is the protocol version in case our format gets updated.
+const GOSSIP_PREFIX: [u8; 4] = [76, 68, 75, 1];
+
+/// Maximum vector allocation capacity for distinct node IDs. This constraint is necessary to
+/// avoid malicious updates being able to trigger excessive memory allocation.
+const MAX_INITIAL_NODE_ID_VECTOR_CAPACITY: u32 = 50_000;
+
+/// Update network graph from binary data.
+/// Returns the last sync timestamp to be used the next time rapid sync data is queried.
+///
+/// `network_graph`: network graph to be updated
+///
+/// `update_data`: `&[u8]` binary stream that comprises the update data
+pub fn update_network_graph(
+ network_graph: &network_graph::NetworkGraph,
+ update_data: &[u8],
+) -> Result<u32, GraphSyncError> {
+ let mut read_cursor = io::Cursor::new(update_data);
+ update_network_graph_from_byte_stream(&network_graph, &mut read_cursor)
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn update_network_graph_from_byte_stream<R: Read>(
+ network_graph: &network_graph::NetworkGraph,
+ mut read_cursor: &mut R,
+) -> Result<u32, GraphSyncError> {
+ let mut prefix = [0u8; 4];
+ read_cursor.read_exact(&mut prefix)?;
+
+ match prefix {
+ GOSSIP_PREFIX => {},
+ _ => {
+ return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion.into());
+ }
+ };
+
+ let chain_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ let latest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ // backdate the applied timestamp by a week
+ let backdated_timestamp = latest_seen_timestamp.saturating_sub(24 * 3600 * 7);
+
+ let node_id_count: u32 = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ let mut node_ids: Vec<PublicKey> = Vec::with_capacity(std::cmp::min(
+ node_id_count,
+ MAX_INITIAL_NODE_ID_VECTOR_CAPACITY,
+ ) as usize);
+ for _ in 0..node_id_count {
+ let current_node_id = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ node_ids.push(current_node_id);
+ }
+
+ let mut previous_scid: u64 = 0;
+ let announcement_count: u32 = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ for _ in 0..announcement_count {
+ let features = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+
+ // handle SCID
+ let scid_delta: BigSize = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ let short_channel_id = previous_scid
+ .checked_add(scid_delta.0)
+ .ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
+ previous_scid = short_channel_id;
+
+ let node_id_1_index: BigSize = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ let node_id_2_index: BigSize = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ if max(node_id_1_index.0, node_id_2_index.0) >= node_id_count as u64 {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue.into());
+ };
+ let node_id_1 = node_ids[node_id_1_index.0 as usize];
+ let node_id_2 = node_ids[node_id_2_index.0 as usize];
+
+ let announcement_result = network_graph.add_channel_from_partial_announcement(
+ short_channel_id,
+ backdated_timestamp as u64,
+ features,
+ node_id_1,
+ node_id_2,
+ );
+ if let Err(lightning_error) = announcement_result {
+ if let ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip = lightning_error.action {
+ // everything is fine, just a duplicate channel announcement
+ } else {
+ return Err(lightning_error.into());
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ previous_scid = 0; // updates start at a new scid
+
+ let update_count: u32 = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ if update_count == 0 {
+ return Ok(latest_seen_timestamp);
+ }
+
+ // obtain default values for non-incremental updates
+ let default_cltv_expiry_delta: u16 = Readable::read(&mut read_cursor)?;
+ let default_htlc_minimum_msat: u64 = Readable::read(&mut read_cursor)?;
+ let default_fee_base_msat: u32 = Readable::read(&mut read_cursor)?;
+ let default_fee_proportional_millionths: u32 = Readable::read(&mut read_cursor)?;
+ let tentative_default_htlc_maximum_msat: u64 = Readable::read(&mut read_cursor)?;
+ let default_htlc_maximum_msat = if tentative_default_htlc_maximum_msat == u64::max_value() {
+ OptionalField::Absent
+ } else {
+ OptionalField::Present(tentative_default_htlc_maximum_msat)
+ };
+
+ for _ in 0..update_count {
+ let scid_delta: BigSize = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ let short_channel_id = previous_scid
+ .checked_add(scid_delta.0)
+ .ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
+ previous_scid = short_channel_id;
+
+ let channel_flags: u8 = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+
+ // flags are always sent in full, and hence always need updating
+ let standard_channel_flags = channel_flags & 0b_0000_0011;
+
+ let mut synthetic_update = if channel_flags & 0b_1000_0000 == 0 {
+ // full update, field flags will indicate deviations from the default
+ UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ chain_hash,
+ short_channel_id,
+ timestamp: backdated_timestamp,
+ flags: standard_channel_flags,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: default_cltv_expiry_delta,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: default_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: default_htlc_maximum_msat.clone(),
+ fee_base_msat: default_fee_base_msat,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: default_fee_proportional_millionths,
+ excess_data: vec![],
+ }
+ } else {
+ // incremental update, field flags will indicate mutated values
+ let read_only_network_graph = network_graph.read_only();
+ let channel = read_only_network_graph
+ .channels()
+ .get(&short_channel_id)
+ .ok_or(LightningError {
+ err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(),
+ action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
+ })?;
+
+ let directional_info = channel
+ .get_directional_info(channel_flags)
+ .ok_or(LightningError {
+ err: "Couldn't find previous directional data for update".to_owned(),
+ action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
+ })?;
+
+ let htlc_maximum_msat =
+ if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = directional_info.htlc_maximum_msat {
+ OptionalField::Present(htlc_maximum_msat)
+ } else {
+ OptionalField::Absent
+ };
+
+ UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ chain_hash,
+ short_channel_id,
+ timestamp: backdated_timestamp,
+ flags: standard_channel_flags,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: directional_info.cltv_expiry_delta,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: directional_info.htlc_minimum_msat,
+ htlc_maximum_msat,
+ fee_base_msat: directional_info.fees.base_msat,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: directional_info.fees.proportional_millionths,
+ excess_data: vec![],
+ }
+ };
+
+ if channel_flags & 0b_0100_0000 > 0 {
+ let cltv_expiry_delta: u16 = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ synthetic_update.cltv_expiry_delta = cltv_expiry_delta;
+ }
+
+ if channel_flags & 0b_0010_0000 > 0 {
+ let htlc_minimum_msat: u64 = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ synthetic_update.htlc_minimum_msat = htlc_minimum_msat;
+ }
+
+ if channel_flags & 0b_0001_0000 > 0 {
+ let fee_base_msat: u32 = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ synthetic_update.fee_base_msat = fee_base_msat;
+ }
+
+ if channel_flags & 0b_0000_1000 > 0 {
+ let fee_proportional_millionths: u32 = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ synthetic_update.fee_proportional_millionths = fee_proportional_millionths;
+ }
+
+ if channel_flags & 0b_0000_0100 > 0 {
+ let tentative_htlc_maximum_msat: u64 = Readable::read(read_cursor)?;
+ synthetic_update.htlc_maximum_msat = if tentative_htlc_maximum_msat == u64::max_value()
+ {
+ OptionalField::Absent
+ } else {
+ OptionalField::Present(tentative_htlc_maximum_msat)
+ };
+ }
+
+ network_graph.update_channel_unsigned(&synthetic_update)?;
+ }
+
+ Ok(latest_seen_timestamp)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
+ use bitcoin::Network;
+
+ use lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
+ use lightning::routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
+
+ use crate::error::GraphSyncError;
+ use crate::processing::update_network_graph;
+
+ #[test]
+ fn network_graph_fails_to_update_from_clipped_input() {
+ let block_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
+ let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(block_hash);
+
+ let example_input = vec![
+ 76, 68, 75, 1, 111, 226, 140, 10, 182, 241, 179, 114, 193, 166, 162, 70, 174, 99, 247,
+ 79, 147, 30, 131, 101, 225, 90, 8, 156, 104, 214, 25, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 97, 227, 98, 218,
+ 0, 0, 0, 4, 2, 22, 7, 207, 206, 25, 164, 197, 231, 230, 231, 56, 102, 61, 250, 251,
+ 187, 172, 38, 46, 79, 247, 108, 44, 155, 48, 219, 238, 252, 53, 192, 6, 67, 2, 36, 125,
+ 157, 176, 223, 175, 234, 116, 94, 248, 201, 225, 97, 235, 50, 47, 115, 172, 63, 136,
+ 88, 216, 115, 11, 111, 217, 114, 84, 116, 124, 231, 107, 2, 158, 1, 242, 121, 152, 106,
+ 204, 131, 186, 35, 93, 70, 216, 10, 237, 224, 183, 89, 95, 65, 3, 83, 185, 58, 138,
+ 181, 64, 187, 103, 127, 68, 50, 2, 201, 19, 17, 138, 136, 149, 185, 226, 156, 137, 175,
+ 110, 32, 237, 0, 217, 90, 31, 100, 228, 149, 46, 219, 175, 168, 77, 4, 143, 38, 128,
+ 76, 97, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 255, 2, 68,
+ 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 2, 3, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 40, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 232, 0, 0, 0, 100,
+ 0, 0, 2, 224, 0, 0, 0, 0, 29, 129, 25, 192, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 36, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 58, 85, 116, 216, 255, 2, 68, 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 24, 0,
+ 0, 3, 232, 0, 0, 0,
+ ];
+ let update_result = update_network_graph(&network_graph, &example_input[..]);
+ assert!(update_result.is_err());
+ if let Err(GraphSyncError::DecodeError(DecodeError::ShortRead)) = update_result {
+ // this is the expected error type
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected update result: {:?}", update_result)
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn incremental_only_update_fails_without_prior_announcements() {
+ let incremental_update_input = vec![
+ 76, 68, 75, 1, 111, 226, 140, 10, 182, 241, 179, 114, 193, 166, 162, 70, 174, 99, 247,
+ 79, 147, 30, 131, 101, 225, 90, 8, 156, 104, 214, 25, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 97, 229, 183, 167,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 136, 0, 0, 0, 221, 255, 2,
+ 68, 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 128,
+ ];
+
+ let block_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
+ let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(block_hash);
+
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
+
+ let update_result = update_network_graph(&network_graph, &incremental_update_input[..]);
+ assert!(update_result.is_err());
+ if let Err(GraphSyncError::LightningError(lightning_error)) = update_result {
+ assert_eq!(lightning_error.err, "Couldn't find channel for update");
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected update result: {:?}", update_result)
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn incremental_only_update_fails_without_prior_updates() {
+ let announced_update_input = vec![
+ 76, 68, 75, 1, 111, 226, 140, 10, 182, 241, 179, 114, 193, 166, 162, 70, 174, 99, 247,
+ 79, 147, 30, 131, 101, 225, 90, 8, 156, 104, 214, 25, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 97, 229, 183, 167,
+ 0, 0, 0, 4, 2, 22, 7, 207, 206, 25, 164, 197, 231, 230, 231, 56, 102, 61, 250, 251,
+ 187, 172, 38, 46, 79, 247, 108, 44, 155, 48, 219, 238, 252, 53, 192, 6, 67, 2, 36, 125,
+ 157, 176, 223, 175, 234, 116, 94, 248, 201, 225, 97, 235, 50, 47, 115, 172, 63, 136,
+ 88, 216, 115, 11, 111, 217, 114, 84, 116, 124, 231, 107, 2, 158, 1, 242, 121, 152, 106,
+ 204, 131, 186, 35, 93, 70, 216, 10, 237, 224, 183, 89, 95, 65, 3, 83, 185, 58, 138,
+ 181, 64, 187, 103, 127, 68, 50, 2, 201, 19, 17, 138, 136, 149, 185, 226, 156, 137, 175,
+ 110, 32, 237, 0, 217, 90, 31, 100, 228, 149, 46, 219, 175, 168, 77, 4, 143, 38, 128,
+ 76, 97, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 255, 2, 68,
+ 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 2, 3, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 136, 0, 0, 0, 221, 255,
+ 2, 68, 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 128,
+ ];
+
+ let block_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
+ let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(block_hash);
+
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
+
+ let update_result = update_network_graph(&network_graph, &announced_update_input[..]);
+ assert!(update_result.is_err());
+ if let Err(GraphSyncError::LightningError(lightning_error)) = update_result {
+ assert_eq!(
+ lightning_error.err,
+ "Couldn't find previous directional data for update"
+ );
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected update result: {:?}", update_result)
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn incremental_only_update_fails_without_prior_same_direction_updates() {
+ let initialization_input = vec![
+ 76, 68, 75, 1, 111, 226, 140, 10, 182, 241, 179, 114, 193, 166, 162, 70, 174, 99, 247,
+ 79, 147, 30, 131, 101, 225, 90, 8, 156, 104, 214, 25, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 97, 227, 98, 218,
+ 0, 0, 0, 4, 2, 22, 7, 207, 206, 25, 164, 197, 231, 230, 231, 56, 102, 61, 250, 251,
+ 187, 172, 38, 46, 79, 247, 108, 44, 155, 48, 219, 238, 252, 53, 192, 6, 67, 2, 36, 125,
+ 157, 176, 223, 175, 234, 116, 94, 248, 201, 225, 97, 235, 50, 47, 115, 172, 63, 136,
+ 88, 216, 115, 11, 111, 217, 114, 84, 116, 124, 231, 107, 2, 158, 1, 242, 121, 152, 106,
+ 204, 131, 186, 35, 93, 70, 216, 10, 237, 224, 183, 89, 95, 65, 3, 83, 185, 58, 138,
+ 181, 64, 187, 103, 127, 68, 50, 2, 201, 19, 17, 138, 136, 149, 185, 226, 156, 137, 175,
+ 110, 32, 237, 0, 217, 90, 31, 100, 228, 149, 46, 219, 175, 168, 77, 4, 143, 38, 128,
+ 76, 97, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 255, 2, 68,
+ 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 2, 3, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 40, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 232, 0, 0, 3, 232,
+ 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 58, 85, 116, 216, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 25, 0, 0,
+ 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 125, 255, 2, 68, 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 29, 129, 25, 192,
+ ];
+
+ let block_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
+ let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(block_hash);
+
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
+
+ let initialization_result = update_network_graph(&network_graph, &initialization_input[..]);
+ if initialization_result.is_err() {
+ panic!(
+ "Unexpected initialization result: {:?}",
+ initialization_result
+ )
+ }
+
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 2);
+ let initialized = network_graph.to_string();
+ assert!(initialized
+ .contains("021607cfce19a4c5e7e6e738663dfafbbbac262e4ff76c2c9b30dbeefc35c00643"));
+ assert!(initialized
+ .contains("02247d9db0dfafea745ef8c9e161eb322f73ac3f8858d8730b6fd97254747ce76b"));
+ assert!(initialized
+ .contains("029e01f279986acc83ba235d46d80aede0b7595f410353b93a8ab540bb677f4432"));
+ assert!(initialized
+ .contains("02c913118a8895b9e29c89af6e20ed00d95a1f64e4952edbafa84d048f26804c61"));
+ assert!(initialized.contains("619737530008010752"));
+ assert!(initialized.contains("783241506229452801"));
+
+ let opposite_direction_incremental_update_input = vec![
+ 76, 68, 75, 1, 111, 226, 140, 10, 182, 241, 179, 114, 193, 166, 162, 70, 174, 99, 247,
+ 79, 147, 30, 131, 101, 225, 90, 8, 156, 104, 214, 25, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 97, 229, 183, 167,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 136, 0, 0, 0, 221, 255, 2,
+ 68, 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 128,
+ ];
+ let update_result = update_network_graph(
+ &network_graph,
+ &opposite_direction_incremental_update_input[..],
+ );
+ assert!(update_result.is_err());
+ if let Err(GraphSyncError::LightningError(lightning_error)) = update_result {
+ assert_eq!(
+ lightning_error.err,
+ "Couldn't find previous directional data for update"
+ );
+ } else {
+ panic!("Unexpected update result: {:?}", update_result)
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn incremental_update_succeeds_with_prior_announcements_and_full_updates() {
+ let initialization_input = vec![
+ 76, 68, 75, 1, 111, 226, 140, 10, 182, 241, 179, 114, 193, 166, 162, 70, 174, 99, 247,
+ 79, 147, 30, 131, 101, 225, 90, 8, 156, 104, 214, 25, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 97, 227, 98, 218,
+ 0, 0, 0, 4, 2, 22, 7, 207, 206, 25, 164, 197, 231, 230, 231, 56, 102, 61, 250, 251,
+ 187, 172, 38, 46, 79, 247, 108, 44, 155, 48, 219, 238, 252, 53, 192, 6, 67, 2, 36, 125,
+ 157, 176, 223, 175, 234, 116, 94, 248, 201, 225, 97, 235, 50, 47, 115, 172, 63, 136,
+ 88, 216, 115, 11, 111, 217, 114, 84, 116, 124, 231, 107, 2, 158, 1, 242, 121, 152, 106,
+ 204, 131, 186, 35, 93, 70, 216, 10, 237, 224, 183, 89, 95, 65, 3, 83, 185, 58, 138,
+ 181, 64, 187, 103, 127, 68, 50, 2, 201, 19, 17, 138, 136, 149, 185, 226, 156, 137, 175,
+ 110, 32, 237, 0, 217, 90, 31, 100, 228, 149, 46, 219, 175, 168, 77, 4, 143, 38, 128,
+ 76, 97, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 255, 2, 68,
+ 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 2, 3, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 40, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 232, 0, 0, 3, 232,
+ 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 58, 85, 116, 216, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 56, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 100, 0, 0, 2, 224, 0, 25, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 125, 255, 2,
+ 68, 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 29, 129, 25, 192, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 29, 129,
+ 25, 192,
+ ];
+
+ let block_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
+ let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(block_hash);
+
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
+
+ let initialization_result = update_network_graph(&network_graph, &initialization_input[..]);
+ assert!(initialization_result.is_ok());
+
+ let single_direction_incremental_update_input = vec![
+ 76, 68, 75, 1, 111, 226, 140, 10, 182, 241, 179, 114, 193, 166, 162, 70, 174, 99, 247,
+ 79, 147, 30, 131, 101, 225, 90, 8, 156, 104, 214, 25, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 97, 229, 183, 167,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 136, 0, 0, 0, 221, 255, 2,
+ 68, 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 128,
+ ];
+ let update_result = update_network_graph(
+ &network_graph,
+ &single_direction_incremental_update_input[..],
+ );
+ if update_result.is_err() {
+ panic!("Unexpected update result: {:?}", update_result)
+ }
+
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 2);
+ let after = network_graph.to_string();
+ assert!(
+ after.contains("021607cfce19a4c5e7e6e738663dfafbbbac262e4ff76c2c9b30dbeefc35c00643")
+ );
+ assert!(
+ after.contains("02247d9db0dfafea745ef8c9e161eb322f73ac3f8858d8730b6fd97254747ce76b")
+ );
+ assert!(
+ after.contains("029e01f279986acc83ba235d46d80aede0b7595f410353b93a8ab540bb677f4432")
+ );
+ assert!(
+ after.contains("02c913118a8895b9e29c89af6e20ed00d95a1f64e4952edbafa84d048f26804c61")
+ );
+ assert!(after.contains("619737530008010752"));
+ assert!(after.contains("783241506229452801"));
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn full_update_succeeds() {
+ let valid_input = vec![
+ 76, 68, 75, 1, 111, 226, 140, 10, 182, 241, 179, 114, 193, 166, 162, 70, 174, 99, 247,
+ 79, 147, 30, 131, 101, 225, 90, 8, 156, 104, 214, 25, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 97, 227, 98, 218,
+ 0, 0, 0, 4, 2, 22, 7, 207, 206, 25, 164, 197, 231, 230, 231, 56, 102, 61, 250, 251,
+ 187, 172, 38, 46, 79, 247, 108, 44, 155, 48, 219, 238, 252, 53, 192, 6, 67, 2, 36, 125,
+ 157, 176, 223, 175, 234, 116, 94, 248, 201, 225, 97, 235, 50, 47, 115, 172, 63, 136,
+ 88, 216, 115, 11, 111, 217, 114, 84, 116, 124, 231, 107, 2, 158, 1, 242, 121, 152, 106,
+ 204, 131, 186, 35, 93, 70, 216, 10, 237, 224, 183, 89, 95, 65, 3, 83, 185, 58, 138,
+ 181, 64, 187, 103, 127, 68, 50, 2, 201, 19, 17, 138, 136, 149, 185, 226, 156, 137, 175,
+ 110, 32, 237, 0, 217, 90, 31, 100, 228, 149, 46, 219, 175, 168, 77, 4, 143, 38, 128,
+ 76, 97, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 255, 2, 68,
+ 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1, 2, 3, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 40, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 232, 0, 0, 3, 232,
+ 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 29, 129, 25, 192, 255, 8, 153, 192, 0, 2, 27, 0, 0, 60, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 100, 0, 0, 2, 224, 0, 0, 0, 0, 58, 85, 116, 216, 0, 29, 0,
+ 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 125, 0, 0, 0, 0, 58, 85, 116, 216, 255, 2, 68, 226, 0, 6, 11, 0, 1,
+ 0, 0, 1,
+ ];
+
+ let block_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
+ let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(block_hash);
+
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
+
+ let update_result = update_network_graph(&network_graph, &valid_input[..]);
+ if update_result.is_err() {
+ panic!("Unexpected update result: {:?}", update_result)
+ }
+
+ assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 2);
+ let after = network_graph.to_string();
+ assert!(
+ after.contains("021607cfce19a4c5e7e6e738663dfafbbbac262e4ff76c2c9b30dbeefc35c00643")
+ );
+ assert!(
+ after.contains("02247d9db0dfafea745ef8c9e161eb322f73ac3f8858d8730b6fd97254747ce76b")
+ );
+ assert!(
+ after.contains("029e01f279986acc83ba235d46d80aede0b7595f410353b93a8ab540bb677f4432")
+ );
+ assert!(
+ after.contains("02c913118a8895b9e29c89af6e20ed00d95a1f64e4952edbafa84d048f26804c61")
+ );
+ assert!(after.contains("619737530008010752"));
+ assert!(after.contains("783241506229452801"));
+ }
+}
persister: P,
/// "User-provided" (ie persistence-completion/-failed) [`MonitorEvent`]s. These came directly
/// from the user and not from a [`ChannelMonitor`].
- pending_monitor_events: Mutex<Vec<MonitorEvent>>,
+ pending_monitor_events: Mutex<Vec<(OutPoint, Vec<MonitorEvent>)>>,
/// The best block height seen, used as a proxy for the passage of time.
highest_chain_height: AtomicUsize,
}
log_trace!(self.logger, "Finished syncing Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor)),
Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
monitor_state.channel_perm_failed.store(true, Ordering::Release);
- self.pending_monitor_events.lock().unwrap().push(MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(*funding_outpoint));
+ self.pending_monitor_events.lock().unwrap().push((*funding_outpoint, vec![MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(*funding_outpoint)]));
},
Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => {
log_debug!(self.logger, "Channel Monitor sync for channel {} in progress, holding events until completion!", log_funding_info!(monitor));
// UpdateCompleted event.
return Ok(());
}
- self.pending_monitor_events.lock().unwrap().push(MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted {
+ self.pending_monitor_events.lock().unwrap().push((funding_txo, vec![MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted {
funding_txo,
monitor_update_id: monitor_data.monitor.get_latest_update_id(),
- });
+ }]));
},
MonitorUpdateId { contents: UpdateOrigin::ChainSync(_) } => {
if !monitor_data.has_pending_chainsync_updates(&pending_monitor_updates) {
/// channel_monitor_updated once with the highest ID.
#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
pub fn force_channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor_update_id: u64) {
- self.pending_monitor_events.lock().unwrap().push(MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted {
+ self.pending_monitor_events.lock().unwrap().push((funding_txo, vec![MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted {
funding_txo,
monitor_update_id,
- });
+ }]));
}
#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
}
}
- fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
+ fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<(OutPoint, Vec<MonitorEvent>)> {
let mut pending_monitor_events = self.pending_monitor_events.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
for monitor_state in self.monitors.read().unwrap().values() {
let is_pending_monitor_update = monitor_state.has_pending_chainsync_updates(&monitor_state.pending_monitor_updates.lock().unwrap());
log_error!(self.logger, " To avoid funds-loss, we are allowing monitor updates to be released.");
log_error!(self.logger, " This may cause duplicate payment events to be generated.");
}
- pending_monitor_events.append(&mut monitor_state.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events());
+ let monitor_events = monitor_state.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events();
+ if monitor_events.len() > 0 {
+ let monitor_outpoint = monitor_state.monitor.get_funding_txo().0;
+ pending_monitor_events.push((monitor_outpoint, monitor_events));
+ }
}
}
pending_monitor_events
pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
- pub(crate) onchain_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
+ pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
(0, payment_hash, required),
- (1, onchain_value_satoshis, option),
+ (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
(2, source, required),
(4, payment_preimage, option),
});
HTLCUpdate {
source: HTLCSource,
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
- onchain_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
+ htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
/// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
/// transaction which appeared on chain.
- input_idx: Option<u32>,
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
},
MaturingOutput {
descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
/// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
/// signature.
HTLCSpendConfirmation {
- input_idx: u32,
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
/// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
/// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
(0, HTLCUpdate) => {
(0, source, required),
- (1, onchain_value_satoshis, option),
+ (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
(2, payment_hash, required),
- (3, input_idx, option),
+ (3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
},
(1, MaturingOutput) => {
(0, descriptor, required),
(0, on_local_output_csv, option),
},
(5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
- (0, input_idx, required),
+ (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
(2, preimage, option),
(4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
},
commitment_txid: Txid,
htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
commitment_number: u64,
- their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
+ their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
},
PaymentPreimage {
payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
(1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
(0, commitment_txid, required),
(2, commitment_number, required),
- (4, their_revocation_point, required),
+ (4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
(6, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
},
(2, PaymentPreimage) => {
/// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
#[derive(PartialEq)]
struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
- input_idx: u32,
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
/// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC, {
- (0, input_idx, required),
+ (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
(2, payment_preimage, option),
});
counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
funding_redeemscript: Script,
channel_value_satoshis: u64,
- // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
- their_cur_
revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
+ // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
+ their_cur_
per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
self.counterparty_commitment_params != other.counterparty_commitment_params ||
self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
- self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
+ self.their_cur_per_commitment_points != other.their_cur_per_commitment_points ||
self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
- match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
+ match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
counterparty_commitment_params,
funding_redeemscript,
channel_value_satoshis,
- their_cur_revocation_points: None,
+ their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
txid: Txid,
htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
commitment_number: u64,
- their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
+ their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
logger: &L,
) where L::Target: Logger {
self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
- txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger)
+ txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, logger)
}
#[cfg(test)]
macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
for htlc in $htlc_iter {
- if let Some(htlc_input_idx) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ if let Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
if let Some(conf_thresh) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) } = &event.event {
- if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_input_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
+ if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
} else { None }
}) {
debug_assert!($holder_commitment);
claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
});
- } else if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.input_idx == htlc_input_idx) {
+ } else if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
// Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
// HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
// commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
// indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
// and awaiting confirmations on it.
let htlc_update_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
- if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { input_idx: Some(input_idx), .. } = event.event {
- if input_idx == htlc_input_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
+ if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
+ if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx {
+ Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
} else { None }
});
if let Some(conf_thresh) = htlc_update_pending {
// preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
// to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
let htlc_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
- if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, preimage, .. } = event.event {
- if input_idx == htlc_input_idx {
+ if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } = event.event {
+ if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx {
Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()))
} else { None }
} else { None }
macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
- if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| Some(v.input_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
+ if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| Some(v.commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
// We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
// have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
// would fail.
// indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
// and awaiting confirmations on it.
let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
- if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { input_idx: Some(input_idx), .. } = event.event {
+ if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
// If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
// before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
// provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
- Some(input_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
+ Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
us.best_block.height() >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
- } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, .. } = event.event {
+ } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
// If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
// immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
// the preimage.
- Some(input_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
+ Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
} else { false }
});
if !htlc_update_confd {
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
source: (**source).clone(),
payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
- onchain_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
- input_idx: None,
+ htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
},
};
log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
Ok(())
}
- pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
+ pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
// TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
// so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
// (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
//TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
- match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
+ match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
Some(old_points) => {
if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
+ self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
} else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
+ self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
} else {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+ self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
}
} else {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+ self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
}
},
None => {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+ self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
}
}
let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
ret = Err(());
}
}
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } => {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
- self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_revocation_point, logger)
+ self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
fn get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>) -> Vec<PackageTemplate> {
let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
if let Some(htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
- if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
- let revocation_point_option =
+ if let Some(per_commitment_points) = self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
+ let per_commitment_point_option =
// If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
// per-commitment point
- if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
- else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
+ if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&per_commitment_points.1) }
+ else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
// If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
// their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
// them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
- if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
+ if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
} else { None };
- if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
+ if let Some(per_commitment_point) = per_commitment_point_option {
for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
if let Some(transaction) = tx {
}
let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
- let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone())) } else { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, htlc.clone())) };
+ let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
+ CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+ preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone()))
+ } else {
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
+ CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+ htlc.clone()))
+ };
let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
// Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
match entry.event {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, onchain_value_satoshis, input_idx } => {
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
// Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
{
payment_hash,
payment_preimage: None,
source: source.clone(),
- onchain_value_satoshis,
+ htlc_value_satoshis,
}));
- if let Some(idx) = input_idx {
- self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { input_idx: idx, payment_preimage: None });
+ if let Some(idx) = commitment_tx_output_idx {
+ self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { commitment_tx_output_idx: idx, payment_preimage: None });
}
},
OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
outputs: vec![descriptor]
});
},
- OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, preimage, .. } => {
- self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { input_idx, payment_preimage: preimage });
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
+ self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { commitment_tx_output_idx, payment_preimage: preimage });
},
OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => {
self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
txid: tx.txid(), height,
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
- input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
// If this is a payment to us (!outbound_htlc, above),
txid: tx.txid(),
height,
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
- input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
on_to_local_output_csv: None,
},
source,
payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
payment_hash,
- onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
+ htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
}));
}
} else if offered_preimage_claim {
txid: tx.txid(),
height,
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
- input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
on_to_local_output_csv: None,
},
source,
payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
payment_hash,
- onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
+ htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
}));
}
} else {
height,
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
source, payment_hash,
- onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
- input_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
+ htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
},
};
log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_cur_revocation_points = {
+ let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
if first_idx == 0 {
None
counterparty_commitment_params,
funding_redeemscript,
channel_value_satoshis,
- their_cur_revocation_points,
+ their_cur_per_commitment_points,
on_holder_tx_csv,
/// Returns an error if `genesis_hash` is for a different chain or if such a transaction output
/// is unknown.
///
- /// [`short_channel_id`]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#definition-of-short_channel_id
+ /// [`short_channel_id`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#definition-of-short_channel_id
fn get_utxo(&self, genesis_hash: &BlockHash, short_channel_id: u64) -> Result<TxOut, AccessError>;
}
///
/// For details on asynchronous [`ChannelMonitor`] updating and returning
/// [`MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted`] here, see [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`].
- fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent>;
+ fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<(OutPoint, Vec<MonitorEvent>)>;
}
/// The `Filter` trait defines behavior for indicating chain activity of interest pertaining to
//! figure out how best to make networking happen/timers fire/things get written to disk/keys get
//! generated/etc. This makes it a good candidate for tight integration into an existing wallet
//! instead of having a rather-separate lightning appendage to a wallet.
+//!
+//! `default` features are:
+//!
+//! * `std` - enables functionalities which require `std`, including `std::io` trait implementations and things which utilize time
+//! * `grind_signatures` - enables generation of [low-r bitcoin signatures](https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/111660/what-is-signature-grinding),
+//! which saves 1 byte per signature in 50% of the cases (see [bitcoin PR #13666](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/13666))
+//!
+//! Available features are:
+//!
+//! * `std`
+//! * `grind_signatures`
+//! * `no-std ` - exposes write trait implementations from the `core2` crate (at least one of `no-std` or `std` are required)
+//! * Skip logging of messages at levels below the given log level:
+//! * `max_level_off`
+//! * `max_level_error`
+//! * `max_level_warn`
+//! * `max_level_info`
+//! * `max_level_debug`
+//! * `max_level_trace`
#![cfg_attr(not(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils")), deny(missing_docs))]
#![cfg_attr(not(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils")), forbid(unsafe_code))]
#[cfg(test)]
pub use debug_sync::*;
#[cfg(not(test))]
- pub use ::std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, Condvar, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
+ pub use ::std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, Condvar, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, RwLockWriteGuard};
#[cfg(not(test))]
pub use crate::util::fairrwlock::FairRwLock;
}
}
/// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
-/// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
+/// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
///
/// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of our counterparty in just 50*32 bytes
/// or so.
}
// ...and make sure we can force-close a frozen channel
- nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
- expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], Some(1000), false);
+ expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(1000), false, false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
- let (temporary_channel_id, funding_tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 43);
+ let (temporary_channel_id, funding_tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 43);
- nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_tx.clone()).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), funding_tx.clone()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.set_update_ret(Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure));
nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
- expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], Some(1000), false);
+ expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(1000), false, false);
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
assert_eq!(fulfill_msg, cs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
}
nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_msg);
- expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], Some(1000), false);
+ expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(1000), false, false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let mut bs_updates = None;
chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure));
chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.set_update_ret(Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure));
- nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure));
- assert!(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id).is_ok());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_ok());
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() });
let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.set_update_ret(Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure));
- assert!(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id).is_ok());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_ok());
let shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &shutdown);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
/// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
/// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
///
- /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
+ /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
/// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
/// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
/// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
/// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
/// standard.
-/// See https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/905 for more details.
+/// See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905 for more details.
pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
/// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
- their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
+ their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
}]
};
self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
});
}
- fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- let counterparty_node_id;
let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
- counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
+ if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
+ }
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
Some(peer_state) => {
}
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
- node_id: counterparty_node_id,
+ node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
msg: shutdown_msg
});
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
}
- let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
+ let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
Ok(())
}
/// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
/// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
/// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
- pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
+ pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
}
/// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
/// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
/// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
/// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
- pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
+ pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
}
#[inline]
}
}
- /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
+ /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
/// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
- fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id:
Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
+ fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id:
&PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
let mut chan = {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
- if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
- if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
- }
+ if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
}
- if peer_node_id.is_some() {
- if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
- self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
- }
+ if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
} else {
self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
}
}
/// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
- /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
- pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
+ /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
+ /// channel.
+ pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
+ match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None) {
Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
/// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
for chan in self.list_channels() {
- let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
+ let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
}
}
msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
}
else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
- // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
+ // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
}
(chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
/// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
/// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
- fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
- (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
+ &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
+ ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let (chan, msg) = {
let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
Some(mut chan) => {
}
#[cfg(test)]
- pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
- self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
+ pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
})
}
///
/// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
/// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
- pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
});
}
}
- self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
+ self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
let mut output_index = None;
let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
}
}
- fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
+ fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
match source {
HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
} else { None };
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
+ let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
+ let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
- let source_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
- source_channel_id,
fee_earned_msat,
claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
+ prev_channel_id,
+ next_channel_id,
});
}
}
/// Called to accept a request to open a channel after [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] has been
/// triggered.
///
- /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted.
+ /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
+ /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
+ /// the channel.
///
/// For inbound channels, the `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
/// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
///
/// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
/// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
- pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
+ pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
}
+ if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
+ }
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
+ counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
channel_value_satoshis: value,
output_script,
user_channel_id: user_id,
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
}
};
- self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
+ self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
Ok(())
}
let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
- for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
- match monitor_event {
- MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
- if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
- self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
- } else {
- log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
- }
- },
- MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
- MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
- let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
- let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
- let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
- if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
- let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
- failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
+ for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
+ for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
+ match monitor_event {
+ MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
+ if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
+ self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
+ self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
+ }
+ },
+ MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
+ MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
+ let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
+ let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
+ let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
+ let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
+ if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
+ let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
+ failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
+ }
+ let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
+ ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
+ } else {
+ ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
+ };
+ self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
+ msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
+ },
});
}
- let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
- ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
- } else {
- ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
- };
- self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
- node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
- msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
- },
- });
- }
- },
- MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
- self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
- },
+ },
+ MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
+ self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
+ },
+ }
}
}
for chan in self.list_channels() {
if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
// Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
- let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
+ let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data));
}
}
} else {
}
// Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
- let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
+ let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data));
}
}
}
tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
}]};
- node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
+ node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
} else { panic!(); }
node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
//! supports a feature if it advertises the feature (as either required or optional) to its peers.
//! And the implementation can interpret a feature if the feature is known to it.
//!
-//! [BOLT #9]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/09-features.md
+//! [BOLT #9]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
//! [messages]: crate::ln::msgs
use {io, io_extras};
///
/// See [BOLT #9] for details.
///
- /// [BOLT #9]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/09-features.md
+ /// [BOLT #9]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
pub trait $feature: Context {
/// The bit used to signify that the feature is required.
const EVEN_BIT: usize = $odd_bit - 1;
}
}
-pub fn create_funding_transaction<'a, 'b, 'c>(node: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, expected_chan_value: u64, expected_user_chan_id: u64) -> ([u8; 32], Transaction, OutPoint) {
+pub fn create_funding_transaction<'a, 'b, 'c>(node: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, expected_counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, expected_chan_value: u64, expected_user_chan_id: u64) -> ([u8; 32], Transaction, OutPoint) {
let chan_id = *node.network_chan_count.borrow();
let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
match events[0] {
- Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
+ Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref counterparty_node_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
+ assert_eq!(counterparty_node_id, expected_counterparty_node_id);
assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, expected_chan_value);
assert_eq!(user_channel_id, expected_user_chan_id);
}
}
pub fn sign_funding_transaction<'a, 'b, 'c>(node_a: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, node_b: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, channel_value: u64, expected_temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Transaction {
- let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(node_a, channel_value, 42);
+ let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(node_a, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, 42);
assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
- assert!(node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).is_ok());
+ assert!(node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
node_a.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
// Ensure that funding_transaction_generated is idempotent.
- assert!(node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).is_err());
+ assert!(node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_err());
assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[b], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[a].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[a].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[b].node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &accept_channel);
- let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[a], channel_value, 42);
- nodes[a].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
+ let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[a], &nodes[b].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, 42);
+ nodes[a].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[b].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
nodes[b].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[a].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[a], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[b].node.get_our_node_id()));
check_added_monitors!(nodes[b], 1);
let (node_b, broadcaster_b, struct_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) };
let (tx_a, tx_b);
- node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
+ node_a.close_channel(channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
}
macro_rules! expect_payment_forwarded {
- ($node: expr, $source_node: expr, $expected_fee: expr, $upstream_force_closed: expr) => {
+ ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $next_node: expr, $expected_fee: expr, $upstream_force_closed: expr, $downstream_force_closed: expr) => {
let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
match events[0] {
- Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, source_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
+ Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, $expected_fee);
if fee_earned_msat.is_some() {
- // Is the event channel_id in one of the channels between the two nodes?
- assert!($node.node.list_channels().iter().any(|x| x.counterparty.node_id == $source_node.node.get_our_node_id() && x.channel_id == source_channel_id.unwrap()));
+ // Is the event prev_channel_id in one of the channels between the two nodes?
+ assert!($node.node.list_channels().iter().any(|x| x.counterparty.node_id == $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id() && x.channel_id == prev_channel_id.unwrap()));
+ }
+ // We check for force closures since a force closed channel is removed from the
+ // node's channel list
+ if !$downstream_force_closed {
+ assert!($node.node.list_channels().iter().any(|x| x.counterparty.node_id == $next_node.node.get_our_node_id() && x.channel_id == next_channel_id.unwrap()));
}
assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, $upstream_force_closed);
},
{
$node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0);
let fee = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0.channel_id).unwrap().config.forwarding_fee_base_msat;
- expect_payment_forwarded!($node, $next_node, Some(fee as u64), false);
+ expect_payment_forwarded!($node, $next_node, $prev_node, Some(fee as u64), false, false);
expected_total_fee_msat += fee as u64;
check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
- let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
+ let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
- nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
// Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
- nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
{
// Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
// broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
- nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan_2.2).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
{
// nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
// HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
- nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&chan_3.2).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
let node2_commitment_txid;
}
let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
match forwarded_events[1] {
- Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, source_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
+ Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
- assert_eq!(source_channel_id, chan_id);
+ assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
+ assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
},
_ => panic!()
}
match forwarded_events[2] {
- Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, source_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
+ Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
- assert_eq!(source_channel_id, chan_id);
+ assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
+ assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
},
_ => panic!()
}
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
- nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
// state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
// transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
- nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
- let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
+ let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
- assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).is_ok());
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
- let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
+ let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, 42);
- node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
+ node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
- nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
- nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
match events[1] {
- Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, source_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
+ Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
- assert_eq!(source_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
+ assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
+ assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
// Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
// and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
- expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], Some(196*2), true);
+ expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
match events[0] {
Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
- nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, 23).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
}
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temp_channel_id).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
match events[0] {
Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
- nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
}
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
}
- let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
+ let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
- nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
// The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
match events[0] {
Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
- nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, 0).unwrap();
- let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, 0);
+ nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
+ let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
match api_res {
Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
#[test]
fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
- let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
- let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
- let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
- let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr)[0].node;
+ let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
+ let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
- let api_res = node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, 0);
+ let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
match api_res {
Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
// Move the first channel through the funding flow...
- let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
+ let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
- nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
// If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
// responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
- if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
- nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
+ let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
+
+ // Bob force-closes
+ if !broadcast_alice {
+ force_closing_node = 1;
+ counterparty_node = 0;
+ }
+ nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
- expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
+ expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
// If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
}
// Move the first channel through the funding flow...
- let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
+ let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
- nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
- create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
+ create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
let funding_created = {
let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
- let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
+ let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
// Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
}
- nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let opt_anchors = false;
- let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
+ let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
if on_holder_tx {
if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
}
}
- nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+use bitcoin::Transaction;
use prelude::*;
expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
}
+fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction) {
+ let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(spendable.len(), 1);
+ if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
+ assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+ let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
+ check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
+ } else { panic!(); }
+}
+
#[test]
fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
// Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
- nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
- let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
- assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
- let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
- check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
- }
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
- let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
- assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
- let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
- check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
- }
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
}
}]),
sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
- let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
- assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
- let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
- check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
- }
-
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
// After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, true);
- let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
- assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
- let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
- check_spends!(spend_tx, a_broadcast_txn[2]);
- } else { panic!(); }
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
// Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
// confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
// After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
// only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
-
- let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
- assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
- let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
- check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
- }
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
// After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
// have only one HTLC output left spendable.
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
-
- let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
- assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
- let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
- check_spends!(spend_tx, b_broadcast_txn[0]);
- } else { panic!(); }
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
}],
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
- let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
- assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
- let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
- check_spends!(spend_tx, as_txn[0]);
- }
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
// Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
// `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
- let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
- if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
- assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
- let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
- Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
- check_spends!(spend_tx, as_txn[1]);
- }
+ test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
}
pub fee_base_msat: u32,
/// The amount to fee multiplier, in micro-satoshi
pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
- pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
+ /// Excess data which was signed as a part of the message which we do not (yet) understand how
+ /// to decode. This is stored to ensure forward-compatibility as new fields are added to the
+ /// lightning gossip
+ pub excess_data: Vec<u8>,
}
/// A channel_update message to be sent or received from a peer
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_commitment_tx);
- expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], None, false);
+ expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], None, false, false);
if !confirm_before_reload {
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx);
// Route a payment, but force-close the channel before the HTLC fulfill message arrives at
// nodes[0].
let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
- nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
/// Maximum Lightning message data length according to
-/// [BOLT-8](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/v1.0/08-transport.md#lightning-message-specification)
-/// and [BOLT-1](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/01-messaging.md#lightning-message-format):
+/// [BOLT-8](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/v1.0/08-transport.md#lightning-message-specification)
+/// and [BOLT-1](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#lightning-message-format):
pub const LN_MAX_MSG_LEN: usize = ::core::u16::MAX as usize; // Must be equal to 65535
// Sha256("Noise_XK_secp256k1_ChaChaPoly_SHA256")
}
pub struct PeerChannelEncryptor {
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::SignOnly>,
their_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, // filled in for outbound, or inbound after noise_state is Finished
noise_state: NoiseState,
impl PeerChannelEncryptor {
pub fn new_outbound(their_node_id: PublicKey, ephemeral_key: SecretKey) -> PeerChannelEncryptor {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
-
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&NOISE_H);
sha.input(&their_node_id.serialize()[..]);
PeerChannelEncryptor {
their_node_id: Some(their_node_id),
- secp_ctx,
noise_state: NoiseState::InProgress {
state: NoiseStep::PreActOne,
directional_state: DirectionalNoiseState::Outbound {
}
}
- pub fn new_inbound(our_node_secret: &SecretKey) -> PeerChannelEncryptor {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
-
+ pub fn new_inbound<C: secp256k1::Signing>(our_node_secret: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> PeerChannelEncryptor {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
sha.input(&NOISE_H);
let our_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, our_node_secret);
PeerChannelEncryptor {
their_node_id: None,
- secp_ctx,
noise_state: NoiseState::InProgress {
state: NoiseStep::PreActOne,
directional_state: DirectionalNoiseState::Inbound {
Ok((their_pub, temp_k))
}
- pub fn get_act_one(&mut self) -> [u8; 50] {
+ pub fn get_act_one<C: secp256k1::Signing>(&mut self, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> [u8; 50] {
match self.noise_state {
NoiseState::InProgress { ref mut state, ref directional_state, ref mut bidirectional_state } =>
match directional_state {
panic!("Requested act at wrong step");
}
- let (res, _) = PeerChannelEncryptor::outbound_noise_act(&self.secp_ctx, bidirectional_state, &ie, &self.their_node_id.unwrap());
+ let (res, _) = PeerChannelEncryptor::outbound_noise_act(secp_ctx, bidirectional_state, &ie, &self.their_node_id.unwrap());
*state = NoiseStep::PostActOne;
res
},
}
}
- pub fn process_act_one_with_keys(&mut self, act_one: &[u8], our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_ephemeral: SecretKey) -> Result<[u8; 50], LightningError> {
+ pub fn process_act_one_with_keys<C: secp256k1::Signing>(
+ &mut self, act_one: &[u8], our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_ephemeral: SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>)
+ -> Result<[u8; 50], LightningError> {
assert_eq!(act_one.len(), 50);
match self.noise_state {
re.get_or_insert(our_ephemeral);
- let (res, temp_k) = PeerChannelEncryptor::outbound_noise_act(&self.secp_ctx, bidirectional_state, &re.unwrap(), &ie.unwrap());
+ let (res, temp_k) =
+ PeerChannelEncryptor::outbound_noise_act(secp_ctx, bidirectional_state, &re.unwrap(), &ie.unwrap());
*temp_k2 = Some(temp_k);
*state = NoiseStep::PostActTwo;
Ok(res)
}
}
- pub fn process_act_two(&mut self, act_two: &[u8], our_node_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<([u8; 66], PublicKey), LightningError> {
+ pub fn process_act_two<C: secp256k1::Signing>(
+ &mut self, act_two: &[u8], our_node_secret: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>)
+ -> Result<([u8; 66], PublicKey), LightningError> {
assert_eq!(act_two.len(), 50);
let final_hkdf;
let (re, temp_k2) = PeerChannelEncryptor::inbound_noise_act(bidirectional_state, act_two, &ie)?;
let mut res = [0; 66];
- let our_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_node_secret);
+ let our_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &our_node_secret);
PeerChannelEncryptor::encrypt_with_ad(&mut res[1..50], 1, &temp_k2, &bidirectional_state.h, &our_node_id.serialize()[..]);
use super::LN_MAX_MSG_LEN;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use hex;
fn get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors() -> PeerChannelEncryptor {
let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("028d7500dd4c12685d1f568b4c2b5048e8534b873319f3a8daa612b469132ec7f7").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
let mut outbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_outbound(their_node_id, SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
- assert_eq!(outbound_peer.get_act_one()[..], hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(outbound_peer.get_act_one(&secp_ctx)[..], hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap()[..]);
outbound_peer
}
// transport-responder successful handshake
let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let our_ephemeral = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
- let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id);
+ let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone()).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
let act_three = hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap().to_vec();
// test vector doesn't specify the initiator static key, but it's the same as the one
#[test]
fn noise_initiator_test_vectors() {
let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
{
// transport-initiator successful handshake
let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
let act_two = hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert_eq!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id).unwrap().0[..], hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id, &secp_ctx).unwrap().0[..], hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap()[..]);
match outbound_peer.noise_state {
NoiseState::Finished { sk, sn, sck, rk, rn, rck } => {
let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
let act_two = hex::decode("0102466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id).is_err());
+ assert!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id, &secp_ctx).is_err());
}
{
let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
let act_two = hex::decode("0004466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id).is_err());
+ assert!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id, &secp_ctx).is_err());
}
{
let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
let act_two = hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730af").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id).is_err());
+ assert!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id, &secp_ctx).is_err());
}
}
fn noise_responder_test_vectors() {
let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121212121").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let our_ephemeral = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
{
let _ = get_inbound_peer_for_test_vectors();
}
{
// transport-responder act1 bad version test
- let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id);
+ let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
let act_one = hex::decode("01036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone()).is_err());
+ assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).is_err());
}
{
// transport-responder act1 bad key serialization test
- let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id);
+ let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
let act_one =hex::decode("00046360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone()).is_err());
+ assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).is_err());
}
{
// transport-responder act1 bad MAC test
- let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id);
+ let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6b").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone()).is_err());
+ assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).is_err());
}
{
// transport-responder act3 bad version test
- let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id);
+ let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone()).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
let act_three = hex::decode("01b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap().to_vec();
assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
}
{
// transport-responder act3 bad MAC for ciphertext test
- let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id);
+ let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone()).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
let act_three = hex::decode("00c9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap().to_vec();
assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
}
{
// transport-responder act3 bad rs test
- let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id);
+ let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone()).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
let act_three = hex::decode("00bfe3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa2235536ad09a8ee351870c2bb7f78b754a26c6cef79a98d25139c856d7efd252c2ae73c").unwrap().to_vec();
assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
}
{
// transport-responder act3 bad MAC test
- let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id);
+ let mut inbound_peer = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&our_node_id, &secp_ctx);
let act_one = hex::decode("00036360e856310ce5d294e8be33fc807077dc56ac80d95d9cd4ddbd21325eff73f70df6086551151f58b8afe6c195782c6a").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone()).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(inbound_peer.process_act_one_with_keys(&act_one[..], &our_node_id, our_ephemeral.clone(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()[..], hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap()[..]);
let act_three = hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139bb").unwrap().to_vec();
assert!(inbound_peer.process_act_three(&act_three[..]).is_err());
// We use the same keys as the initiator and responder test vectors, so we copy those tests
// here and use them to encrypt.
let mut outbound_peer = get_outbound_peer_for_initiator_test_vectors();
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
{
let our_node_id = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let act_two = hex::decode("0002466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f276e2470b93aac583c9ef6eafca3f730ae").unwrap().to_vec();
- assert_eq!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id).unwrap().0[..], hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap()[..]);
+ assert_eq!(outbound_peer.process_act_two(&act_two[..], &our_node_id, &secp_ctx).unwrap().0[..], hex::decode("00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba").unwrap()[..]);
match outbound_peer.noise_state {
NoiseState::Finished { sk, sn, sck, rk, rn, rck } => {
//! call into the provided message handlers (probably a ChannelManager and NetGraphmsgHandler) with messages
//! they should handle, and encoding/sending response messages.
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{self, Secp256k1, SecretKey, PublicKey};
use ln::features::InitFeatures;
use ln::msgs;
peer_counter: AtomicCounter,
logger: L,
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::SignOnly>
}
enum MessageHandlingError {
let mut ephemeral_key_midstate = Sha256::engine();
ephemeral_key_midstate.input(ephemeral_random_data);
+ let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
+ let ephemeral_hash = Sha256::from_engine(ephemeral_key_midstate.clone()).into_inner();
+ secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&ephemeral_hash);
+
PeerManager {
message_handler,
peers: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
peer_counter: AtomicCounter::new(),
logger,
custom_message_handler,
+ secp_ctx,
}
}
/// [`socket_disconnected()`]: PeerManager::socket_disconnected
pub fn new_outbound_connection(&self, their_node_id: PublicKey, descriptor: Descriptor, remote_network_address: Option<NetAddress>) -> Result<Vec<u8>, PeerHandleError> {
let mut peer_encryptor = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_outbound(their_node_id.clone(), self.get_ephemeral_key());
- let res = peer_encryptor.get_act_one().to_vec();
+ let res = peer_encryptor.get_act_one(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec();
let pending_read_buffer = [0; 50].to_vec(); // Noise act two is 50 bytes
let mut peers = self.peers.write().unwrap();
///
/// [`socket_disconnected()`]: PeerManager::socket_disconnected
pub fn new_inbound_connection(&self, descriptor: Descriptor, remote_network_address: Option<NetAddress>) -> Result<(), PeerHandleError> {
- let peer_encryptor = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&self.our_node_secret);
+ let peer_encryptor = PeerChannelEncryptor::new_inbound(&self.our_node_secret, &self.secp_ctx);
let pending_read_buffer = [0; 50].to_vec(); // Noise act one is 50 bytes
let mut peers = self.peers.write().unwrap();
let next_step = peer.channel_encryptor.get_noise_step();
match next_step {
NextNoiseStep::ActOne => {
- let act_two = try_potential_handleerror!(peer,
- peer.channel_encryptor.process_act_one_with_keys(&peer.pending_read_buffer[..], &self.our_node_secret, self.get_ephemeral_key())).to_vec();
+ let act_two = try_potential_handleerror!(peer, peer.channel_encryptor
+ .process_act_one_with_keys(&peer.pending_read_buffer[..],
+ &self.our_node_secret, self.get_ephemeral_key(), &self.secp_ctx)).to_vec();
peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(act_two);
peer.pending_read_buffer = [0; 66].to_vec(); // act three is 66 bytes long
},
NextNoiseStep::ActTwo => {
let (act_three, their_node_id) = try_potential_handleerror!(peer,
- peer.channel_encryptor.process_act_two(&peer.pending_read_buffer[..], &self.our_node_secret));
+ peer.channel_encryptor.process_act_two(&peer.pending_read_buffer[..],
+ &self.our_node_secret, &self.secp_ctx));
peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(act_three.to_vec());
peer.pending_read_buffer = [0; 18].to_vec(); // Message length header is 18 bytes
peer.pending_read_is_header = true;
let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
- let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 100_000, 42);
- nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
+ let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
+ nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
// ChannelManager only polls chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events when we
// probe it for events, so we probe non-message events here (which should just be the
// PaymentForwarded event).
- expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], Some(1000), true);
+ expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(1000), true, true);
} else {
// Confirm the timeout tx and check that we fail the HTLC backwards
let block = Block {
/// A script pubkey for shutting down a channel as defined by [BOLT #2].
///
-/// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
+/// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct ShutdownScript(ShutdownScriptImpl);
pub struct InvalidShutdownScript {
/// The script that did not meet the requirements from [BOLT #2].
///
- /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
+ /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
pub script: Script
}
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
- nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id(), &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
- nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
- expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], Some(1000), false);
+ expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(1000), false, false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
- nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_1_shutdown);
let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
- nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
if recv_count > 0 {
nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_1_shutdown);
assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
- expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], Some(1000), false);
+ expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(1000), false, false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
// We test that in case of peer committing upfront to a script, if it changes at closing, we refuse to sign
let flags = InitFeatures::known();
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 1000000, 1000000, flags.clone(), flags.clone());
- nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id(), &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
let node_0_orig_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
let mut node_0_shutdown = node_0_orig_shutdown.clone();
node_0_shutdown.scriptpubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script().to_p2sh();
// We test that in case of peer committing upfront to a script, if it doesn't change at closing, we sign
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 1000000, 1000000, flags.clone(), flags.clone());
- nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id(), &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
// We test that in case of peer committing upfront to a script, if it oesn't change at closing, we sign
nodes[2].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
// We test that if case of peer non-signaling we don't enforce committed script at channel opening
let flags_no = InitFeatures::known().clear_upfront_shutdown_script();
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, flags_no, flags.clone());
- nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id(), &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_1_shutdown);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
// We test that if user opt-out, we provide a zero-length script at channel opening and we are able to close
// channel smoothly, opt-out is from channel initiator here
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 0, 1000000, 1000000, flags.clone(), flags.clone());
- nodes[1].node.close_channel(&OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.close_channel(&OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id(), &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
//// We test that if user opt-out, we provide a zero-length script at channel opening and we are able to close
//// channel smoothly
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, flags.clone(), flags.clone());
- nodes[1].node.close_channel(&OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.close_channel(&OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id(), &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
- nodes[1].node.close_channel(&OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.close_channel(&OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id(), &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
// Use a segwit v0 script supported even without option_shutdown_anysegwit
let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
- nodes[1].node.close_channel(&OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.close_channel(&OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id(), &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
// Use a non-v0 segwit script supported by option_shutdown_anysegwit
.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey { returns: supported_shutdown_script });
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, node_cfgs[0].features.clone(), node_cfgs[1].features.clone());
- match nodes[1].node.close_channel(&OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id()) {
+ match nodes[1].node.close_channel(&OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id(), &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) {
Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), unsupported_shutdown_script.clone().into_inner());
},
Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
}
- nodes[1].node.close_channel(&OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.close_channel(&OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id(), &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
// Use a non-v0 segwit script unsupported without option_shutdown_anysegwit
let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
- nodes[1].node.close_channel(&OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.close_channel(&OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id(), &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
// Use a segwit v0 script with an unsupported witness program
send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
- nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
*feerate_lock *= 10;
}
- nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id()).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id(), &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
let chan_id = OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id();
- nodes[0].node.close_channel_with_target_feerate(&chan_id, 253 * 10).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel_with_target_feerate(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 253 * 10).unwrap();
let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.close_channel_with_target_feerate(&chan_id, 253 * 5).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.close_channel_with_target_feerate(&chan_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 253 * 5).unwrap();
let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
//! Wire encoding/decoding for Lightning messages according to [BOLT #1], and for
//! custom message through the [`CustomMessageReader`] trait.
//!
-//! [BOLT #1]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/01-messaging.md
+//! [BOLT #1]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md
use io;
use ln::msgs;
pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
}
-
+
/// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
&self.0
/// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
/// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
///
-/// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
+/// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub enum NetworkUpdate {
/// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
return None;
}
};
- Some((DirectedChannelInfo { channel: self, direction }, source))
+ Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), source))
}
/// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
return None;
}
};
- Some((DirectedChannelInfo { channel: self, direction }, target))
+ Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), target))
+ }
+
+ /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
+ pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
+ let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
+ if direction == 0 {
+ self.one_to_two.as_ref()
+ } else {
+ self.two_to_one.as_ref()
+ }
}
}
pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
}
impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
+ #[inline]
+ fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>) -> Self {
+ let htlc_maximum_msat = direction.and_then(|direction| direction.htlc_maximum_msat);
+ let capacity_msat = channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
+
+ let (htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity) = match (htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat) {
+ (Some(amount_msat), Some(capacity_msat)) => {
+ let htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(amount_msat, capacity_msat);
+ (htlc_maximum_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat })
+ },
+ (Some(amount_msat), None) => {
+ (amount_msat, EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat })
+ },
+ (None, Some(capacity_msat)) => {
+ (capacity_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat })
+ },
+ (None, None) => (EffectiveCapacity::Unknown.as_msat(), EffectiveCapacity::Unknown),
+ };
+
+ Self {
+ channel, direction, htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity
+ }
+ }
+
/// Returns information for the channel.
pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
/// Returns information for the direction.
pub fn direction(&self) -> Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo> { self.direction }
+ /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
+ pub fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.htlc_maximum_msat
+ }
+
/// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
///
/// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
/// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
- /// whichever is smaller.
+ /// otherwise.
pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
- let capacity_msat = self.channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
- self.direction
- .and_then(|direction| direction.htlc_maximum_msat)
- .map(|max_htlc_msat| {
- let capacity_msat = capacity_msat.unwrap_or(u64::max_value());
- if max_htlc_msat < capacity_msat {
- EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat: max_htlc_msat }
- } else {
- EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat }
- }
- })
- .or_else(|| capacity_msat.map(|capacity_msat|
- EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat }))
- .unwrap_or(EffectiveCapacity::Unknown)
+ self.effective_capacity
}
/// Returns `Some` if [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] is available in the direction.
/// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
#[inline]
pub(super) fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity { self.inner.effective_capacity() }
+
+ /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
+ #[inline]
+ pub(super) fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 { self.inner.htlc_maximum_msat() }
}
impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
///
/// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
/// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
+#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
/// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
/// direct hop.
self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
}
+ /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
+ ///
+ /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
+ /// rapid gossip sync server)
+ ///
+ /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
+ pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+ };
+
+ let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
+ let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
+ let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
+ features,
+ node_one: node_1.clone(),
+ one_to_two: None,
+ node_two: node_2.clone(),
+ two_to_one: None,
+ capacity_sats: None,
+ announcement_message: None,
+ announcement_received_time: timestamp,
+ };
+
+ self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
+ }
+
+ fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
+ let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
+
+ let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
+ let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
+
+ match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
+ BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
+ //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
+ //exactly how...
+ if utxo_value.is_some() {
+ // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
+ // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
+ // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
+ // do that because
+ // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
+ // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
+ // get reorg'd out.
+ // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
+ Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
+ *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
+ } else {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
+ }
+ },
+ BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ entry.insert(channel_info);
+ }
+ };
+
+ for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
+ match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
+ BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
+ node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
+ },
+ BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
+ node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
+ channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
+ lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
+ announcement_info: None,
+ });
+ }
+ };
+ };
+
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>(
&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>
) -> Result<(), LightningError>
}
let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
- features: msg.features.clone(),
- node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1),
- one_to_two: None,
- node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2),
- two_to_one: None,
- capacity_sats: utxo_value,
- announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
- { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
- announcement_received_time,
- };
-
- let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
- let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
- match channels.entry(msg.short_channel_id) {
- BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
- //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
- //exactly how...
- if utxo_value.is_some() {
- // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
- // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
- // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
- // do that because
- // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
- // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
- // get reorg'd out.
- // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
- Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), msg.short_channel_id);
- *entry.get_mut() = chan_info;
- } else {
- return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
- }
- },
- BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(chan_info);
- }
+ features: msg.features.clone(),
+ node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1),
+ one_to_two: None,
+ node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2),
+ two_to_one: None,
+ capacity_sats: utxo_value,
+ announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
+ { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
+ announcement_received_time,
};
- macro_rules! add_channel_to_node {
- ( $node_id: expr ) => {
- match nodes.entry($node_id) {
- BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
- node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(msg.short_channel_id);
- },
- BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
- node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
- channels: vec!(msg.short_channel_id),
- lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
- announcement_info: None,
- });
- }
- }
- };
- }
-
- add_channel_to_node!(NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1));
- add_channel_to_node!(NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2));
-
- Ok(())
+ self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)
}
/// Close a channel if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use routing::network_graph::{NetGraphMsgHandler, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY};
use ln::msgs::{Init, OptionalField, RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
- UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
+ UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
use util::test_utils;
use util::logger::Logger;
use ln::channelmanager::ChannelDetails;
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
-use routing::scoring::Score;
+use routing::scoring::{ChannelUsage, Score};
use routing::network_graph::{DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate, EffectiveCapacity, NetworkGraph, ReadOnlyNetworkGraph, NodeId, RoutingFees};
-use util::ser::{Writeable, Readable};
+use util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Writer};
use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
#[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Route {
/// The list of routes taken for a single (potentially-)multi-part payment. The pubkey of the
- /// last RouteHop in each path must be the same.
- /// Each entry represents a list of hops, NOT INCLUDING our own, where the last hop is the
- /// destination. Thus, this must always be at least length one. While the maximum length of any
- /// given path is variable, keeping the length of any path to less than 20 should currently
- /// ensure it is viable.
+ /// last RouteHop in each path must be the same. Each entry represents a list of hops, NOT
+ /// INCLUDING our own, where the last hop is the destination. Thus, this must always be at
+ /// least length one. While the maximum length of any given path is variable, keeping the length
+ /// of any path less or equal to 19 should currently ensure it is viable.
pub paths: Vec<Vec<RouteHop>>,
/// The `payment_params` parameter passed to [`find_route`].
/// This is used by `ChannelManager` to track information which may be required for retries,
/// Parameters needed to find a [`Route`].
///
-/// Passed to [`find_route`] and also provided in [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`] for retrying a failed
-/// payment path.
+/// Passed to [`find_route`] and [`build_route_from_hops`], but also provided in
+/// [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`] for retrying a failed payment path.
///
/// [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentPathFailed
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
/// Maximum total CTLV difference we allow for a full payment path.
pub const DEFAULT_MAX_TOTAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u32 = 1008;
-/// The median hop CLTV expiry delta currently seen in the network.
+// The median hop CLTV expiry delta currently seen in the network.
const MEDIAN_HOP_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u32 = 40;
+// During routing, we only consider paths shorter than our maximum length estimate.
+// In the legacy onion format, the maximum number of hops used to be a fixed value of 20.
+// However, in the TLV onion format, there is no fixed maximum length, but the `hop_payloads`
+// field is always 1300 bytes. As the `tlv_payload` for each hop may vary in length, we have to
+// estimate how many hops the route may have so that it actually fits the `hop_payloads` field.
+//
+// We estimate 3+32 (payload length and HMAC) + 2+8 (amt_to_forward) + 2+4 (outgoing_cltv_value) +
+// 2+8 (short_channel_id) = 61 bytes for each intermediate hop and 3+32
+// (payload length and HMAC) + 2+8 (amt_to_forward) + 2+4 (outgoing_cltv_value) + 2+32+8
+// (payment_secret and total_msat) = 93 bytes for the final hop.
+// Since the length of the potentially included `payment_metadata` is unknown to us, we round
+// down from (1300-93) / 61 = 19.78... to arrive at a conservative estimate of 19.
+const MAX_PATH_LENGTH_ESTIMATE: u8 = 19;
+
/// The recipient of a payment.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct PaymentParameters {
/// All penalties incurred from this hop on the way to the destination, as calculated using
/// channel scoring.
path_penalty_msat: u64,
+ /// The number of hops walked up to this node.
+ path_length_to_node: u8,
}
impl cmp::Ord for RouteGraphNode {
}
}
+ fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
+ match self {
+ CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details } => details.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
+ CandidateRouteHop::PublicHop { info, .. } => info.htlc_maximum_msat(),
+ CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { hint } => {
+ hint.htlc_maximum_msat.unwrap_or(u64::max_value())
+ },
+ }
+ }
+
fn fees(&self) -> RoutingFees {
match self {
CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { .. } => RoutingFees {
impl<'a> core::fmt::Debug for PathBuildingHop<'a> {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), core::fmt::Error> {
- f.debug_struct("PathBuildingHop")
+ let mut debug_struct = f.debug_struct("PathBuildingHop");
+ debug_struct
.field("node_id", &self.node_id)
.field("short_channel_id", &self.candidate.short_channel_id())
.field("total_fee_msat", &self.total_fee_msat)
.field("total_fee_msat - (next_hops_fee_msat + hop_use_fee_msat)", &(&self.total_fee_msat - (&self.next_hops_fee_msat + &self.hop_use_fee_msat)))
.field("path_penalty_msat", &self.path_penalty_msat)
.field("path_htlc_minimum_msat", &self.path_htlc_minimum_msat)
- .field("cltv_expiry_delta", &self.candidate.cltv_expiry_delta())
- .finish()
+ .field("cltv_expiry_delta", &self.candidate.cltv_expiry_delta());
+ #[cfg(all(not(feature = "_bench_unstable"), any(test, fuzzing)))]
+ let debug_struct = debug_struct
+ .field("value_contribution_msat", &self.value_contribution_msat);
+ debug_struct.finish()
}
}
) -> Result<Route, LightningError>
where L::Target: Logger {
let network_graph = network.read_only();
- match get_route(
- our_node_pubkey, &route_params.payment_params, &network_graph, first_hops, route_params.final_value_msat,
- route_params.final_cltv_expiry_delta, logger, scorer, random_seed_bytes
- ) {
- Ok(mut route) => {
- add_random_cltv_offset(&mut route, &route_params.payment_params, &network_graph, random_seed_bytes);
- Ok(route)
- },
- Err(err) => Err(err),
- }
+ let mut route = get_route(our_node_pubkey, &route_params.payment_params, &network_graph, first_hops,
+ route_params.final_value_msat, route_params.final_cltv_expiry_delta, logger, scorer,
+ random_seed_bytes)?;
+ add_random_cltv_offset(&mut route, &route_params.payment_params, &network_graph, random_seed_bytes);
+ Ok(route)
}
pub(crate) fn get_route<L: Deref, S: Score>(
// The main heap containing all candidate next-hops sorted by their score (max(A* fee,
// htlc_minimum)). Ideally this would be a heap which allowed cheap score reduction instead of
// adding duplicate entries when we find a better path to a given node.
- let mut targets = BinaryHeap::new();
+ let mut targets: BinaryHeap<RouteGraphNode> = BinaryHeap::new();
// Map from node_id to information about the best current path to that node, including feerate
// information.
- let mut dist = HashMap::with_capacity(network_nodes.len());
+ let mut dist: HashMap<NodeId, PathBuildingHop> = HashMap::with_capacity(network_nodes.len());
// During routing, if we ignore a path due to an htlc_minimum_msat limit, we set this,
// indicating that we may wish to try again with a higher value, potentially paying to meet an
let recommended_value_msat = final_value_msat * ROUTE_CAPACITY_PROVISION_FACTOR as u64;
let mut path_value_msat = final_value_msat;
- // We don't want multiple paths (as per MPP) share liquidity of the same channels.
- // This map allows paths to be aware of the channel use by other paths in the same call.
- // This would help to make a better path finding decisions and not "overbook" channels.
- // It is unaware of the directions (except for `next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat` in
- // `first_hops`).
- let mut bookkept_channels_liquidity_available_msat = HashMap::with_capacity(network_nodes.len());
+ // Keep track of how much liquidity has been used in selected channels. Used to determine
+ // if the channel can be used by additional MPP paths or to inform path finding decisions. It is
+ // aware of direction *only* to ensure that the correct htlc_maximum_msat value is used. Hence,
+ // liquidity used in one direction will not offset any used in the opposite direction.
+ let mut used_channel_liquidities: HashMap<(u64, bool), u64> =
+ HashMap::with_capacity(network_nodes.len());
// Keeping track of how much value we already collected across other paths. Helps to decide:
// - how much a new path should be transferring (upper bound);
// since that value has to be transferred over this channel.
// Returns whether this channel caused an update to `targets`.
( $candidate: expr, $src_node_id: expr, $dest_node_id: expr, $next_hops_fee_msat: expr,
- $next_hops_value_contribution: expr, $next_hops_path_htlc_minimum_msat: expr,
- $next_hops_path_penalty_msat: expr, $next_hops_cltv_delta: expr ) => { {
+ $next_hops_value_contribution: expr, $next_hops_path_htlc_minimum_msat: expr,
+ $next_hops_path_penalty_msat: expr, $next_hops_cltv_delta: expr, $next_hops_path_length: expr ) => { {
// We "return" whether we updated the path at the end, via this:
let mut did_add_update_path_to_src_node = false;
// Channels to self should not be used. This is more of belt-and-suspenders, because in
// - for first and last hops early in get_route
if $src_node_id != $dest_node_id {
let short_channel_id = $candidate.short_channel_id();
- let available_liquidity_msat = bookkept_channels_liquidity_available_msat
- .entry(short_channel_id)
- .or_insert_with(|| $candidate.effective_capacity().as_msat());
+ let htlc_maximum_msat = $candidate.htlc_maximum_msat();
// It is tricky to subtract $next_hops_fee_msat from available liquidity here.
// It may be misleading because we might later choose to reduce the value transferred
// fees caused by one expensive channel, but then this channel could have been used
// if the amount being transferred over this path is lower.
// We do this for now, but this is a subject for removal.
- if let Some(available_value_contribution_msat) = available_liquidity_msat.checked_sub($next_hops_fee_msat) {
+ if let Some(mut available_value_contribution_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat.checked_sub($next_hops_fee_msat) {
+ let used_liquidity_msat = used_channel_liquidities
+ .get(&(short_channel_id, $src_node_id < $dest_node_id))
+ .map_or(0, |used_liquidity_msat| {
+ available_value_contribution_msat = available_value_contribution_msat
+ .saturating_sub(*used_liquidity_msat);
+ *used_liquidity_msat
+ });
// Routing Fragmentation Mitigation heuristic:
//
};
// Verify the liquidity offered by this channel complies to the minimal contribution.
let contributes_sufficient_value = available_value_contribution_msat >= minimal_value_contribution_msat;
+ // Do not consider candidate hops that would exceed the maximum path length.
+ let path_length_to_node = $next_hops_path_length + 1;
+ let doesnt_exceed_max_path_length = path_length_to_node <= MAX_PATH_LENGTH_ESTIMATE;
// Do not consider candidates that exceed the maximum total cltv expiry limit.
// In order to already account for some of the privacy enhancing random CLTV
// bother considering this channel. If retrying with recommended_value_msat may
// allow us to hit the HTLC minimum limit, set htlc_minimum_limit so that we go
// around again with a higher amount.
- if contributes_sufficient_value && doesnt_exceed_cltv_delta_limit && may_overpay_to_meet_path_minimum_msat {
+ if contributes_sufficient_value && doesnt_exceed_max_path_length &&
+ doesnt_exceed_cltv_delta_limit && may_overpay_to_meet_path_minimum_msat {
hit_minimum_limit = true;
- } else if contributes_sufficient_value && doesnt_exceed_cltv_delta_limit && over_path_minimum_msat {
+ } else if contributes_sufficient_value && doesnt_exceed_max_path_length &&
+ doesnt_exceed_cltv_delta_limit && over_path_minimum_msat {
// Note that low contribution here (limited by available_liquidity_msat)
// might violate htlc_minimum_msat on the hops which are next along the
// payment path (upstream to the payee). To avoid that, we recompute
}
}
- let path_penalty_msat = $next_hops_path_penalty_msat.saturating_add(
- scorer.channel_penalty_msat(short_channel_id, amount_to_transfer_over_msat,
- *available_liquidity_msat, &$src_node_id, &$dest_node_id));
+ let channel_usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: amount_to_transfer_over_msat,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: used_liquidity_msat,
+ effective_capacity: $candidate.effective_capacity(),
+ };
+ let channel_penalty_msat = scorer.channel_penalty_msat(
+ short_channel_id, &$src_node_id, &$dest_node_id, channel_usage
+ );
+ let path_penalty_msat = $next_hops_path_penalty_msat
+ .saturating_add(channel_penalty_msat);
let new_graph_node = RouteGraphNode {
node_id: $src_node_id,
lowest_fee_to_peer_through_node: total_fee_msat,
value_contribution_msat: value_contribution_msat,
path_htlc_minimum_msat,
path_penalty_msat,
+ path_length_to_node,
};
// Update the way of reaching $src_node_id with the given short_channel_id (from $dest_node_id),
// meaning how much will be paid in fees after this node (to the best of our knowledge).
// This data can later be helpful to optimize routing (pay lower fees).
macro_rules! add_entries_to_cheapest_to_target_node {
- ( $node: expr, $node_id: expr, $fee_to_target_msat: expr, $next_hops_value_contribution: expr, $next_hops_path_htlc_minimum_msat: expr, $next_hops_path_penalty_msat: expr, $next_hops_cltv_delta: expr ) => {
+ ( $node: expr, $node_id: expr, $fee_to_target_msat: expr, $next_hops_value_contribution: expr,
+ $next_hops_path_htlc_minimum_msat: expr, $next_hops_path_penalty_msat: expr,
+ $next_hops_cltv_delta: expr, $next_hops_path_length: expr ) => {
let skip_node = if let Some(elem) = dist.get_mut(&$node_id) {
let was_processed = elem.was_processed;
elem.was_processed = true;
if let Some(first_channels) = first_hop_targets.get(&$node_id) {
for details in first_channels {
let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details };
- add_entry!(candidate, our_node_id, $node_id, $fee_to_target_msat, $next_hops_value_contribution, $next_hops_path_htlc_minimum_msat, $next_hops_path_penalty_msat, $next_hops_cltv_delta);
+ add_entry!(candidate, our_node_id, $node_id, $fee_to_target_msat,
+ $next_hops_value_contribution,
+ $next_hops_path_htlc_minimum_msat, $next_hops_path_penalty_msat,
+ $next_hops_cltv_delta, $next_hops_path_length);
}
}
info: directed_channel.with_update().unwrap(),
short_channel_id: *chan_id,
};
- add_entry!(candidate, *source, $node_id, $fee_to_target_msat, $next_hops_value_contribution, $next_hops_path_htlc_minimum_msat, $next_hops_path_penalty_msat, $next_hops_cltv_delta);
+ add_entry!(candidate, *source, $node_id,
+ $fee_to_target_msat,
+ $next_hops_value_contribution,
+ $next_hops_path_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ $next_hops_path_penalty_msat,
+ $next_hops_cltv_delta, $next_hops_path_length);
}
}
}
// TODO: diversify by nodes (so that all paths aren't doomed if one node is offline).
'paths_collection: loop {
- // For every new path, start from scratch, except
- // bookkept_channels_liquidity_available_msat, which will improve
- // the further iterations of path finding. Also don't erase first_hop_targets.
+ // For every new path, start from scratch, except for used_channel_liquidities, which
+ // helps to avoid reusing previously selected paths in future iterations.
targets.clear();
dist.clear();
hit_minimum_limit = false;
if let Some(first_channels) = first_hop_targets.get(&payee_node_id) {
for details in first_channels {
let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details };
- let added = add_entry!(candidate, our_node_id, payee_node_id, 0, path_value_msat, 0, 0u64, 0);
- log_trace!(logger, "{} direct route to payee via SCID {}", if added { "Added" } else { "Skipped" }, candidate.short_channel_id());
+ let added = add_entry!(candidate, our_node_id, payee_node_id, 0, path_value_msat,
+ 0, 0u64, 0, 0);
+ log_trace!(logger, "{} direct route to payee via SCID {}",
+ if added { "Added" } else { "Skipped" }, candidate.short_channel_id());
}
}
// If not, targets.pop() will not even let us enter the loop in step 2.
None => {},
Some(node) => {
- add_entries_to_cheapest_to_target_node!(node, payee_node_id, 0, path_value_msat, 0, 0u64, 0);
+ add_entries_to_cheapest_to_target_node!(node, payee_node_id, 0, path_value_msat, 0, 0u64, 0, 0);
},
}
let mut aggregate_next_hops_path_htlc_minimum_msat: u64 = 0;
let mut aggregate_next_hops_path_penalty_msat: u64 = 0;
let mut aggregate_next_hops_cltv_delta: u32 = 0;
+ let mut aggregate_next_hops_path_length: u8 = 0;
for (idx, (hop, prev_hop_id)) in hop_iter.zip(prev_hop_iter).enumerate() {
let source = NodeId::from_pubkey(&hop.src_node_id);
short_channel_id: hop.short_channel_id,
})
.unwrap_or_else(|| CandidateRouteHop::PrivateHop { hint: hop });
- let capacity_msat = candidate.effective_capacity().as_msat();
+
+ if !add_entry!(candidate, source, target, aggregate_next_hops_fee_msat,
+ path_value_msat, aggregate_next_hops_path_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ aggregate_next_hops_path_penalty_msat,
+ aggregate_next_hops_cltv_delta, aggregate_next_hops_path_length) {
+ // If this hop was not used then there is no use checking the preceding
+ // hops in the RouteHint. We can break by just searching for a direct
+ // channel between last checked hop and first_hop_targets.
+ hop_used = false;
+ }
+
+ let used_liquidity_msat = used_channel_liquidities
+ .get(&(hop.short_channel_id, source < target)).copied().unwrap_or(0);
+ let channel_usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: final_value_msat + aggregate_next_hops_fee_msat,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: used_liquidity_msat,
+ effective_capacity: candidate.effective_capacity(),
+ };
+ let channel_penalty_msat = scorer.channel_penalty_msat(
+ hop.short_channel_id, &source, &target, channel_usage
+ );
aggregate_next_hops_path_penalty_msat = aggregate_next_hops_path_penalty_msat
- .saturating_add(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(hop.short_channel_id, final_value_msat, capacity_msat, &source, &target));
+ .saturating_add(channel_penalty_msat);
aggregate_next_hops_cltv_delta = aggregate_next_hops_cltv_delta
.saturating_add(hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
- if !add_entry!(candidate, source, target, aggregate_next_hops_fee_msat, path_value_msat, aggregate_next_hops_path_htlc_minimum_msat, aggregate_next_hops_path_penalty_msat, aggregate_next_hops_cltv_delta) {
- // If this hop was not used then there is no use checking the preceding hops
- // in the RouteHint. We can break by just searching for a direct channel between
- // last checked hop and first_hop_targets
- hop_used = false;
- }
+ aggregate_next_hops_path_length = aggregate_next_hops_path_length
+ .saturating_add(1);
// Searching for a direct channel between last checked hop and first_hop_targets
if let Some(first_channels) = first_hop_targets.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&prev_hop_id)) {
for details in first_channels {
let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details };
- add_entry!(candidate, our_node_id, NodeId::from_pubkey(&prev_hop_id), aggregate_next_hops_fee_msat, path_value_msat, aggregate_next_hops_path_htlc_minimum_msat, aggregate_next_hops_path_penalty_msat, aggregate_next_hops_cltv_delta);
+ add_entry!(candidate, our_node_id, NodeId::from_pubkey(&prev_hop_id),
+ aggregate_next_hops_fee_msat, path_value_msat,
+ aggregate_next_hops_path_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ aggregate_next_hops_path_penalty_msat, aggregate_next_hops_cltv_delta,
+ aggregate_next_hops_path_length);
}
}
// In the next values of the iterator, the aggregate fees already reflects
// the sum of value sent from payer (final_value_msat) and routing fees
// for the last node in the RouteHint. We need to just add the fees to
- // route through the current node so that the preceeding node (next iteration)
+ // route through the current node so that the preceding node (next iteration)
// can use it.
let hops_fee = compute_fees(aggregate_next_hops_fee_msat + final_value_msat, hop.fees)
.map_or(None, |inc| inc.checked_add(aggregate_next_hops_fee_msat));
if let Some(first_channels) = first_hop_targets.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&hop.src_node_id)) {
for details in first_channels {
let candidate = CandidateRouteHop::FirstHop { details };
- add_entry!(candidate, our_node_id, NodeId::from_pubkey(&hop.src_node_id), aggregate_next_hops_fee_msat, path_value_msat, aggregate_next_hops_path_htlc_minimum_msat, aggregate_next_hops_path_penalty_msat, aggregate_next_hops_cltv_delta);
+ add_entry!(candidate, our_node_id,
+ NodeId::from_pubkey(&hop.src_node_id),
+ aggregate_next_hops_fee_msat, path_value_msat,
+ aggregate_next_hops_path_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ aggregate_next_hops_path_penalty_msat,
+ aggregate_next_hops_cltv_delta,
+ aggregate_next_hops_path_length);
}
}
}
// Both these cases (and other cases except reaching recommended_value_msat) mean that
// paths_collection will be stopped because found_new_path==false.
// This is not necessarily a routing failure.
- 'path_construction: while let Some(RouteGraphNode { node_id, lowest_fee_to_node, total_cltv_delta, value_contribution_msat, path_htlc_minimum_msat, path_penalty_msat, .. }) = targets.pop() {
+ 'path_construction: while let Some(RouteGraphNode { node_id, lowest_fee_to_node, total_cltv_delta, value_contribution_msat, path_htlc_minimum_msat, path_penalty_msat, path_length_to_node, .. }) = targets.pop() {
// Since we're going payee-to-payer, hitting our node as a target means we should stop
// traversing the graph and arrange the path out of what we found.
if node_id == our_node_id {
let mut new_entry = dist.remove(&our_node_id).unwrap();
- let mut ordered_hops = vec!((new_entry.clone(), default_node_features.clone()));
+ let mut ordered_hops: Vec<(PathBuildingHop, NodeFeatures)> = vec!((new_entry.clone(), default_node_features.clone()));
'path_walk: loop {
let mut features_set = false;
// Remember that we used these channels so that we don't rely
// on the same liquidity in future paths.
let mut prevented_redundant_path_selection = false;
- for (payment_hop, _) in payment_path.hops.iter() {
- let channel_liquidity_available_msat = bookkept_channels_liquidity_available_msat.get_mut(&payment_hop.candidate.short_channel_id()).unwrap();
- let mut spent_on_hop_msat = value_contribution_msat;
- let next_hops_fee_msat = payment_hop.next_hops_fee_msat;
- spent_on_hop_msat += next_hops_fee_msat;
- if spent_on_hop_msat == *channel_liquidity_available_msat {
+ let prev_hop_iter = core::iter::once(&our_node_id)
+ .chain(payment_path.hops.iter().map(|(hop, _)| &hop.node_id));
+ for (prev_hop, (hop, _)) in prev_hop_iter.zip(payment_path.hops.iter()) {
+ let spent_on_hop_msat = value_contribution_msat + hop.next_hops_fee_msat;
+ let used_liquidity_msat = used_channel_liquidities
+ .entry((hop.candidate.short_channel_id(), *prev_hop < hop.node_id))
+ .and_modify(|used_liquidity_msat| *used_liquidity_msat += spent_on_hop_msat)
+ .or_insert(spent_on_hop_msat);
+ if *used_liquidity_msat == hop.candidate.htlc_maximum_msat() {
// If this path used all of this channel's available liquidity, we know
// this path will not be selected again in the next loop iteration.
prevented_redundant_path_selection = true;
}
- *channel_liquidity_available_msat -= spent_on_hop_msat;
+ debug_assert!(*used_liquidity_msat <= hop.candidate.htlc_maximum_msat());
}
if !prevented_redundant_path_selection {
// If we weren't capped by hitting a liquidity limit on a channel in the path,
// we'll probably end up picking the same path again on the next iteration.
// Decrease the available liquidity of a hop in the middle of the path.
let victim_scid = payment_path.hops[(payment_path.hops.len()) / 2].0.candidate.short_channel_id();
+ let exhausted = u64::max_value();
log_trace!(logger, "Disabling channel {} for future path building iterations to avoid duplicates.", victim_scid);
- let victim_liquidity = bookkept_channels_liquidity_available_msat.get_mut(&victim_scid).unwrap();
- *victim_liquidity = 0;
+ *used_channel_liquidities.entry((victim_scid, false)).or_default() = exhausted;
+ *used_channel_liquidities.entry((victim_scid, true)).or_default() = exhausted;
}
// Track the total amount all our collected paths allow to send so that we:
match network_nodes.get(&node_id) {
None => {},
Some(node) => {
- add_entries_to_cheapest_to_target_node!(node, node_id, lowest_fee_to_node, value_contribution_msat, path_htlc_minimum_msat, path_penalty_msat, total_cltv_delta);
+ add_entries_to_cheapest_to_target_node!(node, node_id, lowest_fee_to_node,
+ value_contribution_msat, path_htlc_minimum_msat, path_penalty_msat,
+ total_cltv_delta, path_length_to_node);
},
}
}
// destination, if the remaining CLTV expiry delta exactly matches a feasible path in the network
// graph. In order to improve privacy, this method obfuscates the CLTV expiry deltas along the
// payment path by adding a randomized 'shadow route' offset to the final hop.
-fn add_random_cltv_offset(route: &mut Route, payment_params: &PaymentParameters, network_graph: &ReadOnlyNetworkGraph, random_seed_bytes: &[u8; 32]) {
+fn add_random_cltv_offset(route: &mut Route, payment_params: &PaymentParameters,
+ network_graph: &ReadOnlyNetworkGraph, random_seed_bytes: &[u8; 32]
+) {
let network_channels = network_graph.channels();
let network_nodes = network_graph.nodes();
}
}
+/// Construct a route from us (payer) to the target node (payee) via the given hops (which should
+/// exclude the payer, but include the payee). This may be useful, e.g., for probing the chosen path.
+///
+/// Re-uses logic from `find_route`, so the restrictions described there also apply here.
+pub fn build_route_from_hops<L: Deref>(
+ our_node_pubkey: &PublicKey, hops: &[PublicKey], route_params: &RouteParameters, network: &NetworkGraph,
+ logger: L, random_seed_bytes: &[u8; 32]
+) -> Result<Route, LightningError>
+where L::Target: Logger {
+ let network_graph = network.read_only();
+ let mut route = build_route_from_hops_internal(
+ our_node_pubkey, hops, &route_params.payment_params, &network_graph,
+ route_params.final_value_msat, route_params.final_cltv_expiry_delta, logger, random_seed_bytes)?;
+ add_random_cltv_offset(&mut route, &route_params.payment_params, &network_graph, random_seed_bytes);
+ Ok(route)
+}
+
+fn build_route_from_hops_internal<L: Deref>(
+ our_node_pubkey: &PublicKey, hops: &[PublicKey], payment_params: &PaymentParameters,
+ network_graph: &ReadOnlyNetworkGraph, final_value_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
+ logger: L, random_seed_bytes: &[u8; 32]
+) -> Result<Route, LightningError> where L::Target: Logger {
+
+ struct HopScorer {
+ our_node_id: NodeId,
+ hop_ids: [Option<NodeId>; MAX_PATH_LENGTH_ESTIMATE as usize],
+ }
+
+ impl Score for HopScorer {
+ fn channel_penalty_msat(&self, _short_channel_id: u64, source: &NodeId, target: &NodeId,
+ _usage: ChannelUsage) -> u64
+ {
+ let mut cur_id = self.our_node_id;
+ for i in 0..self.hop_ids.len() {
+ if let Some(next_id) = self.hop_ids[i] {
+ if cur_id == *source && next_id == *target {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ cur_id = next_id;
+ } else {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ u64::max_value()
+ }
+
+ fn payment_path_failed(&mut self, _path: &[&RouteHop], _short_channel_id: u64) {}
+
+ fn payment_path_successful(&mut self, _path: &[&RouteHop]) {}
+ }
+
+ impl<'a> Writeable for HopScorer {
+ #[inline]
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, _w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ unreachable!();
+ }
+ }
+
+ if hops.len() > MAX_PATH_LENGTH_ESTIMATE.into() {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "Cannot build a route exceeding the maximum path length.".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+ }
+
+ let our_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(our_node_pubkey);
+ let mut hop_ids = [None; MAX_PATH_LENGTH_ESTIMATE as usize];
+ for i in 0..hops.len() {
+ hop_ids[i] = Some(NodeId::from_pubkey(&hops[i]));
+ }
+
+ let scorer = HopScorer { our_node_id, hop_ids };
+
+ get_route(our_node_pubkey, payment_params, network_graph, None, final_value_msat,
+ final_cltv_expiry_delta, logger, &scorer, random_seed_bytes)
+}
+
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use routing::network_graph::{NetworkGraph, NetGraphMsgHandler, NodeId};
- use routing::router::{get_route, add_random_cltv_offset, default_node_features, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteHop, RoutingFees, DEFAULT_MAX_TOTAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
- use routing::scoring::Score;
+ use routing::router::{get_route, build_route_from_hops_internal, add_random_cltv_offset, default_node_features,
+ PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteHop, RoutingFees,
+ DEFAULT_MAX_TOTAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_PATH_LENGTH_ESTIMATE};
+ use routing::scoring::{ChannelUsage, Score};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use ln::msgs::{ErrorAction, LightningError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, RoutingMessageHandler,
- NodeAnnouncement, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
+ NodeAnnouncement, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
use ln::channelmanager;
use util::test_utils;
use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
}
fn get_nodes(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>) -> (SecretKey, PublicKey, Vec<SecretKey>, Vec<PublicKey>) {
- let privkeys: Vec<SecretKey> = (2..10).map(|i| {
+ let privkeys: Vec<SecretKey> = (2..22).map(|i| {
SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(format!("{:02x}", i).repeat(32)).unwrap()[..]).unwrap()
}).collect();
}
}
+ fn build_line_graph() -> (
+ Secp256k1<All>, sync::Arc<NetworkGraph>, NetGraphMsgHandler<sync::Arc<NetworkGraph>,
+ sync::Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, sync::Arc<crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger>>,
+ sync::Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, sync::Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>,
+ ) {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
+ let chain_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
+ let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash()));
+ let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(Arc::clone(&network_graph), None, Arc::clone(&logger));
+
+ // Build network from our_id to node 19:
+ // our_id -1(1)2- node0 -1(2)2- node1 - ... - node19
+ let (our_privkey, _, privkeys, _) = get_nodes(&secp_ctx);
+
+ for (idx, (cur_privkey, next_privkey)) in core::iter::once(&our_privkey)
+ .chain(privkeys.iter()).zip(privkeys.iter()).enumerate() {
+ let cur_short_channel_id = (idx as u64) + 1;
+ add_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &cur_privkey, &next_privkey,
+ ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags(1)), cur_short_channel_id);
+ update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &cur_privkey, UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
+ short_channel_id: cur_short_channel_id,
+ timestamp: idx as u32,
+ flags: 0,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
+ fee_base_msat: 0,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ excess_data: Vec::new()
+ });
+ update_channel(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &next_privkey, UnsignedChannelUpdate {
+ chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
+ short_channel_id: cur_short_channel_id,
+ timestamp: (idx as u32)+1,
+ flags: 1,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: 0,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
+ fee_base_msat: 0,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ excess_data: Vec::new()
+ });
+ add_or_update_node(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, next_privkey,
+ NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(id_to_feature_flags(1)), 0);
+ }
+
+ (secp_ctx, network_graph, net_graph_msg_handler, chain_monitor, logger)
+ }
+
fn build_graph() -> (
Secp256k1<All>,
sync::Arc<NetworkGraph>,
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, _w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> { unimplemented!() }
}
impl Score for BadChannelScorer {
- fn channel_penalty_msat(&self, short_channel_id: u64, _send_amt: u64, _capacity_msat: u64, _source: &NodeId, _target: &NodeId) -> u64 {
+ fn channel_penalty_msat(&self, short_channel_id: u64, _: &NodeId, _: &NodeId, _: ChannelUsage) -> u64 {
if short_channel_id == self.short_channel_id { u64::max_value() } else { 0 }
}
}
impl Score for BadNodeScorer {
- fn channel_penalty_msat(&self, _short_channel_id: u64, _send_amt: u64, _capacity_msat: u64, _source: &NodeId, target: &NodeId) -> u64 {
+ fn channel_penalty_msat(&self, _: u64, _: &NodeId, target: &NodeId, _: ChannelUsage) -> u64 {
if *target == self.node_id { u64::max_value() } else { 0 }
}
}
}
+ #[test]
+ fn limits_path_length() {
+ let (secp_ctx, network, _, _, logger) = build_line_graph();
+ let (_, our_id, _, nodes) = get_nodes(&secp_ctx);
+ let network_graph = network.read_only();
+
+ let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
+ let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[0u8; 32], Network::Testnet);
+ let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+
+ // First check we can actually create a long route on this graph.
+ let feasible_payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[18]);
+ let route = get_route(&our_id, &feasible_payment_params, &network_graph, None, 100, 0,
+ Arc::clone(&logger), &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
+ let path = route.paths[0].iter().map(|hop| hop.short_channel_id).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+ assert!(path.len() == MAX_PATH_LENGTH_ESTIMATE.into());
+
+ // But we can't create a path surpassing the MAX_PATH_LENGTH_ESTIMATE limit.
+ let fail_payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[19]);
+ match get_route(&our_id, &fail_payment_params, &network_graph, None, 100, 0,
+ Arc::clone(&logger), &scorer, &random_seed_bytes)
+ {
+ Err(LightningError { err, .. } ) => {
+ assert_eq!(err, "Failed to find a path to the given destination");
+ },
+ Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
+ }
+ }
+
#[test]
fn adds_and_limits_cltv_offset() {
let (secp_ctx, network_graph, _, _, logger) = build_graph();
assert!(path_plausibility.iter().all(|x| *x));
}
+ #[test]
+ fn builds_correct_path_from_hops() {
+ let (secp_ctx, network, _, _, logger) = build_graph();
+ let (_, our_id, _, nodes) = get_nodes(&secp_ctx);
+ let network_graph = network.read_only();
+
+ let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[0u8; 32], Network::Testnet);
+ let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+
+ let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3]);
+ let hops = [nodes[1], nodes[2], nodes[4], nodes[3]];
+ let route = build_route_from_hops_internal(&our_id, &hops, &payment_params,
+ &network_graph, 100, 0, Arc::clone(&logger), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
+ let route_hop_pubkeys = route.paths[0].iter().map(|hop| hop.pubkey).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+ assert_eq!(hops.len(), route.paths[0].len());
+ for (idx, hop_pubkey) in hops.iter().enumerate() {
+ assert!(*hop_pubkey == route_hop_pubkeys[idx]);
+ }
+ }
+
#[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
pub(super) fn random_init_seed() -> u64 {
// Because the default HashMap in std pulls OS randomness, we can use it as a (bad) RNG.
//! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
-use routing::network_graph::{NetworkGraph, NodeId};
+use routing::network_graph::{EffectiveCapacity, NetworkGraph, NodeId};
use routing::router::RouteHop;
use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
use util::logger::Logger;
+use util::time::Time;
use prelude::*;
use core::fmt;
/// such as a chain data, network gossip, or invoice hints. For invoice hints, a capacity near
/// [`u64::max_value`] is given to indicate sufficient capacity for the invoice's full amount.
/// Thus, implementations should be overflow-safe.
- fn channel_penalty_msat(&self, short_channel_id: u64, send_amt_msat: u64, capacity_msat: u64, source: &NodeId, target: &NodeId) -> u64;
+ fn channel_penalty_msat(
+ &self, short_channel_id: u64, source: &NodeId, target: &NodeId, usage: ChannelUsage
+ ) -> u64;
/// Handles updating channel penalties after failing to route through a channel.
fn payment_path_failed(&mut self, path: &[&RouteHop], short_channel_id: u64);
}
impl<S: Score, T: DerefMut<Target=S> $(+ $supertrait)*> Score for T {
- fn channel_penalty_msat(&self, short_channel_id: u64, send_amt_msat: u64, capacity_msat: u64, source: &NodeId, target: &NodeId) -> u64 {
- self.deref().channel_penalty_msat(short_channel_id, send_amt_msat, capacity_msat, source, target)
+ fn channel_penalty_msat(
+ &self, short_channel_id: u64, source: &NodeId, target: &NodeId, usage: ChannelUsage
+ ) -> u64 {
+ self.deref().channel_penalty_msat(short_channel_id, source, target, usage)
}
fn payment_path_failed(&mut self, path: &[&RouteHop], short_channel_id: u64) {
}
}
+/// Proposed use of a channel passed as a parameter to [`Score::channel_penalty_msat`].
+#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
+pub struct ChannelUsage {
+ /// The amount to send through the channel, denominated in millisatoshis.
+ pub amount_msat: u64,
+
+ /// Total amount, denominated in millisatoshis, already allocated to send through the channel
+ /// as part of a multi-path payment.
+ pub inflight_htlc_msat: u64,
+
+ /// The effective capacity of the channel.
+ pub effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
+}
+
#[derive(Clone)]
/// [`Score`] implementation that uses a fixed penalty.
pub struct FixedPenaltyScorer {
}
impl Score for FixedPenaltyScorer {
- fn channel_penalty_msat(&self, _: u64, _: u64, _: u64, _: &NodeId, _: &NodeId) -> u64 {
+ fn channel_penalty_msat(&self, _: u64, _: &NodeId, _: &NodeId, _: ChannelUsage) -> u64 {
self.penalty_msat
}
#[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
type ConfiguredTime = std::time::Instant;
#[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
-type ConfiguredTime = time::Eternity;
+use util::time::Eternity;
+#[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
+type ConfiguredTime = Eternity;
// Note that ideally we'd hide ScorerUsingTime from public view by sealing it as well, but rustdoc
// doesn't handle this well - instead exposing a `Scorer` which has no trait implementation(s) or
impl<T: Time> Score for ScorerUsingTime<T> {
fn channel_penalty_msat(
- &self, short_channel_id: u64, send_amt_msat: u64, capacity_msat: u64, _source: &NodeId, _target: &NodeId
+ &self, short_channel_id: u64, _source: &NodeId, _target: &NodeId, usage: ChannelUsage
) -> u64 {
let failure_penalty_msat = self.channel_failures
.get(&short_channel_id)
.map_or(0, |value| value.decayed_penalty_msat(self.params.failure_penalty_half_life));
let mut penalty_msat = self.params.base_penalty_msat + failure_penalty_msat;
+ let send_amt_msat = usage.amount_msat;
+ let capacity_msat = usage.effective_capacity.as_msat()
+ .saturating_sub(usage.inflight_htlc_msat);
let send_1024ths = send_amt_msat.checked_mul(1024).unwrap_or(u64::max_value()) / capacity_msat;
if send_1024ths > self.params.overuse_penalty_start_1024th as u64 {
penalty_msat = penalty_msat.checked_add(
impl<G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph>, L: Deref, T: Time> Score for ProbabilisticScorerUsingTime<G, L, T> where L::Target: Logger {
fn channel_penalty_msat(
- &self, short_channel_id: u64, amount_msat: u64, capacity_msat: u64, source: &NodeId,
- target: &NodeId
+ &self, short_channel_id: u64, source: &NodeId, target: &NodeId, usage: ChannelUsage
) -> u64 {
+ if let EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } = usage.effective_capacity {
+ if usage.amount_msat > liquidity_msat {
+ return u64::max_value();
+ } else {
+ return self.params.base_penalty_msat;
+ };
+ }
+
let liquidity_offset_half_life = self.params.liquidity_offset_half_life;
+ let amount_msat = usage.amount_msat;
+ let capacity_msat = usage.effective_capacity.as_msat()
+ .saturating_sub(usage.inflight_htlc_msat);
self.channel_liquidities
.get(&short_channel_id)
.unwrap_or(&ChannelLiquidity::new())
}
}
-pub(crate) mod time {
- use core::ops::Sub;
- use core::time::Duration;
- /// A measurement of time.
- pub trait Time: Copy + Sub<Duration, Output = Self> where Self: Sized {
- /// Returns an instance corresponding to the current moment.
- fn now() -> Self;
-
- /// Returns the amount of time elapsed since `self` was created.
- fn elapsed(&self) -> Duration;
-
- /// Returns the amount of time passed between `earlier` and `self`.
- fn duration_since(&self, earlier: Self) -> Duration;
-
- /// Returns the amount of time passed since the beginning of [`Time`].
- ///
- /// Used during (de-)serialization.
- fn duration_since_epoch() -> Duration;
- }
-
- /// A state in which time has no meaning.
- #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
- pub struct Eternity;
-
- #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
- impl Time for std::time::Instant {
- fn now() -> Self {
- std::time::Instant::now()
- }
-
- fn duration_since(&self, earlier: Self) -> Duration {
- self.duration_since(earlier)
- }
-
- fn duration_since_epoch() -> Duration {
- use std::time::SystemTime;
- SystemTime::now().duration_since(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH).unwrap()
- }
-
- fn elapsed(&self) -> Duration {
- std::time::Instant::elapsed(self)
- }
- }
-
- impl Time for Eternity {
- fn now() -> Self {
- Self
- }
-
- fn duration_since(&self, _earlier: Self) -> Duration {
- Duration::from_secs(0)
- }
-
- fn duration_since_epoch() -> Duration {
- Duration::from_secs(0)
- }
-
- fn elapsed(&self) -> Duration {
- Duration::from_secs(0)
- }
- }
-
- impl Sub<Duration> for Eternity {
- type Output = Self;
-
- fn sub(self, _other: Duration) -> Self {
- self
- }
- }
-}
-
-pub(crate) use self::time::Time;
-
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
- use super::{ChannelLiquidity, ProbabilisticScoringParameters, ProbabilisticScorerUsingTime, ScoringParameters, ScorerUsingTime, Time};
- use super::time::Eternity;
+ use super::{ChannelLiquidity, ProbabilisticScoringParameters, ProbabilisticScorerUsingTime, ScoringParameters, ScorerUsingTime};
+ use util::time::Time;
+ use util::time::tests::SinceEpoch;
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
- use routing::scoring::Score;
- use routing::network_graph::{NetworkGraph, NodeId};
+ use routing::scoring::{ChannelUsage, Score};
+ use routing::network_graph::{EffectiveCapacity, NetworkGraph, NodeId};
use routing::router::RouteHop;
use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable};
use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
- use core::cell::Cell;
- use core::ops::Sub;
use core::time::Duration;
use io;
- // `Time` tests
-
- /// Time that can be advanced manually in tests.
- #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
- struct SinceEpoch(Duration);
-
- impl SinceEpoch {
- thread_local! {
- static ELAPSED: Cell<Duration> = core::cell::Cell::new(Duration::from_secs(0));
- }
-
- fn advance(duration: Duration) {
- Self::ELAPSED.with(|elapsed| elapsed.set(elapsed.get() + duration))
- }
- }
-
- impl Time for SinceEpoch {
- fn now() -> Self {
- Self(Self::duration_since_epoch())
- }
-
- fn duration_since(&self, earlier: Self) -> Duration {
- self.0 - earlier.0
- }
-
- fn duration_since_epoch() -> Duration {
- Self::ELAPSED.with(|elapsed| elapsed.get())
- }
-
- fn elapsed(&self) -> Duration {
- Self::duration_since_epoch() - self.0
- }
- }
-
- impl Sub<Duration> for SinceEpoch {
- type Output = Self;
-
- fn sub(self, other: Duration) -> Self {
- Self(self.0 - other)
- }
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn time_passes_when_advanced() {
- let now = SinceEpoch::now();
- assert_eq!(now.elapsed(), Duration::from_secs(0));
-
- SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(1));
- SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(1));
-
- let elapsed = now.elapsed();
- let later = SinceEpoch::now();
-
- assert_eq!(elapsed, Duration::from_secs(2));
- assert_eq!(later - elapsed, now);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn time_never_passes_in_an_eternity() {
- let now = Eternity::now();
- let elapsed = now.elapsed();
- let later = Eternity::now();
-
- assert_eq!(now.elapsed(), Duration::from_secs(0));
- assert_eq!(later - elapsed, now);
- }
-
- // `Scorer` tests
-
/// A scorer for testing with time that can be manually advanced.
type Scorer = ScorerUsingTime::<SinceEpoch>;
});
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_000);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 1, inflight_htlc_msat: 0, effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Unknown
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_000);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(1));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_000);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_000);
}
#[test]
});
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_000);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 1, inflight_htlc_msat: 0, effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Unknown
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_000);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&[], 42);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_064);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_064);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&[], 42);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_128);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_128);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&[], 42);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_192);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_192);
}
#[test]
});
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_000);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 1, inflight_htlc_msat: 0, effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Unknown
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_000);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&[], 42);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_512);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_512);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(9));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_512);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_512);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(1));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_256);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_256);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10 * 8));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_001);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_001);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_000);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_000);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_000);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_000);
}
#[test]
});
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_000);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 1, inflight_htlc_msat: 0, effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Unknown
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_000);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&[], 42);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_512);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_512);
// An unchecked right shift 64 bits or more in ChannelFailure::decayed_penalty_msat would
// cause an overflow.
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10 * 64));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_000);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_000);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_000);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_000);
}
#[test]
});
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_000);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 1, inflight_htlc_msat: 0, effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Unknown
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_000);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&[], 42);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_512);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_512);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_256);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_256);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&[], 42);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_768);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_768);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_384);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_384);
}
#[test]
});
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_000);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 1, inflight_htlc_msat: 0, effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Unknown
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_000);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&[], 42);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_512);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_512);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_256);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_256);
let hop = RouteHop {
pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(target.as_slice()).unwrap(),
cltv_expiry_delta: 18,
};
scorer.payment_path_successful(&[&hop]);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_128);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_128);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_064);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_064);
}
#[test]
});
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 1, inflight_htlc_msat: 0, effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Unknown
+ };
scorer.payment_path_failed(&[], 42);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_512);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_512);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_256);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_256);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&[], 43);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(43, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_512);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(43, &source, &target, usage), 1_512);
let mut serialized_scorer = Vec::new();
scorer.write(&mut serialized_scorer).unwrap();
let deserialized_scorer = <Scorer>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&serialized_scorer)).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_256);
- assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(43, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_512);
+ assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_256);
+ assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(43, &source, &target, usage), 1_512);
}
#[test]
});
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 1, inflight_htlc_msat: 0, effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Unknown
+ };
scorer.payment_path_failed(&[], 42);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_512);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_512);
let mut serialized_scorer = Vec::new();
scorer.write(&mut serialized_scorer).unwrap();
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
let deserialized_scorer = <Scorer>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&serialized_scorer)).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_256);
+ assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_256);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1, &source, &target), 1_128);
+ assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_128);
}
#[test]
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1_000, 1_024_000, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 256_999, 1_024_000, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 257_000, 1_024_000, &source, &target), 100);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 258_000, 1_024_000, &source, &target), 200);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 512_000, 1_024_000, &source, &target), 256 * 100);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 1_000,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_024_000 },
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 256_999, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 257_000, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 100);
+
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 258_000, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 200);
+
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 512_000, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 256 * 100);
}
// `ProbabilisticScorer` tests
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1_024, 1_024_000, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 10_240, 1_024_000, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 102_400, 1_024_000, &source, &target), 47);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1_024_000, 1_024_000, &source, &target), 2_000);
-
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 128, 1_024, &source, &target), 58);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 256, 1_024, &source, &target), 125);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 374, 1_024, &source, &target), 198);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 512, 1_024, &source, &target), 300);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 640, 1_024, &source, &target), 425);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 768, 1_024, &source, &target), 602);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 896, 1_024, &source, &target), 902);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 1_024,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_024_000 },
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 10_240, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 102_400, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 47);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 1_024_000, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 2_000);
+
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 128,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_024 },
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 58);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 256, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 125);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 374, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 198);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 512, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 300);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 640, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 425);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 768, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 602);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 896, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 902);
}
#[test]
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 39, 100, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_ne!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 50, 100, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_ne!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 50, 100, &source, &target), u64::max_value());
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 61, 100, &source, &target), u64::max_value());
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 39,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 100 },
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 50, ..usage };
+ assert_ne!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+ assert_ne!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), u64::max_value());
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 61, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), u64::max_value());
}
#[test]
let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
let sender = sender_node_id();
let source = source_node_id();
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 500,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_000 },
+ };
let failed_path = payment_path_for_amount(500);
let successful_path = payment_path_for_amount(200);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(41, 500, 1_000, &sender, &source), 301);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(41, &sender, &source, usage), 301);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&failed_path.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(), 41);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(41, 500, 1_000, &sender, &source), 301);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(41, &sender, &source, usage), 301);
scorer.payment_path_successful(&successful_path.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>());
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(41, 500, 1_000, &sender, &source), 301);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(41, &sender, &source, usage), 301);
}
#[test]
let target = target_node_id();
let path = payment_path_for_amount(500);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 250, 1_000, &source, &target), 128);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 500, 1_000, &source, &target), 301);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 750, 1_000, &source, &target), 602);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 250,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_000 },
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 128);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 500, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 301);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 750, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 602);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&path.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(), 43);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 250, 1_000, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 500, 1_000, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 750, 1_000, &source, &target), 300);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 250, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 500, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 750, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 300);
}
#[test]
let target = target_node_id();
let path = payment_path_for_amount(500);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 250, 1_000, &source, &target), 128);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 500, 1_000, &source, &target), 301);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 750, 1_000, &source, &target), 602);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 250,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_000 },
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 128);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 500, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 301);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 750, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 602);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&path.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(), 42);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 250, 1_000, &source, &target), 300);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 500, 1_000, &source, &target), u64::max_value());
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 750, 1_000, &source, &target), u64::max_value());
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 250, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 300);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 500, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), u64::max_value());
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 750, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), u64::max_value());
}
#[test]
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
let recipient = recipient_node_id();
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 250,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_000 },
+ };
let path = payment_path_for_amount(500);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(41, 250, 1_000, &sender, &source), 128);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 250, 1_000, &source, &target), 128);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(43, 250, 1_000, &target, &recipient), 128);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(41, &sender, &source, usage), 128);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 128);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(43, &target, &recipient, usage), 128);
scorer.payment_path_successful(&path.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>());
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(41, 250, 1_000, &sender, &source), 128);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 250, 1_000, &source, &target), 300);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(43, 250, 1_000, &target, &recipient), 300);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(41, &sender, &source, usage), 128);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 300);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(43, &target, &recipient, usage), 300);
}
#[test]
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 0, 1_024, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1_024, 1_024, &source, &target), 2_000);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 0,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_024 },
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 1_024, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 2_000);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&payment_path_for_amount(768).iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(), 42);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&payment_path_for_amount(128).iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(), 43);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 128, 1_024, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 256, 1_024, &source, &target), 93);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 768, 1_024, &source, &target), 1_479);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 896, 1_024, &source, &target), u64::max_value());
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 128, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 256, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 93);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 768, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_479);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 896, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), u64::max_value());
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(9));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 128, 1_024, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 256, 1_024, &source, &target), 93);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 768, 1_024, &source, &target), 1_479);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 896, 1_024, &source, &target), u64::max_value());
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 128, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 256, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 93);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 768, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_479);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 896, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), u64::max_value());
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(1));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 64, 1_024, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 128, 1_024, &source, &target), 34);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 896, 1_024, &source, &target), 1_970);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 960, 1_024, &source, &target), u64::max_value());
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 64, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 128, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 34);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 896, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1_970);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 960, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), u64::max_value());
// Fully decay liquidity lower bound.
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10 * 7));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 0, 1_024, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1, 1_024, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1_023, 1_024, &source, &target), 2_000);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1_024, 1_024, &source, &target), 2_000);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 0, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 1, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 1_023, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 2_000);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 1_024, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 2_000);
// Fully decay liquidity upper bound.
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 0, 1_024, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1_024, 1_024, &source, &target), 2_000);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 0, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 1_024, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 2_000);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 0, 1_024, &source, &target), 0);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 1_024, 1_024, &source, &target), 2_000);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 0, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 0);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 1_024, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 2_000);
}
#[test]
let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 256, 1_024, &source, &target), 125);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 256,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_024 },
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 125);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&payment_path_for_amount(512).iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(), 42);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 256, 1_024, &source, &target), 281);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 281);
// An unchecked right shift 64 bits or more in DirectedChannelLiquidity::decayed_offset_msat
// would cause an overflow.
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10 * 64));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 256, 1_024, &source, &target), 125);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 125);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 256, 1_024, &source, &target), 125);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 125);
}
#[test]
let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 512,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_024 },
+ };
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 512, 1_024, &source, &target), 300);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 300);
// More knowledge gives higher confidence (256, 768), meaning a lower penalty.
scorer.payment_path_failed(&payment_path_for_amount(768).iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(), 42);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&payment_path_for_amount(256).iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(), 43);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 512, 1_024, &source, &target), 281);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 281);
// Decaying knowledge gives less confidence (128, 896), meaning a higher penalty.
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 512, 1_024, &source, &target), 291);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 291);
// Reducing the upper bound gives more confidence (128, 832) that the payment amount (512)
// is closer to the upper bound, meaning a higher penalty.
scorer.payment_path_successful(&payment_path_for_amount(64).iter().collect::<Vec<_>>());
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 512, 1_024, &source, &target), 331);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 331);
// Increasing the lower bound gives more confidence (256, 832) that the payment amount (512)
// is closer to the lower bound, meaning a lower penalty.
scorer.payment_path_failed(&payment_path_for_amount(256).iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(), 43);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 512, 1_024, &source, &target), 245);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 245);
// Further decaying affects the lower bound more than the upper bound (128, 928).
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 512, 1_024, &source, &target), 280);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 280);
}
#[test]
let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 500,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_000 },
+ };
scorer.payment_path_failed(&payment_path_for_amount(500).iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(), 42);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 500, 1_000, &source, &target), u64::max_value());
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), u64::max_value());
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 500, 1_000, &source, &target), 473);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 473);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&payment_path_for_amount(250).iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(), 43);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 500, 1_000, &source, &target), 300);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 300);
let mut serialized_scorer = Vec::new();
scorer.write(&mut serialized_scorer).unwrap();
let mut serialized_scorer = io::Cursor::new(&serialized_scorer);
let deserialized_scorer =
<ProbabilisticScorer>::read(&mut serialized_scorer, (params, &network_graph, &logger)).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 500, 1_000, &source, &target), 300);
+ assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 300);
}
#[test]
let mut scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 500,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_000 },
+ };
scorer.payment_path_failed(&payment_path_for_amount(500).iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(), 42);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 500, 1_000, &source, &target), u64::max_value());
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), u64::max_value());
let mut serialized_scorer = Vec::new();
scorer.write(&mut serialized_scorer).unwrap();
let mut serialized_scorer = io::Cursor::new(&serialized_scorer);
let deserialized_scorer =
<ProbabilisticScorer>::read(&mut serialized_scorer, (params, &network_graph, &logger)).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 500, 1_000, &source, &target), 473);
+ assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 473);
scorer.payment_path_failed(&payment_path_for_amount(250).iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(), 43);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 500, 1_000, &source, &target), 300);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 300);
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(10));
- assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 500, 1_000, &source, &target), 365);
+ assert_eq!(deserialized_scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 365);
}
#[test]
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 100_000_000, 950_000_000, &source, &target), 3613);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 100_000_000, 1_950_000_000, &source, &target), 1977);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 100_000_000, 2_950_000_000, &source, &target), 1474);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 100_000_000, 3_950_000_000, &source, &target), 1223);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 100_000_000, 4_950_000_000, &source, &target), 877);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 100_000_000, 5_950_000_000, &source, &target), 845);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 100_000_000, 6_950_000_000, &source, &target), 500);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 100_000_000, 7_450_000_000, &source, &target), 500);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 100_000_000, 7_950_000_000, &source, &target), 500);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 100_000_000, 8_950_000_000, &source, &target), 500);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 100_000_000, 9_950_000_000, &source, &target), 500);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 100_000_000,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 950_000_000 },
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 3613);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_950_000_000 }, ..usage
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1977);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 2_950_000_000 }, ..usage
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1474);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 3_950_000_000 }, ..usage
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 1223);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 4_950_000_000 }, ..usage
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 877);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 5_950_000_000 }, ..usage
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 845);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 6_950_000_000 }, ..usage
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 500);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 7_450_000_000 }, ..usage
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 500);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 7_950_000_000 }, ..usage
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 500);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 8_950_000_000 }, ..usage
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 500);
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 9_950_000_000 }, ..usage
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 500);
}
#[test]
let network_graph = network_graph();
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 128,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_024 },
+ };
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters {
liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat: 1_000,
..ProbabilisticScoringParameters::zero_penalty()
};
let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 128, 1_024, &source, &target), 58);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 58);
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters {
base_penalty_msat: 500, liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat: 1_000, ..Default::default()
};
let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 128, 1_024, &source, &target), 558);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 558);
}
#[test]
let network_graph = network_graph();
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 512_000,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_024_000 },
+ };
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters {
liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat: 1_000,
..ProbabilisticScoringParameters::zero_penalty()
};
let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 512_000, 1_024_000, &source, &target), 300);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 300);
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters {
liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat: 1_000,
..ProbabilisticScoringParameters::zero_penalty()
};
let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
- assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, 512_000, 1_024_000, &source, &target), 337);
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 337);
}
#[test]
let network_graph = network_graph();
let source = source_node_id();
let target = target_node_id();
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: u64::max_value(),
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Infinite,
+ };
let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters {
liquidity_penalty_multiplier_msat: 40_000,
..ProbabilisticScoringParameters::zero_penalty()
};
let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
- assert_eq!(
- scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, u64::max_value(), u64::max_value(), &source, &target),
- 80_000,
- );
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), 80_000);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn accounts_for_inflight_htlc_usage() {
+ let network_graph = network_graph();
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
+ let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters::default();
+ let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
+ let source = source_node_id();
+ let target = target_node_id();
+
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 750,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat: 1_000 },
+ };
+ assert_ne!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), u64::max_value());
+
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { inflight_htlc_msat: 251, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), u64::max_value());
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn removes_uncertainity_when_exact_liquidity_known() {
+ let network_graph = network_graph();
+ let logger = TestLogger::new();
+ let params = ProbabilisticScoringParameters::default();
+ let scorer = ProbabilisticScorer::new(params, &network_graph, &logger);
+ let source = source_node_id();
+ let target = target_node_id();
+
+ let base_penalty_msat = params.base_penalty_msat;
+ let usage = ChannelUsage {
+ amount_msat: 750,
+ inflight_htlc_msat: 0,
+ effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat: 1_000 },
+ };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), base_penalty_msat);
+
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 1_000, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), base_penalty_msat);
+
+ let usage = ChannelUsage { amount_msat: 1_001, ..usage };
+ assert_eq!(scorer.channel_penalty_msat(42, &source, &target, usage), u64::max_value());
}
}
/// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated
FundingGenerationReady {
/// The random channel_id we picked which you'll need to pass into
- /// ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated.
+ /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`].
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated
temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ /// The counterparty's node_id, which you'll need to pass back into
+ /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`].
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated
+ counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
/// The value, in satoshis, that the output should have.
channel_value_satoshis: u64,
/// The script which should be used in the transaction output.
/// This event is generated when a payment has been successfully forwarded through us and a
/// forwarding fee earned.
PaymentForwarded {
- /// The channel between the source node and us. Optional because versions prior to 0.0.107
- /// do not serialize this field.
- source_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>,
+ /// The incoming channel between the previous node and us. This is only `None` for events
+ /// generated or serialized by versions prior to 0.0.107.
+ prev_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>,
+ /// The outgoing channel between the next node and us. This is only `None` for events
+ /// generated or serialized by versions prior to 0.0.107.
+ next_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>,
/// The fee, in milli-satoshis, which was earned as a result of the payment.
///
/// Note that if we force-closed the channel over which we forwarded an HTLC while the HTLC
/// The temporary channel ID of the channel requested to be opened.
///
/// When responding to the request, the `temporary_channel_id` should be passed
- /// back to the ChannelManager with [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] to accept,
- /// or to [`ChannelManager::force_close_channel`] to reject.
+ /// back to the ChannelManager through [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] to accept,
+ /// or through [`ChannelManager::force_close_channel`] to reject.
///
/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
/// [`ChannelManager::force_close_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_channel
temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
/// The node_id of the counterparty requesting to open the channel.
+ ///
+ /// When responding to the request, the `counterparty_node_id` should be passed
+ /// back to the `ChannelManager` through [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] to
+ /// accept the request, or through [`ChannelManager::force_close_channel`] to reject the
+ /// request.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
+ /// [`ChannelManager::force_close_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_channel
counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
/// The channel value of the requested channel.
funding_satoshis: u64,
(0, VecWriteWrapper(outputs), required),
});
},
- &Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, source_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
+ &Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
7u8.write(writer)?;
write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
(0, fee_earned_msat, option),
- (1, source_channel_id, option),
+ (1, prev_channel_id, option),
(2, claim_from_onchain_tx, required),
+ (3, next_channel_id, option),
});
},
&Event::ChannelClosed { ref channel_id, ref user_channel_id, ref reason } => {
7u8 => {
let f = || {
let mut fee_earned_msat = None;
- let mut source_channel_id = None;
+ let mut prev_channel_id = None;
let mut claim_from_onchain_tx = false;
+ let mut next_channel_id = None;
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, fee_earned_msat, option),
- (1, source_channel_id, option),
+ (1, prev_channel_id, option),
(2, claim_from_onchain_tx, required),
+ (3, next_channel_id, option),
});
- Ok(Some(Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, source_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx }))
+ Ok(Some(Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id }))
};
f()
},
pub(crate) mod chacha20poly1305rfc;
pub(crate) mod transaction_utils;
pub(crate) mod scid_utils;
+pub(crate) mod time;
/// Logging macro utilities.
#[macro_use]
/// encoded in several different ways, which we must check for at deserialization-time. Thus, if
/// you're looking for an example of a variable-length integer to use for your own project, move
/// along, this is a rather poor design.
-pub(crate) struct BigSize(pub u64);
+pub struct BigSize(pub u64);
impl Writeable for BigSize {
#[inline]
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
update_res
}
- fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
+ fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<(OutPoint, Vec<MonitorEvent>)> {
return self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
}
}
--- /dev/null
+// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
+// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
+// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
+// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
+// licenses.
+
+//! [`Time`] trait and different implementations. Currently, it's mainly used in tests so we can
+//! manually advance time.
+//! Other crates may symlink this file to use it while [`Time`] trait is sealed here.
+
+use core::ops::Sub;
+use core::time::Duration;
+
+/// A measurement of time.
+pub trait Time: Copy + Sub<Duration, Output = Self> where Self: Sized {
+ /// Returns an instance corresponding to the current moment.
+ fn now() -> Self;
+
+ /// Returns the amount of time elapsed since `self` was created.
+ fn elapsed(&self) -> Duration;
+
+ /// Returns the amount of time passed between `earlier` and `self`.
+ fn duration_since(&self, earlier: Self) -> Duration;
+
+ /// Returns the amount of time passed since the beginning of [`Time`].
+ ///
+ /// Used during (de-)serialization.
+ fn duration_since_epoch() -> Duration;
+}
+
+/// A state in which time has no meaning.
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct Eternity;
+
+impl Time for Eternity {
+ fn now() -> Self {
+ Self
+ }
+
+ fn duration_since(&self, _earlier: Self) -> Duration {
+ Duration::from_secs(0)
+ }
+
+ fn duration_since_epoch() -> Duration {
+ Duration::from_secs(0)
+ }
+
+ fn elapsed(&self) -> Duration {
+ Duration::from_secs(0)
+ }
+}
+
+impl Sub<Duration> for Eternity {
+ type Output = Self;
+
+ fn sub(self, _other: Duration) -> Self {
+ self
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
+impl Time for std::time::Instant {
+ fn now() -> Self {
+ std::time::Instant::now()
+ }
+
+ fn duration_since(&self, earlier: Self) -> Duration {
+ self.duration_since(earlier)
+ }
+
+ fn duration_since_epoch() -> Duration {
+ use std::time::SystemTime;
+ SystemTime::now().duration_since(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH).unwrap()
+ }
+ fn elapsed(&self) -> Duration {
+ std::time::Instant::elapsed(self)
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub mod tests {
+ use super::{Time, Eternity};
+
+ use core::time::Duration;
+ use core::ops::Sub;
+ use core::cell::Cell;
+
+ /// Time that can be advanced manually in tests.
+ #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+ pub struct SinceEpoch(Duration);
+
+ impl SinceEpoch {
+ thread_local! {
+ static ELAPSED: Cell<Duration> = core::cell::Cell::new(Duration::from_secs(0));
+ }
+
+ pub fn advance(duration: Duration) {
+ Self::ELAPSED.with(|elapsed| elapsed.set(elapsed.get() + duration))
+ }
+ }
+
+ impl Time for SinceEpoch {
+ fn now() -> Self {
+ Self(Self::duration_since_epoch())
+ }
+
+ fn duration_since(&self, earlier: Self) -> Duration {
+ self.0 - earlier.0
+ }
+
+ fn duration_since_epoch() -> Duration {
+ Self::ELAPSED.with(|elapsed| elapsed.get())
+ }
+
+ fn elapsed(&self) -> Duration {
+ Self::duration_since_epoch() - self.0
+ }
+ }
+
+ impl Sub<Duration> for SinceEpoch {
+ type Output = Self;
+
+ fn sub(self, other: Duration) -> Self {
+ Self(self.0 - other)
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn time_passes_when_advanced() {
+ let now = SinceEpoch::now();
+ assert_eq!(now.elapsed(), Duration::from_secs(0));
+
+ SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(1));
+ SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(1));
+
+ let elapsed = now.elapsed();
+ let later = SinceEpoch::now();
+
+ assert_eq!(elapsed, Duration::from_secs(2));
+ assert_eq!(later - elapsed, now);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn time_never_passes_in_an_eternity() {
+ let now = Eternity::now();
+ let elapsed = now.elapsed();
+ let later = Eternity::now();
+
+ assert_eq!(now.elapsed(), Duration::from_secs(0));
+ assert_eq!(later - elapsed, now);
+ }
+}
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff